Henry Bogdan: From Warsaw To Sofia

Many Yugoslavs demand constitutional changes that would reduce the power of the country's autonomous republics and reestablish federal authority over the economy. But Slovenia and Croatia refuse to accept any restrictions on their independence. Their resolve is strengthened by the Republic of Serbia's agitation for greater authority, spearheaded by the Serbian Party leader, Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic became a hero among the Serb populations for his demagogic speeches favoring the annexation of the Vojvodina province with its Hungarian minority and the Muslim- Albanian dominated province of Kosovo. In reply to Stipe Suvar's demand that "reckless confrontations and mass rallies" be put to an end, Milosevic protested any ban of meetings, something "unacceptable for the Serbs." In mass rallies, mostly Serb nationalist, crowds clamored for the return of these provinces to create a greater Serbia, to give the Republic more weight in Yugoslavian politics. "Serbia," Milosevic declared, "has no claims to the territory of other republics, but does have claim to territory in its own republic." Non-Serb nationalities fear that Milosevic's drive would create an imbalance of political power between the seven republics by giving Serbia, already the largest republic, additional status.

The world-wide prediction that Yugoslavia would fall apart as a federation after the death of Marshal Tito is slowly becoming a reality. The delicate balance necessary for unity between the divergent republics is

increasingly difficult to maintain; conflicting interests between the prosperous Croat and Slovene republics and the impoverished Serbs and the rest of the country, all serve to weaken the federation. The force holding the "Yugoslav" state together as an entity is the Serbian-dominated military, which is not an adequate replacement for the unifying effect of Tito's charismatic leadership.

Rumania: Legacies of the Ceausescu Dynasty

Before the Communist takeover in 1947, Rumania was a prosperous country, considered the "bread-basket" of the region and rich in oil and minerals. Rumania in the 1980s is the poorest country in Eastern Europe with the possible exception of Albania. The Rumanian economy, still governed by the orthodox system instated by Stalin in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, is now Eastern Europe's most glaring failure.

The capitol of Rumania, Bucharest, once called the Paris of the East, is today a devastated city. On President Ceausescu's orders, the old city was razed; the monasteries and churches dating back three to four centuries along with Bucharest's only Sephardic synagogue were not spared. Historic houses and famous buildings are being demolished to make room for Ceausescu's dream of a new socialist city, built in a Stalinist monolithic style. Plans include a palatial headquarters for the Communist party, various ministries and state committee buildings, and a palace for the president and his family, dubbed "Palatu Ceausescu" by the Rumanian people. The estimated cost of the grandiose project is about $1.5 billion dollars, spent at a time when the country faces a widespread shortage of food and fuel. The plight of his countrymen does not seem to concern Ceausescu, as the construction of the new "Ceausescu Bucharest" continues uninterrupted.

The Conducator ("leader"), the nickname Nicolae Ceausescu was given in 1965, holds the nation's three most powerful positions: head of state, general-secretary of the Communist party, and commander in chief of the army of about 200,000 soldiers. The ubiquitous and feared Rumanian secret police, the securitate are also under his direct command. With the aid of this Gestapo-like organization and a network of thousands of informers, Ceausescu has absolute control of the country.

Surrounding himself with loyal advisors, most of whom are family members, Ceausescu's position appears impenetrable. His wife Elena holds the positions of first deputy prime minister, chairman of the National Council of Science and Technology, and is in charge of the Party personnel department. Their youngest son Nicu, who turned thirty-eight in 1988, was the former head of the Communist youth organization and is now first secretary of the Sibion region in Transylvania. Altogether, thirteen immediate family members occupy important government and Party

positions, and Nicolae and Elena's birthdays are national holidays. In the Communist world, only North Korea comes close to Rumania's level of nepotism.

In May of 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev visited Rumania, marking the first such official visit by a Soviet leader since 1976. In a televised speech before 4,000 Rumanian Party members, he expounded on his hopes for perestroika and glasnost. Gorbachev then turned to the state of Rumania's economy, pointing out the severe food and energy shortages and the "difficulties Rumanians endure in their everyday lives." He went on to criticize Rumania's mistreatment of minorities, and said that it clashed with Lenin's policy on nationalities. The nepotism of the Ceausescu family was also alluded to as he stressed the importance of Party decision-making over decisions made by individuals.

Gorbachev's speech marked the first instance the Rumanian public heard of the political and economic reforms taking place in the Soviet Union and in other East Bloc countries; Rumania forbids the publication of literature from other socialist countries, and not even the Soviet paper Pravda is for sale in Bucharest.

The first open rebellion in Rumania was catalyzed by the municipal elections in November of 1987 in Brasov, Transylvania. About 20,000 angry workers -- fed up with the government's severe austerity program -- went on a four-hour rampage, storming the city hall and Party headquarters, and setting them on fire. They protested the new pay and power cuts along with worsening living conditions, shouting, "We want bread!" and "Kill Ceausescu!" The government sent 1,000 policemen and military tanks to restore order. Later the securitate arrested hundreds of workers for their participation in the rebellion.

The tragic fate of the Rumanian people, living in cold and in hunger, is the responsibility of Ceausescu's chaotic leadership. In the 1960s, he decided to industrialize Rumania, completely neglecting the country's reliance on its healthy agricultural sector. In 1969 alone, 200 new industrial sites were built, including a giant refinery which has never produced more than one-third of its capacity. The new industries fared poorly; their products weren't competitive and couldn't find markets in the West. Ceausescu was forced to turn to the Soviets for oil, minerals and other energy sources for which the Russians cleverly requested payment in dollars.

The United States Senate finally canceled the Rumanian's most- favored-nation trade status because of its dismal human-rights record. The loss to Bucharest of American business comes to nearly $350 million a year.

Over time, the biggest tragedy caused by the industrialization policy was the abandonment of the agricultural sector. For almost 20 years there was no serious investment, modernization, or new technology put into agriculture.

The result was already apparent in the 1970s as food shortages became more and more serious. Ceausescu ordered a radical austerity program to counteract the effects of the shortages. Basic foods such as bread, cooking oil and sugar are rationed, and staples such as milk and butter are rare in shops. For four winters in the mid-1980s, the electricity use for a family was limited to a single 40-watt bulb. Heaters and other electric appliances were strictly forbidden. In some cities, electricity was blacked out for hours at night-- killing newborn babies in hospital incubators -- while factories were floodlit to keep them in operation 24 hours a day.

The Rumanian people know that there is no hope for change in their lives as long as Ceausescu and his family remain in power. But the "sick man of communism" as The Economist (October 26, 1985) called Ceausescu, displays no intention of changing his policy or stepping down. Unlike Poland or Hungary, dissident groups and reform-demanding writers remain underground and seem to have little impact on the system. A question is how long Gorbachev will tolerate Ceausescu's Stalinist leadership in his new Communist Europe.

Bulgaria: The Good Satellite

Often referred to as the 16^th Soviet Republic because of its strict adherence to Soviet policy, Bulgaria is the Soviet Union's most favored ally in the Eastern Bloc. Anti-Soviet sentiment among the Bulgarians is minimal compared to the rest of the Bloc, stemming in part from historical loyalties and alliances.

Since Gorbachev s rise to power in the Soviet Union, Todor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian party's general-secretary since 1954, has worked to prove his readiness for reform, for more democracy in the system and better planning and management of the economy. At the Central Committee meeting in July, 1987, the aging general-secretary presented a radical reform plan designed to drastically alter Bulgarian life. He dissolved the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, replacing them with a new department, the National Coordinating Board. His plans for the economy included giving market forces a greater role, more "realistic" valuations of the country's currency, the Leva, and more attention to exports and tourism. Factories and businesses were granted more autonomy in their organization, prizes established for production and salaries set according to performance, Zhivkov did not allow for any major changes in the political life of the country, except to give parliament, the National Assembly, a more important role in decision making. In January 1988, six months after the congress, Zhivkov had to call a special Party conference to clear up the effects of his proposals. The new reforms, which had changed so frequently, confused not only the economic

management but the population as a whole. At the meeting, the young Party members requested more organized and progressive reform proposals, and a greater share for themselves in leadership. In reply, Zhivkov suggested that all high-ranking Party leaders be limited to a term of two or three years to allow younger Party members to move into more powerful positions. Of course, the new law is to go into effect in 1991 , giving Zhivkov several more years in power.

In March of 1988, Prime Minister Grisha Filipov resigned and was replaced by an old Party organizer, Georgi Atanasov. Although not an expert in economic affairs, Mr. Atanasov's primary responsibility is to supervise an industrial reorganization. In January of 1988, all ministries responsible for the country's industrial and agricultural management were disbanded and replaced with one super-ministry. By completely overhauling the economic organization, Zhivkov was attempting to follow Gorbachev's perestroika initiatives and reduce the overstaffed industrial and trade ministries.

Hungary: Window to the West

In all of Eastern Europe, the most visible effect of Glasnost was the ouster in Hungary of Janos Kadar, who had served as Party general-secretary for thirty-two years. In an extraordinary Party Conference in May of 1988, Kadar and his followers were removed not only from the most important government positions, but also from the Central Committee. Kadar's popularity had waned in his last years in office; he was considered weak and his calls for moderation and a slower pace were interpreted as resistance to reform.

The Central Committee voted in Hungary's first secret ballot to elect a new party boss, Prime Minister Karoly Grosz. At a comparatively young fifty-seven, Grosz had a reputation for being a good administrator and a disciplined, faithful Party member. He announced in several speeches that the Communist party would continue to be the only governing party and that alliances with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries would remain as before. Nevertheless, after his election, Grosz selected several popular and progressive co-workers to initiate a period of reform. These men included Imre Pozsgay, Janos Berecz, and a previous economic reformer Rezso Nyers, who was expelled from his position during the Brezhnev era for his western orientation. Grosz declared his intention to push through several new economic policies, warning his countrymen to tighten their belts because they had been living beyond their means for years. Hungary's human rights record improved under the new government. It tolerated criticism of the Stalin-Rakosi era, recognizing that during that time hundreds of thousands of Hungarians had been thrown in prison and thousands had been executed on fabricated charges. Travel restrictions to

non-communist countries eased significantly after January 1988. Finally, the administration introduced a law to parliament allowing the formation of independent political "associations" as long as they did not become political parties.

The source for most of the reforms was a government-sponsored organization, the Patriotic People's Front, chaired by Pozsgay, the most reform-minded member of the Politburo. Pozsgay spoke of a new system for elections where candidates would not have to belong to the Communist party, and also advocated freedom for the press and for writers and artists.

In September of 1988, over 350 intellectuals -- primarily writers, artists and sociologists -- drafted the constitution for a new independent organization called the Democratic Forum. According to this constitution, the primary goal of the Forum was to become the spiritual and social guide for Hungary's democratization. The founders comprised many of Hungary's most popular writers: Sandor Csoori, Istvan Csurka, Sandor Lezsak, Zoltan Biro, Gyula Fekete, and others. The Grosz government has kept silent about the new movement, and will probably continue to look the other way as long as the Forum doesn't question the absolute hegemony of the Communist party. The regime is aware that it needs the support of the writers for the success of many of its new reforms; the Hungarian dissident movement and its publication of Szamizdat literature is one of the most active in Eastern Europe, and reaches the population in a way the government is unable to.

Hungary introduced economic and social reforms as early as 1968, reforms far more radical than any Mr. Gorbachev has proposed for the Soviet Union. Despite the outward successes of many of Hungary's reforms, the effects of "goulash communism" -- a market-oriented, decentralized, yet state-controlled economy -- finally caught up with the country. The economic prosperity of the early 1980s in Hungary was supported by tremendous borrowing, totaling over $17.7 billion of debt by l988.

The new leadership faces enormous economic difficulties. Hungary has the highest debt per person in all of the East Bloc and an inflation rate which rose from 14 to 20 percent in 1987, to over 25 percent in 1988. The stagnating economy, a trade deficit rising over $1 billion a year, and an economic growth rate hovering around one percent a year, confronted the Grosz government when it took office. Grosz, instated as prime-minister in 1986, attempted to counter these problems by introducing reforms hitherto unheard of in Communist countries. Hungarians were faced with "western" innovations such as personal income tax, wages based on performance, reduced subsidies for transportation and living supplies, and an end to support for factories unable to make a profit.

In July of 1987, Hungary introduced the first bankruptcy law known to the Communist world, and was soon followed by Poland and Yugoslavia.

Subsidies for steel mills, coal mines, and hundreds of other out-dated industries cost these countries more than $1 billion a year. Already responsible as "socialist states" for subsidizing food, housing and transportation, the artificial support of profitless industries had become too much of a financial burden. Reducing subsidies in the social sector or raising prices to more realistic levels was considered risky; Poland had attempted such solutions in 1956 and in 1970, but in so doing catalyzed the strikes responsible for ousting Party leaders Gomulka and Gierek. Socialist states realize they must shut down unprofitable and inefficient factories, but are then faced with the dilemma of millions of unemployed workers in a system where employment is guaranteed. Hungary and other socialist countries can introduce reforms such as the bankruptcy law, but find it almost impossible to put them into effect.

To alleviate its energy problems, Hungary agreed to a joint Hungarian-Czechoslovakian project for a large hydro-electric dam. The plan was signed and put into effect in September, 1986, while Kadar was still in office. The dam, already being built at Bos-Nagymaros on the Danube with Austrian loans, is under fire from the Hungarian public because it will destroy a large, beautiful area in northern Hungary. The dam will only supply a minimum of energy to Hungarian industry but Grosz and the new leadership know that cancellation of the disastrous project at such a late date will cost almost $1 billion -- far too much for the already indebted country. The government and the Patriotic Front have suggested a national referendum on the dam in 1989, but the probability of canceling the project is slim.

It is critical for Hungary to import necessary goods and technology from the West, but new credits from different countries and institutions are limited. Hungary received 13 credits from the World Bank between 1983 and 1987. The last two credits signed in July of 1988 brought the country's total debt to the World Bank to $1.5 billion. In July 1988, Mr. Grosz visited the U.S. to get financial support for his economic programs. He was not accepted with open arms by either the U.S. government or the business community, but was somewhat more successful with the EEC. In June of 1988, Hungary became the first East Bloc member of COMECON to sign an agreement with the Community, giving it the right to export food and industrial products to Community members. The EEC also agreed to eliminate all its trade quotas on Hungarian goods by 1995.

In spite of an atmosphere of glasnost and waning fear of the police apparatus, most Hungarians are suspicious of the new government; they are afraid that a new economic policy without corresponding social, cultural and political changes will be unsuccessful. They demand more political and religious liberty, greater freedom of speech and the abolishment of state

organizations responsible for censorship. But the new leadership, like the one it replaced, continues to require that all reforms and final decisions come from the Party.

East Germany: COMECON's Wealthy Member

The economic and political experiences of the German Democratic Republic under socialism has been different from any of the other East Bloc countries. Enjoying the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe, East Germany is comparatively a prosperous country. There is little unemploy- ment, plenty of food and no strikes or protests. The East German industry functions well, and exports goods with a fair rate of success to the rest of the world. "Why institute reforms?" the government asks, when everything appears to be working just fine. The leadership considers Gorbachev's reforms of perestroika and glasnost to be doomed to failure.

Eric Honecker, who has been the head of state and general secretary of the communist Socialist Unity party since 1971, keeps a strong hold on the political and economic life of the GDR; he maintains that the country's tightly-run economy needs no changes, ignoring the enormous financial assistance it receives from West Germany.

The political life in the GDR also appears to be more relaxed in comparison to other East Bloc states. The people live far more normal lives than in neighboring Czechoslovakia or Poland. Mr. Honecker continues to staunchly defend the heavy state subsidies which insure that rent, food and transportation remain inexpensive.

Relations between the two Germanies improves every year. Mr. Honecker's official visit to the West in September of 1987, the first such visit made by an East German leader in 40 years, did not come as a complete surprise. The visit was planned in August 1984, but Honecker was requested to "postpone" his trip by the Soviets. The Soviet Union had threatened West Germany that inter-German relations would suffer if Germany agreed to station Euro-missiles on their territory. The talks and subsequent agreements between the two superpowers to reduce nuclear missiles in Europe made it possible for Honecker to meet with the German chancellor, Helmuth Kohl, in Bonn. The visit was followed with great interest by both the Communist Bloc and the West; the fear of a German reunification, altering the balance of power in Europe, was still strong. Without West Germany, NATO defense would be considerably weakened, while in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union the memory of Hitler's Germany was still very much alive. But Honecker silenced any rumors of a reunification with a speech in which he compared the two country's economic and political systems to "fire and water." This was direct retort to Mr. Kohl's earlier remark that "Germans suffer from their separation."

The two German leaders agreed to set up a joint economic commission and approved agreements on the environment, radiation control, and science and technology. Honecker also agreed to ease travel between the two states, allowing for one million East Germans under retirement age and more than two million pensioners to visit West Germany each year. Bonn agreed to pay East Germany nearly $550 million a year for the street use and postal services necessary for transit through the GDR to Berlin. The West Germans also agreed to give $100 to every East German visiting the West. Bonn promised a "swing credit" to finance East German trade and duty-free exports to the European Community. An unofficial outcome of the meeting was Honecker's promise to rescind the order for East German border guards to shoot-to-kill people attempting to escape East Germany.

After his successful visit in West Germany, Honecker made an official visit to Paris in January of 1988. The French government wanted to underscore the importance of French and European involvement in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, and became the first NATO country to recognize the GDR. The visit marked an important advance in the GDR's drive for international acceptance.

East Germany's relationship with the Soviet Union continues to be cordial and deferring, but is no longer one based on complete understanding. the East German leaders mistrust glasnost, believing it could undermine the power of the Communist party. Honecker believes in hard work, discipline, and has little tolerance for public criticism at home. Gorbachev's plan to limit the tenure of elected Party officials to two five-year terms is out of the question for East German politicians. Out of the 22 members of the Politburo, 12 have been members for longer than a decade. Honecker himself has belonged since 1958, while his prime minister, Willi Stoph, has been a sitting member since 1953.

The East Germans also feel they need no lessons from the Soviet Union in running their economy. As Honecker has said, "Present Soviet developments have arisen from Soviet needs" and "we intend to continue in our previously proven way." Gorbachev has himself praised East German industry and its high-quality production. Although the COMECON members demanded that East Germany export first to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, East Germany was able to export enough to the West after fulfilling trade agreements with the East to earn hard currency surpluses. As a result, the country's national debt has come down from $11.7 billion in 1981 to $4 billion in 1988.

Honecker and the leadership in East Germany are attempting to move away from a "vassal-state" relationship with the Soviet Union to one based on partnership and trade. The bitter disappointment of the East German's when Honecker's visit to the West was postponed and they were forced to

withdraw their Olympic team (one of the best in the world) from the games in Los Angeles did not help their image of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev has realized the detrimental consequences of such decisions and their potential for jeopardizing the Soviet Union's relationship with Eastern Europe; unlike his predecessors, he approaches East Bloc leaders with a semblance of friendliness and equality.

Czechoslovakia 1969-1988: Husak's Solution

Gustav Husak came to power in the wake of the Warsaw Pact tanks that crushed the Prague Spring in 1968. In April of 1969 he was elected to the position of Czechoslovak first secretary and by 1970 had garnered the presidency. Brezhnev was instrumental in instating Husak and the rest of the leadership in Czechoslovakia after the invasion, including Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal and the hard-line chief of ideology, Vasil Bilak. When Gorbachev took office in 1985, these men had already been in power for sixteen years; they paid little attention to his criticism of the Brezhnev years in the Soviet Union or to his reform policies. Husak had always been a faithful ally to the Soviet Union, but Gorbachev's reform initiatives directly contradicted the leadership style he had developed after the Prague Spring. Husak had virtually banished all thought of reform in Czechoslovakia -- the word itself was taboo after Dubcek's attempt to "reform" Communism in 1968. Czechoslovakians knew that as long as he remained in power, they couldn't expect to see any real changes in their system.

As far as Husak and the other Communist party leaders were concerned, Czechoslovakia was in no need of reforms or guidance by the Soviet Union. Before the Party Congress in March of 1986, government figures showed an economic growth rate of 3.2 percent. At the Congress, Husak acknowledged a degree of failure for the measures taken in 1981, but carefully avoided any suggestion of economic or political reforms as a solution.

In April, 1987, Gorbachev made an official visit to Prague. In contrast to his visits to Poland and Hungary, where he openly praised General Jaruzelski and Janos Kadar for their advancement of reforms, Gorbachev reminded the Czechoslovak leaders of the Soviet experiments in self-criticism, economic reorganization, and the democratic elections of Party officials. He referred to the Soviet Union's unresolved problems and the difficulties involved in putting reform into action, without ever directly mentioning Czechoslovakia's struggling economy and stagnating political system. The Czechoslovakian people nonetheless understood the meaning behind Gorbachev's words -- the subtle criticism of Husak's resistance to reform -- and gave him a warm welcome.

In December of 1987, after finding it difficult to adapt to Gorbachev's call for reforms, Husak stepped down as secretary general of the

Czechoslovak Communist party. Retaining his largely ceremonial position as president, he was still the first Eastern European leader to fall victim to "Gorbachevism. " The Party leadership was taken over by another hard-liner, Milos Jakes, a long-time Politburo member educated at the Moscow Party College. Jakes was considered an opportunist for having first supported the liberalism of 1968 and then, after the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion, becoming the overseer for purges of Party members for their behavior during the Dubcek era. Not a Gorbachev-style reformer, Jakes has done little to initiate perestroika and glasnost in Czechoslovakia. Although he has endorsed a limited restructuring of the economy, he will not make a wholesale commitment to reforming the sluggish industrial and agricultural sectors. Following in Husak's footsteps, Jakes has also discouraged any liberalization of the nation's political and cultural life.

The human rights organization, Charter 77, has emerged as the locus for increasing disenchantment with the regime. Most Czechoslovakians are more inclined to listen to this organized source of unofficial information than to official publications. The movement is concerned with the environment, with the economy, and is the only serious group to challenge the political repression imposed on the Czechoslovak people in the name of "normalization" after the Soviet invasion. When Charter 77 was founded in 1977 by writers, artists and others, its members never sought mass endorsement and disavowed any political activity. Their aim was simply to be the monitoring group for the Helsinki Accords on Human Rights. Yet the movement has had its effect on the people and the regime, galvanizing people to voice their discontent as they did in Prague on December 10^th, 1987, "Human Rights Day." Despite an authorized ban on meetings, over 1000 young people assembled in protest, shouting "Husak out", and calling for reform. The Czechoslovak press remained silent, but Husak was ousted a week later. Beginning in 1987-88, Charter 77 also established contact with other East Bloc dissident movements like the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Solidarity in Poland and East German church-sponsored groups for human rights.

The instatement of Milos Jakes as the new Communist party leader dashed hopes that Gustav Husak's departure would open the door to Soviet-initiated reforms in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, there are signs that the Czechoslovak people, who have remained silent for so long, are regaining the voice they lost in 1968 and will exert pressure on the government to abandon its inflexible resistance to change.

Poland: Solidarity's Resurrection

General Wojciech Jaruzelski's decision to impose martial law and crush the Solidarity movement on December 13, 1981, was well received by the

governments of the other Communist countries. East Germany and Czechoslovakia in particular feared that their own populations would be contaminated by the Polish example and applauded the "lesson" taught the Polish dissidents. Other countries like Hungary and Yugoslavia were concerned that a need for Warsaw Pact troop intervention in Poland would create tensions with the West, and were relieved that the crisis was resolved internally.

The West was outraged by the declaration of martial law and Solidarity's defeat; huge protest marches were staged in capitals and other major cities around the world. The U.S. government suspended Poland's most-favored nation trade status, barred the Polish airline LOT from landing on U.S. territory, blocked Polish membership to the IMF (International Monetary Fund), and suspended Polish fishing rights in U.S. waters. Many European governments adopted the U.S. sanctions imposed against the Jaruzelski regime.

In two years of power, General Jaruzelski was able to restore order to Poland and strengthen the Communist system without using excessive force. He began to suspend, but not abolish, the extraordinary measures taken after the crackdown in December of 1981. He felt secure enough in his position to run the risks of liberating Lech Walesa on November 12,1982, of closing most of the camps where about 10,000 Solidarity activists had been interned, and of allowing the Pope to visit Poland for a second time.

Most of the nearly ten million Poles who joined Solidarity during the years 1980-81 became passive and apathetic after the crackdown. Although faithful to the spirit of Gdansk, they were afraid of the consequences of participating in active opposition. According to official reports on the first year of the "state of war" or sztatarium after martial law was imposed, 15 people were killed and 991 injured. Demonstrations took place all over Poland but especially in Warsaw, the towns on the Baltic Sea and the industrial districts in Silesia; they were followed by severe repression by the infamous police unit ZOMOS. Great courage was demanded of participants risking arrest, and many were deterred from protesting.

The Polish episcopate was consistently opposed to violent action, and attempted to channel popular discontent into other means of expression. Cardinal Glemp negotiated with the government unceasingly to find a compromise which would respect basic human rights and the liberty of the Church, but would comply with Party stipulations. In November, 1982, Glemp met with Jaruzelski, and the result of the meeting -- that Pope John Paul would visit Poland in the Summer of 1983 -- was announced with great fanfare. At the meeting Jaruzelski also agreed to release Walesa and to suspend martial law before the end of the year. These concessions were announced right before the beginning of a big strike called for November

1Oth by the clandestine Solidarity movement, effectively diffusing the strike to the great advantage of the authorities.

Cardinal Glemp's conduct during 1981-82 came under fire from younger priests in Polish industrial centers and the Vatican for being too cooperative with the Jaruzelski regime. In fact, the concessions Glemp obtained in the name of the Church were far from minimal. The Pope's visit from June 16-23 was a clear sign to the world of the importance of Catholicism in Polish society despite Communist ideology. Jaruzelski did take advantage of the opportunity to prove his ability to maintain internal peace in Poland, a status that certainly increased his credibility with foreign powers and no less importantly the Kremlin's leaders.

The extent of the "freedom" granted to Lech Walesa, however, was limited. Although no longer under arrest, he was constantly watched by the police. In 1983, when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Walesa was unable to go to Oslo to accept the distinction for fear of being prevented from returning to Poland.

Suspension of martial law on December 30^th, 1982, was also limited. General Jaruzelski and the military council remained in control of the state, and retained special "emergency" powers. Solidarity was outlawed by a large majority of the Polish parliament on October 8, 1982. The independent trade union's possessions were seized by the state, and ex-members of the movement continued to suffer constant harassment by the police and were discriminated against in employment. Of the 10,000 persons confined to camps after the imposition of martial law, many were liberated but many were accused of conspiracy and transferred to prisons. Some were retained until as late as 1984-85. In a show of strength, police burst in on a February 1984 meeting of Solidarity leaders, arresting seven including Bogdan Lis and Adam Michnik. They were tried and spent several years in prison for their Solidarity and KOR (Worker's Defense Committee) activities.

The visit of Pope John Paul II, once Cardinal Wojtyla of Cracow, in June of 1983, reawakened national and anti-government sentiments throughout Poland. A wave of demonstrations and protests against the regime and for the legalization of Solidarity swept the country. In Cracow, John Paul II celebrated a mass for over two million people, many of who waved illegal Solidarity banners. The Pope met with Jaruzelski twice, and had a private interview with Walesa, remarking that "everyone was pleased" with the outcome of the meetings.

Then in October of 1984, four officers of the Polish Secret Service kidnapped and brutally murdered Father Jerzy Popieluszko, a pro-Solidarity priest. The outburst of protest and demands for retribution from the Polish people were so vehement that the government decided, after long hesitation, to put the four accused men on trial. On December 27, 1984, the world was

able to witness not only a detailed account of the murder, but the methods used by the secret police to undermine the Church and to infiltrate everyday Polish life. Since Tito's dismissal of his chief of security Rankovitch in 1966, no Communist country had lifted the veil of secrecy from the operations of its security organization. The trial lasted two months, during which both the government and the Church accused each other of interfering in one another's affairs. The normally cautious Cardinal Glemp spoke out about the dangers of cooperating with the government after learning of secret service infiltration in Church life. Jaruzelski attempted to put the Church on the stand with the accused, remarking that if the Church had occupied itself with strictly Church affairs instead of involving itself with politics as Father Popieluszko had, the entire crisis could have been avoided.

In October of 1985, Poland held a parliamentary election, the first in five years. The underground Solidarity called a boycott of the elections, but failed to reach the masses. With a 78.8 percent rate of participation, Jaruzelski considered the result a victory over Solidarity. He felt that both inside and outside of Poland, the people and the media accepted him as the legitimate leader in Poland. In November of that year, Jaruzelski stepped down from his position as prime minister but retained the Party leadership -- the position of real power in the Communist world -- which he had held for four years. He also took over the chairmanship of the Council of State, the position of President of Poland. Mr. Zbigniew Messner, an economist and a close associate of the General's, became the new prime minister.

The following year, in September of 1986, the Polish government declared a blanket amnesty for the remaining 225 Solidarity political prisoners, including Zbigniew Busak, the former head of the Solidarity underground, and Adam Michnik, leader of the KOR. In response to the amnesty, the U.S. Iifted almost all of its sanctions and several European countries actually offered the Polish government loans -- Austria bidding $40 million.

Poland's economy suffers from a foreign debt reaching nearly $40 billion in 1988, a skyrocketing inflation rate, poor export earnings, frequent food, oil and consumer good shortages, and a poorly paid, apathetic work-force. At the October 8^th, 1987, central committee meeting, General Jaruzelski announced a new economic reform. His proposal included instituting a new competitive banking system, diminishing the role of central planning, setting up a stock market, and expanding the private sector. He warned his countrymen to expect their standards of living to fall because of wage-freezes and price increases; a 110 percent price hike was predicted for food, although actual prices only rose 40 percent, and 140 to 200 percent inflation predicted for fuel, energy, transportation, etc. Jaruzelski decided to diffuse

discontent by letting the Polish people vote on a referendum, asking for support for his new economic reforms. The Poles, knowing from experience that any "reform" would begin with price increases, voted an emphatic "No" to Jaruzelski's plans on November 27, 1 987. Solidarity had issued a statement on November 10, warning against the vote: "Huge price hikes with unclear guarantees of compensation . . . could well push broad circles of society into poverty and intensify feelings of hopelessness. " The government went ahead with its plans despite the clear wishes of its citizens to the contrary.

The influence of Solidarity's voice on the referendum proved that seven years after the Jaruzelski regime's attempt to crush the movement, it was still alive. A new generation of workers moved into the underground structures of the union, organizing strikes in the coal mines, factories and shipyards. In August and September of 1988, the new strike leaders showed that they had more in mind than wage increases and better working conditions: the strikers now included demands for the legalization of Solidarity. The differing opposition groups, such as the former radical labor leaders, intellectuals agitating for democratic reform and Catholic activists, all agreed on Lech Walesa as the leader of a new strike movement. The choice was significant, as over the years differences in policy and goals had developed between the opposition. The greatest split within the labor movement occurred between younger, more radical strike leaders like Alojzy Pitrzik (37) and Jacek Merkel (34), and the veteran Solidarity leaders.

A wave of strikes catalyzed by the government measures broke out in April and again in August in the mines in Silesia and the shipyards on the Baltic Sea. The workers demanded the legalization of Solidarity and Lech Walesa stepped in to negotiate. The minister of the interior, General Kiszczak, promised that if the debilitating strikes ended, the government would be ready to talk with Walesa about the future of a new independent union. Walesa decided to cooperate with the government even though he had received no guarantee of legalization for Solidarity, to the dismay of younger Solidarity leaders. "Walesa took a tremendous risk in agreeing to end the latest strikes without any guarantees," said the historian Bronislaw Geremek, a Walesa advisor. The of official talks between Walesa and Kiszczak were frustrated at every turn by the Jaruzelski faction which presented new demands unacceptable to the workers. It became obvious that the government had no intention of making concessions to Solidarity, but wanted to buy time and escalate divisions between the different Solidarity factions.

On September 19, 1988, the government of prime minister Zbigniew Messner resigned after strong criticism of its management of the economy. For the first time in Polish history, the entire cabinet, all nineteen ministers, stepped down. The new prime minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, was against

restoring Solidarity's status as the only independent labor union in Eastern Europe, and declared that Poland's political and economic problems would not be solved by cooperation with the union. A few days later, the official Polish news agency, PAP, announced that the Lenin shipyard in ()Gdansk would be closed in December according to the new bankruptcy law. The government's decision to close the shipyard was decidedly political. The Gdansk shipyard was far from the least profitable yard in Poland and had been improving its performance -- actually logging back-orders, including orders from the Soviet Union, and was predicted to make a profit in 1989. The real motive in closing down the yard was that it was the birthplace of Solidarity in 1980 and was still a symbol of resistance to the regime; Walesa worked there with 30,000 other workers, comprising an unusually disciplined and united work-force for the independent union. Rakowski anticipated the reaction of the shutdown: "Based on experience, I know this will lead to huge political turmoil. . . " Solidarity's negotiations with the government were essentially crippled by the announcement, and by the end of 1988, prospects for its reemergence as a legal force in Poland were dim.

Despite the setback for Solidarity, Poland has again demonstrated that it is Eastern Europe's most spirited country in the struggle against repressive regimes. With its courageous and relatively free press, an abundance of szamizdat publications, the unifying force of the Catholic church and many fledgling opposition organizations, Poland continues to push for a more democratic, pluralistic society, even within the confines of Communism's one-party system.

Henry Bogdan: From Warsaw To Sofia