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Creation of artifical states

So many crushing testimonials of levity, thoughtlessness, ignorance and indeed scandalous bias on the part of the West-ern delegates to the Peace Conference leave one speechless. At least they ought to have mistrusted that morbid hunger for territorial gain so openly displayed by the small successor states, instead of encouraging the brazen greed with which, over and above the "liberation" of their own racial brethren, they went all out to capture great numbers of Magyar hostages, too. In that they mutually cooperated, for it was obvious that the greater the number of accomplices in hostility surrounding her, the more easily could Hungary be gagged. The success of their joint action was so stupendous that it has been said --however incredible it may sound-- that even Benes felt rather frightened when confronted with its sum total. It explains at any rate why the frontiers drawn at Trianon did hardly ever coincide with ethnographic boundaries and did in fact deliberately cut into massive Hungarian populations. If one is to believe the rapporteur of the Trianon Treaty, the French politician Charles Daniélou, in the ultimate resort the victors did not so much want to "punish" Hungary than rather to satisfy the demands of the successor states, "with the result that there were allowed to subsist among the peoples of Danu-bian Europe frictions of discontent hard to smooth over". In other words, instead of restoring and consolidating good understanding between those countries, in the higher interest of Europe as a whole, their quarrels had been further embittered by arbitrary dissections, rendering impossible for a long time that kind of collaboration between the Hungarians and their neighbours which had always prevailed to the 19th century. Territories wrenched from Hungary had been turned into ready coinage with which to pay the price of alliances contracted during the war. To quote Henri Pozzi once more: "The question at Trianon was not who was right; the question was who should be declared right in the interest of the victors." ...

This was confirmed by a Member of the British House of Commons, Sir Robert Gower, who recalled that "the Czechoslovak Republic was recognized by the Entente Powers in advance during the summer of 1918. On the other hand secret treaties had been concluded prior to the armistice. The one signed on August 18, 1916, had promised the Rumanians, in addition to Transylvania, a considerable portion of the Great Hungarian Plain. In the course of one of its meetings, held in June 1918, the Supreme Council of the Entente, decided to set up a state for the Southern Slavs as one of the war aims to be achieved. However, that decision could only be put into practice by dismembering Hungary. A country had thus been condemned without ever being heard." (Sir Robert Gower: La Révision du Traité de Trianon, Paris 1937).

In that way secret treaties had decided about the partition of Hungary long before the Peace Conference. And Clémenceau declared not less cynically: "The peace treaties are yet another means to continue the war".

At Trianon the Hungarian delegation had been fully prepared, in view of the circumstances, to comply with frontiers to be determined by plebiscites, organized under impartial international supervision and thereafter to establish new relationships with Hungary's neighbours on an equitable basis. But Hungary's plea was sternly rejected. "It is difficult to understand --wrote Sir Robert Gower-- why Hungary's claim, based as it was on President Wilson's own principle, was rejected. The thesis that popular consultation properly speak-ing had been rendered superfluous by the clearly expressed will of the various nationalities just does not stand up to scrutiny, and it certainly does not justify the severing of three and a half million Hungarians from the mother country. (Sir Robert Gower: La Révision du Traité de Trianon, Paris 1937).

As to why, really, the populations concerned were not granted the right of speaking up for themselves, André Tardieu --who was to become twice Prime Minister of the Third Republic between the wars-- reveals the truth bluntly in his book entitled La Paix (Peace) in the following terms: "We had to choose between organizing plebiscites or creating Czechoslovakia!"

André Tardieu, on assuming his functions as chairman of the Committee called upon to settle the fate of Austria-Hungary, declared bluntly: "No pity must be shown to Hungary!" -- echoing incidentally General Franchet d'Esperey's brutal outburst to Michael Károlyi: "Your country shall pay and atone." ...

Such was the frame of mind of the leaders of France at that time. "All counter-proposals, all protests --adds Henri Pozzi-- were met by the inexorable opposition of André Tardieu". And he goes on: "The Trianon Peace Conference will appear on the record of history well informed as the handiwork of André Tardieu. Hiding behind Clémenceau and Wilson he did all. ... Today we are able to take the true measure of the immense mistake which he caused the victor-ious allies to commit at Trianon, actuated by blind hatred, by his ruthless concern for ensuring the fullness of loot to the Czech and Serb Slavs as well as their Rumanian associates, the loot which they craved and the possession of which he --their collaborator and paid hireling of many years' standing-- had guaranteed them." (Henri Pozzi: Les Coupables, Paris 1934).

French opponents of Trianon

For the sake of historic truth and in fairness to France there existed at the time which is the object of these recollections another school of thought. It represented quite obviously the best of the intellectual and moral forces of the country, but it was unable to prevail against the others and impose its views upon them. But at least it raised a great number of voices. Gabriel Gobron, in his book already often quoted on these pages, passed some of them in review:

"Trianon? A peace of ignorance, --declared Gabriel Hanotaux.-- A peace of cruel imagination, according to Senator de Monzie. A peace disorganizing Europe, said Monsieur Lanail. A peace which the fathers of the glorious dead for the fatherland could not have had the courage to ratify, admitted Monsieur de Lamarzelle. An imperfect peace, emphasized Aristide Briand. And why not add to that rosary of sad assessments the word of Paul Doumer, President of the Senate: 'Poor Hungary to which we've been so unjust...'

A year went by, --continues Gabriel Gobron-- before the powers in control plucked up sufficient courage to present the criminal Treaty of Trianon to the French Parliament for ratification. For it the French negotiators had been at least as responsible as their Allied colleagues. When confronted by Czech trickery they could have examined objectively the Hungarian objections formulated by Count Albert Apponyi. But nothing of that kind was done because those responsible did not wish to do so. Yet, being embarrassed by their own negativism they held out fallacious promises of rectification and revision for a vague future. Such was Millerand's ill-famed covering letter which was merely heaping insult upon injury. And as to the attempts at whitewashing the French negotiators and Parliamentarians, if they were not guilty, how could be made sense of some of the protestations? Such as Lamarzelle, Paul Boncour, Charles Daniélou, Anatole de Monzie, Charles Tisseyre, Aristide Briand etc. Trianon was a criminal act; there is no other term to describe adequately the most wicked of all wartime treaties, imposed amid the vapours of blood, the haze of gunpowder, the exaltation of victory and the 'Schadenfreude' derived from torturing the vanquished. This was the generosity of France for you! Torchbearer of civilization indeed! Her so-called policy of greatness, humane-ness and readiness to sacrifice, etc. ... to quote only the most pompous and hackneyed clichés of the French professional politicians' vocabulary! ... What monstrously pitiful unaware-ness! ... Because to us the name of France is inseparable from the notion of JUSTICE" --concludes Gabriel Gobron-- "Let us ask forgiveness of a Hungary impoverished and aggrieved because of the ills which our elders and betters have inflicted upon her!" ... (Gabriel Gobron: La Hongrie mystérieuse, Paris 1933).

May we refer at this juncture to some French contemporary opinions, expressed more elaborately than the preceding statements. Take for example, Senator de Monzie:

"The psychologists of history will never understand why the French politicians of our day were so dead set against Hungary alone, risking to transfer her remains to those very powers which we always pretended to look upon as a future menace. What Neronian madness pushes us to starting irreden-tist movements, as though we wished deliberately to maintain endemic seats of fire around a people which we loathe so much that we throw it as fuel for recurring incendiary flames to feed on? ... By what aberration of the mind did the same men who had been trumpeting all over the world the sanctity of rational and national rights, deprive the Magyars of towns the entire population of which --apart from a very few exceptions-- spoke Hungarian, and indeed was Hungarian by origin, heart and culture? Why, indeed why?" (Charles Tisseyre: Une erreur diplomatique: La Hongrie mutilée, Paris 1922).

Where Hungary stood and why?

Charles Tisseyre, Member of the Chamber of Deputies, had this to say:

"It needed all the bad faith of some to join forces with the ignorance of others in order to cut to pieces, on account of some imaginary oppressiveness, that marvellous entity which was ancient Hungary. That nation, which had lived the reality of administrative and political unity for 10 centuries and which by virtue of its geographical conformation represented an economic entity was torn to shreds under the pretext of consisting of disparate nationalities. And by so doing what have they achieved?

They have created three new countries inhabited by a mixture of races even more disparate than that of Hungary had been.

They destroyed the political and economic unity of a strong and sound country so as to build from its fragments new states whose unity is much more fragile. ...

Hungary attributes to France, not unjustifiedly, the respons-ibility for the errors and injustices from which she suffers. This state of affairs must not be allowed to last forever. Why did France allow all this to happen?... This Treaty is our handi-work. Thanks to a policy of blunder, contradictory to long his-toric experience, we have alienated a nation which everything ought to attract to France. ...

The Hungarians were the faithful and loyal allies of the Germans during the late war? All right, do not let us forget that. However, are we entitled to blame the Hungarians for having become Germany's allies? Didn't we push them by favouring as much as we have done the growth of Panslavism in the countries of Austria-Hungary? ...

Now Trianon has thrust Hungary into Germany's arms once more. ...

Was it thinkable that Hungary could afford not to go to war on Austria's side? We all know today what attitude Count Tisza had adopted in the Crown Council in Vienna, held on the morrow of the Sarajevo murders.

As for the Hungarians, their war was not directed against France: they fought against the Russians and Serbs who threat-ened them. ...

Throughout the war French subjects were enabled to live in Budapest as free individuals, subject to no coercion, free to speak their language -- and the theatres in Budapest continued producing French plays. ... And need one to add that the outbreak of Count Michael Károlyi's revolution was accom-panied by the cry 'Long live France'? That we wished to punish Hungary for having participated in the war, is someth-ing that may be discussed. But why treat her more harshly than Germany or Austria? The Hungarians have not been able to get a jot of justice out of France. No wonder that as time went by, they have come to regard France as the sole source of all the ills which have befallen Hungary since Trianon. ...

The French press excells especially by its anti-Magyar ravings. ...

In Hungary you get the impression that every one of their misfortunes comes from France. ...

After all this you ask yourself if you are awake or dreaming; what could have been the incentive of those who built that monument of insanity which is Trianon?" (Charles Tisseyre: Une erreur diplomatique: La Hongrie mutilée).

Grave consequences of Trianon

"The monumental error of the treaties of 1919--1920 consisted in having led to results diametrically opposed to the aims pursued. They did in fact surrender Central Europe to the Germans, only to have it handed over subsequently to the Russians, since it is quite clear today that the treaties in question favoured those two imperialisms much more than would have the preservation of an Austria-Hungary remodelled by the Allies. The Germans would have found it much more difficult to exercise their influence in Slovakia, Croatia and Transylvania than they actually did if those regions had remained united with Hungary. The "Drang nach Osten" was made much easier to realize than it would have been, had it found blocking its forward march a Hungary still in the possession of her essential pride and power, traditionally averse to both Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism."

(End of quotations from Daruvar's book).

The destruction of Central Europe's political unity has created a power vacuum in this "Marchland" region. The fragmentation of the states has prevented the formation of a strong buffer-zone between the rival eastern and western powers and there is little chance today that the present states of the region will ever reach a state of sincere cooperation.

For centuries the domination of these Marchlands has been the key to European supremacy. This is why the First World War was followed by the second one: frustrated in their attempts to extend their influence over the region, both Russia and Germany used the between-wars period to extend their influence over the countries of Central Europe. Both powers had suffered defeat at the end of World War I. It would have been opportune therefore to establish a strong independent zone here to hold both powers at bay. Unfortunately, the Trianon Treaty had fragmented the area and had set the nations against each other, instead of uniting them. Germany was the first to move. Gradually Germany coerced the small nations into her camp: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia- Croatia, Hungary in 1938--41 whilst the only state to resist, Poland was conquered in 1939 (in concert with Russia).

The other rival power, Soviet Russia, began its conquest by the occupation of Poland, followed by the annexation of the Baltic states (1940) and the attack on Finland (1939--40). When the German-- Russian conflict turned into a Russian advance, the Soviet extended its domination over most of Central Europe.


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