DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

In the face of the growing assertiveness of Hungarian independence, the Germans whipped up interest in the formation of a Rumanian-Croat-Slovak bloc against Hungary. Hungary's relations with the two German protected puppet states, Tiso's Slovakia and Pavelic's Croatia, were, to put it mildly, unfriendly, and relations with Rumania were even worse, having several times approached the point of a severance of diplomatic relations. Both Hungary and Rumania were manifestly preparing for a private showdown at the end of the general war, if not sooner.

As first secretary of our Bucharest legation, in 1942 I had a special assignment regarding the affairs of the Hungarian minority in southern Transylvania. Thus I witnessed the Antonescu regime apply ruthless discriminatory measures against members of the Hungarian minority group. Thousands of tragic cases accumulated in the files of our legation and consulates. Diplomatic protests had no result whatever. The Rumanian Government on their part complained about the persecution of the Rumanians in northern Transylvania. The whole situation seemed utterly confused and hopeless.

Hitler himself envisaged the war between Hungary and Rumania but desired to postpone it. He explained his views on the matter to Mussolini, recalling how he had stated to the Rumanians and Hungarians that:

if, at all costs, they wanted to wage war between themselves, he would not hinder them, but they would both lose by it. However, it would be a problem if both countries now withheld petroleum for the war which they wanted to fight between themselves later. It would be the duty of the Foreign Ministers of the Axis to deal with both countries persuasively and calmly so as to prevent an open break.⁵⁰

In order to avoid an open conflict in the Axis camp, Berlin and Rome decided, in the summer of 1942, to appoint an Italo-German commission headed by a German and an Italian plenipotentiary minister (Hencke and Ruggieri) to study the complaints of the Hungarian minority in southern Transylvania and those of the Rumanian minority in northern Transylvania. The commission spent almost two months in Transylvania, investigated hundreds of individual cases, and prepared a long report which recommended several measures to the Hungarian and Rumanian governments aimed at ameliorating the situations of their respective minorities. Moreover, Italo-German military commissions were established in northern and southern Transylvania. These watchdog

commissions informed the German and Italian governments of the troubles in Transylvania and tried to improve the situation of the minorities by means of direct intervention with the local authorities.

Such Italo-German conciliatory efforts proved to be superficial palliatives and the Germans supported the Rumanians almost openly. The weakening of Hungary, as recommended by the German General Staff in 1938,⁵¹ remained the constant goal of German foreign policy. This policy was strengthened in Hungarian-Rumanian relations by the fact that Rumania had a strategic key position in the war against Soviet Russia, had carried out a full mobilization, and in general had contributed to the German war efforts incomparably more than Hungary. In addition Hitler disliked the Hungarians, and had a great liking for the Rumanian dictator, Antonescu. As Hitler's interpreter later was to put it, Antonescu was "one of Hitler's closest intimates and was even kept more closely in the picture than Mussolini. He was the only foreigner from whom Hitler ever asked for military advice when he was in difficulties. . . . He made long speeches just like Hitler, usually starting off at the creation of Rumania, and somehow relating everything he said to the hated Hungarians, and the recovery of Transylvania. This hatred of Hungary, too, made him congenial to Hitler, for the Fuehrer despised the Magyars".⁵² Antonescu indicated to the Fuehrer his determination to recover northern Transylvania by force of arms and "Hitler took a secret pleasure in Antonescu's outbursts against the Hungarians, and even went so far as to hint that he might perhaps give him a free hand later in his plans of conquest".⁵³

Surrounded again by a sort of revived Little Entente, which was protected this time by Germany, the Hungarian Government, on its part, tried again to rely on Italy. This policy was bound to fail because Italy gradually declined to the status of Hitler's vassal and Mussolini decided to fight along with Hitler until the very last. Despite several disappointments the Hungarians tried to win Italy's support because they saw no other alternative.

For these reasons, the Hungarian Government sought time and again to explore tentatively the possibilities of electing an Italian king.⁵⁴ The advanced age of the Regent was another reason for such soundings. The Duke of Aosta, cousin of Victor Emmanuel III, and a possible candidate of the Hungarian Government for the throne of St. Stephen, became seriously ill and died in March, 1942. Meanwhile, the son of Regent Horthy, Stephen, was elected deputy Regent. The right of succession was not attached to this position, but Stephen Horthy might have been elected as Regent in case of vacancy. He was notoriously anti-Nazi and his election was strongly opposed by Germany and the rightist Hungarian

politicians. Stephen Horthy, however, soon disappeared from the political scene. In August, 1942, the day before he was scheduled to return to Budapest, he was killed in a mysterious airplane accident at the Russian front behind the Hungarian lines. The Hungarians then reverted to the Italian solution and endeavored to strengthen Hungary's independence with the establishment of a personal union with Italy under King Victor Emmanuel. But the Duce reacted adversely to this plan, saying that he had entertained a similar proposition in regard to the Duke of Aosta, "but with him dead, nothing else will be done".⁵⁵

Prime Minister Kallay was anxious to clarify personally the delicate political problems in Rome, and arranged for a trip to Italy in November of 1942. This was postponed by Mussolini because of the collapse of the Libyan front. "In fact, this is not the time to welcome any guest," remarked Ciano.⁵⁶ Eventually Kallay visited Rome in early April, 1943. The main object of his visit was to gain Italian support for the policy of resistance to Germany. Kallay explained to Mussolini that the formation of an anti-Hungarian Little Entente was being effected under German auspices, and requested support against it. Mussolini was also informed of the Hungarian determination to send no more soldiers to Germany for the Russian campaign. Kallay told him of Hungary's intention to fight the constantly growing German threat with the aid of the Rome Government. He expounded the idea of creating a bloc in the Balkans to resist Germany. The Duce, however, seemed to have no interest in the Hungarian suggestions.

As a matter of fact, events in Italy soon brought the situation to a conclusion. Italy's exhausted forces were weakened to a point where she was not even able to press her own interests. After the African campaign the English and Americans landed in Sicily in July, 1943. Mussolini was forced to resign, and Marshal Badoglio's government prepared the way for Italy's surrender. The Italian Armistice Treaty, sigjed on September 3, was published five days later.

The political division of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, having received news of the Italian armistice in the absence of the prime minister and the foreign minister, immediately set about drafting a government announcement. This stated that the Tripartite Pact ceased to be valid after the collapse of Italy, and Hungary had regained her liberty of action. But Kallay and Ghyczy did not see their way clear to accept this course, for they feared German reprisals. With the Allies so far removed, both thought it premature to expose the country to such a test in the absence of the most elementary technical means necessary for a change of front. To proclaim the termination of the Tripartite Pact would have undoubtedly provoked an immediate German occupation

of Hungary, followed by the total extermination of all anti-Nazi elements and the complete mobilization, by a puppet government, of all Hungarian material resources and manpower against the Allies.

As events developed in Italy, the Germans were prepared to press home their demands. The German minister to Hungary, Dietrich von Jagow, informed Ghyczy of Hitler's impending message to Mussolini acknowledging the government constituted by the latter as the only legitimate Italian government. He made it clear that the German Government awaited a statement expressing a similar attitude from the Hungarian Government. The Hungarian Government, however, was reluctant to follow this course, for the Badoglio government appeared to be the sole legal representative of Victor Emmanuel. After repeated German pressure, Ghyczy found a compromise solution. In a letter he merely recognized de facto the Mussolini government,⁵⁷ an action which infuriated the Germans. In this confused situation the Foreign Ministry could and did consider pro-Badoglio members of the Italian Legation staff as accredited representatives of their country. The situation became more complicated after the establishment of a pro-Mussolini Legation in Budapest. Two Italian Legations fought each other. Still, the diplomatic privileges of the Badoglio diplomats were safeguarded; they were received in the Foreign Ministry, and the Italian Cultural Institute of Budapest was left in the hands of its former administrators. Only after the Germans had ousted Kallay's government was the Institute turned over to Casertano, Mussolini's Minister to Hungary. After the German occupation of Budapest the SS treated the Royal Italian diplomats outrageously, "making the members of the so-called Badoglio Legation run around for hours in the courtyard".⁵⁸

Kallay's general policy was founded on the supposition that British and American forces would reach Hungary's frontiers by the beginning of 1944, possibly at an earlier date. Such a development would have opened the way for Hungary to join the Allies against Germany. Some contacts were made with the Allies in 1942, but official talks did not take place before 1943.

The first feeler was in February, 1943. A Hungarian newspaperman, Andrew Frey, was sent by the Foreign Ministry to establish contact with English and American diplomats in Istanbul. Subsequently an official of the Foreign Ministry Laszlo Veress, was dispatched on a special mission to Istanbul, where he informed the British Embassy of Hungary's determination not to resist the Allies (should their forces reach the frontiers of Hungary), but to turn against the Germans. At the same time he transmitted Hungary's request that Czechoslovak, Rumanian, and Yugoslav troops should not take part in the occupation of Hungary.

The British took cognizance of this information and asked that a staff officer be sent to discuss the military aspects of the case. Nevertheless, such a risky step was not undertaken. The Allied forces were still at a great distance from the boundaries of Hungary.

Talks resumed when Dezso Ujvary was appointed Consul General at Istanbul. Ujvary and Veress told the British Minister plenipotentiary, Sterndale Bennett, on August 17, l943, that Hungary was ready to accept the Casablanca formula for unconditional surrender, and asked Bennett to inform the other Allied governments of Hungary's decision. Hungary's surrender, of course, was still regarded as practicable only if the military situation made it possible.

President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill allegedly received the news of Hungary's acceptance of the "unconditional surrender" clause at the Quebec Conference, and the Soviet government was informed shortly thereafter. The reply was dispatched to the Hungarian government through Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, British ambassador to Turkey. On September 9, 1943, he received Veress aboard a British ship on the sea of Marmora. The British statement, made in the name of the three major Allied Powers, suggested how the Hungarian people could "work their passage home" in the following manner:

(1) The Hungarian Government was to confirm its August 17 declaration about Hungary's capitulation, and the acceptance of the Allied conditions;

(2) The capitulation of Hungary was to be kept secret; to be published by the Allies and by the Hungarian Government at the same time only at a date found mutually suitable. At the express wish of the Hungarian negotiator, it was agreed not to publish it, in any case, before the Allies reached the boundaries of Hungary;

(3) Hungary was to reduce her military cooperation with Germany, step by step, notably by withdrawing her forces from Russia, and by promoting the passage of Allied air forces across Hungary to attack German bases;

(4) Hungary gradually was to stop her economic cooperation with Germany, refusing to carry out her share in German war production;

(5) Hungary was to pledge herself to resist a possible German attempt to occupy Hungary. To further this object, the Hungarian Army Staff was to be reorganized to enable the army to cut loose from the Germans, and to attack them;

(6) Hungary was to surrender all her resources, her transportation system and her air bases to the Allies, at a given date, to pursue the fight against the Germans;

(7) An Allied Military Commission was to land on Hungarian soil, at an opportune date, to prepare the necessary measures for Hungary's surrender;

(8) A regular radio connection was to be established between the Allies and the Hungarian government organs. The Allies were to be kept informed about the German and Hungarian situations. The dispositions and instructions of the Allies concerning Hungary's moves were to be conveyed in this manner.⁵⁹

But it did not prove easy to live up to these conditions, the mere preliminary understandings for an armistice treaty to be concluded when the Allied forces reached the boundaries of Hungary. Hungary was hemmed in and controlled by the Germans. Still some important results were achieved.

Through the Hungarian Minister in Lisbon, Andor Wodianer, and Sir Ronald Campbell, British ambassador to Portugal, Ghyczy confirmed Ujvary's power in the August 17 notification of Hungary's acceptance of the Casablanca formula for unconditional surrender.

Allied flying units, in passage over Hungary, were not fired upon or chased by Hungarian fighter planes. On the contrary, their flights were facilitated by information about air defense. The demand of the German Army High Command (September, 1943) that it should be allowed to garrison western Hungary with five German flying units was firmly refused. The important practical result of this attitude was, that until German troops occupied the country, Hungarian territory was not bombed by the British and Americans.

Secret radio connections had been established between Budapest and the Allies in September, 1943. Veress brought a shortwave transmitter and receiver from Istanbul. This had been placed in the basement of the Budapest police headquarters building. At certain hours of the day regular, direct, short-wave communication, via Istanbul, was maintained with an Allied agency.

The government made repeated efforts to secure the return of all Hungarian troops from Russia. The Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army went, on three occasions, to German Headquarters, under instructions to arrange for the sending home of Hungarian soldiers from Russia. Hitler did not give a direct answer. He merely said he would not place any more Hungarian soldiers in the front lines. At last, on February 9, 1944, Regent Horthy himself wrote to Hitler, asking for the release of the Hungarian forces. His argument was that the war's approach to Hungary necessitated their presence at home for the defense of their country's frontiers.⁶⁰

After the contacts had been made and maintained in Istanbul,

further negotiations were undertaken through the Stockholm,⁶¹ Lisbon, and Berne legations. The Stockholm and Berne legation staffs were reorganized to facilitate strictly confidential parleys. No such changes were necessary in Lisbon.

To reshuffle the Army Staff was more difficult, and the rearrangements in it were much less extensive. A reliable military attache, however, was sent to Istanbul to get in touch with the Allies.

Talks with the emissaries of the United States took place mainly in Switzerland, and were conducted by the Hungarian Minister to Switzerland, Baron George Bakach-Bessenyey. A glance at the first contacts will perhaps characterize the atmosphere of these conversations.

At the end of August, 1943, I was dispatched as diplomatic courier from Budapest to Geneva where Bakach-Bessenyey had the first secret talks with an American emissary. I carried instructions for Bessenyey in my diplomatic pouch through Germany, and was supposed to return with Bessenyey's report containing the American suggestions.

During my stay in Geneva I contacted several persons in touch with the Western Allies and the governments-in-exile. I discussed with them the world situation and the expected fate of Hungary. One of the best informed persons told me the following: Stalin was no maniac of the Hitler sort. He was too much the shrewd Georgian peasant to be misled into a downright expansionist policy, fraught with so many dangers. Thus, the almost certain Russian occupation of Hungary would be but a temporary measure. Hungary would be allowed to work out an independent political existence of her own after the conclusion of the peace treaty. That did not mean, of course, that Soviet Russia would tolerate an anti-Bolshevist regime in Hungary, of the Horthy type. No doubt, it would be necessary to reform Hungary's antiquated social and political system, and to carry out a radical land reform with the progressive parties of the country, like the Smallholders Party, the Democratic Party and the Social Democrats, supported on a coalition platform by a Communist Party.

I was deeply impressed by this opinion, which was expressed in the most decided manner and shared by other competent persons in contact with Western circles, and relayed the conversations to Bessenyey. I risked mentioning to him the possibly dubious value of our parley with the Americans in case of a Russian occupation of the Danubian area. Bessenyey, instead of arguing, simply referred me to the map of Europe in our Geneva consulate-general. He pointed to the Balkans and the Danube Valley with the remark that the Western powers simply could not afford a Russian domination of this geographically most important area, the gateway to Western Europe, because it would be more

dangerous to their safety than a German victory. With these words Bessenyey expressed the general conviction of leading Hungarian statesmen and diplomats.

As was mentioned, during this period the Allied powers pressed the Hungarian Government to withdraw all Hungarian troops from Russia. At the same time Hitler urged Hungary to occupy a substantial part of the Balkan peninsula. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry opposed the acceptance of Hitler's proposal, which was considered as a further involvement in the war. It was Regent Horthy's idea that Hungary should combine the two suggestions coming from the opposite camps. There would be an apparent compliance with Hitler's demands. Hungary would withdraw her troops from Russia, and Hungarian troops would take part in the occupation of the Balkans where they would be in a position to surrender to the advancing Anglo-American armies, and push on against the Germans. Horthy, like most of the Hungarian statesmen, supposed that the Allied offensive in the Balkans would soon take place. When Bessenyey explained Horthy's idea to the American negotiator, the American opposed it most resolutely. His advice was that Hungary should immediately withdraw her troops from Russia should not take part in the occupation of the Balkans and should turn against the Germans as soon as Italy's imminent surrender was announced. Otherwise, he said, it would be too late to change sides in the war and the Hungarian nation would share the terrible punishment to be imposed on the German people.

Bessenyey's report about the Geneva parleys would have badly compromised both the Kallay government and Regent Horthy if it had fallen into the hands of the Germans. Since the Nazis were not very discriminating in their choice of means, I put several small bottles of benzine and some inflammable material into my pouch containing the reports to facilitate their quick destruction should the Nazis try to acquire them during my two days transit through Germany. At night I slept with the pouch under my head, and a cigarette lighter was always at hand.

I had hardly reached Budapest when the Italian armistice agreement was published.⁶² Ghyczy reviewed Hungary's foreign political situation in the Council of Ministers on September 14, 1943. The Council decided to ask Germany for the repatriation of all Hungarian troops from Russia and took a stand against Hungary's participation in any military action on the Balkans.

In Budapest, when I reported the various rumors and hints predicting the Russian occupation of Hungary, the general reaction was exactly like that of Bessenyey. The Italian minister in Budapest, a

staunch Fascist registered ironically the opinion prevailing in Hungary in the following manner: "I hear from all quarters: We are expecting an Anglo-American invasion in the Balkans. The decisive battle will be fought southeast of Budapest, in the plains of Lake Balaton. It will be there that the Magyars will unite themselves with the Allies and will get rid of the Germans and probably even of the Russians. Until then all efforts in any direction would be futile and harmful".⁶³

Parleys with Western emissaries continued under the assumption that an Anglo-American landing would take place in the Balkans. Up to the German occupation of Hungary this assumption was not contradicted by the Western negotiators, although they repeatedly advised Hungary to contact Soviet Russia. Thus Hungarian politicians and diplomats were in the dark about the real situation created by the Quebec and Teheran Conferences.

Following Hungaro-American conversations, conducted in Berne three days before the Germans occupied Hungary, a United States military mission was parachuted to Hungarian soil. It was composed of four members under the command of a colonel, and provided with a special radio set, one of its tasks being to utilize this means to give information directly to the American Army Command. A prominent American diplomat, well acquainted with Hungary, was assigned to take part in the expedition but was unable to arrive in time. According to a preconceived plan, the mission landed in the vicinity of the Yugoslav border. The Hungarian detachment which took them prisoners was told that they had been about to fly to Tito, but having lost their bearings had landed farther to the north than they intended. In Budapest, the head of the intelligence section of the Ministry of Defense, aware of the real purpose of the mission, talked over the gloomy situation with the American flyers, who were soon to become German war prisoners. The sending of a British Army Mission was also contemplated, but failed to materialize because of the German occupation of Hungary.

Throughout these contacts with the English and Americans the Hungarian diplomats and statesmen were under the spell of "wishful thinking". They were loath to believe rumors about an exclusive Russian occupation of Hungary. Despite repeated Western advice, they did not start negotiations with Moscow. Such negotiations seemed futile. Their convictions, however, had some realistic foundation, based on political and strategical considerations. In the war the Western powers, and specifically the United States, had by far the greatest resources and increasing power. Under these conditions the handing over of central Eastern Europe to Soviet Russia in the last period of the war seemed inconceivable. Russian rule in this strategically important area was

equivalent with its Bolshevization. Therefore they simply refused to credit rumors that Southeastern Europe could be recognized as an exclusive Russian zone of interest by the Allies.

In this conviction the leading Hungarian statesmen and diplomats were willing to take all risks and were eager to make all possible preparatory steps for an Anglo-American occupation, which was the basis of their policy. On the other hand for the British and Americans, talks with Hungarian emissaries were only part of the Allied psychological warfare. British and American negotiators, following the course of international events, gradually limited the objectives of the conversations. Finally their interest was mostly concentrated on matters of military intelligence and sabotage. After the Anglo-American decision at Quebec and the Anglo-American-Russian decision at Teheran, the game was up for Hungary, as far as military occupation of the Danubian region was concerned. With no Anglo-American forces to rely upon, Hungary never was given a real opportunity to assist the Western Allies.⁶⁴

In the course of the contacts with the Western powers Hungary obtained little positive encouragement as to its future position in Danubian Europe, but instead was threatened with a variety of unattractive possibilities in case it failed to turn in time against the Germans. It is true that threats remained far behind the realities which actually occurred in Hungary in the postwar period, but these tragic events were not the consequence of Hungary's good or bad behavior. Western negotiators repeatedly demanded that Hungary should begin an all-out resistance against Germany irrespective of consequences to the anti-Nazi elements in the country, but never indicated the possible reward for such suicidal action. The example of Poland was not reassuring and that of the Baltic states even less. Under the circumstances a limited cooperation with the Axis powers seemed to be the only means for the maintenance of Hungary's relative independence for the final show-down.

Another characteristic feature of the parleys was the emphasis laid by Western representatives upon Allied unity. Simultaneously with the advice that Hungary should start negotiations with the Soviet Union, they gave optimistic assurances concerning Soviet Russia's prospective role and intentions in international affairs. For example, it was suggested that Stalin would welcome Count Antal Sigray a leading legitimist with an American wife as Hungarian foreign minister. Allied unity seemed to be so perfect that the coming world was pictured as a sincere collaboration between the Western and the Soviet political systems. The dissolution of the Comintern, formal reestablishment of the Orthodox Church, the revival of patriotism in Russia, and other Soviet gestures seemed to support this opinion. There were some hints

too that the Soviet Union might develop her internal structure on the lines of the Western democracies. The Atlantic Charter and the noble principles of other wartime agreements, accepted by both East and West, seemed to be the indication of a changed Soviet approach toward international cooperation. It was assumed that the leaders of the Soviet Union understood and accepted the inevitability of the simultaneous existence of Communism and capitalism, and that differing ideological systems could co-exist and peacefully cooperate as they had done so many times in the past. It was even thought that a middle road between Soviet Communism and Western capitalism was possible.

Such ideas, commonly accepted in the western countries, found little credit in Hungary a country which had already had experience with Communists in 1919. Nonetheless, the fact remained that the Soviet Union was a much praised ally of the great western democracies, and people fearful of a Russian preponderance in postwar Europe were inclined to ponder comforting arguments. Another factor was, that in the territories under German occupation, the Communist and non-Communist parties closely collaborated against the Nazi invaders.

The Four Freedoms, together with the principles expressed in the Atlantic Charter and in the United Nations declaration. had a tremendous impact upon all social classes in Hungary. It was supposed that the Western powers, in addition to these general principles, had some concrete plans for the reorganization of Europe in general and the Danubian region in particular. It was obvious that principles alone, without the support of adequate military strength and political determination, could not operate in the vacuum created by the collapse of Hitler's Europe. Few persons, at that time, had a premonition that the fate of Europe was being shaped by extra-Continental forces perhaps full of good-will but often very far from political realities. However it may have been, the nations living in the critical danger zone had no choice and thus accepted inevitable facts and welcomed ideas which sometimes gave a gleam of hope for a decent future. They felt some misgivings, but had no conception of the scope of the impending catastrophe.

End of Independence.

In the last years of the war, the Germans became increasingly dissatisfied with Hungary's military and economic contributions to the Axis war efforts. Nevertheless, what provoked the most vehement outburst of wrath from the Nazis was the fact that German demands that Hungary persecute the nearly one million Hungarian Jews in the Nazi way, were to no avail. Hungary was the only place in Hitler-dominated

Europe where the Jews had a relatively tolerable life. All other German satellites were willing to adopt and carry out the anti-Jewish Nuremberg rulings as a preliminary condition for German favor. This policy increased in violence as the war proceeded, and became a categorical rule in Hitler's Reichstag address of April 26, 1942.

Hitler's government at first repeatedly approached Dome Sztojay, the Hungarian Minister in Berlin. Later, on October 17, 1942, it sent a sharply-worded note to the Hungarian government enumerating the steps to be taken. Essentially it demanded the marking of Jews with the yellow star badge, their complete exclusion from all economic and cultural life, and their deportation to the east.⁶⁵ The Hungarian Government flatly refused to accede to these measures. Martin Luther, assistant Secretary of State in the German Foreign Ministry, expressed to Sztojay his "sincere regret" about the negative answer. He emphasized that the German government was willing to accede to all the wishes of the Hungarian government by designating areas in the east suitable for the settling of the Jews. He strongly disclaimed the rumors broadcast by England and America about the treatment of Jews in Germany, and said they could hardly be substantiated by facts.⁶⁶

In early 1943 the Germans became infuriated with Kallay and through Horthy, tried to force him from power. Hitler invited the Regent to his headquarters in April 1943. The German leader did not conceal his dissatisfaction over Hungary's small military contribution in Russia and over the general trend of _llay's policy. He dwelt upon the ill-concealed decline of Hungarian cooperation and mentioned certain facts proving Hungary's determination to approach the English and Americans. The Germans summed up their accusations in a memorandum which particularly emphasized Hungary's firm determination not to commit any act of war against the Western powers, and the small output of Hungarian industry and agriculture. Moreover, the German memorandum accused the Hungarian cabinet of failing to support the war, Prime Minister Kallay of having lost faith in an Axis victory, and Professor Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, the famous biologist and Nobel prize-winner, of having conducted negotiations in Istanbul with the Western powers and of boasting there that Hungary was protecting 70,000 Jewish refugees. The memorandum then listed a number of threats to force Hungary into a more active participation in the Axis struggle. Hitler and Ribbentrop attacked Horthy with special vehemence because Hungary refused to settle the Jewish question according to the course set by Germany. To Horthy's counter-question as to what he should do with the Jews, now that he had deprived them of almost all possibilities of livelihood he could not kill them off the Reich Foreign

Minister declared that "the Jews must either be exterminated or taken to concentration camps. There was no other possibility".⁶⁷

As is evident from the memorandum handed to Horthy, the Germans were not entirely ignorant of the moves and purposes of the Kallay government. Hitler again brought up the German demand that Hungarian forces be sent to the Balkans. Horthy flatly refused, referring to an earlier decision of the Hungarian Government. He reiterated Hungary's determination not to allow troops to go beyond her borders.⁶⁸

After Horthy's return to Hungary the German Government proposed to the Italian Government that the German and Italian envoys in Budapest should cease all their personal contacts with Kallay, who at that time also acted as foreign minister. This scheme, an attempt to overthrow Kallay through boycotting, failed because of the non-cooperative attitude of the Italian Government.

In the following months Hungaro-German relations went from bad to worse.⁶⁹ In January, 1944, Luther bluntly told Sztojay that Hitler was not willing to wait until the end of the war for the settlement of the Jewish question. He once more pointed out that the handling of the Jewish question in Hungary was responsible for the chilly atmosphere surrounding German-Hungarian relations.

In late February, 1944, the German Government requested the Hungarian Government's consent to the passage of 100,000 German soldiers, urgently needed to check the Russian offensive. The Hungarian Government first refused passage, saying that this would provoke Allied bombings of the country. Consent was later given, on condition that German troops avoid Budapest. After this answer was received the Germans dropped the matter. On March 15, Horthy received an urgent invitation from Hitler. The German minister in Budapest indicated that Hitler would like to discuss the question of the withdrawal of Hungarian troops from Russia a wish expressed in Horthy's letter of February 9.⁷⁰ The German minister suggested that, since the negotiations would be of a military nature, Horthy should take the minister of defense and the chief of staff with him.

Previously the Hungarian Government had received reliable reports of German troop concentrations along the Hungarian border, and asked the purpose of these. The Germans indignantly rejected the supposition that the troops were intended to be used for the occupation of Hungary, and claimed to be insulted. The troops were, according to the German answer, destined to strengthen the sector of the Russian front held by the Rumanians. But, in spite of the categorical German denial, officials of the Foreign Ministry made preparations to destroy secret documents. Kallay sought to persuade the Regent to postpone the visit for a fortnight.

Horthy, however, accepting the advice of those who wanted "to face the danger", declared he was not afraid of Hitler. He left for Germany on March 17. accompanied by the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff.

In Klessheim he was told by Hitler, during a violent scene, that Germany could no longer tolerate the repetition of events which had occurred in Italy. Therefore the Kallay government should be dismissed immediately and a new and reliable government must assure, by every means full military and economic cooperation between Hungary and Germany. The Hungarian press and radio must change their tune, and the Jewish question must be settled. And to enforce these demands, Hitler added, a German military occupation of Hungary was absolutely necessary.⁷¹

Horthy flatly refused. He announced that in the event of an occupation he would resign. When it appeared that Hitler intended to confront him with a fait accompli Horthy left the room and decided to return to Hungary immediately. By various pretexts his departure was prevented. Nor could the delegation get in touch with Budapest by telephone. As an eyewitness described it, "a most convincing fake air-raid was staged, which even included a smoke screen over the castle, as an excuse for preventing Horthy's special train from leaving, and the telephone line to Budapest turned out to be 'badly hit', so that the Regent was cut off from the outside world".⁷²

In the meantime Horthy's military suite did everything to convince him of the futility of military resistance. Their main argument was the German threat that Hungary would be occupied by Rumanian, Slovak, and Croatian troops.⁷³ Moreover, they emphasized that a hostile German occupation would mean the extermination of the Hungarian leading classes, not to speak of the fate of democratic elements, and of Jews, Poles, and other refugees. Horthy was forced to see Hitler again. In the course of another dispute Hitler sent for Field Marshal Keitel and asked about the possibilities of suspension or change in the plan of occupation. Keitel's answer was that the trains already were rolling toward Hungary; the occupation could not be deferred, and the plans could not be changed. Horthy was then assured that the occupation would be of an exclusively military nature and that the occupying force would not interfere with the political life of the country, and would be withdrawn after the appointment of a new government. Influenced by all these considerations, Horthy showed a willingness to remain Regent for the time being. In spite of this agreement, however, his return was again delayed until after the occupation of Budapest. The Nazis did not take chances.

The German war machine started rolling into Hungary on the night

of March 18-19 1944. On the morning of March 19. the capital, the most important airfields, railway junctions, and other places of strategic importance were in the hands of the Germans. The Hungarian Government, concurrently with the military occupation received false messages from the Hungarian delegation indicating that everything was settled with the Germans and that nothing should be done until the return of the Regent. Ghyczy had arranged, before his departure from Budapest, to communicate Hitler's plans to the Hungarian Government by one of two alternate code messages. But the Germans were too cautious to be fooled by this device and did not transmit the seemingly harmless text, addressed to Mrs. Ghiczy about a social engagement, until the occupation was well under way. It now became clear why Horthy was asked to bring the leaders of the Hungarian Army to Germany. In the absence of the Regent and the minister of defense there was no central military authority to order the Hungarian Army to resist. There were isolated cases of resistance, but these did not substantially change the timetable of occupation. The minister of the interior intended to issue an order of resistance to the police forces. but was dissuaded from this action, the futility of which was obvious. On March 19 when Horthy was allowed to return he was received before the Royal Palace by a German Ehrenwache.

March l9, 1944, was a tragic day in Hungarian history. From this time onward the relatively calm atmosphere of the Hungarian scene changed radically. The Hungarian people began to feel the full impact of war and occupation. Allied bombing started. The looming shadow of the Nazi dictator became a cruel reality. Subsequent protestations and resignations of Hungarian diplomatic representatives in neutral countries were received with sympathy by the free world, but this did not alleviate the fate of the Hungarian people. The German security police arrested members of the Hungarian Parliament. The finest Hungarian patriots were jailed or forced underground. Hitler's promise concerning the exclusively military character of the occupation proved entirely worthless. The Gestapo started its usual work. Persecution and mass deportation of the Jews began.⁷⁴

Kallay himself never resigned formally. Horthy first wanted to appoint a purely administrative, non-representative government composed of officials, but this was not accepted by the Germans. Subsequently Horthy asked for the cessation of arrests, and guarantees of no further intervention in Hungarian home affairs. Receiving only some vague promises, he did not comply with the German demand for the appointment of an Imredy government but, eventually, appointed Dome Sztojay, a former general and Hungarian Minister to Germany. Sztojay

had always fervently advocated a policy of complete submission to the Nazis. The new government dissolved the trade unions and the opposition parties, such as the Smallholders, the Democrats, and the Social Democrats, and, in close collaboration with the Germans, carried out the Nazification of Hungary.

The Regent assumed an ostensibly passive attitude in the first months, later resisting more or less openly the Germans and their Hungarian accomplices. The fact that the Germans did not directly take over the major government agencies left open certain possibilities for the future. The officials of the Foreign Ministry especially tried to check Nazi influence whenever they had the opportunity. Although Szentmiklossy and Szegedy-Maszak were arrested by the Germans, the traditions of their policies prevailed to a large extent, and were revived, in a different form, by the new secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, Mihaly Jungerth-Arnothy.

Immediately after the occupation the Germans, in cooperation with the puppet Sztojay Government, carried out the anti-Jewish measures rejected by the Kallay Government in 1942. The Jews were first obliged to wear a yellow star, then they were put into ghettos and concentration camps, and finally most of them were deported "to work in Germany". These actions were carried out with amazing speed by the Germans and their chief Hungarian accomplices, Laszlo Endre and Laszlo Baky, secretaries of state in the Ministry of Interior.⁷⁵ One of the German organizers, Dieter Wisliceny, described this process at the Nuremberg trials in the following manner:

After the entry of the German troops into Hungary, Eichmann went there personally with a large command. By an order signed by the head of the Security Police, I was assigned to Eichmann's command. Eichmann began his activities in Hungary at the end of March, 1944. He contacted members of the then Hungarian Government, especially State Secretaries Endre and von Baky. The first measure adopted by Eichmann in cooperation with these Hungarian Government officials was the concentration of the Hungarian Jews in special places and special localities. These measures were carried out according to zones, beginning in Ruthenia and Transylvania. The action was initiated in mid-April, 1944.

In Ruthenia over 200,000 Jews were affected by these measures. Consequently, impossible food and housing conditions developed in the small towns and rural communities where the Jews were assembled. On the strength of this situation Eichmann suggested to the Hungarians that these Jews be transported to Auschwitz and

other camps. He insisted, however, that a request to this effect be submitted to him either by the Hungarian Government or by a member thereof. This request was submitted by State Secretary von Baky. The evacuation was carried out by the Hungarian Police.

Eichmann appointed me liaison officer to Lieutenant Colonel Ferency, entrusted by the Hungarian Minister of the Interior with this operation. The evacuation of Jews from Hungary began in May 1944 and was also carried out zone by zone, first starting in Ruthenia, then in Transylvania, northern Hungary, southern, and western Hungary. Budapest was to be cleared of Jews by the end of June. This evacuation, however was never carried out, as the Regent, Horthy, would not permit it. This operation affected some 450,000 Jews. . .⁷⁶

Although the ultimate fate of the deported people was not known at that time, the Pope, the King of Sweden, President Roosevelt, the British Government, and the International Red Cross protested the anti-Jewish measures, particularly the mass deportations. Representatives of neutral powers in Budapest, under the leadership of the Papal Nuncio, Angelo Rotta, made energetic collective protests. The Nuncio personally lodged several protests with Prime Minister Sztojay.

The secretary general of the Foreign Ministry called the attention of the council of ministers to these protests, but the Nazi-minded ministers denied the alleged atrocities. Hungarian Nazis were enraged because of these "unjustified foreign interventions" while innocent civilians were victims of the Allied air attacks in Hungary. Secretary of State Endre in his report to the council of ministers in June, 1944, pictured the deportations in such a euphemistic way that Jungerth-Arnothy remarked sarcastically that he almost regretted not having been born a Jew and thus not having been able "to join these pleasure trips".⁷⁷

Gradually the Regent's position strengthened and in July, he succeeded, by threatening to use force, in hindering the deportation of Jews from Budapest.⁷⁸ Protests of Allied and neutral states, interventions of the papal nuncio, and actions of the Catholic episcopate and the Protestant churches were instrumental in stiffening the resistance of the Regent. The neutral legations issued letters of protection, safe-conduct passes, and passports to Hungarian Jews. Eventually an international ghetto was established in Budapest under the protection of the neutral powers. The co-operation of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry greatly facilitated the success of these actions.⁷⁹ Throughout this period, a secretary of the Swedish Legation, Raoul Wallenberg, alone saved the lives of several

thousand persons.⁸⁰

During these months the Germans gave the Hungarian Government the most emphatic assurances about the fate of the deported Jews, and protested against the "malicious rumors", spread abroad. Germany even claimed from Hungary the food ration of these deported people.⁸¹

In regard to Hungarian Jews the following general ruling was laid down in Auschwitz: "Children up to the age of 12 or 14, older people over 50, as well as the sick, or people with criminal records (who were transported in specially marked wagons) were taken immediately on their arrival to the gas chambers. The others passed before an SS doctor who, on sight, indicated who was fit for work and who was not. Those unfit were sent to the gas chambers, while the others were distributed in various labor camps." ⁸²

As Sztojay proved a mere German puppet, Horthy sought to replace him with General Gyula Lakatos, but this action was hindered by a German ultimatum. German protests notwithstanding, Horthy gradually dismissed the most savage pro-Nazi members of Sztojay's administration. The attempt on July 20 to kill Hitler created confusion among German authorities, somewhat increasing Horthy's freedom of action. Eventually he dismissed the sick Sztojay and appointed General Lakatos as prime minister. Contact was established between the government and the underground parties.⁸³ The problem of an armistice was discussed in the cabinet, and in various top level secret meetings. The Germans, however, received exact information of these intentions, and arrangements were made for Ferenc Szalasi, the Hungarian Arrow-Cross leader, to take over the government at an appropriate time.⁸⁴ Meanwhile Szalasi lived in Budapest at German Headquarters.

Historical experience and practical considerations made Hungarian military strategy aim at the establishment of a strong line of defense in the eastern and southern Carpathian mountains.⁸⁵ For a variety of reasons such plans were not accepted in time by the Germans. Nazi policy was influenced to a great extent by propaganda considerations and the Nazis were reluctant to give up territories solely for strategic reasons.⁸⁶ Moreover, in Rumania the Germans desired to hold the Ploesti oil fields under any circumstances. Eventually Hitler agreed to the establishing of a line of defense in the southern Carpathians, but it was too late. When the Rumanian armistice was proclaimed on August 23, the entire Rumanian Army ceased to fight against the Red Army, and shortly afterwards the German Army in Rumania was practically annihilated. On September 5, the weak and unprepared Hungarian army began an offensive aiming at the occupation and eventual defense of the southern Carpathians in Rumanian Transylvania, but this desperate

move did not take military realities into consideration and achieved little success.

In early September, 1944, the Red Army, without much difficulty, occupied the passes of the southern Carpathians. The door to the Hungarian lowlands lay open. The German military attache in Budapest reported the critical military situation to the Hungarian authorities. The Lakatos government demanded the immediate dispatch of seven German armored divisions for the defense of the Hungarian lowlands and intimated that otherwise Hungary would ask for an armistice. The Germans promised to fulfill the Hungarian demand. Some armored divisions promptly arrived, but did not go to the battlefront. They remained around Rudapest, thus further curtailing Horthy's freedom of action.

On September 8, a Crown Council, upon the proposal of Count Stephen Bethlen, decided that Hungary should ask for an armistice. In the cabinet, however, the opinions were very much divided in the matter. During those days the experts of the Foreign Ministry alternately prepared and destroyed a variety of requests for an armistice. One type was to be addressed to the Allied Powers through the neutral legations functioning in Budapest, the other directly to the commander-in-chief of the Red Army. Because of the unpleasant alternatives, indecision and hesitation prevailed at the last moment in responsible quarters.

The Lakatos government sent out feelers to the Allies, and the invariable reply was that Hungary should ask Moscow for an armistice. This answer notwithstanding, Horthy sent General Stephen Naday by plane to Caserta on September 22, to negotiate an armistice, and suggested that Anglo-American troops should take part in the occupation of Hungary. In Caserta Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Allied Commander of the Mediterranean theatre, took note of Hungary's determination to conclude an armistice but showed no particular interest in Naday's mission. Naday was told that the merits of the case must be negotiated in Moscow, since Hungary was within the Russian zone of military operations.

A few days later an armistice delegation left for Moscow.⁸⁷ Following an arrangement made with the Russian high command, Russian partisans took care of the delegation in Slovakia, which was still under German occupation. Taken by car to the city of Zvolen, the delegates left by plane for Kiev, and arrived in Moscow on October 1. General Kuznetsov received them, and Horthy's letter addressed to Marshal Stalin was delivered to him. The Hungarian delegation signed a preliminary armistice agreement on October 11.

Meanwhile, the Lakatos government made some preparations for

the proclamation of the armistice, but the German military preparations in Hungary were more advanced and of greater magnitude. Before the Hungarian delegation was dispatched Hitler had been informed of Horthy's decision to offer surrender to Soviet Russia. He briefed his trouble shooter, Otto Skorzeny, and sent him to Budapest to prepare for the occupation of the Royal Castle Hill and the government buildings.⁸⁸ The German secret service knew of the anti-Nazi activities of the Regent's son, Nicholas Horthy, Jr., and a Croat spy was planted among his close collaborators. Thus Skorzeny was informed of young Horthy's meeting on October 15 with emissaries of Tito, who themselves were agents of the German secret service.⁸⁹ A trap was prepared and Nicholas Horthy, Jr., was kidnapped by Skorzeny's men after a shooting and struggle in which Horthy, Jr., was wounded and some of his guards killed. On the same day a Crown Council was held and the Regent's armistice proclamation read on the Budapest radio.⁹⁰

This desperate attempt was bound to fail. Several German armoured divisions occupied the outskirts of Budapest. German "Tiger" tanks moved into the capital. The Nazis and their Hungarian accomplices organized everything with German thoroughness. Horthy, wanting to remain chivalrous to the end, informed Hitler's representative in Hungary about the impending armistice before the proclamation was read on the radio. Thus the Nazis had all possible advantages. Besides, as early as October 10, the Germans had kidnapped General Szilard Bakay, commander of the army corps stationed in Budapest. Bakay was in charge of the organization of the scattered Hungarian military units and had made preparations for the arrest of the pro-German Hungarian generals. After his arrest all serious preparations for a showdown were frustrated. But in spite of these odds, Horthy decided to remain in Budapest rather than join the Hungarian fighting forces at the front and proclaim the armistice from there. Only one plan was carried out concurrently with the armistice proclamation, the release of political prisoners from Hungarian jails.

Shortly after Horthy's proclamation was read over the Budapest radio, the station was taken over by the Nazis and the proclamation countermanded and refuted. Pro-Horthy military commanders were arrested. Nazi-minded officers were in important key positions in the Hungarian Army, and they organized a conspiracy simultaneous with Skorzeny's mission. The attitude of these Hungarian army officers was probably the greatest disappointment in Horthy's life, filled as it was with vicissitudes. The bulk of the Hungarian Army and people did not know about the events until everything was over. After a short fight against the overwhelming German forces, the Lakatos government was deposed

and the Arrow Cross gang of Szalasi installed by the Germans. Horthy, forced to resign, was taken prisoner with his family and taken to Germany. With the violent end of the Horthy regime, a chapter of Hungarian history terminated.⁹¹

It was officially announced that Horthy abdicated of his own free will, placed himself under German protection (it was not stated against whom) and surrendered his rights and powers to Ferenc Szalasi.⁹² Although Justinian Cardinal Seredi, in a session of the state council of Hungary, challenged the validity of Horthy's resignation and Szalasi's seizure of power, such legalistic considerations did not change the course of events.⁹³ Seredi's appeal to free the detained members of Parliament was of no avail. An incomplete Parliament took note of the accomcomplished facts and under duress accepted Szalasi as leader of the nation.

A new wave of political persecutions began. Leading patriots were arrested, among them Joseph Mindszenty, at that time Bishop of Veszprem. In many places the mob took over. Atrocities and pogroms continued. In October and November, more than 30,000 Jews were deported from Budapest. They had to walk to the German border (almost 200 kilometres) under dreadful conditions. A large proportion of these people died during the death march or later in work camps.⁹⁴

The cruelties were somewhat mitigated by the collective interventions of the neutral powers, notably by the representatives of the Vatican, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, and Spain. Protests from the Christian churches continued and the International Red Cross made great efforts. Such actions had some restraining influence on the irresponsible elements in power.⁹⁵ Officials of the Foreign Ministry invented rules of international law to convince the Arrow Cross leaders of the validity of neutral protection extended to Hungarian Jews. Daily events brought forward manifestations of both human solidarity and bestiality. Former opposition politicians formed a committee of liberation under the leadership of Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and planned to overthrow the Szalasi regime by force. The plot was betrayed by a planted spy, most of the organizers caught, and the leaders executed.⁹⁶

As the Red Army advanced the Arrow Cross Government moved to western Hungary. The Germans discovered with astonishment the inability of Szalasi, who withdrew to a castle on the Austro-Hungarian frontier to write his lifework a' la Hitler's "Mein Kampf". Confusion and arbitrariness prevailed throughout the country, while the various factions of the Hungarian pro-Nazi parties quarreled and intrigued among themselves.⁹⁷ The Papal Nuncio and the representatives of the neutral powers, like Sweden and Switzerland, refused to follow the

Arrow Cross Government to western Hungary and remained in Budapest.⁹⁸

Meanwhile, as the Red Army steadily approached Budapest, Hungarian patriots lived in a tragic dilemma. Overwhelming outside forces had trapped the Hungarian people between two barbarian worlds. The Hungarian nation was almost entirely engulfed in the flood of invading armies and cast into the Danubian whirlpool.

DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL