DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

Part II%

Diplomacy in the Shadow of the Red Star

VI SOVIET AND WESTERN POLITICS

Armistice Agreement and Allied Control Commission.

The terms of the armistice agreements were almost equally harsh for all former Axis satellite states, but Hungary was probably in the worst political position of them all at the close of hostilities. In point of time she was the last of the Axis satellites to conclude an armistice treaty with the three major Allies.l Unlike the armies of Rumania and Bulgaria, the Hungarian Army had not turned against the Germans, a fact which did not improve Hungary's international position in the armistice period. The country was isolated, with neither diplomatic representatives abroad nor friends among the victorious states. Moreover, the Hungarians are not Slavs and have a western political and cultural background and tradition. Thus it was more difficult for them to understand the Russian mind than for the Slav or Orthodox peoples. The Nazis were barbarians but they had a comprehensive system. The Soviet Russians had none and their reactions were incalculable, or at least seemed so to the Hungarians during the initial phase of the armistice period.

The armistice agreement contained clauses of a political, military, economic and financial nature. Hungary declared war on Germany and placed all her resources military and otherwise, at the disposal of the Allied (Soviet) High Command for prosecuting the war. She was reduced to her pre-war frontiers and required to evacuate all Hungarian troops and officials from territories returned to Hungary since 1938. The two Vienna awards were declared to be null and void. Hungary was obliged to release all prisoners of war and persons held in confinement because of their activities in favor of the United Nations, or as a result of discriminatory legislation. All such legislation was to be repealed. Fascist organizations were to be dissolved. Hungary was required to cooperate in the apprehension and trial, as well as the extradition, of persons accused of war crimes. The country was occupied by the Red Army, and until September, 1947, lived under the strict rule of the Allied Control Commission (hereafter ACC) a fact which greatly reduced Hungarian sovereignty, both in internal and foreign affairs. Hungarian authorities were to carry out the orders and instructions issued by the Soviet High Command or ACC for the purpose of securing the execution of the armistice terms. These terms were interpreted extensively by the same authorities; thus both the Red Army and the ACC

101

wielded authority superior to the Hungarian Government.

In addition to the political provisions, the armistice imposed on Hungary great economic burdens. These included payments, commodities and services required by the occupying Red Army and the ACC, and reparation deliveries.² Hungary was also required to restore Allied property rights and interests, and to pay compensation for loss and damage caused by the war to the Allied states and their nationals. American endeavors in Moscow, aiming at a more generous armistice treaty, had failed. Moreover, the Russians were unwilling to provide explicitly for equal participation of the three Allied governments in the work of the ACC during the period following the termination of hostilities against Germany.³ As established by the armistice agreement, the ACC was under Soviet Chairmanship, with American, British and Russian sections. The chairman was Marshal Klementy Voroshilov, a close friend of Stalin and member of the politbureau. In practice the ACC was completely dominated by the Russians. The British and Americans were only nominal members. Copies of Hungarian notes and other documents were not even transmitted to the American and British sections. As the former American Minister to Hungary, H. F. A. Schoenfeld, has pointed out: "Orders had been given by the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission that communication between the representatives of the Western allies and the Hungarian authorities must be channeled through himself".⁴ For all practical purposes the business of the ACC was run exclusively by the Russians in the name of the three major Allies. The fact that the Western powers tolerated this situation, and thus tacitly endorsed Soviet control of the country, discouraged even the most optimistic Hungarians and did harm to the prestige of the West. The Yugoslav and Czechoslovak representatives delegated to the ACC apparently were more influential with the Russians than the American and British members. It was article 18 of the armistice agreement which expressly provided that the ACC would be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command until the conclusion of the hostilities against Germany.⁵ The fact that the Soviet chairmanship was restricted to this period implied a promise for a larger Western participation between that time and the conclusion of peace with the satellites. Consequently at Potsdam in July, 1945, the three Allied Governments:

took note that the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues pro 104

posals for improving the work on the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Governrnent's proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto.⁶

After the Potsdam conference President Truman reaffirmed the joint responsibility of the three major powers to establish governments broadly representative of the democratic elements of the population in the liberated and satellite nations of Europe. In particular references to Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, he stated that these nations:

are not to be spheres of influence of any one power. They now are governed by Allied Control Commissions composed of representatives of the three governments which met at Yalta and Berlin. These control commissions, it is true, have not been functioning completely to our satisfaction, but improved procedures were agreed upon at Berlin. Until these states are re-established as members of the international family, they are the joint concern of all of us.⁷

The revised statutes of the ACC accordingly set forth that the United States and British representatives on the ACC should have the right "To receive copies of all communications, reports and other documents which may interest the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom." ⁸

In actual practice, however, no change took place. Control Commissions in the Danubian states remained under Russian domination throughout their existence.⁹ For example, General V. P. Sviridov, deputy chairman of the ACC in Hungary, ordered the dissolution of certain Catholic youth organizations and demanded the dismissal of some government officials, in July, 1946, without consulting or informing the American and British representatives.¹⁰ The Soviet High Command issued instructions regarding the size, personnel and organization of the Hungarian Army, without consulting Western representatives. The chairman of the ACC refused the American members permission to visit Hungarian Army units, and refused even to permit freedom of movement for the American and British members of the ACC. In short, the Soviet chairman or his deputy consistently acted unilaterally

105

in the name of the ACC, without consultation with, or notice to the American and British representatives. Thus even the semblance of effective participation in the work of the ACC was denied to them. Sometimes the Soviet chairman simply stated that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the Red Army or that it must be referred to Moscow. This latter position, for example, was taken when the American and British representatives protested, in a plenary session of the ACC, against the conclusion of the Hungarian-Russian economic cooperation agreement, signed in Moscow on August 27, 1945. On this occasion, direct Anglo-American protests were made to the Russian Government without any result." ¹¹

Because of this practical exclusion of the British and Americans from the business of the ACC, the Hungarians had no forum whatever, to deal with Soviet violations and abuses of the armistice agreement. The vague and ambiguous provisions of the armistice left the door open for manifold interpretations and arbitrary Soviet actions, which reduced Hungarian sovereignty to a minimum.¹² In this period Hungary could not renew diplomatic relations without permission of the ACC. This permission was in some cases delayed, in others refused. Usually, the ACC did not even acknowledge these or any other notes. For instance, the Hungarian Government never received an answer to its several requests concerning the renewal of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. The ACC seldom used the Foreign Ministry as a channel of communication with Hungarian authorities, but intervened directly with various government agencies. The Foreign Ministry was only later informed if at all through the Hungarian authorities, of various Soviet demands and interventions. This practice made an integrated Hungarian policy toward the ACC and the Red Army impossible. If the Foreign Ministry gave an unsatisfactory answer to a certain dernand, they simply addressed the same demand to the prime minister or another governmental agency. Soviet interventions for the expulsion of the Germans from Hungary was an example of this. Many times such moves were coordinated with communist actions.

All foreign travel required permission from the ACC. This prerogative was exercised in an arbitrary way. It was next to impossible for the average man to obtain a travel permit if the application was not supported by the Communist Party. Later, when travel became somewhat easier, it was accompanied by such administrative malpractices as bribery through a middleman. Even official foreign travel was strictly controlled and arbitrarily authorized. Sometimes the departure of foreign service officers was delayed or hindered because they lacked the exit permit of the ACC. For example, the foreign Minister personally

106

asked several times that I be granted a travel permit to go to Switzerland to bring back the peace preparatory material deposited at our Berne Legation during 1943 and 1944. The Soviet political advisor to the ACC, Georgij M. Pushkin, refused this request each time, stating that such material would not be needed. Eventually we asked the American political mission to help us out in this situation and requested that the American diplomatic courier be authorized to bring the documents from Switzerland to Budapest. This request was turned down as incompatible with the regulations of the United States courier service.

The argument that the Russians, in this exclusion of the Western Allies from the business of the ACC in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, simply followed the precedent set in Italy, is not entirely without foundation.¹³ In Italy, the Soviets had only an observer with the ACC and membership on an Advisory Council, which, in fact, did very little. The Italian ACC was a joint Anglo-American agency and the Russians often complained about their exclusion.¹⁴ The situation was the same as in the ex-Axis-satellite states in that one side ran the show and the other merely observed, although the institutions were not quite identical. In substance the role of the ACC was entirely different in Italy from that in the Soviet satellite states. The Western powers did not abuse the provisions of the armistice agreement. Italy had no reason to complain because of the behavior of her liberators. She was not looted or otherwise abused by the Anglo-Americans, but was in fact greatly assisted in her rehabilitation. As early as January, 1945, the political section of the ACC in Italy was abolished, while in the following two years the remaining sections of the Commission fulfilled only an advisory function.¹⁵ In contrast with this situation, in the Soviet satellite states the Allied Control Commissions brought ruthless pressure on the local governments and, in close cooperation with the local Communist parties, engineered the political transformation of these countries.

Western Attitude.

Contacts between the Russians, and the Americans and British in Hungary were, of course, only a small segment of their larger relationships. The wartime policy of the Western powers was based on a misconception about the possibilities of postwar cooperation with Soviet Russia. Very few Western statesmen were familiar with, or attached any importance to, the basic tenets of Communist strategy and tactics as they were clearly explained in the writings of Lenin and Stalin. In 1945 Western wishful thinking still prevailed in East-West relations. The leaders of the Western powers, and particularly President Roosevelt, had

IO7

great hopes that the Soviet Union could somehow be brought into a democratic world community if treated with patience and magnanimity. That view was also widespread among the American and British people.

Besides these psychological features, there was also the reality of the military and political situation at the end of 1944 and the first part of 1945. At that time the English speaking powers were still fighting the war, with the Russians as allies, and were building, together with them, a new security organization on which the western hopes for future peace and cooperation were based. Moreover, Soviet military intervention against Japan was considered absolutely necessary. At that time, the Western powers were trying to work out ways of dealing with the liberated areas which would respect the rights of the peoples of these areas and also preserve the unity of the great powers. Perhaps the decision of the historians in the years to come may be that it was impossible to achieve these objectives. A few British and American statesmen and diplomats were realistic and skeptical during the whole period of appeasement. Nevertheless, the official leaders of American and British foreign policy thought that under the circumstances, the attempt had to be made.

Prime Minister Churchill's report on the Crimean Conference in the House of Commons (February 27, 1945) reflected the attitude of the Anglo-American leaders:

The impression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my other contacts, is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in honourable friendship and equality with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond. I know of no Government which stands to its obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government. I decline absolutely to embark here on a discussion about Russian good faith. It is quite evident that these matters touch the whole future of the world. Somber indeed would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian Soviet Union, if all the future world organizations were rent asunder, and if new cataclysms of inconceivable violence destroyed all that is left of the treasures and liberties of mankind.

President Roosevelt in his address to Congress on March 1, 1945, stated:

Never before have the major Allies been more closely united not only in their war aims but also in their peace aims. And they are

108

determined to continue to he united, to be united with each other and with all peace-loving nations so that the ideal of lasting peace will become a reality. ... I think the Crimean Conference was a successful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells and it ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, exclusive alliances, and spheres of influence, and balances of power, and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peaceloving nations will finally have a chance to join.

President Roosevelt's speech was characteristic of his approach toward fundamental international problems, but Churchill's words might have been only an attempt to dispel unwelcome thoughts. After Yalta Churchill was increasingly concerned about the Soviet attitude in Europe. This can be verified by his many cables sent across the Atlantic. Washington even feared that he "might take some precipitate action that would seriously endanger the unity of the Big Three".¹⁶ So, in May, 1945, Joseph E. Davies was sent to visit him. During their meeting Churchill spoke with such bitterness about Soviet methods that Davies suggested to him that he was "expressing the doctrines which Hitler and Goebbels had been proclaiming . . . in an effort to break up Allied Unity".¹⁷ Eventually Davies' appeasement mission was successful. Amidst postwar difficulties, Great Britain was hardly in a position to initiate, alone, a "tough" policy toward the Soviet Union, and thus to antagonize the United States. Churchill declared that he "was willing to take the risk of a much 'tougher' attitude" but agreed to the "policy of trying to exhaust all means consistent with self-respect in order to resolve the difficulties between the Big Three so that unity might be preserved to achieve a peace after military victory".¹⁸

In the course of negotiations in Moscow, Teheran and Yalta, the Soviet Union was not required to give concrete detailed assurances concerning the independence of the central eastern European countries, and no attempt was made to give a common meaning to the word "democracy". Later, Soviet Russia was not compelled by serious and concentrated dipIomatic actions to live up to the principles laid down in the wartime inter-allied agreements. The belated Western opposition to Soviet violations of international obligations was not integrated into a well-planned European strategy, and in the Danubian region had no influence whatever on the Russian-controlled course of events. The quick demobilization of the American Army was probably considered as a green light for Soviet ambitions.

109

It was characteristic of the general atmosphere of this period that the American military authorities in Germany were not anxious to obtain guarantees from the Russians to assure freedom of communication with Berlin, but they did show deep concern with regard to securing free lines of communication across the British and French zones.¹⁹ The Western powers made further substantial concessions to the Russians at Potsdam in July, 1945, and at the Moscow Conference in December, 1945. As Secretary Byrnes later remarked, his actions in Moscow stemmed from the hope "that the Soviet Union and United States had a common purpose".²⁰

This concept was expressed even more clearly in one of Byrnes' speeches in which he drew a parallel between the role of Soviet Russia in Eastern Europe and that of the United States in the Americas. He pointed out that the United States could not and would not deny to other nations the right to develop a good-neighbor policy and stated that:

Far from opposing, we have sympathized with, for example, the effort of the Soviet Union to draw into closer and more friendly association with her central and eastern European neighbors. We are fully aware of her special security interests in those countries, and we have recognized those interests in the arrangements made for the occupation and control of the former enemy states.²¹

Such ideas played directly into the hands of Soviet policy makers, whose ambitions in Eastern Europe could be easily satisfied by a Stalinist version of an Eurasiatic Monroe doctrine, streamlined according to Communist theories and practice.²²

When representatives of the Western powers arrived in Hungary early in 1945, they clearly based their policy upon a belief in Allied unity. Serious gestures of goodwill toward Hungary nevertheless were made, but the Western powers carefully avoided taking a stand on any delicate political issue which might antagonize the Russians. They were not willing to expose themselves against their powerful ally for the sake of an ex-Axis satellite such as Hungary. Thus the initial violations of the armistice agreement by Soviet authorities and the abuses of the rights of an occupying power as for instance, the wholesale lootings, removal of factories, deportation of civilians on a mass scale, and other violations of international law took place throughout 1945 without a single Western protest. In the course of the execution of the armistice agreement the Russians offered and enforced their interpretation of "democracy" and "fascism" without being seriously challenged by the West; the representatives of the Westem powers showed manifestly that they

110

could not or would not take a stand against the Russians.

A few lower ranking members of the Western missions sometimes made goodwill remarks which were interpreted by the Hungarian public in a wildly optimistic way. In 1945, rumors spread that the western part of Hungary uould be occupied by American and British troops, or that the purely Soviet occupation would be followed by a joint AngloAmerican-Russian occupation. Of course nothing of the sort happened, and disappointment was great.

Although American and British goodwill toward Hungary was displayed mainly in the form of advice and friendly gestures, some material help was forthcoming from both English-speaking countries. There also were humanitarian gifts needed badly in the impoverished country. One of the first American moves was a considerable gift of medicine to the Hungarian Red Cross. Later, the United States granted loans totaling $30,000,000 for the purchase of surplus property.²³ Moreover UNRRA relief supplies, valued at over four million dollars, were sent to Hungary.²⁴ However, the Soviet Government repeatedly refused American proposals aiming at tripartite examinations of Hungary's economic plight and at joint assistance by the Yalta powers.²⁵

The heads of the American, British, and Soviet diplomatic missions were political advisors to the ACC and were not accredited to the Hungarian Government. An American representative with the personal rank of Minister, H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, arrived in Budapest in May, 1945. He functioned as the United States representative in Hungary for the general protection of American interests, in addition to and separate from the ACC, and maintained informal contacts with the provisional Hungarian authorities.²⁶

Schoenfeld on May 15, explained to Foreign Minister Gyongyosi that the American Government intended to help in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Hungary. Moreover, he made it clear that the American authorities did not intend to seize as war booty the property removed forcibly by the Nazis from Hungary into the American zone of Germany, but intended to restore all identifiable displaced property.²⁷ As for war guilt, he declared that the United States advocated punishment of war criminals but opposed application to any particular nation of the principle of collective responsibility. Gyongyosi then called Schoenfeld's attention to the persecution of the Hungarians in Slovakia, and stated that the Hungarian Government would ask for the intervention of the ACC. Later, when an exchange of notes took place between the American Mission and the Hungarian Government in connection with the problem of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Schoenfeld expressed the hope to the Foreign Minister that the American attitude

111

would restrain persecution of the Hungarians.²⁸ He added that the United States had approved the voluntary transfers of population in the belief that the Danubian countries would become ethnically more homogeneous and thereby more cooperative.

On May 26, 1945, the American Minister personally handed Gyongyosi a note expressing American willingness to receive a nonofficial Hungarian representative in Washington even before the renewal of diplomatic relations. Establishment of such representation would have made possible the practical protection of Hungarian interests in the United States. This American offer was reiterated in September, 1945, but the Hungarian government under the protective custody of the ACC could not accept it because of Soviet opposition.

The first American and British protests in Hungary took place against the seizure of the landed properties of British and American citizens, in contravention of Article 13 of the armistice agreement. The Hungarian Government explained the impossibility of exempting foreigners from the agrarian reform but promised full compensation according to the rules of international law.

The British political representative, Alvary D. F. Gascoigne, repeatedly pointed out to Foreign Minister Gyongyosi the shortcomings of Hungarian democratic practices, as for example, the lack of freedom of speech or guarantees for personal liberties. Gascoigne particularly objected to the abuses committed by the political police. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, in a speech along these same lines in the House of Commons on August 20, 1945, had characterized the shortcomings of the new regimes established in the Danubian states. In speaking of the situation in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary he observed:

The Governments which have been set up do not, in our view, represent the majority of the people, and the impression we get from recent developments is that one kind of totalitarianism is being replaced by another. This is not what we understand by that very much overworked word "democracy", which appears to need definition, and the forms of government which have been set up as a result do not impress us as being sufficiently representative to meet the requirements of diplomatic relations.²⁹

All these anomalies were recogmzed by non-Communist Hungarian political leaders and caused serious anxieties to them, but substantial amelioration of the situation was beyond their reach.

The British and American attitude did help to stiffen the Opposition of the non-Communist political parties to the single electoral ticket proposed

112

by the Communist Party, and strongly urged by Voroshilov in October, 1945. This Soviet pressure had occurred after the defeat of the joint Socialist-Communist ticket on October 7, in the Budapest municipal elections. The Western representatives counterbalanced the Soviet move by stating that their governments would not regard elections based on a single electoral ]ist as free elections corresponding to the requirement of the Yalta Declaration. The non-Communist political leaders took courage, refused to give away their political prospects, and their successful resistance to Voroshilov's proposals led to the general elections of November 5, 1945, in which the Communist Party obtained only 17 percent of the votes.

Meanwhile, at the first meeting of the Council of Allied Foreign Ministers,³⁰ opened in London on September 11. 1945, Secretary Byrnes declared that the United States would not sign treaties with the existing unrepresentative governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, but was ready to recognize the government of Hungary on receipt of a pledge of free elections.

An American note delivered to the Hungarian foreign minister on September 22, 1945, indicated the readiness of the United States to establish diplomatic relations and to negotiate a treaty with the provisional Government of Hungary, provided that Government:

would give full assurances for free and untrammeled elections for a representative government and if, in the meantime, it would provide to the full measure of its responsibilities under the armistice regime for freedom of political expression of democratic parties and right of assembly, such conditions being essential to permit the holding of free elections.

On September 25, a Hungarian reply to the United States stated that "the Provisional National Government of Hungary was in a position to offer the guarantees required by the Government of the United States". On September 29, the Department of State, having received this assurance, indicated American willingness to renew relations with Hungary.³¹ This American diplomatic move clearly aimed at strengthening non-Communist elements in the Hungarian coalition.

The Soviet foreign minister, Vyascheslav Molotov, countered the American move by an immediate and unconditional recognition of the Hungarian Government. Voroshilov informed the Hungarian Government, on September 25, that the Soviet Union was ready to establish diplomatic relations with them.

In the course of recognition of the powerless provisional Government

113

of Hungary, a sort of competition took place between the U. S. A. and the U.S.S.R. The Hungarian press had to publish first the establishment of the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and only later the earlier American move. Thus the actual sequence was reversed.

Subsequent]y, the American and Russian missions were changed to legations and the American and Russian diplomatic representatives to the ACC presented their credentials to the Hungarian Government as plenipotentiary ministers.³² Great Britain, however. conforming to the rules of traditional diplomacy, manifested a more reserved attitude. She was not willing to renew regular diplomatic relations with Hungary, a country technically at war with the Allied powers, and appointed as British political representative to Hungary, the British political advisor to the ACC, A. D. F. Gascoigne.³³

Renewal of diplomatic relations with Hungary did not strengthen the position of the British and American representatives in the ACC. The Russians ignored them as before. In the course of the postwar period the most astonishing phenomenon to Hungarian eyes was this striking contrast between the attitude of the Western powers and Soviet Russia.

The Yalta Agreement.

In the spring of 1945, the man in the street read on huge posters all over Hungary the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, signed by Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. The common man considered it as a pledge made to him by the leaders of the three major victorious powers.

It is true that in 1944, inter-allied negotiations took place and allegedly agreements were concluded concerning the establishment of wartime zones of influence in Danubian Europe.³⁴ Whatever may have happened in 1944, the Yalta Agreement appeared to be the valid international agreement concerning the fate of Central and Eastern Europe, at least until the conclusion of the peace treaties. At Yalta the Russians had secured important political concessions, especially with regard to Poland and the Far East, but there were also obligations. No matter what conversations took place and what understandings were agreed upon in earlier periods, Yalta, for better or worse, seemed to be a lex posterior, overruling previous decisions.

At the Crimean Conference Prime Minister Churchill, Marshal Stalin and President Roosevelt jointly declared their mutual agreement:

to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and peoples

114

of the former Axis satellite states in Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

Moreover, the Yalta declaration stated that the three governments:

will jointy assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (A) to establish conditions of internal peace; (B) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

Thus the Yalta Agreement was a contract among the three major powers to act together in giving the peoples of the liberated countries the opportunity to have governments of their own choosing. This pledge was repeated again at Potsdam and solemnly announced to the American public by President Truman. True, this common undertaking of the three major powers was not a pledge by the Western powers to the peoples of liberated Europe which the Western powers were obligated to fulfill against Soviet opposition. The average man, however, did not think in terms of legal niceties. It was difficult for him to realize that the Yalta Agreement was a diplomatic instrument among the three major powers, and that all joint actions could be and actually were frustrated by Soviet authorities. The picture was all the more confusing since the Soviet Chairman on the ACC acted in the name of Britain and the United States as well as in the name of Soviet Russia.

In view of Soviet Russian encroachments and Communist abuses, some Hungarian politicians thought it appropriate to ask for Western support in connection with the rights pledged at Yalta. On these occasions the Western attitude was most reserved. As the American Minister to Hungary put it, the representatives of the western Allies:

were frequently sounded out as to how much help they would provide to the non-Communist political groups. When our invariable reply was that American diplomatic practice excluded the possibility of such interference in the internal political affairs of foreign countries, there was bewilderment at what seemed so unrealistic an attitude compared with that of the Russians.³⁵

The same American policy was expressed even more directly in the following passage of a letter addressed by Minister Schoenfeld to Joseph

115

Cardinal Mindszenty, December 27, 1946:

It is noted that your letters of December 12 and December 16, touching on internal political problems of Hungary, requested the assistance of the United States Government in altering certain conditions which Your Eminence deplores. In this connection you are of course aware of my Government's long standing policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. This policy has proven over a long period of time and through many trying situations the best guarantee of spontaneous, vigorous and genuine democratic development. It will be clear to Your Eminence that it necessarily precludes action by this Legation which could properly be construed as interference in Hungarian domestic affairs or which lies outside the normal functions of diplomatic missions.³⁶

Such diplomatic or other inhibitions did not embarrass the Soviet representatives in Hungary.

Soviet Attitude.

From the very beginning of the Soviet occupation the attitude of the Soviet military and political representatives towards the Western powers was anything but cooperative. The diplomatic representative of Soviet Russia, Georgij Pushkin, came with the Red Army to Debrecen, seat of the provisional Hungarian Government, and there, in cooperation with the Soviet military authorities and the Hungarian Communists, shaped the things to come. Later a few members of the American and British missions arrived, forming the nucleus of the American and British sections of the ACC. They, however, occupied a very isolated position, and did not take part in the actual work of the ACC. It was not suspected at that time that this would remain, in essence, the Western position throughout the armistice period.

In the course of the military occupation of Hungary, it was amazing to hear many simple Russian soldiers freely explain that the Red Army, after defeating the Germans, would expel the British and Americans from the Continent. As early as March, 1945, Soviet propaganda even against Switzerland appeared. At the seat of the new Hungarian Government, in Debrecen, a huge poster depicted the Swiss cow fed by the western Allies and milked by Hitler.

A group of British and Dutch officers who had escaped from German captivity were active in the underground in Hungary during the last years of the war.³⁷ When the Red Army entered Hungary, some of them reported to the Russians and were promptly interned in the town of

116

Hatvan. The best-informed men of this group were not released, but later mysteriously disappeared.

Russian and Hungarian Communists looked upon Hungarians educated in western countries with deep suspicion; in fact, anyone possessing any kind of contacts with the West was regarded in the same manner. Even superficial social contacts with western representatives were considered as treacherous behavior. Democratic leaders who returned from concentration camps, and others who had worked underground risking their lives during the war for the Allied cause were simply eliminated from public life, while former Nazis were welcomed into the Communist party. This suspicion of and hostility to any Western "taint" was, from the outset, characteristic of the Russian and Communist attitude.

The chief instruments of Soviet actions were the Red Army and the ACC. In the entire armistice period, part of the Soviet technique in Hungary was to act in the name of the three major Allies while keeping Britain and the United States from effective action. The Russians always barred joint action, invoking either the exclusive rights of an occupying power or the independence of the Hungarian State. The chairman of the ACC was at the same time commandant of the Soviet military forces in Hungary. To evade all Western intervention, Marshal Voroshilov, or his deputy, usually neglected to explain whether he addressed his demands to the Hungarian Government in the name of the ACC or as the commander-in-chief of the occupying forces. To ask for precision on such occasions was considered as an unfriendly act toward the Soviet Union.

In December, 1945, Marshal Voroshilov warned the Hungarian public that the foreign policy of Hungary did not depend entirely on the Hungarians. At the same time, he pointed out that the Hungarians should not count on considerable outside help at a time when the world was in such a state that no nations could count on external aid.³⁸ Nonetheless, when Western help was offered to Hungary, it was opposed by the Russians. For instance, UNRRA assistance offered to destitute Hungary in March, 1945, was declined by the ACC on the ground of "no necessity", and Soviet opposition to such assistance was continued for some months. Eventually the direct requests of the Hungarian Governnent and those of various Hungarian private organizations received a favorable response from the UNRRA.³⁹

The Russians had a wide choice of means in exerting pressure on Hungarian authorities, for they had practically unlimited power. Personal liberty, the daily bread of the population in fact, all the necessities of life depended entirely upon them. Devastated Hungary had to feed an occupying force of several hundred thousand men. Food

117

supplies were seized. Factory equipment was removed at will as war booty. Hungary was compelled to begin reparation deliveries in 1945. Civilians by the thousands, including women from Eastern Hungary, were taken to the Soviet Union as prisoners of war. Public safety did not exist; there was no authority capable of giving protection against the Russians. Even when the period of large-scale deportations came to an end, people were arrested and judged by Soviet military tribunals on fantastic charges, sometimes for merely having carried out the instructions of the Hungarian Government. In such cases, there was no question of legal assistance or of due process of law. The accused simply disappeared.

One of the first important actions of the newly organized Foreign Ministry was intervention with the Soviet authorities on behalf of the civilians taken as prisoners of war. This action began in Debrecen as early as March, 1945, as part of the activities of the newly organized political division of the Foreign Ministry. A few weeks later when the Ministry moved to Budapest, it became necessary to organize a special division for the prisoners of war cases. This division dealt mainly with requests for intervention from the relatives of deported civilians. The magnitude of the problem grew daily. In a few weeks tens of thousands of cases were registered in the files of the Ministry. In all cases routine interventions were made with the Soviet authorities. They paid no attention to any of them.

Probably the largest number of civilians were taken as prisoners of war after the occupation of Budapest. This may have been due to the small number of soldiers captured after the siege. It was suggested that the Soviet High Command, in its reports, overestimated the strength of the Nazi forces in Budapest and after the occupation of the city wanted to increase the number of war prisoners accordingly. Later, however, requests pouring in by the thousands into the Foreign Ministry from all parts of Hungary, made it evident that the same practice was followed all over the country.⁴⁰ This procedure was most cruel in East Hungary, where, in communities inhabited by people of German origin, the entire adult population of many villages, men and women alike, were taken into Soviet Russia. In other parts of the country Soviet military practice usually disregarded political affiliation, age, social position, or ethnic origin of captured people. They simply needed a certain number of prisoners, and anybody was good enough to fill their quota.

Besides making routine interventions, the Foreign Ministry asked for the release of those who had worked for the cause of the Allies during the war. After a while the Russians became tired of these requests and said that they could understand an intervention on behalf of

118

100,000 people, but it really did not matter whether a few odd individuals were in Hungary or in the Soviet Union. Only the Communist Party managed, in certain special cases, to liberate a few prisoners still in Hungary in concentration camps.

When prisoners were taken by train-loads to the Soviet Union, some prisoners in utter desperation jumped out of the moving trains or otherwise escaped. To make up Ior the losses the guards often encircled the next railroad station and picked up the necessary number of persons to replace the missing men. The train then continued on the journey to Russia. Thus it was entirely a matter of sheer luck whether or not one was kidnapped as a war prisoner. Sometimes Jews returning from Nazi concentration camps were intercepted and rerouted to Russia. A man living in the neighborhood of a Budapest railroad station left his home to buy some matches. Four months later his farnily received their next news of him from Archangelsk.

From the practical handling of the civil deportation cases it clearly appeared that the liberty and dignity of the human individual, the cornerstone of Western civilization, was a non-existent category in the Soviet Russian mind.

Besides the prisoners of war, some Hungarian politicians were taken to Russia. This happened without any publicity or accusation of any sort. They were simply rounded up. This procedure of elimination was a warning given to all politicians who would not submit entirely to Soviet dictation. Among the politicians who suffered this fate was Count Stephen Bethlen, prime minister of Hungary between 1921 and 1931. He publicly denounced Nazi ideas and anti-Jewish laws. In the Crown Council he advocated direct armistice negotiations with the Soviet Union. He countered the objection that the Russians would commit robberies, rape, loot and so on, with the remark that they would do less if they came as friends. Despite these facts, Bethlen was arrested, and deported to the Soviet Union.

A strongly anti-Nazi publicist, Ivan Lajos, published a so-called "Grey Book" in 1939. In it he denounced the German war preparations and revealed the weaknesses of the German economic system and war potential. This book translated into several languages was later confiscated under German pressure by the Hungarian Government. The author himself was taken by the Germans to Mauthausen. Upon his return after the war he studied Franco-Hungarian relations and became one of the propagators of the cooperation of the Danubian peoples, and allegedly advocated the restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy. On one occasion he informed me, enthusiastically, that he had discussed the various possibilities of Danubian cooperation with a Soviet captain who

119

showed much interest in the matter. Shortly thereafter he disappeared. Count John Esterhazy, the leader of the Hungarian party in Slovakia during the Second World War, was the only member of the Slovak Parliament who voted against the Hitlerite anti-Semitic laws and strongly criticized them as not being in accordance with humanitarian principles. Esterhazy was arrested in 1945, and a few weeks later was suddenly taken to Soviet Russia together with the other leading personalities of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. A Slovak people's court sentenced him to death in absentia.

The fate and whereabouts of politicians taken to Russia was usually unknown. Count Bethlen and Ivan Lajos are believed to have died. Esterhazy was returned to Slovakia and his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment.

This method of eliminating political opponents was unknown in countries belonging to Western civilization. In Horthy's Hungary the Communist party was banned, but the Communist agents, if caught, had an open trial and legal assistance, and usually were sentenced to several years for subversive activities. The example of Rakosi and Zoltan Vas are cases in point.

Irrespective of other political considerations, the mass deportation of civilians and selected politicians was but one of the initial means to frighten the population into conformity with Soviet wishes. At first it was difficult to understand the apparently senseless Soviet behavior, which seemed harmful even to the Communist cause. After a while, however, it became obvious that behind these actions there had been an over-all plan. Abuses and atrocities were carried out to frighten the population and to weaken its moral and economic resistance. The Russians did not care for popularity. They wanted servile submission; they preferred to be feared rather than loved. The abuses of the Red Army made the Russians and Communists unpopular, but at the same time created a feeling of helplessness in all social classes. The creation of an atmosphere of fear and of absolute personal insecurity was a necessary precondition for subsequent Soviet political actions supporting the Hungarian Communists. In Hungary, unlike Czechoslovakia, the seizure of power did not take place by one stroke, but was a gradual process. With the help of the Red Army and the ACC in the armistice period, the Communists gradually seized all key positions and created a state apparatus which eventually served their interests alone.

Hungarian Expectations.

Despite all the difficulties with the Russians, a strange optimism was discernible in the Hungarian coalition parties, especially after the Communist

120

defeat in the elections of November 1945.⁴¹ All political parties recognized the impact of Soviet Russia's overwhelming power position in the Danubian area and were well aware of Soviet methods, but nevertheless a spirit of wishful thinking prevailed. Soviet Russia appeared a newcomer in the society of great powers. She was a muchpraised ally of the great western democracies. Her harsh manners seemed due to a different tradition and not to ill will. After the armistice period she would, so some Hungarians thought, withdraw into the vastness of Russia and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Hungary. Even a few non-Muscovite Communists who pictured the future along lines that today would be considered Titoism, openly discussed such ideas. At that time this way of thinking was not a crime. Moreover Communist leaders and the Russians openly encouraged it.

Such optimism was not generally shared but was all the more remarkable because events in other countries clearly foreshadowed the things to come in Hungary. In Yugoslavia and in Poland communist-dominated regimes were installed and free elections had not been held. In the two westernmost Danubian countries Hungary and Czechoslovakia free elections were permitted and almost genuine coalition governments were established, but in Bulgaria and Rumania other considerations prevailed. In the region of the lower Danube and on the shores of the Black Sea, Soviet Russia had direct strategic interests for which Molotov repeatedly had exposed himself at his last meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop, in November 1940.⁴² This region was part of the road to Istanbul, and there was the Rumanian oil. Thus the Soviet action was immediate and inexorable. Both in Bulgaria and Rumania the nonCommunist elements were eliminated from the government by force. Soviet Russia dominated these former Axis satellite countries through the Red Army and the Allied Control Commissions. The puppet regimes and the Soviet authorities refused to consider American and British interventions.⁴³

In Hungary the alarming news of Soviet interference and Communist seizure of power in Yugoslavia, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria was discounted under considerations such as the following: Hungary's geographical and political situation is different; our Communists are different; it can't happen here; we defeated the Communists at free elections, recognized as such by the whole world; we are neither Slavs nor Orthodox; we belong culturally to the West; the Russians fully realize that an Eastern system would be completely foreign to our people; they prefer a free cooperation with the majority of the people instead of the imposition of a minority rule.

Many progressive liberal intellectuals, disgusted with the previous

121

regimes, considered the Communists as one species of the left-wing parties, and hoped that the Hungarian Communists would be the spokesmen for the Hungarian cause in Moscow. Foreign Minister Gyongyosi followed a policy of strict cooperation with the Soviet Union. His attitude notwithstanding, the Russians frequently intervened in the conduct of Hungary's foreign affairs both in major and minor matters. Contacts with the West were hindered and all propositions of collaboration with neighboring states rebuffed.

The Potsdam Protocol of August 2, 1945, caused a further deterioration of Hungary's position.⁴⁴ The undefined category of "German external assets" in territories under Soviet occupation, granted to Soviet Russia as reparations, opened new possibilities for Soviet conquest of the Hungarian economy. In the political field, the Western acceptance of the principle of collective responsibility in connection with the transfer of the German population from Hungary was a blow to Hungary's position, which was based on individual responsibility in the matter of war criminals and traitors.⁴⁵ This also contradicted official American policy repeatedly expressed to the Hungarian Government. The Potsdam Protocol did contain some favorable provisions. It looked forward to the early conclusion of a peace treaty and Hungary's admission into the United Nations. These and certain other provisions filled Hungarian politicians with new hope. They thought that after the evacuation of Hungary by the Red Arrny a real democratic evolution would take place. Their optimism was further bolstered by President Truman's report to the American people after the Potsdam Conference.

The greatest disappointment of Hungarian foreign policy in the armistice period was the attitude of the three major Allies concerning persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. The leaders of new Hungary planned and eagerly wished to establish friendly relations with Czechoslovakia. Prague did not reciprocate this policy. A Government proclamation announced that Czechoslovakia was going to be transformed into a national state and President Benes emphasized in his speech of May 9, 1945, that the Czechs and Slovaks did not want to live together in the same state with Germans and Hungarians. Persecution and expulsion of Hungarians began.⁴⁶

The Hungarian Government between April, 1945, and July, 1946, addressed 184 notes to the ACC protesting specific cases of persecutions in Czechoslovakia.⁴⁷ The result was neither action nor answer. The United States was the only power which gave some indirect support to Hungary. An American memorandum handed to the Hungarian Government on June 12, 1945, took a stand against collective punishment of ethnic groups, and emphasized that the removal of minorities could

122

take place only in accordance with international agreements, and "in an orderly way".⁴⁸

These principles of American foreign policy were expressed in Prague as well, but neither these nor the Hungarian protests addressed to the ACC influenced the course of Czechoslovak policy. As the persecutions continued, the Hungarian Government repeatedly sent complaints accompanied by extensive memoranda directly to the British, American and Soviet representatives in Budapest and asked for the intervention of the major victorious powers. In a note of September 12, 1945, the Hungarian Government requested to be heard by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the question of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, and proposed that an international commission of inquiry, composed of the representatives of France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, should investigate and examine the controversial issues between Czechoslovakia and Hungary.⁴⁹ In spite of the negative attitude of the victorious powers, the Hungarian Government reiterated its request in another note of November 20, 1945, and asked that the districts of Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians be placed under international control, pending the appointment of the commission of inquiry.⁵⁰

These moves met with no success, and the Government of Prague intimated that an exchange of population was the price for the reconsideration of their anti-Hungarian measures. Negotiations began at Prague in December, 1945. The head of the Czechoslovak delegation, Vladimir Clementis, under-secretary of state in the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, proposed that the Czechoslovak Government should have the right to remove, in equal numbers, Hungarians from Czechoslovakia in exchange for the Slovaks in Hungary who spontaneously declared their wish to be transferred. The transfer would take place under the supervision of a Hungaro-Czechoslovak mixed commission. The Hungarians who were not subject to the exchange would also be removed to Hungary and their goods confiscated.⁵¹

The Hungarian delegation proposed the immediate abolition of all discriminatory anti-Hungarian measures and refused to enter into negotiations about the removal of Hungarians remaining in Czechoslovakia after the population exchange. It expressed the opinion that the transfer of these Hungarians to Hungary could only be effected with the simultaneous cession of the territory on which they lived.⁵² Moreover, the Hungarian delegation tried once more to secure Western cooperation in the settlement of the conflict with Czechoslovakia. However, the Hungarian proposal concerning the participation of Western representatives in an international commission to be established for the supervision of the population exchange was opposed not only by Czechoslovakia,

123

but was later rejected by the British and United States Governments as well.⁵³ Clementis made it clear that the persecution of Hungarians would be continued until the conclusion of the population exchange agreement and pointed out that Czechoslovakia, enjoying the support of both East and West, would be able to expel all Hungarians, or remove them if necessary, to the Sudeten territories. The Hungarian delegation repeatedly pointed out that Hungary disapproved the population exchange as an action contrary to the principles of democracy and humanity. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Government was prepared, under duress, to accept the transfer. But it stipulated that the rights of the Hungarian population, remaining in Czechoslovakia after the exchange, would have to be guaranteed until the peace settlement. It appeared that the Hungarian and Czechoslovak standpoints were irreducible, and since the delegations could not agree even on the text of a communique, the two governments published separate statements.

After the failure of the Prague negotiations, the Russians increased their pressure on the Hungarian Government for the acceptance of the Czechoslovak standpoint with respect to the settlement of the Hungarian question in Slovakia. Pushkin complacently explained to Foreign Minister Gyongyosi that the clumsy Czechoslovak politicians committed a serious political mistake in not removing the Hungarians from Slovakia at the close of the hostilities. Thus an accomplished fact would have been created which would have solved the chief difficulty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the negotiations between the two countries would have been made a lot easier. Pushkin repeatedly made it clear that Czechoslovakia enjoyed the unqualified support of Soviet Russia because in the past she had proved a reliable friend; Hungary should accept the Czechoslovak thesis and should look for compensation from Rumania, a country which had been in the same boat as Hungary. Such were Pushkin's suggestions.

The present writer and the Czechoslovak experts of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry advised Foreign Minister Gyongyosi that Hungary should delay negotiations and submit to the peace conference the whole problem of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, including the population exchange. Gyongyosi, however, felt that this policy would run against Western advice and would provoke strong Soviet retaliation. All these powers remained unresponsive to Hungarian proposals and complaints concerning the persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, and the Hungarian Government had no means of defending its suffering kinsmen or to hinder mass expulsions or internal removals to the Sudeten territories. Under these conditions, Gyongyosi saw no other possibility for the defense of the Hungarians in Slovakia but to go ahead in the direction

124

of the population exchange. Moreover, he was convinced that the population exchange would prove that the Czechoslovak allegations of the existence of several hundred thousand Slovaks in Hungary were absolutely without foundation.⁵⁴ Gyongyosi was afraid that the Czechoslovak Government with its great propaganda facilities might convince the peace conference of the validity of these allegations, and hoped that the results of the population exchange would reveal the real situation and thus strengthen Hungary's position at the peace table.

Negotiations were renewed at Prague, and, in February, 1946, Hungary signed a population exchange agreement with Czechoslovakia an unequal treaty, containing a series of unilateral benefits to Czechoslovakia.⁵⁵ By the conclusion of this treaty, however, the Hungarian Government obtained some pledges from the Czechoslovak Government and thus hoped to assure at least physical survival for the bulk of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia until the decision of the Peace Conference.⁵⁶

All in all, the failure of Hungarian endeavors to obtain Western cooperation for the preservation of the basic human rights of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia was anything but encouraging for the future. The passive attitude of the Western powers in this affair increased the feeling among Hungarian politicians that the Hungarian nation had been completely abandoned to Soviet Russia and the Slav interests. Even considering the fact that Hungary had lost the war and Czechoslovakia belonged to the United Nations, Western aloofness did not portend much good for Hungary, and caused serious worries for non-Communist Hungarian politicians, who were eager to promote a friendly cooperation of peoples in the Danubian region on the basis of equality.

125

DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL