![[Table of Contents]](../icons/toc.gif){kind=icon}
![[Previous]](../icons/back.gif){kind=icon}
![[Next]](../icons/next.gif){kind=icon}
![[HMK Home]](../icons/home.gif){kind=icon}
|
DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL |
I
STRUGGLE ALONG THE DANUBE
1 These are the Polish lowland narrow between the Northern Carpathians and the
Baltic Sea, and the Door of Focsani between the Eastern Carpathians and the
Danube Delta. The possession of the Carpathian Basin is a necessity for an
eastern power which wants to control the northern lowland route toward the
Atlantic and the outlets to the Mediterranean (Adriatic and Agean seas and the
Straits). For Russia - Czarist or Soviet it is also the European key-area for
the control of the eastern Mediterranean Sea and thus of the Suez Canal route.
A western embracement of the Middle East is only possible through the control
of the Carpathian Basin and the Balkan Peninsula together. See map on p 4.
2 See for details, H. St. L. B. Moss, The Birth of the Middle Ages 395-814
(Oxford, 1935), pp. 38-56. Balint Homan, Geschichte des Ungarischen
Mittelalters, I. Band (Berlin, 1940), pp. 17-27. Ferdinand Lot, Les Invasions
Germaniques: La Penetration Mutuelle du Monde Barbare et du Monde Romain
(Paris, 1945)
3 Cf. A. Ronai, Biographie des Frontiäres Politiques du Centre-Est
Europeen (Budapest, 1936). The map on p 35, showing the durability of the
frontiers in Eastern Central Europe from 1000 to 1920, is of particular
interest. However, this unparalleled and almost perfect geographic and
hydrographic unity did not prove to be an unmixed blessing to Hungary. The
natural frontiers helped to develop an extreme local patriotism in the country
in the sense of: Extra Hungariam non est vita, si est vita, non est ita, and in
certain periods of history, an unconcern for wider horizons. In addition, the
protection offered by the boundaries induced many peoples living outside the
Carpathians, to seek shelter in Hungary. This fact contributed considerably to
the increase of the various nationalities in the country.
For the sources of the various periods of Hungarian history, see the
bibliographical article of Stephen Borsody, "Modern Hungarian Historiography,"
The Journal of Modern History, XXIX (1952), 398-405.
4 The recent study of Oscar Halecki emphasized the unusual rapidity with which
the Magyars integrated themselves into the Christian European community and
absorbed Western culture. Moreover, he rightly pointed out the consequences of
the establishment of the Hungarian state for the whole later course of Slavic
and Central European history. Oscar Halecki, Borderlands of Western
Civilization. A History of East Central Europe (New York, 1952), pp. 30-32.
The Holy Crown has been throughout history the supreme symbol of the Hungarian
Kingdom. Cf Patrick Kelleher, The Holy Crown of Hungary, Papers and Monographs
of the American Academy in Rome (Rome, 1951). Mathild Uhlirz, Die Krone des
heiligen Stephan, des ersten Konigs von Ungarn, Veroffentlichungen des
Instituts fur ôsterreichische Geschichtsforschung (Graz, 1951).
5 For information concerning the various Hungarian wars and alliances with
Constantinople and their interplay in general European politics, see Homan, op.
cit., pp 379-403.
6 In 1241 there occurred the first great catastrophe in Hungarian history when
the country was overrun and devastated by the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan. It
was the first time, after the establishment of Hungary, that a major foreign
army crossed the Carpathian mountains. Subsequently the Russian army in 1849
and the Red Army in 1944 followed suit.
189
7 Cf. Emil Reich, "Hungary and the Slavonic Kingdoms", Cambridge Modern
History, Vol. I (New York, 1902), pp. 329-346. Christopher Dawson Understanding
Europe (New York, 1952), pp. 86-87.
8 Because or the Turkish danger threatening the Christian world on the banks
of the Danube, Pope Calixtus III, on June 29, 1456, ordered prayers in every
Christian land, and the tolling of bells between noon and vespers. Cf. Ludwig
Pastor, The History of the Popes (London, 1891), Vol. II, p. 400.
9 The Rumanians in Transylvania claim to be descendants of the Dacians, of
Trajan's soldiers and Roman settlers. Hungarian scholars say that the Rumanians
migrated into Transylvania sporadically after the twelfth century but in great
masses only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The historians of the
two nations collected a mass of evidence to prove the correctness of their
respective theories. However it may have been, it seems utterly irrelevant
today whether the Hungarians or Rumanians were the first settlers in
Transylvania. For the two opposite views see Louis Tamas, Romans et Roumains
dans l'histoire de la Dacie Traiane (Budapest, 1936); G. Bratianu, Une Enigme
et un miracle historique le peuple roumain (Bucharest, 1937); R. W.
SetonWatson, A History of the Roumanians (Cambridge, 1934); Eugene Horvath
Transylvania and the History of the Rumanians, A Reply to Professor R. W.
Seton-Watson (Budapest, 1935).
10 Transylvania sometimes played a significant role in international
relations. Stephen Bathory, prince of Transylvania (1572-1581) was elected king
of Poland in 1575 and defeated the Russian monarch, Ivan the Terrible, who had
endeavored to expand toward the West. Several of the Transylvanian princes
chiefly Gabriel Bethlen (1613-1629) and George Rakoczi (1630-1648) maintained
close relations and often negotiated alliances with Western European Protestant
powers and with France, in order to strengthen their position against the
Habsburgs.
Religious tolerance became an official policy of the princes in Transylvania
in a period when religious persecution was at its peak in western Europe. The
Transylvanian Diet of 1564 proclaimed freedom of religion. In 1571 four
religions were recognized: Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism and Unitarianism
(receptae religiones). The peace treaty of Vienna concluded in 1606 between the
Emperor Rudolph II and Stephen Bocskay, prince of Transylvania, went beyond the
principle of "cuius regio, eius religio" and guaranteed religious freedom for
individuals.
Though conditions in Transylvania were far from ideal, they were incomparably
better than those beyond the Carpathians. This was the main reason for the
constant influx of Rumanians. In the second half of the seventeenth century
Transylvania itself was ravaged by Turkish and Tartar hordes. Thus she
gradually withered away from the European scene as a power factor. In 1691, the
Diploma Leopoldinum declared Transylvania a Habsburg province. For the History
of Transylvania, see Ladislaus Makkai, Histoire de Transylvanie, Paris 1946).
Cf. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and her Successors (London, 1937), pp. 254-270.
11 Rakoczi was a descendant of one of the ruling princes of Transylvania. The
Hungarian Diet elected him "ruling prince" and Louis XIV gave him some support
during the war of Spanish Succession. In order to win international recognition
the Diet proclaimed the dethronement of the House of Habsburg and Rakoczi's
troops occupied almost the whole of Hungary. When, however, the Austrian army
was released from the West, the long insurrection (1703-1711) was defeated.
Rakoczi's commander-in-chief concluded peace with the Emperor who promised the
ancient constitutional rights and religious freedom to Hungary. Rakoczi and a
group of his followers died in exile. For details, see, Ladislas
190
Baron Hengelmaller, Hungary's Fight for National Existence, 1703-1711 (London,
1913).
12 Under King Mathias Hunyadi, at the end of the fifteenth century Hungary
possessed a population of approximately five million, of which 75 to 80 percent
were Magyars. A census in 1720, after tbe expulsion of the Turks, revealed
three and one half million persons in Hungary proper, of which only about 55
percent were Magyars. As a result of colonization, the proportion of the
Magyars further decreased in the eighteenth century. For the changes in
Hungary's population see The Hungarian Peace Negotiations, published by the
Royal Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. I (Budapest, 1921), pp.
43-53.
13 An English scholar suggested that the central tragedy of the year 1848 was
the fact that "the Magyars, unquestionably the torchbearers of constitutional
liberty in all the Danubian countries, become at the same time advocates of
racial uniformity and assimilation in its extreme form, and try to apply to the
other races of the country, which still form a decided majority of the
population, the very methods which they resent so intensely when applied by the
Germans to themselves". R. W. Seton-Watson, "The Era of Reform in Hungary". The
Slavonic and East European Review, XI, American Series, II (1942-1943), 166.
14 In July, 1849, shortly before the final defeat, the Hungarian Parliament in
a belated effort to reconcile the nationalities passed a very liberal
nationality act.
15 Austrian protests notwithstanding, President Taylor stated in his special
message to Congress on March 28, 1850: "My purpose . . . was to have
acknowledged the independence of Hungary had she succeeded in establishing a
government de facto on a basis sufficiently permanent in its character to have
justified me in doing so, according to the usages and settled principles of
this Government and although she is now fallen, and many of her gallant
patriots are in exile or in chains, I am free still to declare that had she
been successful in the maintenance of such a government as we could have
recognized, we should have been the first to welcome her into the family of
nations". John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International law, Vol. I
(Washington, 1906), p. 113. Cf. Leslie C. Tihany, "America's Interest in
Hungarian Struggle for Independence", United States Department of State
Documents and State Papers, I (1948), 323-339.
16 Cf. Alfred Francis Pribram, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain, (London
1951), pp. 41-42. Charles Sproxton, Palmerston and the Hungarian Rerolution
(Cambridge, 1919).
17 There is a considerable literature devoted to Kossuth's stay and activities
in the United States. For example, Report of the Special Committee of the City
of New York for the Reception of Governor Louis Kossuth (New York, 1852). Ph.
Skinner, The Welcome of Kossuth (Philadelphia, 1852). Kossuth in New England
(Boston, 1852). F. M. Newman, Select Speeches of Kossuth (New York, 1854).
Denis J_nossy, "Kossuth and the Presidential Election, 1852" Hungarian
Quarterly, VII (1941), 105-111. Stephen G_l, "Kossuth, America and the Danubian
Confederation", Hungarian Quarterly, VI (1940), 417-433. Denes J_nossy
published three volumes in Hungarian on the Kossuth emigration in Great Britain
and the United States (Budapest, 1940-1948).
18 Louis Kossuth, Memories of My Exile (New York, 1880). Kossuth also
negotiated with various Slav and Rumanian emigre groups on the possibilities of
cooperation among Danubian peoples and published a plan for a Danubian
federation. Cf. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire; Nationalism and
National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1898-1918, Vol. II (New York, 1950),
pp. 108-114 and the literature quoted there.
19 The Polish nation has been in this respect a momentous exception and
191
Pan-Slavism never became a popular movement among them. One part of Poland
lived under Russian rule after the partitions. The Poles knew from experience
the meaning of the Russian liberation and protection. In Austria the Poles
belonged to the category of the most satisfied nationalities and held high
positions in the Austrian administration until the very last. Cf. H. W. V.
Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol. IV (London, 1921),
pp. 58-69.
20 Cf., Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism (University of Notre Dame Press, 1953).
21 The compromise meant the recognition of Hungary's constitutional rights by
the Habsburgs after a struggle which lasted over three centuries. Its
conclusion was preceded by long negotiations in the course of which the chief
Hungarian negotiator, Francis Deak, claimed that Hungary had remained an
independent country since 1526 and that between Austria and Hungary there was
established a union only in the person of the monarch. The compromise was
embodied in Hungary in statute 12 of the year 1867: "The relations of Hungary
to Austria." For its English text see, Geoffrey Drage, Austria-Hungary (London,
1908), pp. 753-766. Cf. Louis Eisenmann, Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867
(Paris, 1904).
22 C. A. Macartney, Op. cit., pp 20-21. Cf. Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg
Monarchy 1867-1914 (Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 83.
23 The process of Magyarization began in the first part of the nineteenth
century with the increasing use of the Magyar language. It was most successful
in the towns. These usually had large German and some Jewish populations. The
way of life of the Magyar society had a great attractive force and, especially
until the 1880's, Magyarization was to a considerable extent a spontaneous
development. The children of the Czech and German officials transferred to
Hungary during the period of oppression (1849-1867) frequently became the most
chauvinistic Magyars. In the subsequent period of forced Magyarization the
Rumanians and Serbians resisted much more effectively than the Germans, Slovaks
or Ruthenians because their Orthodox churches enjoyed considerable autonomy and
these remained cultural and political centers. Cf. Macartney, op. cit., pp.
32-34.
24 Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that in the same period of time, the
nationality policy of other states was harsher than that of Hungary. It is
enough to refer to the treatment of the Poles in Germany and the Ukranians in
Russia. Undoubtedly, in Hungary, in addition to the policy of Magyarization,
administrative abuses occurred which formed a suitable subject of propaganda
and were greatly publicized, particularly in France and England. But the
legislation of the country did not jeopardize anybody's economic existence
because of his nationality. For instance, the Rumanians in Transylvania in the
decades preceding World War I, bought up in an organized way large properties
from Hungarians. For such transactions money was lent not only by Rumanian but
also by Hungarian and German banks. The elaborate legislative and
administrative measures of discrimination in economic matters, practiced by the
successor states between the world wars against national minorities, was
unknown in historic Hungary.
II-CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
1 According to an American student of international affairs, the sudden
disappearance of Austria-Hungary "has been characterized as the most important
purely political occurrence since the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476
A.D." Raymond Leslie Buell, Europe: A History of Ten Years (New York, 1928), p.
296.
192
II-CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
2 According to the famous Czech historian, Frantisek Palaczky, it would have
been necessary to create the Habsburg Monarchy, had it not existed. Other
outstanding Slav and Rumanian statesmen also believed that the polyglot Empire
was a necessity to its own people and to Europe. Eduard Benes stated in one of
his books that he did not believe in the dismemberment of Austria. He argued
that the historic and economic bonds between the Austrian nations are too
powerful to make such a dismemberment possible. And he predicted that the
national struggles would play an important role in Austria for a long time but
that they would not be the same as they used to be in the preceding half
century. Eduard Benes, Le probläme Autrichien et la question Tchäque
(Paris, 1908), p. 307.
A Rumanian patriot, Aurel C. Popovici, the Austro-Rumanian champion of ethnic
federalism, correctly pointed out the international aspect of the Austrian
problem: "Rumania, based on her urge for self-preservation, has a great
interest in the existence of a mighty Austria. This interest excludes a priori
any dream, any thought of an annexation of Austrian territories inhabited by
Rumanians. Such annexation would be possible only in the case of an Austrian
debacle, and such a debacle with mathematical certainty would in the course of
a few decades lead to the ruin of Rumania, her destruction in the Russian sea."
Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich (Leipzig, 1906), p. 418. English
translation in Robert A. Kann, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 314-315.
3 Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm, (Boston, 1948), p. 10.
4 New York Times, October 3, 1950.
5 Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929). Cf.
Macartney, National States and National Minorities (Oxford University Press,
1934). R. W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908). R. W.
Seton-Watson, Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy (London, 1911).
Ferenc Eckhardt, A Short History of the Hungarian People (London, 1931). Jules
Szekfu, Etat et Nation (Paris, 1945) . A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy
1809-1918 (London, 1948). Dominic G. Kosary, A History of Hungary (Cleveland,
1941). Oscar Halecki, op. cit. For the general aspects of modern nationalism,
see, Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York, 1926); The
Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931). Hans Kohn, The
Idea of Nationalism (New York, 1944). Alfred Cobban, National
Self-Determination, Revised edition (Chicago, 1947).
6 The case of Austria-Hungary has been ably presented by Archduke Otto, the
eldest son of Emperor-King Charles, the last Austro-Hungarian ruler. "Danubian
Reconstruction", Foreign Afairs, 20 (1941-42), 243-252.
7 Count Ottokar Czernin, writing under the impact of the events in 1918 was
rather pessimistic and thought that "Austria-Hungary's watch had run down" in
any event. "We could have fought against Germany with the Entente on Austro
Hungarian soil, and would doubtless have hastened Germany's collapse; but the
wounds which Austria-Hungary would have received in the fray would not have
been less serious than those from which she is now suffering; she would have
perished in the fight against Germany, as she has as good as perished in her
fight allied with Germany." In the World War (New York, 1920), pp. 36-37.
8 See Oesterreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914-1918, published by the Austrian
Bundesministerium fur Heereswesen, editor-in-chief Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, 7
vols. (Vienna, 1931-1938).
9 The Austrian Minister to Great Britain between the world wars made the
following statement concerning the foreign service: "Although its personnel
consisted of Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Czechs, Croats,
Italians and Serbs from the different parts of the Monarchy, the service was
inspired by a single-minded patriotism, and I remember no single case in
which
193
an official ever put the interests of his own nationality before those of the
Monarchy." Sir George Franckenstein, Diplomat of Destiny (New York, 1940), p.
25.
10 In the early stages of the First World War, the Entente Powers did not plan
the destruction of Austria-Hungary. With respect to President Wilson, Colonel
House noted that "ln common with the leading statesmen of western Europe he
believed that the political union of Austro-Hungarian peoples was a necessity."
Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, VoI. III (Boston, 1928}
pp. 335-336. When President Wilson, in his address of December 4. 1917,
proposed to Congress a declaration of war on the Habsburg Monarchy, he
emphasized that "We do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own
life, either industrially or politically. We do not propose or desire to
dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left
in their own hands, in all matters, great or small." Foreign Relations 1917,
pp. XI-XII. According to point ten of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, "The
peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see
safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of
autonomous development." At almost the same time, on January 5, 1918, Prime
Minister Lloyd George stated that the British were not fighting to destroy
Austria-Hungary and that a break-up of that Empire was no part of their war
aims.
Notwithstanding these various declarations of principle, the specific promises
made in the course of the war to Italy, to Rumania, and later to the other
nationalities could not have been fulfilled without the destruction of the
Monarchy. Moreover, in the last months of the war the propaganda and diplomatic
activity of the Entente powers underwent a fundamental change with regard to
the fate of Austria-Hungary. Clemenceau's revelations in April, 1918,
concerning Emperor Charles' peace overtures had a decisive impact on the course
of events. Some Western statesmen possibly fell under the spell of the wartime
propaganda encouraged and supported by themselves, at first perhaps only for
military expediency. In this process, Czech political leaders in the western
countries played a leading role and the creation of Czechoslovakia was the most
decisive blow to the Monarchy. For details see, Eduard Benes My War Memoirs,
(Boston, 1922). E. Benes, Detruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie (Paris, 1916), published
in English in the following year. T. G. Masaryk, The Making of a State (London,
1927). Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years 1892-1922 (Garden City, 1925).
R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (Cambridge, 1943). War Memoirs of Robert
Lansing (Indianapolis, 1935). Charles Pergler, America in the Struggle for
Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphia, 1926). Count Stephen Burian, Austria
in Dissolution (London. 1925). Heinrich Lammasch, Europas elfte Stunde
(Munchen. 1919). Mitchell Pirie Briggs, George D. Herron and the European
Settlement (Stanford, 1932). A. J. P. Taylor, op. cit. Victor S. Mametey, "The
United States and the Dissolution of Austria-Hungary", Journal of Central
European Affairs, X (1950), 256-270.
11 The recent allegation made by Stefan Osusky, one of the founders of
Czechoslovakia, that Emperor Charles' irresolution and procrastination caused
the downfall of the Monarchy is unsubstantiated by facts and is contrary to the
events, especially as explained by Masaryk and Benes who, since 1915, had been
doing successful spade work for the destruction of the Monarchy. Cf. Freedom
and Union (May 1949), pp. 22-23. Regardless of what Emperor Charles might have
offered to the nationalities in 1918, the positions in Paris, London, Rome and
Washington were definitively taken against the survival of the Monarchy.
12 For details see, Oscar Jaszi, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary
(London, 1924). Count Michel Karolyi, Fighting the World; the Struggle for
Peace (New York, 1925). Gusztav Gratz, A forradalmak kora 1918-1920 (Budapest,
1935).
194
II-CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
13 For a description of these events, see, C. A. Macartney, op. cit., pp.
275-279, 364-370, 390-395.
14 A. J. P. Taylor, op. cit., 250.
15 Albert Kaas, Bolshevism in Hungary (London, 1931). F. Borkenau World
Communism (New York, 1939), pp. 108-133. In Soviet Russia itself the
establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was considered an event of the
greatest importance. Even the cautious Lenin asserted in his speech of April 17
that "the Hungarian Revolution plays a larger role in history than the Russian
revolution. " Quoted bn Dasid T. Cattell, "The Hungarian Revolution of 1919 and
the Reorganization of the Comintern in 1920", Journal of Central European
Affairs, XI (1951), 27-38.
16 Herbert Hoover gave a colorful description of these events in the
following: "Hungary in the year 1919 presented a sort of unending, formless
procession of tragedies, with occasional comic relief. Across our
reconstruction stage there marched liberalism, revolution, socialism,
communism, imperialism, terror, wanton executions, murder, suicide, falling
ministries, invading armies, looted hospitals, conspirators, soldiers, kings
and queens all with a constant background of starving women and children. ...
The relief organization contributed something to their spiritual recovery. But
had there not been a magnificent toughness in the Magyar spirit, the race would
have collapsed". The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover 1874-1920 (New York, 1952), p.
397.
17 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War, Vol. I, (Washington 1933),
pp. 163-205. H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris,
Vol. IV, (London, 1921), pp. 368-381.
18 "As regards the question of plebiscites the Allied Powers consider them
needless, when they perceived with certainty that this consultation, if
surrounded with complete guarantees of sincerity, would not give results
substantially different from those at which they had arrived after a minute
study of the ethnographic conditions and national aspirations". H. W. V.
Temperley, op cit., Vol. IV, p. 422. Concerning the Hungarian peace treaty
negotiations see, Francis Deak Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference (New York,
1942).
19 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis The Aftermath (New York, 1929), pp.
231-232.
20 At this time the United States had 92,000,000 inhabitants.
21 Frederick Hertz, The Economic Problem of the Danubian States (London,
1947), pp. 24, 38, 49.
22 Daily Telegraph, April 18, 1950. In connection with the centenary of Thomas
Masaryk's birth an exchange of opinion took place on the break-up of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire in April 14, 17, 18, 19, 27 and June 1, 1950 issues of
the Telegraph.
With regard to the establishment of Czechoslovakia, Samuel Hazzard Cross of
Harvard, gave in retrospect the following description of events:
"It is worth remarking that in 1914 Bohemian ambitions had not extended beyond
vague hopes of eventual autonomy within a federalized monarchy, while the
utopia of independence was conceived mainly in the minds of emigre leaders like
Professor Masaryk and Dr. Benes. It was not until 1917 that the domestic
Bohemian attitude became definitely revolutionary, and Slovak sympathy was not
finally secured until May, 1918, through the celebrated Treaty of Pittsburgh,
which guaranteed the Slovaks a degree of autonomy which they never attained
until just before the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered by Hitler. As a
matter of fact, the relations between Czechs and Slovaks were never so
dove-like
195
as Bohemian statesmen would have had us suppose and at the Armistice, Czech
troops had simply marched in and occupied the Slovak section of Hungary".
Slavic Civilization Through the Ages (Harvard University Press, 1948), p.
182.
23 In the light of statistics his conclusion was that "all the efforts to
foster, by an extreme protectionism, elther the rapid increase of agricultural
production or that of industrial output had only a very limited success.
Increases of production were smaller than the progress under the former
conditions of free trade within the Austro-Hungarian Customs Union." Hertz, op.
cit., p. 220.
24 See article 222 of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, and articles 205, 207
and 208 of the Peace Treaty of Trianon.
25 Hugh Seton-Watson has published the best general description of these
events. See Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941 (Cambridge, 1945) and The
East European Revolution (New York, 1951). Cf. C. A. Macartney Hungary and her
Successors (London, 1937)
26 The internal development of two newly created states, Czechoslovakia and
Yugoslavia was described by a British historian in the following way:
"Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, despite their national theory, reproduced the
national complications of Austria-Hungary. Constitutional Austria had contained
eight nationalities: Czechoslovakia contained seven. Great Hungary had
contained seven nationalities; Yugoslavia contained nine. Czechoslovakia became
a unitary state, in which the Czechs were 'the people of the state', as the
Germans had been in constitutional Austria. Yugoslavia had a period of sham
federalism; then it too became a unitary state, which the Serbs claimed as
their national state, after the model of the Magyars in Hungary. ...
"The Czechs could outplay the Slovaks; they could not satisfy them. Masaryk
had hoped that the Czechs and the Slovaks would come together as the English
and the Scotch had done, the Slovaks turned out to be the Irish. In the same
way, the Serbs could master the Croats- they could not satisfy, nor even, being
less skillful politicians, outplay them." A. J. P. Taylor, op. cit., pp.
254-255.
27 In his report of November 1, 1938, Newton, the British Minister to Prague,
characterized Czechoslovak democracy in the following way: "There can be little
doubt that the democratic system as it has developed in this country during the
past twenty years has not been a wholly unmixed blessing, even for the Czechs
by whom and for whom it was elaborated. Under it quick and clear decisions were
difficult to come by, and party considerations were only too often given pride
of place over national. Moreover, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that all
public appointments even down to that of crossing sweeper depended upon
possession of the necessary party ticket so that each party became almost a
State within the State. Today there is a natural tendency to say goodbye to all
that, and one of the constant themes in the press is that public life and
social services must be cleansed of patronage and the misuse of political
influence. Criticism is heard not only of the quality but of the quantity of
officials in the civil service. It is said for example, that there are more
officials in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Prague than there were in the
Ballplatz of Imperial Vienna." British Documents, Third Series, Vol. III, Doc.
245.
28 The situation resulting from the peace settlement has been well
characterized by the late Professor Cross of Harvard. He writes: "If there is
any lesson to be learned from the experience of the last thirty years, it is
that setting up a series of economically weak national states solely on the
basis of romantic ideals and strategic aims is no guarantee of peace. To
bolster up their weak budgets or to favor local industry, such states erect
tariff barriers which prevent the normal flow of commerce and exchange on which
their very life depends. If their territories contain linguistic minorities,
the latter are discriminated
196
III-HUNGARY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
against in business and politics until they seek support from the nearest
larger state to which they are akin, and eventually provide that state with a
natural pretext for intervention. In order to counterbalance their more
powerful neighbors or checkmate some adjacent state with good diplomatic
connections, these little states unite in ententes and alliances which become
the pawns of international politics, and give statesmen of these minor
organisms a chance to assume positions of influence for which they are not
qualified by experience or vision. Samuel Hazzard Cross, op. cit., p. 183.
III-HUNGARY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
1 Rumania concluded a separate peace with the Central Powers in January 1918
and re-entered the war in the following November.
2 The loot of Hungary and the general behaviour of the Rumanian army was
described in detail by the American member of the Inter-Allied Mission to
Hungary. See Maj. Gen. Harry Hill Bandholtz, An Undiplomatic Diary (New York,
1933), pp. 18, 50, 92-93. Herbert Hoover explained that the Rumanian army
occupied Budapest on August 5, 1919, in defiance of direct orders of the 'Big
Four', and "then began a regime equally horrible with Bela Kun's. The Rumanian
army looted the city in good old medieval style. They even took supplies from
the children's hospitals. Many children died. They looted art galleries,
private houses, banks, railway rolling stock, machinery, farm animals in fact,
everything movable which Bela Kun had collected". Op. cit., pp. 400401.
3 Francesco Nitti, The Wreck of Europe (Indianapolis, 1922), pp. 170-171.
4 For the peace negotiations the best general sources are: D H. Miller My
Diary at the Conference of Paris, Vol. XXI (New York, 1924). Harold W. V.
Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, Vol. I-VI (London,
1920-24). Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, Vol. I-XIII
(Washington, 1942-1947). The foremost study of the diplomatic history of the
Treaty of Trianon is Francis Deak's work: Hungary at the Paris Conference (New
York, 1942), which is based mainly on original documents and deals with all the
pertinent material. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry published the official
Hungarian material in The Hungarian Peace negotiations, Vol. I-III and maps
(Budapest, 1920-22). C. A. Macartney condensed comprehensive material in his
standard work Hungary and Her Successors The Treaty of Trianon and Its
Consequences (London, 1937).
5 Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking (London, 1933), p. 117. Cf. Harold Temperley,
"How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn", Foreign Affairs, 6 (1928), 432-433,
and A History of the Peace Conference at Paris, Vol. I, p. 258.
6 Nicolson mentioned as an example that the Committee on Rumanian claims
thought only in terms of Transylvania, and the Committee on Czech claims
concentrated upon the southern frontiers of Slovakia. "It was only too late
that it was realized that these two entirely separate Committees had between
them imposed upon Hungary a loss of territory and population which, when
combined, was very serious indeed. Had the work been concentrated in the hands
of a Hungarian Committee, not only would a wider area of frontier have been
open for the give and take of discussion, but it would have been seen that the
total cessions imposed placed more Magyars under alien rule than was consonant
with the doctrine of Self-Determination." Op. cit., pp. 127-128. Nicolson's
observations were not influenced by any sympathy toward Hungary. He repeatedly
explained in his various writings that he disliked the Magyars. When the Red
197
Army advanced on Budapest he was pleased and detected in himself "stirrings of
positive delight". Spectator, November 10, 1944.
7 Cf. Deak, op. cit., pp. 27-29.
8 Ibid., pp. 15-23.
9 D. Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), p.
266.
10 In the words of an English scholar, "One point after another was conceded;
and in the end Roumania was given an area in which the Roumanians formed only
55 per cent of the total population. The Slovaks in Slovakia were 60 per cent,
the Ruthenes in Ruthenia 56 per cent, the Serbs in the Voivodina only 28 per
cent, or 33 per cent counting all the Yugoslavs together: while the
Magyar-speaking persons in each area formed close on one-third of all the
inhabitants, over one million in the territory assigned to Czechoslovakia, over
1,650,000 in that given to Roumania, 450,000 in Yugoslavia's portion." C. A.
Macartney, op. cit., p. 4. True, these figures were based on the census of 1910
and some aspects of this census were contested. But the overall picture
remained the same even according to the censuses carried out by the succession
states themselves. For the situation arising from the 1930 censuses, see below,
footnote 14.
11 This observation of Benes was noted by the editor of the Journal de
Genäve, William Martin, Les Hommes d'Etat pendant la guerre (Paris, 1929),
p. 316. In any case this is an overstatement because not all demands of Benes
were fulfilled. For example, a corridor between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
was not established.
12 According to the 1910 census, Hungary proper possessed a population of over
18,000,000 persons of whom 54.5 percent declared Magyar to be their mother
tongue. Including Croetia-Slavonia the total population was over 20,000,000 of
whom 48.1 percent spoke Magyar as their mother tongue.
13 In reality the Hungarian peace delegation was confronted with a fait
acompli. According to Temperley no event affected the frontiers of Hungary more
decisively than the Bela Kun regime which, Temperley considered partly a
socialist experiment, partly a Hungarian protest against the advance of the
Czech and Rumanian army. "Bela Kun finally sent forces to attack both
Czechoslovaks and Rumanians, and it was this action that forced the Big Four to
come to a decision. . . . And the finis Hungariae . . . was decreed on June 13
1919." Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn", Foreign
Affairs, 6 (1928), pp. 434-435.
14 The result of the 1930 censuses disclosed that: with 10.8 million Magyars
in Europe, the new Hungary had a population of 8.7 millions on an area of
93,000 square kilometers; with 13.8 million Rumanians in Europe, the new
Rumania had a population of 18.1 millions and an area of 295,000 square
kilometers; with 11.9 million Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Europe, the new
Yugoslavia had a population of 13.9 millions and an area of 249,000 square
kilometers; with 10.2 million Czechs and Slovaks in Europe, the new
Czechoslovakia had a population of 14.7 millions and an area of 140,000 square
kilometers. This means that the Czechs and Slovaks were able to unite 96.6% of
the Czechs and Slovaks living in Europe in their own country, but despite this,
these groups made up only 66.2% of the total population of the country. The
Rumanians assembled 96% of their own people within their own frontiers but this
group was only 72% of the total population. The Yugoslavs had 93% of their own
nationals within their country, but they were only 79.8% of the total
population of Yugoslavia. In contrast to this, at this time only 74% of the
Magyars lived in their own country but they made up 92% of the total population
of Hungary.
198
HUNGARY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
15 See the report on Hungary by A. C. Coolidge. Quoted by Deak, op. cit., pp.
16-18.
10 Nicholas Horthy was the last commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian
navy. After the military collapse of the Monarchy, he handed over the fleet to
the Yugoslav National Council according to the order of King-Emperor Charles.
Subsequently he became minister of war in the counter-revolutionary government
of Szeged and entered Budapest in November, 1919 at the head of the national
forces as the commander-in-chief. While this book was already in the process of
publication, Horthy published his memoirs. Nikolaus von Horthy, Ein Leben fur
Ungarn (Bonn, 1952).
17 The pertinent documents were published by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,
HFR., Vol. I-II. The intricate Franco-Hungarian negotiations complicated by
many side issues, were described by Deak, op. cit., pp. 253-338. Cf. "The
Political Diary of the Hungarian Peace Delegation," HFR, Vol. I, pp. 898-911
15 The English translation of the Hungarian and French memoranda were
published by Deak, op cit., pp. 264-268.
19 Deak, op. cit., p. 289.
20 "True to the spirit by which they were inspired in tracing the frontiers
fixed by the Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers have nevertheless
considered the case of the frontiers thus traced not corresponding precisely
with the ethnical or economic requirements. An inquest held on the spot may,
perhaps, make apparent the necessity of a displacement of the limits provided
by the Treaty in certain parts. Such an inquest could not be actually pursued
without indefinitely retarding the conclusion of a peace desired by the whole
of Europe. But when the Delimitation Commission will have commenced activity,
should they find that the provisions of the Treaty in some spot, as is stated
above, create an injustice which it would be to general interest to efface it
shall be allowable to them to address a report on this subject to the Council
of the League of Nations. In this case the Allied and Associated Powers accept
that the Council of the League may, under the same circumstances, at the
request of one of the parties concerned, offer their services for an amicable
rectification of the original demarcation at the passages where a modification
has been judged desirable by a Delimitation Commission. The Allied and
Associated Powers are confident that this proceeding will furnish a convenient
method for correcting all injustice in the demarcation of the frontiers against
which objections not unfounded can be raised." De_k, op. cit., pp. 552-553.
21 See pp. 23-24
22 For the pertinent conversations between Hungarian and Polish statesmen and
diplomats, see, HFR, Vol. I, Docs. 51, 383, 441, 555, 689, 739, 891, and 892.
Prince Sapieha himself favored a transversal block (Finland-Baltic
States-Poland-Hungaria-Rumania). This plan apparently was endorsed by the
Baltic States, (Doc. 771), while some leading officials in the Polish Foreign
Ministry advocated the necessity of a new Central Europe to be constituted of
Poland Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria (Doc.
739). 23 Ibid, Doc. 106.
24 War material from Hungary to Poland was transported through Rumania under
Polish supervision. Czechoslovakia invoked her neutrality and refused to permit
transportation. Ibid., Docs. 379, 432, 437, 417, 497, and 553. It belongs to
the strange occurrences of this period that in December 1920 the Conference of
Ambassadors protested against the furnishing of war materials to Poland by the
Csepel factory. Cf. Ibid., Doc. 893 and HFR, Vol. II, Docs. 7 and 12.
199
25 HFR, Vol. I, Docs. 438, 445, and 496.
26 Ibid., Docs. 536, 555, and 565.
27 Ibid., Docs. 554, 595. 621, 665, and 712. For other aspects of the
negotiations concerning Hungary's military assistance to Poland, see, Docs.
126, 383, 509, 5lO, 518, 526, 528, 536, 538, 543, 580, 594. For the reasons of
the Czechoslovak attitude, see, F. J. Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of
Czechoslorakia 1918-1935 (New York, 1937), pp. 155-156.
25 "A Frenchman of very great standing and authority sent word to the Emperor
that the chances of a restoration in Hungary were becoming worse by
postponement, that at the moment the Powers would protest against his return
but that their protests would not alter a fait accompli." Baron Charles von
Werkman, The Tragedy of Charles of Habsburg (London, 1924), pp. 130-131. Cf.
Horthy, op. cit., pp. 141-145.
29 Diplomatic steps taken in Budapest by the great powers and Hungary's
neighbors were described in a document by the Secretary General of the Foreign
Ministry, Coloman Kanya, HFR. Vol. II, pp. 354-357. The Italian charge
d'affaires informed Regent Horthy on March 28 that "the prevention of the
return of the Habsburgs was a cardinal principle of Italian policy and that his
Government would take action in accordance with that principle". The French
High Commissioner, Fouchet, explained in a letter that the Conference of
Ambassadors on February 16 1921, renewed its original resolution of February 4,
1920 agamst the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty.
30 The Little Entente was later consolidated by military conventions and
several other treaties, and especially by the establishment of a Permanent
Council in 1933. See, John 0. Crane, The Little Entente (New York, 1931); Deak,
op. cit., pp. 320-323.
31 HFR, Vol. II, pp. 225, 231 and 233-241. Cf. De_k, op. cit., p. 342.
32 In the course of the negotiations Benes stated that if a neutral agency,
such as a League of Nations Commission, found that 300,000 Slovaks in Hungary
enjoyed the same minority rights as the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia, he
would be willing to regard these 300,000 Slovaks as having been turned over to
Slovakia even though they remained in Hungary, and to return to Hungary
territory containing an equal number of Magyar population. HFR, Vol. II, pp.
237-238.
33 He made this statement to Joseph Szent-Ivanyi, a Hungarian member of the
Czechoslovak Parliament, on April 29, 1921. HFR, Vol. II, p. 393. Cf. below,
footnote 35.
34 Notes of Count Banffy, on the negotiations were published in HFR, Vol. II,
pp. 559-564.
35 President Masaryk's various statements made from 1921 to 1935 favoring
frontier revision with Hungary were quoted in Hungary and the Conference of
Paris, Vol. IV, pp. 162-169. Cf., p. 32.
36 The 'Venice Protocol' was signed on October 13, 1921 and the plebiscite
took place on December 14 and 15. For details see: Sarah Wambaugh, op. cit.
Vol. I, pp. 271-297; C. A. Macartney, op cit., pp. 41-72.
37 The ancestors of both Bethlen and Teleki were leading Transylvanian
statesmen. Bethlen had the same family roots as Gabriel Bethlen, the ruling
prince of Transylvania in the seventeenth century. Paul Teleki in 1909, as an
unknown geographer, won the Jomard Prize of the French Academy with his Atlas
on the Northwestern Pacific Islands entitled "Atlas zur Geschichte der
200
III-HUNGARY BETEEN THE WORL WARS
Kartographie der Japanischen Inseln". From 1921 until 1938 Teleki concentrated
on many scholarly and international activities. He was professor of geography
at the University of Budapest and was a member of the Committee appointed by
the Council of the League of Nations in the Turkish-Iraqi boundary (Mosul)
affair. In 1938 he was appointed a member of the European Council of the
Carnegie Endowment.
38 For Hungary's problems in this period see, Count Stephen Bethlen, "Hungary
in the New Europe", Foreign Affairs, 3 (1925), 445-458. For Bethlen's view on
Trianon Hungary s international situation, see Appendix, Document I.
39 Cf. C. Revy and N. Czegledy, Policy of Hangarian Public Culture (Budapest,
1946). G. C. Paikert, "Hungarian Foreign Policy in International Relations,
1919-1944", American Slavic and East European Review, XI ( 1952), 42-65.
40 For a description and evaluation of these measures, see, C. A. Macartney,
op. cit.
41 In 1927 the British Daily Mail and its owner, Lord Rothermere, launched an
ardent campaign for revision of the Trianon Treaty. This campaign excited much
enthusiasm and was falsely interpreted in Hungary as a British move for
revision of Hungary's frontiers. In fact, the leading political factors in
Great Britain remained uninterested in the Hungarian complaints. Concerning the
Hungarian revisionist thesis, see Sir Robert Donald, The Tragedy of Trianon
(London, 1934); Justice for Hungary by Count Albert Apponyi and others (London,
1928); Count Stephen Bethlen, The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace (London,
1934). Cf. R. W Seton-Watson, Treaty of Trianon and European Peace (London,
1934). E. H. Carr International Relations between the Two World Wars (London,
1948) pp. 10-11. C. A. Macartney, op. cit.
42 In his famous speech before the Senate on June 5, 1928, Mussolini stated
that "the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon have cut too deeply
into the flesh and it may be added that for a thousand years Hungary has
performed an historic mission of importance in the Danubian Basin. The
Hungarian people with their fervent patriotism, their consciousness of their
power, their persevering work in time of peace, deserve a better fate. Not only
from the point of view of universal equality, but also in the interest of
Italy, it may well be that this better fate of Hungary should find its
realization". For the full text of the speech, see Muriel Currey, Italian
Foreign Policy 1918-1932 (London, 1933), pp. 234255. After the delivery of this
speech, Mussolini was generally considered as the champion of the Peace Treaty
Revision. Actually he advocated this idea in more general terms as early as
1921. Cf. Maxwell H. A. Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy's Foreign and
Colonial Policy 1914-1937. (London, 1938), pp. 123, 215-220.
43 In 1929-1930 the Hague and Paris conferences finally settled Hungary's
reparations liability and some other outstanding issues between Hungary and her
neighbors, like the so-called "optant question". Since Italy was a major member
of the winning team in the first World War, her support at international
negotiations was important to Hungary.
44 Count Karolyi in his speech to the Hungarian Parliament on assuming office
stated that "we used to feel during our period of isolation that Hungary was in
a prison. The doors of that prison were opened by the friendship of Italy,
which is of inestimable value to us. This remains unchanged, and everything
shows that it will increase in the future." Cf. Muriel Currey, op. cit., p.
312.
45 Hungarian version of Nazism.
46 Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston, 1948), pp. 132-133.
201
47 Hungary and Austria, in line with the Rome protocols, refused to vote for,
and to participate in the sanctions.
48 Cf. Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis (New York, 1949). G. M.
Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs 1920-]939 (London,
1950). E. H. Carr, op. cit. Dwight E. Lee, Ten Years The World on the Way to
War (Boston, 1942). Maurice Baumont, La Faillite de la paix (Paris, 1946).
J.-B. Duroselle, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 Ö nos jours (Paris,
1953).
49 Cf. pp. 60-63.
50 J. Einzig, Bloodless Invasion, German Economic Penetration Into tlle
Danubian States and the Balkans (London, 1938). E. Wiskemann, Prologue to War
(New York, 1940). A Basch, The Danube Basin and the German Economic Sphere (New
York, 1943). J. Jocsik, German Economic Influences in the Danube Valley
(Budapest, 1946).
51 The first anti-Semitic special measure in Hungary was a bill passed in
1921, restricting the admission of Jewish students by the universities to a
proportion corresponding to the percentage of Jews in the country. This
restriction was later liberally applied, but the anti-Jewish demonstrations of
students were recurring yearly phenomena.
52 For the intimate contacts of Italian and Hungarian statesmen and diplomats
see, Ciano's Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948) and Galeazzo Ciano, 1937-1938
Diario (Rocca S. Casciano, 1948).
53 For Hungary's relations with her neighbors in 1936, see, Ciano's Diplomatic
Papers, pp. 65-67.
54 Auer was the chairman of the Comite Permanent pour le Rapprochement
Economique des Pays Danubiens in which Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania and Yugoslavia were represented with outstanding statesmen. The
Committee was founded on February 12, 1932, and held sessions in Budapest,
Basel and Vienna. Auer was appointed Hungarian Minister to France in early
1946.
55 Cf. Paul von Auer, "Das Neue Mitteleuropa", New Commonwealth Quarterly, IV,
(1938), 267. Cf. Istvan Borsody, Magyar-Szlovak kiegyezes (Budapest, 1945), pp.
75-76.
56 Galeazzo Ciano, 1937-1938 Diario (Rocca S. Casciano, 1948), pp. 94-97.
57 It is interesting to note that Sir Nevile Henderson, British Ambassador to
Germany, considered Imredy in his report of October 18, 1938, as "not
specifically friendly to Germany", and recommended that justice be done to
legitimate Hungarian claims, partly because Imredy might be removed and
replaced by a pro-German. British Documents, Third Series, Vol. III, Doc. 215.
See footnote 69 on p. 203 and pp. 35, 37, 42.
58 Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 227-229.
59 DGFP, Series D, Vol. II, Doc. 383.
60 Ibid., Doc. 383. Horthy remarked to Mrs. Weizsacker at Kiel that "We must
see to it that we do not get involved in a new war." Memoirs of Ernst von
Weizsacker (Chicago, 1951), p. 138. Horthy stated in his memoirs that he and
the other members of the Hungarian delegation refused a military cooperation
with Germany. See op. cit., p. 200. This statement is supported by the later
attitude of Hitler. Cf. pp. 37-38 and 41.
61 DGFP, Series D. Vol. II, Doc. 390. For a detailed account of Hungary's
negotiations with the Little Entente and Germany, in 1937-1938, see Survey of
202
Ill-HUNGARY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
International Affairs l938, published by the Royal Institute of International
Affairs (London, l951), Vol. II, pp. 288-298.
62 DGFP, Series D, Vol. II, Doc. 402. 63 Ibid., Doc. 506. 64 British
Documents, Third Series, Vol. III, Annex to Doc. No. 7.
65 Ibid., Doc. 15. For further exchange of notes between the British and
Hungarian governments on the same subject see, Ibid., Docs. 29, 44, and 52.
66 British Documents, Third Series, Vol. II, Doc. 1024.
67 British Documents, Third Series, Vol. III, Doc. 37. Cf. DGFP, Vol. IV, Doc.
47.
68 British Documents, Third Series, Vol. II, Doc. 937.
69 DGFP, Series D, II, Doc. 554. During his previous visit to Germany Imredy
told Ribbentrop on August 26, 1938, that in his opinion "France would hasten to
assist Czechoslovakia in the event of a German attack, as France had pledged
her honor to do this". Ibid., Doc. 395.
70 La Politique Allemande (1937-1943), Documents Secrets du Ministäre des
Affairs Etrangäres de l'Allemagne traduit du Russe (Hongrie, Edition Paul
Dupont, 1946), pp. 74-76.
71 Hitler's dislike of Hungary was well known and has been proved by many
documents. He indicated his feelings frankly to the Rumanian Foreign Minister,
G. Gafencu, on April 19, 1939. "They say that I want to restore the grandeur of
Hungary. Why should I be so ill advised? A greater Hungary might be
embarrassing for the Reich. Besides, the Hungarians have always shown us utter
ingratitude. They have no regard or sympathy for the German minorities. As for
me, I am only interested in my Germans. I said so frankly to Count Csaky....
And I have said so without equivocation to the Regent Horthy and to Imredy: the
German minorities in Rumania and Yugoslavia do not want to return to Hungary;
they are better treated in their new fatherland. And what the German minorities
do not want, the Reich does not want either". G. Gafencu Lest Days of Europe, A
Diplomatic Journey in 1939 (Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 68-69. Cf. the
German documents published by the Soviet government in 1946, the pertinent
passages of Goebbels Diaries (New York, 1948), and Erich Kordt, Wahn und
Wirklichkeit, Die Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Stuttgart, 1947), pp.
112-113, 308, 386. Cf. p. 65.
72 For details see. Graham Hutton, Survey After Munich (Boston, 1939). R. W.
Seton-Watson, Munich and the Dictators (London, 1944). F. Borkenau, The New
German Empire (New York, 1939); John W. Wheeler-Bennett: Munich Prologue to
Tragedy (New York, 1948); L. B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude 1938-1939 (London,
1948); and the pertinent volumes of the German, British and Italian
documents.
73 Times, September 28, 1938.
74 British Documents, Third Series, III, Doc 113.
75 DGFP, D, Vol. II, Docs. 609 and 660 and Vol. IV, Doc. 9. 76 DGFP, D, IV,
Doc. 39.
77 The German document called the easternmost province of Czechoslovakia
"Carpatho-Ukraine", the official name of which was "Subcarpathian Ruthenia".
The local authorities in early 1939, used the name "Carpatho-Ukraine". When the
province was reattached to Hungary in March 1939, its name became
"Subcarpathian Territory" and after the cession to the Soviet Union in 1945 it
was renamed "Transcarpathian Region". Cf. A. Stefan, "Carpatho-Ukraine the
Forgotten Land. Variation in Name". Carpathian Star (New York), II, May,
1952.
203