DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

VII REORGANIZAT0N OF HUNGARY

1 The Way of Our People's Democracy, Rakosi's speech delivered at the Academy of the Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party on February 29, 1952. The text quoted is from the English translation published by the National Committee For a Free Europe (New York, 1952), p. 8. In this speech Rakosi described the methods by which the transformation of Hungary's political structure has been brought about.

2 Ibid., p. 11.

3 For the complete list of cabinet members, see Appendix, Document 7.

4 The two meetings took place within a few hours. Gero presented the list to the Hungarians on December 5, 1944 at 7:30 P.M. and Molotov received them on December 6 at 2:30 A.M. Between the two meetings the Hungarians

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were taken to a long movie. Thus they could not discuss among themselves Gero's proposals. It is a common Soviet practice to tire people out before negotiations and not to leave them any time for serious preparations or thinking.

5 Gero and Joseph Revai, allegedly were Trotskyites. Thus later they had to be "more Stalinist than Stalin" in order to survive.

6 Gyula Kallay, A Magyar Fuggetlensegi Mozgalom, 1936-45 (Budapest, 1948), p. 242. The text of this agreement was prepared by Laszlo Rajk, central secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Rajk became minister of interior in 1946, foreign minister in 1948, and was hanged in October, 1949, as a traitor. Arpad Szakasits signed the agreement in the name of the Social Democrats on October 10, 1944, but he denied the existence of such an agreement even before the Social Democratic Party. The agreement was made public by Rakosi on August 15, 1947.

7 The history of the Debrecen period of the new regime has been published in Hungarian by Job Paal and Antal Rado, A Debreceni Feltamadas - Resurrection of Debrecen (Debrecen, 1947). The book is highly laudatory about everything that happened in Debrecen. Otherwise it could not have been published in post-war Hungary.

8 Altogether thirty eight towns and villages, representing 1,381,000 people in the Russian liberated areas, took part in these "elections", whereas about three and a half million people lived on this same territory. Regular elections could not have taken place in those days. Paal and Rado, op. cit., p. 160.

9 Pa_l and Rado, op cit., p. 180.

10 For the text of the armistice agreement see Appendix, Document 8.

11 See Appendix Document 7.

12 Loc cit., p. 34.

13 The pattern for such cooperation was set in the Moscow declaration of November 1, 1943, regarding Italy. The three major Allies stated that "It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism".

14 La Hongrie et La Conference de Paris, Vol. I, pp. 52, 84.

15 It will be remembered that the phrase "spoils system" as used in the United States referred to the practice of political parties filling substantially all public offices, even those of the lowest rank, with their own supporters. In more recent times in the United States the increasing strength of the civil service system has considerably lessened the scope of the application of the "spoils system". Here, the term refers to a modified application of the "spoils system" by a government formed by a coalition of parties.

16 For the ACC, see pp. 103-107.

17 Rakosi explained in retrospect: "In the process of carrying out the land reform we used the tactics of trying to divide the enemy, or, if possible, to neutralize him. Therefore, we drew the line of land distribution at 200 acres which did not involve the majority of the kulaks; this enabled us to carry out the land reform quickly and smoothly." Loc. cit., p. 13. Cf. Leland Stowe, "Hungary's Agrarian Revolution", Foreign Affairs, 24 (1946-47), 490-502. Alexander Eckstein, "Land Reform and the Transformation of Agriculture in Hungary" Journal of Farm Economics XXXI (1949), 456-468. L. D. Schweng, "Recent Agricultural Developments in Eastern Europe", Journal of Farm Economics, XXXIII (1951), 40-54. Agriculture and Food in Hungary, UNRRA European Regional Office Operational Analysis Paper No. 33 (London, 1947), pp. 12-16.

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18 Szabad Nep, September 8, 1946.

19 Even in western European countries, such as France, cases of war criminals were judged by special tribunals.

20 The infiltration of trade unions is, everywhere, the first step in Communist conquests. Lenin strongly advised the Communists to enter even "reactionary" trade unions in order to conquer them from within. See Lenin's "Left-Wing Communism. An Infantile Disorder" (April 27, 1920), reprinted in The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism Supplement I, (Washington, 1948), pp. 3442. The Communist Internationai declared, moreover, that "It is the bounden duty of every communist to belong to a trade union, even a most reactionary one, provided it is a mass organization". The Italian and French situations are eloquent examples of the manner in which Communists penetrate and use trade unions in free countries. John Williamson, the national labor secretary of the Communist Party, developed the argumentation of American Communists in a letter published in the New York Times, October 4, 1949.

21 H. F. A. Schoenfeld, "Soviet Imperialism in Hungary", 26, Foreign Affairs, (1947-48), 560.

VIII-HUNGARY A REPUBLIC

1 For the transformations of Hungarian society and institutions in recent years, see Lorand D. Schweng, Political Social and Economic Developments in Postwar Hungary (Washington, 1950), published by the National Planning Association in mimeographed form. This comprehensive work contains by far the best evaluations and the most reliable information concerning the changing Hungarian scene.

2 The authorization of the ACC was also necessary for the creation of a political party.

3 Cf. pp. 112-113.

4 On the eve of the elections Rakosi delivered a radio speech in which he quoted passages from Secretary Byrnes' address before the Herald Tribune Forum on October 31, 1945, to prove that the English-speaking powers abandoned Central and Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. Matyas Rakosi, A magyar demokraciaert (Budapest, 1947), p. 163. Cf. p. 110.

5 Rakosi evaluated the result of the elections in the following: "The Smallholders' Party, as became clear in the weeks preceding the elections, won the majority of the peasant votes, it was backed by the bulk of the urban petit-bourgeois, and almost without exception, by the masses composed of fascists, capitalists, great landowners, and reactionaries. It is noteworthy that in Budapest, where it had no serious organization prior to the liberation, it won 50 percent of the votes". Loc. cit., p. 17.

6 Lorand D. Schweng, op. cit., p. 64.

7 Rakosi bitterly remarked that "the majority of the new smallholders in the Trans-Danubian area did not vote for us but for other parties. We believed that since we helped them to get land, their majority would side with us. The 1945 elections taught us a lesson, i. e. that we could not make the new Trans-Danubian landholders understand that they had to thank first of all our Party for their land, and that they could keep it only if they supported us". Loc. cit., p. 18.

8 Christian Science Monitor, October 9, 1945. Cf. New York Herald

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Tribune, November 6, 1946. Journal de Genäve, November 9, 1945. One of the Soviet purposes in allowing free elections in Hungary might have been to divert attention from Communist seizure of power in Bulgaria and Rumania countries strategically more important to the Soviet Union than Hungary. However, this strategy backfired to some extent in Austria and Berlin, where people, encouraged by the election results in Hungary, voted overwhelmingly anti-Communist.

9 Ferenc Nagy, op. cit., p. 154.

10 Loc. cit., p. 18. In another passage of his speech Rakosi described Communist tactics in financial and economic fields. "In stating our demands we carefully weighed the probable effects of them, and wherever possible proceeded cautiously, step-by-step, so as to make it hard for the enemy to muster and mobilize all his strength against us. We gradually increased our demands in every possible field, using provisional forms. In the banking line, for instance, we insisted at first only on state control over the banks, and only later on the nationalization of the three major banks. We proceeded in a similar way with industry, first demanding state control over the mines, then expanding our demands to the control of large machine manufacturing factories and smelting industry, and ending by their nationalization. Thus we achieved the nationalization of industry by dividing the process into four or five stages during the span of several years." Loc. cit., p. 13.

ll For the English translation of the important provisions of the Republican Constitution of Hungary, see Andrew Gyorgy, Governments of Danubian Europe (New York, 1911), pp. 298-300.

12 This practice was to some extent the consequence of the lack of means of transportation and communication throughout the country. Many Smallholder deputies had to remain at home to till their own land, and their movement was greatly handicapped by the lack of transportation. The available vehicles were under Communist direction and were used mainly by the Red Army.

13 The history of the National Peasant Party is characteristic of the political evolution in Hungary. The party was founded in June, 1939, by a peasant writer, Imre Kovacs, as a more radical party than the Smallholders. During the war years it worked underground and comprised only a few scattered groups without parliamentary representation. Radical peasant writers the so-called village explorers and a group of progressive intellectuals formed the core of the party. Some members were secretly Communists. After the war these secret Communists, with the help of radical slogans and friendly interventions of the Communist Party, gradually seized control in the party. Progressive intellectuals lost all power positions. Gradually the Peasant Party became a mere front, and the Communists used it to expedite the disintegration of the tottering Hungarian political system. Imre Kovacs resigned as secretary general when the Peasant Party joined the leftist block, later resigned from the Party and finally fled the country.

14 Rakosi summed up the result of Communist actions in the following: "At the beginning of March, 1946, the Left-Wing Bloc stressed its demands by staging a demonstration of the Budapest workers. Under the menacing effect of the impressive, disciplined meeting numbering over 400,000 participants [this is a gross exaggeration] the Smallholders' Party was obliged to meet the demands. It had to oust 21 of its most incriminated members, it was compelled to agree that the new farmers could not be evicted from their newly acquired landholdings, that after the mines also the oil wells and bauxite mines be nationalized, that the banks be put under State control, that the Csepel Weiss Manfred factory, the Ganz factory, and the Ozd Iron Smelting Works come under State management and that representatives of the trade unions be included in the committees entrusted with the task of purging reactionary elements from the State machine.

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. . . The expansion of nationalization, and the fact that the banks and the important heavy industry plants had been placed under State control and State management showed the direction in which we would be able to gear our further development. ... The Smallholders' Party was constantly compelled to expell or remove single individuals or groups of its discredited members. This gradual day-by-day 'slicing' off of the reaction lurking within the Smallholders' Party was then nicknamed 'salami tactics'". Loc. cit., pp. 20, 21. For the Russian pressure, see Ferenc Nagy, op. cit., pp. 193-196.

15 See, for example the speech of Prime Minister Nagy at Bicske. Kis Ujsag, August 13, 1946.

16 Szabad Nep, November 21, 1946.

17 For the election results of the Danubian countries, see map on p. 145.

18 Cf. Oscar Jaszi, "The Choices in Hungary", Foreign Affairs, 24 (1946)

462. Jaszi points out that "the Small Landholders' Party is not reactionary, not even conservative; it is a progressive party in favor of social and cultural reforms".

l9 Cf., pp. 72-74.

20 Ferenc Nagy, op. cit., p. 72. Cf. Rakosi, loc. cit., p. 12.

21 Oscar Jaszi, loc. cit., p. 454.

22 Ibid., pp. 457-58.

23 Rakosi even in his recent speech attacked Socialist leadership. "Our competitor in winning over the industrial workers was the Social Democratic Party. The majority of its leaders consisted of Horthy's police agents, or British spies, and after the liberation they entered into the services of the imperialists, just as the Smallholders' Party leaders. Naturally, these leaders would have preferred to see Hungary occupied by American or British troops. Their majority hated the Soviet Union and in the beginning maintained close ties with the Labor Party, serving the interests of British imperialists, and tried to carry out its instructions and follow its advice, later it was guided more and more by the American imperialists. At the same time, however, the great majority of the Social Democratic workers and peasants - of which there were considerable numbers in the Plains of Hungary sympathized with the liberating Soviet Union approved of the union of workers, of the unity front with the Communists, and demanded a fight against the imperialists, the remnants of the Fascists and the capitalistic reaction. In the face of this the majority of the Social Democratic Party leaders, as well as the leaders of the Smallholders' Party, played a double game. To the masses they pretended to be members of the Independence Front, the democratic coalition, but in secret, on the sly, however, they aimed from the very first day to deprive the Communists of power, and to reduce their influence on the toiling masses to the minimum." Loc. Cit., p. 14.

24 H. F. A. Schoenfeld, the former American Minister to Hungary, observed in this respect: "Rakosi told me in one of our early conversations, that he and his Communist colleagues who had been trained in Moscow had a great advantage over the somewhat nondescript aggregation of non-Communist political leaders in Hungary. He said that he and his associates had been part of the working mechanism of government in the Soviet Union. This he claimed gave them an understanding of practical problems of government which other Hungarian leaders emerging on the political scene could not match, and made them the only effective leaders available to the Hungarian people. There was some truth in Rakosi's statement. The Communist leaders were energetic and able men, and it was apparent that they intended to fill the administrative vacuum, with or without the backing of the electorate". H. F. A. Schoenfeld, loc. cit., p. 558.

25 Cf. Rakosi, loc. cit., pp. 9-10.

26 Joseph Revai, "On the Character of Our People's Democracy". The

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original article appeared in the Tarsadalmi Szemle (Budapest, March-April, 1949). An English translation of the article was published in Foreign Affairs, 28 (1949), 143-152.

27 The new constitution entered into force on August 20, 1949, and its preamble set forth: "The armed forces of the great Soviet Union liberated our country from the yoke of the German fascists, crushed the power of the great landowners and capitalists who were ever hostile to the people, and opened the road of democratic progress to our working people... the Hungarian working class, in alliance with the working peasantry and with the generous assistance of the Soviet Union, rebuilt our war-ravaged country. Led by the experiences of the socialist revolution of 1919 and supported by the Soviet Union, our people began to lay down the foundations of socialism and now our country is advancing towards socialism along the road of a people's democracy." Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic (Budapest, 1949). Cf. Rakosi, loc cit., pp. 9-10.

28 London Times, October 31, 1946. For excerpts of the article, see Annex, Document 15.

IX-SOVIET RUSSIA AND HUNGARY'S ECONOMY

1 See Article 11 of the armistice agreement. Cf. Appendix, Document 8.

2 Colonel Susmanovich was a sort of political watchdog over the Soviet occupying forces in Hungary. He allegedly reported directly to the Politbureau.

3 The provisions of the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land seemed a sad joke. Article 43 of the Convention set forth: "The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Cf. pp. 116-120.

4 For the food loan given by the Red Army to Budapest, see p. 133.

5 See Arturo Karasz, "La Stabilizzazione in Ungheria nel 1946", Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, XV (1948, No. 2), 1-22.

6 One month before stabilization the bank note circulation had reached the figure of 6,277 trillion pengos.

7 The restitution of the gold of the National Bank and other looted Hungarian property located in the American zone of Germany was the greatest outside help Hungary had received since the war.

8 By a special agreement between the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Governments, Yugoslavia was to receive 70 million and Czechoslovakia 30 million of this sum. However, in September, 1948, the Hungarian Government ceased all reparations deliveries and refused to answer the Yugoslav government's notes of protest. New York Times, September 28, 1949.

9 In 1946, the period of the payment was extended to eight years. Cf. p. 182.

10 Hungary's reparations and other postwar burdens, and the general economic situation were described in a memorandum prepared by the Hungarian National Bank on November 24, 1945. See Appendix, Document 16. Cf. George Kemeny, Economic Planning in Hungary 1947-1949 (London, 1952), pp. 1-5.

At the peace conference the United States' delegation proposed reducing the total amount of reparations to be paid by Hungary to $200 million. The proposal explained that the economic burdens laid upon Hungary by the various provisions

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of the armistice and the treaty of peace were beyond the capacity of Hungary to pay. It estimated these burdens to be 35 percent of Hungary's national income, even before any allowance was made for the reduction in Hungarys postwar economic potential. Selected Documents, p. 1153. This American amendment was rejected and the peace treaty reiterated the reparations provisions of the armistice agreement.

11 For detail see Margaret Dewar, Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe 1945-1949 (London, 1951), pp. 62-72. At the time of these concessions the political power in Hungary was entirely in Communist hands.

12 The development of trade relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union is treated by Margaret Dewar, op. cit., pp. 58-62.

13 For the protocol of the council of ministers on October 12, 1945, see Appendix, Document 17.

14 The texts of these notes are in the Appendix, Documents 18 and 19.

15 In the ACC the Soviet representative dismissed the Arnerican and British protests by declaring that the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the ACC. Cf. p. 106. The Western posvers also sent notes directly to Moscow, protesting against the conclusion of economic collaboration agreements with the former Axis satellites during the armistice period. All these steps apparently had no effect whatever.

16 The Hungarian note addressed to the American and British Missions is in the Appendix, Document 20.

17 Quoted from the American note of July 23, 1946, addressed to the Soviet Government, Bulletin, XV (1946), 231.

18 Arthur Karasz and others, "Europe's Eastern Frontier", Common Cause, IV (1950), 135.

19 Bulletin, XV (1946), 229.

20 Ibid., pp. 229-232

21 Ibid., p. 231

22 The full text of the note was published in the New York Times, August 2, 1946, and in the Bulletin, XV (1946), 263-265.

23 Bulletin, XV (1946), 638-639.

24 Bulletin, VIII (1943), 21-22.

25 See the pertinent American statement at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, on April 3, 1947, Bulletin, XVI (1947), 653, and the American note delivered to the Soviet Government on July 29, 1947, Bulletin, XVII (1947), 298. Cf. James R. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 162-163.

26 In the peace treaty the Hungarian government was obligated to waive "on its own behalf and on behalf of Hungarian nationals all claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding on May 8, 1945, except those arising out of contracts and other obligations entered into, and rights acquired, before September 1, 1939". (Article 30 sec. 4). According to the Soviet interpretation this provision prevented the achievement of balance between claims and debts in former Axis-satellite and German relationships. The German claims automatically became Soviet claims and remained valid, whereas the counterclaims of the satellite governments and citizens were annulled.

The Italian assets in Hungary also shared the fate of the German assets. According to article 74, sec. 2 of the peace treaty with Italy, Italian assets in

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Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary formed part of the reparations to be paid by Italy to the Soviet Union. However, Italian assets in Hungary were much less significant than the German.

27 It is next to impossible to give the exact dollar equivalent of this amount because of the changing rates. Various calculations might be equally right or wrong.

28 Soviet-Hungarian joint stock companies were exempted even before from all export and import duties, and had many other important privileges.

29 The most important joint companies are: Maszovlet (Hungarian-Soviet Civil Aviation Co.), Meszhart (Hungarian-Soviet River Transportation Co.) Maszovol (Hungarian-Soviet Crude Oil Co.), Molaj (Hungarian-Soviet Petroleum Refining Co.), and Maszobal (Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite Aluminum Co.).

30 The Final Report on Foreign Aid of the House Select Committee of Foreign Aid describes the organization of the joint-stock corporations and in general the Soviet economic policy in Eastern Europe. (Washington, 1948), pp. 353-427. For an excellent review of some cases pertinent to the Soviet exploitation process, see Howard G. Hilton, "Hungary: A Case History of Soviet Economic Imperialism", Bulletin, XXV (1951), 323-327.

X-THE PEACE PREPARATORY WORK (1945-1946)

1 Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945 (Washington, 1949).

2 For my first contacts with him, see pp. 97-98.

3 On this subject see my memorandum addressed to Prime Minister Tildy, Appendix, Document 22.

4 The members of the committee were: Gusztav Gratz, former foreign minister, Lipot Baranyay, and Arthur Karasz, both former presidents of the Hungarian National Bank; Izso Ferenczi, former secretary of state in the Ministry of Commerce; Istvan Vasarhelyi, secretary of state in the Ministry of Finance; Lorand D. Schweng, special economic adviser, former secretary of state in the Ministry of Finance; and Jozsef Judik, head of the research division of the National Bank.

5 Cf. Appendix, Document 22.

6 For a short version of these data and argumentation, see, La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, Vol. I, pp. 63-107.

7 For its text see, La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, Vol. I, pp. 1-6.

8 Article 53 of the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land provided that, "An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally all movable property belonging to the state which may be used for the operations of the war."

9 The armistice division of the Foreign Ministry in May, June and July 1945, repeatedly sent notes with similar contents to the ACC. The note of May 25 enumerated 28 factories which were dismantled and removed but were not included in the reparations deliveries. Other notes completed the list and described in detail the various confiscatory actions and other abuses of the Red Army and asked for restitution and remedies. The ACC refused to negotiate on such matters and Hungary was even made responsible to foreign countries for confiscations and damages caused by the Red Army. For example, a British note of November

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19, 1945, in reply to a memorandum of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, stated that "all loss or damage to British rights, interests and property in Hungary regardless of cause, is to be reinstated under the terms of Article 13 of the Armistice". (ltalics mine).

10 For the process of the renewal of diplomatic relations, see pp. 113-114.

11 La Hongrie et La Conference de Paris, Vol. I, pp. 7-14.

12 For excerpts from the note, see Appendix, Document 21.

13 La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, Vol. I, pp. 15-20.

14 Ibid., pp. 21-36.

15 The Hungarian representative, foreign minister of the by then, completely Communist-dominated Hungarian Government, did not reply other than by his hundred percent support of the Soviet position, which in fact denied that freedom of navigation for which the Hungarian Government had dared to raise its voice three years before. This statement was made on August 13, 1948. Bulletin, XIX (1948), 283.

16 These aspects of postwar Hungarian foreign policy will be developed in other publications.

17 For the pertinent passages of the memorandum see Appendix, Document 22.

18 I developed the arguments used in the memorandum addressed to Tildy. Cf. Appendix, Document 22, and Stephen Kertesz, "The Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary", Review of Politics, 15 (1953), 179-208.

19 Cf. pp. 122-125.

20 General Sviridov demanded that the President and managing director of the National Bank and Arthur Karasz be removed and prosecuted because of alleged mismanagement of the ruble fund in the National Bank. The charges were absolutely false and the Hungarian Government resisted for some time. Eventually the three leading officials were dismissed but not prosecuted. Cf. Ferenc Nagy, op. cit., pp. 238-239.

21 La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, Vol. I, pp. 40-50.

22 Cf. pp. 18-20.

23 La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, Vol I, pp. 51-55.

24 A later memorandum dealt in detail with Hungary's responsibility in the Second World War. Another memorandum explained the development of the Jewish question in Hungary. Both memorandums were handed to the powers participating in the Paris Conference. Ibid., pp. 72-107.

25 See, Nepszava, February 24, March 3, 10, and 17, 1946.

26 The economic advisor was Eugene Racz who at that time was a nonparty man. Later when he was appointed minister of finance, he entered the Smallholders Party.

27 Cf. p. 51 and Appendix, Document 8, Art. 19.

28 Actually Hungarian manpower and Hungarian experts were used for this work performed under the direction of the Red Army. Some of the railroad lines for which Hungary was required to pay were situated in the neighboring countries. Cf. Ferenc Nagy, op. cit., p. 208.

29 Article 19 of the Rumanian armistice agreement set forth: "The Allied Governments regard the decision of the Vienna Award regarding Transylvania as null and void and are agreed that Transylvania (or the greater part thereof) should be returned to Rumania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement, and the Soviet Government agrees that Soviet forces shall take part for this

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purpose in joint military operations with Rumania against Germany and Hungary."

30 John C. Campbell, "The European Territorial Settlement", Foreign Affairs, 26 (1947), 211-213. Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Exploitation of National Conflicts in Eastern Europe". The Soviet Union (Notre Dame, Indiana), p. 75.

31 La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, Vol. I, pp. 108-111.

32 The Soviet draft treaties for the Danubian ex-Axis Satellite countries put forward in the session of the Deputy Foreign Ministers during March, 1946, were briefer even than the armistice agreements themselves. They contained no mention of frontiers, with the one exception of the restoration of Northern Transvlvania to Rumania. John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947 (New York, 1947), p. 115.

33 Mosely, as an eyewitness, stated that: "In the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers the search for a basis of settlement could begin only after the Soviet delegation had become convinced that further delay was no longer working to the advantage of Soviet interests". Philip E. Mosely, "Peace Making 1946", International Organization, I (1947), 31. Cf. Harold Nicolson "Peacemaking in Paris: Success, Failure or Farce?", Foreign Affairs, 25 (1917), 190-203.

34 "In general, the United States sought fair terms for Hungary, but it did not want to place itself in the position of Hungary's champion against Allied nations. American relations with Czechoslovakia had to be considered. Furthermore, Hungary's record as a junior partner of the Axis, both before and during the war, hardly entitled her to over-sympathetic treatment at the peace settlement. That was the main reason why the Hungarians, despite the validity of many of the arguments they presented, found so few friends at Paris, even among the democratic nations outside the Soviet bloc." John C. Campbell, "The European Territorial Settlement", Foreign Affairs, 26 (1947-48), 214.

35 Selected Documents, pp. 1123, 1153, 1194-1195. For the full text of the declaration of the American Delegate, William L. Thorp, see, Bulletin, XV (1946), 746-748.

36 Winston Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), p. 628.

37 Art. 2, par. I, Hungarian Treaty. The same provisions are embodied in Art. 2, Bulgarian Treaty; Art. 6, Finnish Treaty; Art. 15, Italian Treaty, Art. 3, par. 1, Rumanian Treaty. These provisions are due to American initiative and were accepted as a better alternative to the minority protection system adopted at the peace settlement after the first World War. Cf. Stephen Kertesz, "Human Rights in the Peace Treaties", Law and Contemporary Problems, 14 (1949), 627-646.

In a memorandum addressed to the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Hungarian Government pointed out the importance of reviving and strengthening provisions for the international protection of minority rights. Later the Hungarian peace delegation submitted an elaborate draft treaty for the protection of minority rights, with the system of mixed commissions and tribunals to enforce them under the supervision of the United Nations. Cf. La Hongrie et La Conference de Paris, Vol. I, pp. 135-171.

38 The Australian proposal intended that "a new Part should be included in the Treaty providing for the establishment of a European Court of Human Rights with jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes concerning the rights of citizenship and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in the treaty. The Australian case for this proposal rested on the belief that the general declarations contained in the treaty in support of human rights and fundamental freedoms were not sufficient, standing alone, to guarantee the inalienable rights of the individual and that behind them it was essential that

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some sufficient sanction and means of enforcement should be established. It was proposed that the Court of Human Rights should have the status parallel to that of the International Court of Justice and that the Court would have the additional obligation of making reports to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on its working in relation to the rights within its jurisdiction. It was contemplated that the jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal should be voluntarily accepted by States as an essential means of international supervision of the rights of individuals and as necessary method of giving force and effect to obligations accepted in general terms". Selected Documents, pp. 444-445.

39 Selected Documents, p. 608.

40 Cf. Martin Domke, "Settlement-of-Disputes Provisions in Axis Satellite Peace Treaties", American Journal of International Law, 41 (1947), 911-920.

41 Cf. Yuen-Li Liang, "Observance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Request for an Advisory Opinion on Certain Questions", American Journal of International Law, 44 (1950) 100-117. Kenneth S. Carlston, "Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria and Rumania, Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice," American Journal of International Law, 44 (1950), 728-737.

42 Another publication of the author will deal in more detail with the Paris Peace Conference and with developments of the Hungarian situation since 1946.