DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

APPENDIX

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

* 1. Count Stephen Bethlen's view on Hungary's international situation in 1926.

2. Memorandum concerning the case of the Czech and Slovak settlers in Southern Slovakia.

3. British standpoint of October 26, 1938, concerning the settlement of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak question by an Italo-German arbitration.

4. Cipher instructions sent by the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo Bardossy, to the Hungarian Minister to Germany, Dome Sztojay, on December 11 1941, concerning Hungary's solidarity with the Axis Powers.

5. Cipher instructions sent by the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo Bardossy, to the Hungarian Minister to Germany, Dome Sztojay, on December 12, 1941, concerning the state of war with the United States.

6. Nazi Proposal concerning various alternatives for the Absorption of Hungary, March 11, 1944.

7. The list of the members of the Provisional National Government elected by the Provisional National Assembly on December 22, 1944.

8.The Hungarian Armistice Agreement signed in Moscow on January 20, 1945.

9.Text of a Soviet letter transmitted on July 12, 1945, to the representatives of the United States and United Kingdom Governments on the Allied Control Commission in Hungary. (Annex I to the Potsdam Protocol of August 2, 1945.)

10. Note of the Hungarian Government to the British, Soviet and United States Governments concerning the expulsion of the Germans from Hungary, December 1, 1945.

11. Note Verbale of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry to the British and United States Governments concerning the expulsion of the Germans from Hungary, December 15, 1945.

12. Memorandum of the United States Mission in Budapest concerning the transfer of the national minorities in Czechoslovakia, June 12, 1945.

13. Reply of the United States Government to various Hungarian proposals concerning the problems of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, February 9, 1946.

14. Reply of the British Government to the various Hungarian proposals concerning the problems of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, March 19, 1946.

15. "The Spirit of Hungary. Leaders' efforts to establish democratic state." London Times, October 31, 1946.

16. Memorandum of the Hungarian National Bank on Hungary's Reparations, November 24, 1945, prepared for the confidential information of the British and United States Missions in Budapest.

17. Excerpts from the minutes of the meeting of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, October 12, 1945, dealing with the ratification of the Economic Cooperation Agreement signed by Hungary and the Soviet Union.

18. United States Memorandum addressed to the Hungarian Government October 31, 1945, concerning the Soviet-Hungarian Economic Cooperation Agreement.

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19. British Note Verbale addressed to the Hungarian Government, November 19, 1945, concerning the Soviet-Hungarian Economic Cooperation Agreement.

20.Note Verbale addressed by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Political Mission of the United States of America on December 20, 1945, concerning the Soviet-Hungarian Economic Cooperation Agreement.

21. Excerpts from the Hungarian Note of August 14, 1945, addressed to the British, United States and Soviet Governments on the peace aims of Hungary.

22. Excerpts from the memorandum addressed by Stephen Kertesz to Prime Minister Zoltan Tildy on December 28, 1945, concerning the Hungarian peace preparations.

23. Population-breakdown of Hungary according to mother tongue from 1910 to 1941.

*Documents 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 are unpublished documents from the files of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. For the French text of Documents 10 and 21, see La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, Tome Ier (Budapest, 1947), pp. 37-39 and 7-14. I obtained Documents 16 and 17 through the courtesy of Count Geza Teleki.

DOCUMENT 1

COUNT STEPHEN BETHLEN'S VIEW ON HUNGARY'S INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN 1926. 1

Today, we may not clearly realize that the small states formed from the territory of the late Monarchy may become eventually vassals of either Russia or Germany. As a result of the great struggle, not only the Monarchy has been cut to pieces, but also the Russian Empire has been torn by a violent revolution for a decade. Thus, fate has provided us with a breathing spell for the beginning of a new life. But how long is this state of affairs going to persist? There can be no doubt at all for a thinking man that the great Russian nation is going to become a factor in world politics sooner or later, and that the great German nation will also recuperate from its defeat. We, Hungarians, do not want to become a vassal of the Russians, and want to maintain our independence of the Germans, as we have done for a thousand years, in spite of all the historical and cultural bonds between us. We want to remain Hungarians and live our independent national life.

1 Extract from the Memorial Speech of Count Stephen Bethlen on Count Stephen Tisza, delivered on April 22, 1926. Grof Bethlen Istv_n beszedei es irasai (Budapest, 1933), Vol. II, p. 120.

DOCUMENT 2

A MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE CASE OF CZECH AND SLOVAK SETTLERS IN SOUTHERN SLOVAKIA.

This memorandurn was prepared under the supervision of a leading official of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Paul Sebestyen, in August 1946 for the information of members ot the Hungarian Peace Delegation. He represented the Hungarian Government in the negotiations conducted with Czech, Slovak and German representatives concerning the case of Czech and Slovak settlers in territories returned to Hungary.

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The Czechoslovakian Government used the land reform to Slavonize the Magyar areas of Southern Slovakia. The local Magyar peasants received none or, at most, very few allotments from the large estates which were divided in the Magyar districts, because these lands were allotted to Slovak and Czech settlers brought into the Magyar districts from distant regions for this purpose. Of the 170,000 hectares distributed under the agrarian reform, in the contiguous purely Magyar districts, 130,000 were allotted to Slovak and Czech settlers. For example, on the purely Magyar Danubian Island, Csallokoz, only 6,617 hectares were allotted to the local Magyar population, while 31,673 hectares were allotted to Slovak and Czech settlers brought there from remote districts. Though these settlers formed only four percent of the population of Csallokoz they received eighteen percent of the land. Several thousand Slav families, numbering about 30,000 people, settled in the Magyar districts. This situation, understandably resulted in tension between the local Magyar population and the newly arrived settlers, because the Magyars were, of course, grieved by the fact that land, which had been cultivated by their ancestors as serfs for centuries, had now been allotted to foreign settlers.

After the Vienna award, November 2, 1938, nearly all of the Czech settlers, and part of the Slovaks voluntarily left their lands before the entry of Hungarian troops. Only at one place did an armed clash take place between Hungarian soldiers and Czech settlers. This occurred at Kobolkut, in the district of P_rk_ny. Twenty nine Czech and two Slovak settlers lived there. The Czechs were former members of the Czech Legion in the First World War, and had been rearmed on the occasion of the Czechoslovakian mobilization in the fall of 1938. A few of these Czech legionnaires had remained after their families had left. They possessed a machine-gun with which they opened fire on the entering Hungarian army; the latter reciprocated and three settlers were killed.

The problem of the Czech and Slovak settlers was settled by three international agreements arrived at between the Hungarian Government and the German Government with regard to the Czech settlers, and with the Slovak Government in the case of the Slovak settlers.

Under the provisions of the Agreement signed on October 16, 1940, Hungary agreed to pay 135 million Czech crowns to the Government of the Protectorate as compensation for 20,816 hectares and its appurtenances. Of this amount, ninety million Czech crowns were actually paid in cash at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, while the rest was paid in pre-arranged instalments as long as the war events permitted.

Prior to this agreement, another one had been concluded between the Hungarian and German Governments on May 29, 1940, dealing with the property rights and treatment of the Czech and Moravian people who returned or wanted to return to the Protectorate. Under this agreement they were entitled to take with them their cash, securities, savings-bank books, personal jewelry and that of their families, furniture, all objects of personal use, tools, machines, agricultural inventory, live stock, merchandise, crops, etc. No customs or other duties had to be paid on these goods, and the Hungarian Government guaranteed the personal security and property of the returners and their assistants or representatives. The Hungarian Government also supplied the necessary wagons for the transportation of these items and set a time limit of six months for the completion of the task. In order to facilitate the contacts of Czech individuals with the Hungarian authorities, a mixed Commission was formed under the previously mentioned

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agreement. The Commission resided in Budapest. This Commission also helped the departing Czech settlers and remaining holders of land to assert their rights under the mentioned two agreements. This Commission, consisting of three delegates from each government, functioned until September, 1944.

The agreement concluded between the Hungarian and Slovak Governments on August 2, 1941, settled the claims of the Slovak settlers. The substance of the Agreement was that the Hungarian Government paid 110 millions of Slovak crowns to the Slovak settlers, who returned to Slovakia, as compensation for their 18,000 hectares of land with its appurtenances. In addition the Hungarian Government undertook the settlement of the mortgage debt on those lands in the amount of forty seven million Slovak crowns.

The Hungarian Government guaranteed those Slovak settlers who did not leave the country free possession of their houses and about 11.5 hectares of land, and compensation for land exceeding this area.

DOCUMENT 3

BRITISH STANDPOINT OF OCTOBER 26, 1938, CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE HUNGARO-CZECH05LOVAK QUESTION BY ITALO-GERMAN ARBITRATION. Document No. 227 1 Viscount Halifax to the Earl of Perth (Rome) No. 476 Telegraphic (C 12924/2319/1 2) FOREIGN OFFICE, October 26, 1938. 9:20 P.M. Berlin telegram No. 632.1

Czechoslovak Minister informed me this morning on instructions that his Govermment regarded as quite unacceptable the Hungarian demand for plebiscites in the disputed districts on the basis of the 1910 census. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak Government would be in favour of arbitration by Germany and Italy. In response to an enquiry, M. Masaryk later ascertained from Prague that his Government were opposed to Poland being included among the arbitrators and thought that if Poland were included, Roumania should be included also. M. Masaryk said that the Czechoslovak Government would have to reply today to the Hungarian demand, and before doing so wished to have the views of His Majesty's Government on their attitude.

In reply the Czechoslovak Minister was informed this afternoon that His Majesty's Government saw no objection to the settlement of the Czech-Hungarian question by means of arbitration by Germany and Italy, if the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments agreed to settle their differences in this way. It was added that if the two parties to the dispute preferred to refer the matter to the four Munich Powers, His Majesty's Government would be ready to join in any discussions.

If the views of the Italian Ambassador, reported in Berlin telegram under reference, represent those of his Government, it seems that the Italian Government would prefer that Great Britain and France, as signatories of the Munich Agreement, should participate in any arbitration. If this is indeed the attitude of the Italian Government, it is no doubt occasioned by their desire to obtain support against Germany, who is believed to oppose the acquisition of Ruthenia

---------1 British Documents, Third Series, Vol. III, pp. 202-203.

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by Hungary. Herr von Ribbentrop may of course settle the whole question when he arrives in Rome tomorrow, but it may be of value to the Italian Government to have an indication of our views on this question before the German Minister for Foreign Affairs arrives.

I should therefore be glad if you would seek an early interview with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and inform him that while it is difficult for us to adjudicate between the line claimed by the Hungarians and that offered by the Czechs, and to decide whether or not the 1910 census offers a fair basis, His Majesty's Government are, in principle, in favour of the return to Hungary of those districts in which the population is predominantly Hungarian, subject possibly to certain modifications that may be desirable for economic reasons, e. g., Bratislava. The holding of plebiscites in those regions where the races are so ethnographically entangled and where there is a difference of opinion regarding the figures to be taken as a basis for the voting would, however, in the view of His Majesty's Government be extremely difficult, especially at such short notice as the Hungarian Government propose (before November 30).

His Majesty's Government would, therefore, be happy to see the Czechs and Hungarians agree to settle their differences by reference to arbitration by the Italian and German Governments. If, however, it were deemed preferable or necessary that the questions in dispute between the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments should be referred to the four Munich Powers, His Majesty's Government would be ready to take their part in trying to bring about an agreed settlement.

An expression of the views of His Majesty's Government on the above lines might, I feel, be welcome to Signor Mussolini as an indication that they are anxious to co-operate with him in the discussion of European questions. You will, of course, appreciate that His Majesty's Government do not wish to give the impression of trying to profit by any Italo-German disagreement over the future of Ruthenia.

Repeated to Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade and Paris No. 404.

DOCUMENT 4

CIPHER INSTRUCTIONS SENT BY THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MlNISTER, LASZLO BARDOSSY, TO THE HUNGARIAN MINISTER TO GERMANY, DOME SZTOjAY, ON DECEMBER 11, 1941, CONCERNING HUNGARY'S SOLIDARITY WITH THE AXIS POWERS.1 No. 377

Exung

Berlin

I ask Your Excellency to officially inform the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the contents of the communication made via telephone.

I emphatically ask Your Excellency to restrict Yourself to the text of the communication and not to enter into its interpretation. Your Excellency should point out the following:

Barely a few hours after the declaration of war between Germany and the United States of America we had ostentatiously stated our solidarity and had

--------- 1 The same instructions were sent to the Hungarian Minister to Italy with the omission of the allusion to Weizsacker and to the Hungarians in the United States.

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severed diplomatic relations. The Hungarian Government is convinced that we have fulfilled to the maximum what could be expected from us. Without delay we reached the conclusions hinted at by Weizsacker to you.

If however they want to start a conversation regarding the interpretation of the Government's decision, the following should serve as guidance to Your Excellency's words, expressed as Your private opinion.

Having immediately declared our solidarity and having broken diplomatic relations we have done the maximum that could be expected from us. The Tripartite Pact does not oblige us to do more. The Pact mentioned only political, economic and military assistance. With the declaration of solidarity we gave full political support. Economically we are constantly aiding the Axis to our utmost. There could be no practical question of our military support against the United States.

I ask Your Excellency also to refer to the fact, that the Hungarian Government could not do more, since it would seriously imperil the fate of the nearly one million Hungarians living in the United States.

I emphatically ask your Excellency to maintain the above standpoint for the time being as your own private opinion.

In this respect it will be Your Excellency's task to secure acceptance of the above position in case of necessity.

Bardossy

DOCUMENT 5

CIPHER INSTRUCTIONS SENT BY THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, LASZLO BARDOSSY, TO THE HUNGARIAN MINISTER TO GERMANY, DOME SZTOJAY, ON DECEMBER 12, 1941, CONCERNING THE STATE OF WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES.

Telephonecipher Berlin

The Italian Envoy and the German Charge d'Affaires have informed me this morning of the following:

The Axis Powers concluded from the aggresive acts committed against them that they were obliged to declare the existence of a state of war.

Since it has been established that Germany and Italy are the victims of aggression, in their opinion it is the duty of the states having signed the Tripartite Pact to declare the existence of a state of war. Hungary is among the signatory states. The Axis Powers attach great importance to the fact that this should happen, for reasons of higher political interests and as a demonstration of European solidarity.

I answered as follows:

We have already stated our solidarity with the Axis Powers yesterday. It is our opinion that we have thus fulfilled our obligations emanating from the Pact. In the following I have given the reasons mentioned in paragraph 5 of my cypher No. 337.

The Italian Envoy and the German Charge d'Affaires in their answer have not contested the legal validity of our standpoint without having admitted it. They pointed out, that the quick and spontaneous manifestation of our solidarity undoubtedly made a very good impression in Berlin and in Rome. Their in ---------1 The same instructions were sent to the Hungarian Minister to Italy.

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structions were dated in Berlin and Rome at a time when the attitude of the Hungarian Government could not yet have been considered by their Governments, therefore they will ask their Governments for new instructions. Nonetheless, they emphatically called my attention to the fact that higher political reasons make it necessary that the European states should take a unanimous stand. If we were to maintain our original standpoint, it might easily happen that all the other states uhich have joined the Tripartite Pact would declare war and Hungary would remain alone with her declaration of solidarity.

I answered that in this case we would reconsider the situation.

I presume that Your Excellency has made communications in accordance with the cypher No. 337. If, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, they told Your Excellency that a declaration of war was considered absolutely necessary, I ask You to call on the Foreign Minister again, without awaiting further instructions, and inform him of the following:

The Hungarian government is convinced, that in declaring its solidarity it has fulfilled entirely its obligations emanating from the Tripartite Pact. The "declaration of solidarity", however, really means that in order to document the unity of the signatory parties in accordance with the spirit of the Pact, we are willing to take steps without legal obligations. Therefore, if all signatory powers to the Pact declare war, the Hungarian Government now authorizes the Governments of the Reich and the Kingdom of Italy to interpret our declaration of solidarity in this sense.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, please inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that when the American Envoy asked me yesterday evening as to whether our decision meant a declaration of war, I answered according to our legal standpoint, that we have spontaneously and immediately declared our solidarity but that this did not mean a declaration of war for the time being. If all states signatory to the Pact declare war, we shall give such interpretation of our declaration of solidarity to the American Envoy in Budapest and to the Government in Washington.

I ask you to act most urgently. Try to find out what is known there of the attitude of the Bulgarian and Rumanian Governments. Report this via telefonecypher at once, so that I can make corrections accordingly to the American Envoy.

Bardossy

DOCUMENT 6

NAZI PROPOSAL FOR ABSORPTION OF HUNGARY. 1

[Typewritten draft for a memorandum. It is undated, but one page is written on the back of an unfinished letter dated 11 March, 1944]

(Handwritten corrections made to the original typewritten script by Krallert Weneck, Kaltenbrunner, Flotte and Urban, are given in brackets with their initials, viz., Kr., W., K., & U., the crossed out phrase being underlined [italics].)

From the point of view of the Reich, an incorporation of the Hungarian

---------1 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Supplement A (Washington, 1947), pp. 908-913.

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area as a fundamental part of the old Habsburg sphere of power is in the long run inadmissible.

This aim can be achieved by force (by intervention K.), or as the result of an evolutionary process.

In spite of the extraordinary geopolitical and economic importance of Hungary for the Reich, German foreign policy has made no serious attempt during recent years to gain an influence on developments in Hungary and to make use of this to attain the goal by means of evolutionary methods (apart, perhaps, from direct personal endeavors by the Fuehrer to win Horthy over to the dismissal of Kallay and the elimination of the Bethlen influence K.).

Those Hungarians who look back, in the field of foreign policy, to a centuries old tradition as a great power, incline fundamentally towards a conspiratorial policy. The complete lack of German attempts at influence has inevitably trained them to follow that policy of playing off one power against another which has now attained an intolerable character as the "proofs" have clearly revealed. (Underlining by W.)

(+) Instead of recognizing therein the necessity of seeking, in the numerous positive forces, bases for a solution which will both secure the total utilization of Hungarian potentialities for the prosecution of the war at the moment, and create for the future the prerequisites for the final aim striven for an attempt at a military solution by force now threatens. This will by no means lead (underlining by U.) to the complete fulfillment of the military and economic demands of the Reich in this area, and will, on the contrary, obstruct forever the road to an evolutionary development ( (+) the whole paragraph is crossed out and the following substituted: I fear that the road to a future evolutionary development might be blocked by immediate military operations, without achieving for the present the seizure of the military and economic potentialities. K.).

On the Hungarian side there stands against all this the fear of falling a victim to Bolshevism on the defeat of Germany, which is taken for granted. It is believed that the only way to exercise this danger is by an early adherence to the Anglo-American side. To this is added the deep dislike of the leading upper class towards us as the bearers of a social revolution which will, in the long run, make impossible the continuation of the feudal system of life in Hungary the beneficiary of which is this very upper class.

The consideration that a possible English intervention would have to be met in good time was one of the main reasons for the origination of the plan for a solution by force. (Indecipherable alterations have been made by K. and the whole paragraph has been struck out.)

Against this, I consider for reasons arising from the geographical situation alone, the probability of an attempt at an invasion to be very slight. (Firstly, because of the geographical situation and then because of an undertaking so unpredictable does not tempt the English who are not minded to take risks. K.) I believe, on the other hand, that the approach of Bolshevism will in itself soon make even those of the upper class forces which are inimical to us, ready to negotiate, out of despair of the possibility of English aid and out of fear of the even greater Bolshevist danger.

The vitally essential demands of the Reich in this area are now as follows:

(1) Clomplete exhaustion of all economic and especially agricultural resources in order to safeguard the basis of Germany's and Europe's food supply, in view of the loss of the Ukranian areas.

(2) Employment of all reserves of manpower for carrying on the war and

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DIPLOMACY lN A WHIRLPOOL

(3) Complete relaxation of tension, in order to set free the Rumanian troops also, for use on the Eastern front.

The military action will create the following state of affairs, especially in the event of participation by the Rumanians and Slovaks:

(1) A united defense front, such as has never been seen before from the Communists to the Arrow and Cross party (Pfeilkreuzler).

(2) The impossibility of forming any government; at the most some mercenary persons would be found.

(3) Horthy's immediate resignation.

(4) Military, political and economic chaos. The country one center of resistance, partisan activity on the greatest possible scale.

(5) And this point carries particularly great weight when the present German military situation is taken into consideration numerous German divisions will be tied down for an unlimited period.

The desired aims will therefore not be attained. The carrying out of the military action at the time of the cultivation of the land in the spring, in itself decisively damages the prospects for the harvest. Ownership of large estates and the activity of Jewish middlemen, neither of which can be eliminated at short notice, will further lessen results. The partisan activity that can be expected for certain, finally destroys any hope of an increase in productivity.

The Hungarians have for centuries had experience in the organization of national resistance. Even the efforts of the old monarchy, which went on for twenty years, from 1848 to 1867, making use of all means of power, resulted in total failure. On the contrary, they decisively contribute to the creation and intensification of Hungarian national chauvinism. A recruitment of the Hungarian reserves of manpower for the German war effort is out of the question under these circumstances. On the other hand, continuous partisan warfare will ensue in the area occupied by us. As a result of the clash of the two opponents, warfare on a large scale would ensue in Transylvania and would presumably last a long time.

Even assuming the more advantageous case of a final Rumanian victory, the losses the Rumanians would have suffered and the necessity of suppressing northern Transylvania would make the employment of Rumanian troops in the East impossible for some months at least, if not permanently. We would, therefore, not see our present hopes fulfilled, would probably close the road o a later appeasement and final solution and would also evoke far-reaching reactions in the fields of strategy and of foreign politics. The zones of unrest created behind our enemies, with an operational intention, would be closed to form a belt reaching from the Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, if a mutinous Hungary and a Transylvania in a state of war were added to them. Simultaneously, we thereby cut those supply routes, the safe functioning of which is vitally necessary to the southern wing of the Eastern front. If the Soviet intention of cutting, one after another, the supply routes that run parellel to and outside the Carpathians until the last railway line is cut, succeeds, then the supply lines through the Carpathian basin will alone be the basis for further resistance. But, also, those supply lines into the Balkans which are today the only safe ones and which would be vitally necessary in view of the possibility of a war against Turkey or a (of a K.) landing in the Balkans (there K.) would be endangered.

Almost equally important are presumably the political effects abroad. The German attitude on the Transylvanian question, once again executing a volte face, would entail such a loss of prestige even in friendly foreign countries that

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no one could have faith in (doubts would arise as to K.) our ability and our will for a New Order in Europe. The effects must be disastrous (will be oppressive K.) even in friendly nations such as Bulgaria, where it would be feared that a possible German agreement with the Serbs or Greeks might one day result again in the loss of Macedonia or Thrace. Thus we would drive the Bulgarians too into the arms of the Anglo-Americans in the endeavor (who will endeavor K.) to make it possible to retain (to obtain a guarantee from them (Sewoff) K.) the territories they have gained, by changing sides in time.

The effects to be expected in Finland, the Baltic States, etc., would be quite similar.

I am therefore convinced that the intended military coercive measures (intervention K. ) will not only not (will not necessarily K.) attain any of the (the K.) aims set, will create new and unforseeable difficulties (situations that are difficult to get a bird's eye view of K.) in the fields of strategy and of foreign politics. A successful attempt at a new order on an evolutionary basis on the other hand (however K.), would mean:

(1) An internally consolidated Hungary, friendly to Germany,

(2) Horthy's remaining in his position as a "historical" personality, who would continue to guarantee the functioning of the national institutions.

(3) The Honved and the security units would remain entirely in step and would thus be at the disposal of the Reich's military requirements.

(4) The total economic draining of the Hungarian area is fully guaranteed.

(5) The elimination of all arguments on Rumania's part that she needs troops in Transylvania, makes these troops available for the East, and can postpone the present Transylvanian problem to a later date by clever promises.

(6) Therefore, not only will Hungarian and Rumanian troops be gained, but numerous German divisions will be spared.

(7) A distribution of German troops throughout Hungary, which might become necessary for the purpose of security and against a British invasion, can be carried out unhindered, by means of troops in training, in the same way as has been done in Rumania.

These far reaching results can be attained by comparatively simple means.

The point of departure would have to be a personal message from the Fuehrer to Horthy who, as is known, is (has been K.) always most strongly (strongly K.) impressed by the personality of the Fuehrer. The go-between for this message could be a diplomat such as von Papen who is not only known as an honest broker, but who enjoys moreover the personal confidence of Horthy. This message would have to refer to the debit balance of the government (Kallay's K.) which had been hostile to Germany and express the thought that the full employment of Hungary's potentialities for Germany's and Europe's aims could alone assure Hungary's future existence. The condition and the guarantee for the carrying out of these demands would have to be created by a complete change of regime (in any case with German occupation K.). Following on this, the Regent will legalize a new government on the broadest (a broad K.) basis from the right wing of the Government throughout the Party for Hungarian Renewal and the Hungarian National Socialist Party to the Arrow and Cross Party (Underlining by V.)

The Putsch-like carrying out of this change of government must be organized in such a manner that the entire public remains unaware of the actual connections, as a result of the authoritative decision of the Regent and that antagonistic forces do not get a chance to act. The putting into effect of this plan is

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guaranteed by the existence of plenty of suitable personalities with whom we have close connections through my collaborators (underlining by W).

(x) The most important of these men, who could take up leading parts in a new government, are:

Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal of the Reserve Ratz, a respected general who enjoys the confidence of the entire right wing opposition, and who seems certain to be acceptable to the Regent as Prime Minister.

Lieutenant-Fieldmarshal Ruszkay, a highly qualified soldier of pure German descent, who enjoys the very highest respect of the officer class, and who, on taking over the Honved Ministry, would be a certain guarantee that Hungary's military forces would stand unconditionally at the side of the Reich.

The former Prime Minister Imredy, a man of great qualities as an economic leader and financial expert, who meets with very great approval, particularly among the Hungarian intelligentsia.

Major General of the Reserve Baky (deputy Kr), one of the organizers of the Hungarian gendarmerie, who are generally and quite rightly looked upon as being the surest instrument for peace and order, and who have, at the same time, always been entirely sympathetic to Germany.

A number of popular party leaders of the right wing, as well as acknowledged experts, would also immediately be at our disposal (passage from (x) sidelined by F.).

(+ +) Conclusion.

I dare say that such an attempt could, through my collaboration, bring about a government consisting of the above-named people within 3 days. The military undertaking (transports to the Eastern Front) will make its own contribution towards this. The Troian method remains assured, but so does our good reputation as well.

The discussions taken down on the 13.3 did not even become a "D-day."

It rests with the (?) and the "proofs"! (+ + K.).

DOCUMENT 7

THE PROVISIONAL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ELECTED BY THE PROVISIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON DECEMBER 22, 1944. 1

Prime Minister: Bela Dalnoki Miklos (non-party man)2

Minister of Interior: Dr. Ferenc Erdei (Peasant Party)3

Minister of Finance: Dr. Istvan Vasary (Smallholder Party)

Minister for Foreign Affairs: Dr. Janos Gyongyosi (Smallholder Party)

Minister of Religion and Public Instruction: Count Geza Teleki (non- party man)4

Minister of National Defense: Janos Voros (non-party man)5

Minister of Agriculture: Imre Nagy (Communist Party)6

---------1 Foreign Minister Molotov presented the same list to the first Hungarian armistice delegation and to the Hungarian Generals on December 6, 1944.

2 Former Commander-in-Chief of the First Hungarian Army.

3 As it turned out later Ferenc Erdei was a crypto-Communist.

4 Son of the late Prime Minister Count Paul Teleki, Professor of Geography and member of the first Hungarian armistice delegation. For a short period in 1945 President of the Civic Democratic Party.

5 Chief of the General Staff until October 15, 1944.

6 Muscovite Communist.

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Minister of Trade and Transportation: Jozsef Gabor (Communist Party)7 Minister of Justice: Dr. Agoston Valentiny (Social Democratic Party)

Minister of Industry: Ferenc Takacs (Social Democratic Party)

Minister of Food Provision: Gabor Faragho (non-party man)8

Minister of Social Welfare: Erik Molnar (presented as Social Democrat but professed himself Communist at the first Council of Ministers)

The apparent balance in the Cabinet between the parties was offset by the fact that Communists seized all the effective power positions. The Communist Party organized and controlled the police with the help of the crypto-Communist Minister of Interior. The Minister of Agriculture was a Communist in the critical period of the execution of the agrarian reform. The Communist Minister of Trade and Transportation was in charge of reorganization of the destroyed transportation and communication system. Thus the Communists exercised a tight control over the movement of persons and transportation throughout the country. This situation assured the Communists important advantages, particularly before the elections of 1945. The Communist Minister of Social Welfare could act as public benefactor. In contrast with the Communist advantages, the Smallholders obtained the Ministry of Finance with an empty treasury and many obligations, and the portfolio of the Foreign Ministry. The latter could have been important in Smallholder hands under normal conditions but the Armistice Agreement put foreign affairs under the guardianship of the ACC.

7 Jozsef Gabor was replaced in April, 1945 by Erno Gero, the strong man of the Hungarian Communist Party. Both were Muscovites.

8 Supervisor of the Hungarian Gendarmery until October 15, 1944, and a member of the first Hungarian armistice delegation. Previously he was military attache in Moscow and published a strongly anti-Soviet book. Later in 1945 he entered the Smallholder Party.

DOCUMENT 8 1

AGREEMENT CONCERNING AN ARMlSTICE BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON ONE HAND AND HUNGARY ON THE OTHER.

The Provisional National Government of Hungary, recognizing the fact of the defeat of Hungary in the war against the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and other United Nations, accepts the armistice terms presented by the Governments of the above-mentioned three powers, acting on behalf of all the United Nations which are in a state of war with Hungary.

On the basis of the foregoing the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov, duly authorized thereto by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, acting on behalf of all the United Nations which are at war with Hungary, on the one hand and the representatives of the Provisional National Government of Hungary, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mister Gyongyosi J_nos, Minister of Defense Colonel General Voros Janos and State Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers Mister Balogh Istvan, on the other, holding proper full powers, have signed the following conditions:

--------- 1 Executive Agreement Series 456 (Washington, 1945).

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1. (a) Hungary has withdrawn from the war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other United Nations, including Czechoslovakia, has severed all relations with Germany and has declared war on Germany.

(b) The Government of Hungary undertakes to disarm German armed forces in Hungary and to hand them over as prisoners of war.

The Government of Hungary also undertakes to intern nationals of Germany.

(c) The Government of Hungary undertakes to maintain and make available such land, sea and air forces as may be specified for service under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. In this connection Hungary will provide not less than eight infantry divisions with corps troops. These forces must not be used on allied territory except with the prior consent of the allied government concerned.

(d) On the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Hungarian armed forces must be demobilized and put on a peace footing under the supervision of the Allied Control Commission. (See Annex to Article I.)

2. Hungary has accepted the obligation to evacuate all Hungarian troops and officials from the territory of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania occupied by her within the limits of the frontiers of Hungary existing on December 31,

1937, and also to repeal all legislative and administrative provisions relating to the annexation or incorporation into Hungary of Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Rumanian territorry.

3. The Government and High Command of Hungary will ensure to the Soviet and other allied forces facilities for free movement on Hungarian territory in any direction if, in the opinion of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, the military situation requires this, the Government and High Command of Hungary giving such movement every possible assistance with their own means of communication and at their own expense on land, on water and in the air. (See Annex to Article 3.)

4. The Government of Hungary will immediately release all allied prisoners of war and internees. Pending further instructions the Government of Hungary will at its own expense provide all allied prisoners of war and internees, displaced persons and refugees, including nationals of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, with adequate food, clothing, medical services, and sanitary and hygienic requirements, and also with means of transportation for the return of any such persons to their own country.

5. The Government of Hungary will immediately release, regardless of citizenship and nationality, all persons held in confinement in connection with their activities in favor of the United Nations or because of their sympathies with the United Nations' cause or for racial or religious reasons, and will repeal all discriminatory legislation and disabilities arising therefrom.

The Government of Hungary will take all necessary measures to ensure that all displaced persons or refugees within the limits of Hungarian territory, including Jews and stateless persons, are accorded at least the same measure of protection and security as its own nationals.

6. The Government of Hungary undertakes to return to the Soviet Union, and also to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and to the other United Nations, by the dates specified by the Allied Control Commission, and in complete good order, all valuables and materials removed during the war to Hungary from United Nations' territory and belonging to state, public or cooperative organizations, enterprises, institutions or individual citizens, such as factory and works equipment,

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locomotives, rolling stock, tractors, motor vehicles, historic monuments, museum treasures and any other property.

7. The Government and High Command of Hungary undertake to hand over as booty into the hands of the Allied (Soviet) High Command all German war material located on Hungarian territory, including vessels of the fleet of Germany.

8. The Government and High Command of Hungary undertake not to permit, without the authorization of the Allied Control Commission, the export or expropriation of any form of property (including valuables and currency) belonging to Germany or her nationals or to persons resident in German territory or in territories occupied by Germany. They will safeguard such property in the manner specified by the Allied Control Commission.

9. The Government and High Command of Hungary undertake to hand over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all vessels belonging or having belonged to the United Nations which are located in Hungarian Danubian ports, no matter at whose disposal these vessels may be, for use during the period of the war against Germany by the Allied (Soviet) High Command in the general interests of the Allies, these vessels subsequently to be returned to their owners.

The Government of Hungary will bear full material responsibility for any damage or destruction of the aforementioned property until the moment of its transfer to the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

10. Hungarian merchant vessels, whether in Hungarian or foreign waters, shall be subject to the operational control of the Allied (Soviet) High Command for use in the general interests of the Allies.

11. The Government of Hungary will make regular payments in Hungarian currency and provide commodities (fuel, foodstuffs, et cetera), facilities and services as may be required by the Allied (Soviet) High Command for the fulfillment of its functions as well as for the needs of missions and representatives of the allied states connected with the Allied Control Commission.

The Government of Hungary will also assure, in case of need, the use and regulation of the work of industrial and transport enterprises, means of communication, power stations, enterprises and installations of public utility, stores of fuel and other material, in accordance with instructions issued during the armistice by the Allied (Soviet) High Command or the Allied Control Commission. (See Annex to Article 11.)

12. Losses caused to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia by military operations and by the occupation by Hungary of the territories of these states will be made good by Hungary to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, but taking into consideration that Hungary has not only withdrawn from the war against the United Nations but has declared war against Germany, the parties agree that compensation for the indicated losses will be made by Hungary not in full but only in part, namely, to the amount of 300 million American dollars payable over six years in commodities (machine equipment, river craft, grain, livestock, et cetera), the sum to be paid to the Soviet Union to amount to 200 million American dollars and the sum to be paid to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to amount to 100 million American dollars.

Compensation will be paid by Hungary for loss and damage caused by the war to other allied states and their nationals, the amount of compensation to be fixed at a later date. (See Annex to Article 12.)

13. The Government of Hungary undertakes to restore all legal rights and interests of the United Nations and their nationals on Hungarian territory as they existed before the war and also to return their property in complete good order.

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14. Hungary will cooperate in the apprehension and trial, as well as the surrender to the governments concerned, of persons accused of war crimes.

15. The Government of Hungary undertakes to dissolve immediately all proHitler or other fascist political, mi]itary, para-military and other organizations on Hungarian territory conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations and not to tolerate the existence of such organizations in future.

16. The publication, introduction and distribution in Hungary of periodical or non-periodical literature, the presentation of theatrical performances or films, the operation of wireless stations, post, telegraph and telephone services will take place in agreement with the Allied (Soviet) High Command. (See Annex to Article 16.)

17. Hungarian civil administration will be restored in the whole area of Hungary separated by not less than 50-100 kilometres (depending upon conditions of terrain) from the front line, Hungarian administrative bodies undertaking to carry out, in the interests of the reestablishment of peace and security, instructions and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command or Allied Control Commission issued by them for the purpose of securing the execution of these armistice terms.

18. For the whole period of the armistice there will be established in Hungary an Allied Control Commission which will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms under the chairmanship of the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

During the period between the coming into force of the armistice and the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Allied Control Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. (See Annex to Article 18.)

19. The Vienna Arbitration Award of November 2, 1938 and the Vienna Award of August 30, 1940 are hereby declared to be null and void.

20. The present terms come into force at the moment of their signing.

Done in Moscow 20 January, 1945, in one copy which will be entrusted to the safekeeping of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the Russian, English and Hungarian languages, the Russian and English texts being authentic.

Certified copies of the present agreement, with annexes, will be transmitted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to each of the other governments on whose behalf the present agreement is being signed.

FOR THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE

THE PROVISIONAL NATIONAL UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY R E P U B L I C S, THE UNITED GYONGYOSI JANOS KINGDOM AND THE UNITED

VOROS JANOS STATES OF AMERICA

BALOGH ISTVAN K. VOROSHILOV

ANNEX TO

"AGREEMENT CONCERNING AN ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED

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STATES OF AMERICA ON ONE HAND AND HUNGARY ON THE OTHER", SIGNED IN MOSCOW 20 JANUARY, 1945.

A. ANNEX TO ARTICLE 1.

The Hungarian Military Command shall hand over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command within a period fixed by the latter all the information at its disposal regarding the German armed forces and the plans of the German Military Command for the development of military operations against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the other United Nations, and also the charts and maps and all operational documents relating to the military operations of the German armed forces.

The measures provided for in Article I of the Agreement regarding the internment of nationals of Germany now in Hungarian territory do not apply to nationals of that country of Jewish origin.

B. ANNEX TO ARTICLE 3.

The assistance specified in Article 3 of the Agreement shall be taken to mean that the Government and High Command of Hungary will place at the disposal of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, for use at its discretion during the armistice, in complete good order and with the personnel required for their maintenance, all Hungarian military, air and river fleet installations and buildings, ports, barracks, warehouses, airfields, means of communication and meteorological stations which might be required for military needs.

C. ANNEX TO ARTICLE 11.

The Government of Hungary will withdraw and redeem within such time limits and on such terms as the Allied (Soviet) High Command may specify, all holdings in Hungarian territory of currencies issued by the Allied (Soviet) High Command, and will hand over currency so withdrawn free of cost to the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

The Government of Hungary will not permit the disposal of external Hungarian assets or the disposal of internal Hungarian assets to foreign governments or foreign nationals without the permission of the Allied (Soviet) High Command or Allied Control Commission.

D. ANNEX TO ARTICLE 12.

The precise nomenclature and varieties of commodities to be delivered by Hungary to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement and also the more precise periods for making these deliveries each year shall be defined in special agreements between the respective governments. These deliveries will be calculated at 1938 prices with an increase of fifteen percent for industrial equipment and ten percent for other goods.

As the basis of calculation for payment of the indemnity foreseen in Article 12 of the Agreement, the American dollar is to be used at its gold parity on the day of signing of the agreement, i.e. thirty-five dollars to one ounce of gold.

In connection with Article 12 it is understood that the Government of Hungary will immediately make available certain food and other supplies required for relief and rehabilitation of the population of those Czechoslovak and Yugoslav territories which have suffered as a result of Hungarian aggression. The quantities of the products to be delivered will be determined by agreement between the three governments and will be considered as part of the reparation by Hungary for the loss and damages sustained by Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

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E. ANNEX TO ARTICLE 16.

The Government of Htungary will ensure that wireless communication, telegraphic and postal correspondence, and correspondence in cipher and by courier, as well as teiephonic communication with foreign countries, of embassies, legations and consulates situated in Hungary will be conducted in the manner laid down by the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

F. ANNEX TO ARTICLE 18.

Control over the exact execution of the armistice terms will be entrusted to the Allied Control Commission to be established in conformity with Article 18 of the Armistice Agreement.

The Government of Hungary and its organs shall fulfill all instructions of the Allied Control Commission arising out of the armistice agreement.

The Allied Control Commission will set up special organs or sections entrusting them respectively with the execution of various functions. In addition, the Allied Control Commission may have its officers in various parts of Hungary.

The Allied Control Commission will have its seat in the city of Budapest.

Moscow, 20 January, 1945.

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