DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

DOCUMENT 18

UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT, OCTOBER 31. 1945, CONCERNING THE SOVIET-HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT.

In the view of the Government of the United States, the economic collaboration agreement recently negotiated between the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Hungary is contrary to the United States policy of nondiscrimination in economic and commercial matters as that policy has been evidenced in the treaty signed with Hungary on June 24, 1925.

Attention is invited to the following points in this connection:

1. Article X of the United States Hungarian treaty assuring most favored nation treatment to nationals of the United States would make it necessary that joint Soviet-Hungarian enterprises for reconstruction and development in Hungarian industry, agriculture, transport and banking should be established and operated in such a manner as not to impair most favored nation treatment to nationals of the United States. Particular importance is attached by the United States to receiving most favored nation treatment for United States nationals in the field of discovery of petroleum, as well as its exploitation, refining, processing and marketing.

2. Special concern is felt by the Government of the United States at the clause in the Soviet-Hungarian economic collaboration agreement which permits Soviet-Hungarian participation in "existing" plants since nationals of the United States have substantial interests both in petroleum and in other properties in Hungary. Hence, action adversely affecting these interests is considered undesirable by the Government of the United States which must point out that the proper recognition and protection of such interests is necessary.

3. With reference to the organization and development of river and ocean shipping, the Government of the United States believes that the Soviet-Hun

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garian economic collaboration agreement should not be so implemented as to prevent complete freedom of transit being granted as provided in Article XIII of the treaty between the United States and Hungary.

4. The Government of the United States believes, with regard to the operation of the undertaking on the part of the Hungarian Government to facilitate the processing of raw materials supplied by the Soviet Union for processing in Hungarian factories, that this undertaking by the Hungarian Government should not be so implemented as to deny for United States nationals unconditional most favored nation treatment as agreed to in Article VII of the treaty between the United States and Hungary.

In general, the Government of the United States considers the purposes of the United States Hungarian treaty of continued importance without reference to the present status of that treaty as a result of hostilities, since the treaty could be restored to full force and effect upon the conclusion of peace and perhaps replaced at a later date by a new treaty mutually granting even broader rights.

Budapest, October 31, 1945.

DOCUMENT 19

BRITISH NOTE VERBALE ADDRESSED TO

THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT,

NOVEMBER 19, 1945,

CONCERNING THE SOVIET-HUNGARIAN

ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT.

No. 92

British Political Mission in Hungary. 133/116/45 Budapest, November 19, 1945.

NOTE VERBALE

His Majesty's Government desire to make reference to the proposed Russo-Magyar Agreement for Economic Co-operation and to remind the Hungarian Government that under Article 2 of the Anglo-Hungarian Commercial Treaty of 1926, Great Britain secured most favoured nation rights. Even if this Treaty is technically abrogated by the war, the conditions of the Armistice guarantee to Great Britain the restoration of pre-war rights. It would indeed be intolerable if, having won the war, Great Britain were asked to accept less extensive rights than those previously enjoyed.

For the information of the Hungarian Government it is pointed out that discussions on this subject between His Majesty's Government and the Central Government of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics in Moscow have not, in fact, been closed, and they will be resumed.

DOCUMENT 20

NOTE VERBALE ADDRESSED BY

THE HUNGARIAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

TO THE POLITICAL MISSION OF

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON DECEMBER 20, 1945,

CONCERNING THE SOVIET-HUNGARIAN

ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT.

145/res.Be. 1945. NOTE VERBALE 1

The Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Political Mission of the United States of America and, referring to the Memorandum handed over by His Excellency H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld on October 31st, 1945, to M. J. Gyongyosi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has the honor to communicate that the National High Council ratified in its session held today the Agreement concerning economic cooperation between Hungary and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics signed at Moscow, on the 27th of August, 1945.

The ratification will be exchanged in the near future at Budapest.

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When deciding on the ratification, the National High Council took into consideration the resolution of the Political Committee of the National Assembly, according to which:

"The Political Committee of the National Assembly presents for ratification the Hungaro-Soviet Agreement on Economic Cooperation to the National High Council and takes cognizance of the Government's declaration stating that this Agreement by no means impedes the Hungarian State to conclude economic or commercial Agreements of any kind with other States."

The Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs wishes to add to the aforesaid that, according to the Hungarian Government, the Agreement of Economic Cooperation concluded with the Soviet Hnion does not effect the validity of the "Most favored nation Clause" inserted in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights concluded between the Kingdom of Hungary and the United States of America at Washington, on the 24th of June, 1925. 2

Budapest, December 20th, 1945.

--------- l The same day the British political representative in Budapest received a note couched in identical terms which referred in its last paragraph to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between the Kingdom of Hungary and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1926.

2 For the termination of this treaty one year notice was required. This notice was given to Hungary on July 5, 1951, and one year later President Truman ordered the Treasury Department to end all trade agreement benefits to Hungary.

DOCUMENT 21

EXCERPTS FROM THE HUNGARIAN NOTE

OF AUGUST 14, 1945,

ADDRESSED TO THE BRITISH, UNITED STATES

AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS

ON THE PEACE AIMS OF HUNGARY.

HUNGARIAN MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

44/res.Be. 1945 Budapest, August 14th, 1945.

Sir,

The democratic Hungarian Government wishes to express its deep gratitude to His Britannic Majesty's Government for the good will they have displayed towards Hungary during the Potsdam Conference when our country's fate was being discussed.

The Hungarian Government is especially grateful for that part of the communique issued at the close of the conference which makes it possible for Hungary to conclude a peace treaty in the near future, foreshadowing, as it does, our eventual admission into the organization of the United Nations. This will enable the Hungarian people to join the community of democratic states. Hungary wishes to participate actively and without reservation in the work of the new world organization which is predestined to lead the nations towards a happier future.

At the time of the forthcoming peace negotiations the Hungarian Government does not desire to stress particular Hungarian interests. It is our wish that the peace treaties to be concluded should adjust the Hungarian problems with due consideration for the cause of world peace, bearing in mind the special interests of the Central European community. Hungarian interests will also best be served by a peace which brings tranquillity to the peoples ravaged by the war and which achieves satisfaction to the widest possible extent facilitating peaceful co-operation with foreign states, especially our neighbours.

Starting from this guiding principle the Hungarian Government recommends

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that the following general considerations should form the basis of the peace negotiations adjusting the political, territorial, cultural and economic problems:

(1) The preliminary requirement of the welfare of the small nations living in the Danube valley is that their close economic co-operation should be realized. It is a well-known fact that the cost of agricultural production in these countries is much higher for reasons which cannot be enumerated here but which were thoroughly investigated by the Hungarian Government than in the large wheatgrowing countries which establish world prices. Similarly the production cost of most of the manufactured goods in South-Eastern Europe is higher than world prices. The nations of this region are so interdependent economical!y that they must be either enemies or friends.

Under these circumstances the prosperity of the peoples of South-Eastern Europe can only be put on a solid basis if their close economic co-operation and reciprocal trade is institutionally secured.

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was undoubtedly obsolete politically, but it was better equipped on account of its widespread borders extending from Passau to Pola and Predeal to assure the welfare of its peoples than the small succession states carved out of it. The latter being impelled by excessive chauvinism tried to achieve unsound autarchy and adopted an economic policy of mutual exclusion which proved to be extremely detrimental to the welfare of the peoples. . . .

This unsound and irrational economic policy paved the way for the German economic penetration which none of the states were able to withstand, especially during the recurring economic crises.

Therefore the peace treaties should strive to ensure institutionally that the small Danubian nations, complementary to one another in natural resources and economically dependent upon each other, pursue the policy of closest economic co-operation instead of economic isolation. This would materially minimize the political controversies and dissensions and at the same time benefit world economy. The economic advancement of the Danubian countries would also augment their importance as consumer markets.

Here it is necessary to point out that in the commercial agreement between the United States of America and Czechoslovakia in 1935, the United States agreed not to claim under the most favoured nation clause any benefits that Czechoslovakia would confer on Austria, Roumania, Hungary or Yugoslavia. Thus the Government of the United States acknowledged at that time the special relationship existing between the Danubian States.

In view of the aforesaid the Hungarian Government on its part deems it desirable that the Powers responsible for the territorial reconstruction of the Danubian region state their views as to how the effective economic co-operation of the Danubian states can be institutionally secured.

(2) In this connection the Hungarian Government requests that when the reconstruction of the Danubian region is undertaken the increased industrialization of Hungary should be made feasible.

Here is indeed the crux of the situation: Hungary as an agrarian state can only take care of the increase in her population through the thorough reorganization of her economic system. There is no doubt that the reorganization of her agricultural production will necessitate large-scale capital investment, considerable time and favourable economic conditions. But even with the reorganization of agriculture the greater part of the natural increase in population will still have to seek employment in other industries.

Between 1900 and 1941 the population of present day Hungary increased by

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2,463,000; out of this only 373,000 could find employment in agriculture. Other industries, mainly manufacturing, had to absorb the rest, about 2,090,000. ...

The industrialization of South-Eastern Europe could be made easier if some of the German industries to be discontinued were reassembled in this region. In this event the economic dependency of these countries on Germany would cease to a large extent, and German expansion to the East would be drastically checked. Formerly the German industrial expansion has been towards the East, so its re settlement here would continue the natural trend.

When advocating this plan the Hungarian Government does not wish to advocate economic self-sufficiency. This would not be in accord with our previous remarks about the necessity of economic collaboration between the Danubian countries. Every South-Eastern European country should be given an opportunity to develop those industries which complement its natural resources. In Hungary for instance it would mean the establishment of industries connected with agriculture and fruit growing, as well as of those industries which have the requisite raw materials for developed production (for instance bauxite, oil, natural gas) and the reconstruction and improvement of existing industries such as chemical industries, manufacturing chemists, etc.

(3) Economic co-operation however has certain ideological prerequisites. In other words public opinion in the South-Eastern European countries must be trained in the art of good neighbourliness instead of enmity as in the past. The last traces of racial theory created by German chauvinism must be eradicated to prevent the recurrence of the evil effects of racial intolerance throughout the world. One of the most important tasks of all nations should be the total elimination of all Nazi doctrines from their ideologies.

Therefore in the opinion of the Hungarian Government it is essential that public education should be basically changed from that existing between the two world wars, as well as the press and all political publication in the Danubian countries, all of them preeminently exposed to German ideologies. Means should be found within the framework of the new world organization to prevent the spreading of Fascist doctrines and other fallacies through school books and the press, which only arouse hostile sentiments towards other people.

The chauvinistic principle dominating these countries was responsible for creating an atmosphere inimical to healthy international co-operation of any kind. In view of this one of the first tasks of the democratic Hungarian Govermment was to revise all school textbooks. The aim of this revision was to eliminate all Fascist concepts and any statements which would cause antagonism towards our neighbours in the minds of our youths.

Furthermore, the Hungarian Government is planning the publication of a whole series of tracts emphasizing the common cultural and historical bonds between the Danubian peoples, which will also show that the economic co-operation between them is in the natural course of events.

Experience of the past indicates the unhealthy Fascist morality, tendenciously spread through school books, the press and political publications and capable only of hatred of other people, is the most serious obstacle to firmly founded international co-operation.

The Hungarian Government thinks it desirable with this in mind to set up international cultural commissions within the framework of the new world organization or at least limited to South-Eastern Europe which would undertake to investigate in a friendly spirit those biased statements and harmful tendencies appearing in the press, school books and political publications, which are liable to hamper international co-operation and good neighbourliness.

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This commission could achieve positive constructive work by the promulgation of those tenets which would create a friendly atmosphere between the Danubian peoples. These principles could then be popularized by the different countries in their press, school books, and radio.

(4) As for the territorial settlement to be undertaken by the peace conference, the Hungarian Government hopes to see established a peace "which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from want and fear".

The conditions so wisely outlined in Article 6 of the Atlantic Charter can be realized only by the widest application of the principles of nationality. No doubt the ideal state of affairs would be if the boundaries would lose their significance. Failing this, the cause of international reconciliation and co-operation would best be served if nationalities living on contiguous territories were to belong to the same state.

The Hungarian people had to pay a heavy price for the failure to achieve this after the First World War, as largely due to this fact no sound democracy could be developed in Hungary. The Hungarian reactionaries for 25 years were sustained by the fact that one third of the Hungarian people torn away from the mother country against their will lived under severe oppression in the neighbouring countries. Hungarian public opinion could never understand why the Treaty of Trianon, advocating the principles of democracy and nationality, found it necessary to distribute one third of their compatriots among foreign states when the majority of them lived in one block on territories adjacent to Hungary. Hungarian minorities amounting to more than 3 millions unfortunately were subjected to the despotism of exaggerated nationalism, which fact was used to advantage by the reactionary Hungarian press to create and foster an irredentist and revisionist mentality in the Hungarian public.

The most effective measure to counteract national antagonism, which is still rampant in countries corrupted by Fascist doctrines and constantly stirred by chauvinist elements, would be the delimination of boundaries according to the freely expressed wish of the population and to the principles of nationality wherever the nationalities live on contiguous territories.

From the time of the French Revolution the principles of nationality as a basis for settlement have been universally accepted. This was the driving force behind several European revolutions. This principle inspired the theory of selfdetermination advocated by President Wilson and is the dominating feature of Lenin's and Stalin's works as well as of the constitution of the Soviet Union.

The Hungarian Government is well aware of the fact that a settlement according to the principles of nationality is not sufficient in itself to solve economic problems. The economic problems of South-Eastern Europe cannot be eliminated by adjusting the boundaries one way or another but by extensive economic cooperation as mentioned in section 1. On the other hand if the boundaries are delineated in conformity with the wishes of the population concerned, this would bring about the political stability necessary to economic co-operation.

The idea of the transfer of population has been often suggested to facilitate the formation of homogeneous national states. The standpoint of the Hungarian Government is, in this respect, that the transfer of populations can be justified only when nationalities live in isolated fragmentary groups, that is to say, when it is impossible to reunite the national minorities with the mother country by redrawing the boundaries. What is more, such transfer of populations runs con

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trary to all rights of liberty as well as to the evolution of international law for the past 300 years, and can be considered as absolutely arbitrary in character. Major transfers of populations can be effected in the Danubian countries already overpopulated agriculturally only through corresponding territorial adjustments.

Finally, the Hungarian Government recalls that, as the example of the Greek-Turkish population transfer proves such large-scale movements in population can be effected only by granting international credit and economic assistance. This is especially true in the case of Hungary, which is obliged to meet heavy reparation payments and considering that she has practically no transport facilities, her industries are in a deplorable seate due to well known causes in connection with the war; furthermore, her agriculture cannot be expected to attain the prewar production level for five or six years due to the loss of 70 to 90 percent of her live stock and to the radical land reform recently undertaken.

(5) Since national minorities most probably will still be found outside the mother country, however the borders may be drawn, it is absolutely necessary to provide for their protection by means of some international machinery of the United Nations.

The protection afforded to minorities by the League of Nations undoubtedly justified certain adverse criticism, but at least there was some protection. In many cases the very fact that such machinery existed was sufficient to restrain governments planning oppressive measures against minorities. It will be an act of retrogression if even such protection is not granted in the future to national minorities.

When presenting the above the Hungarian Government felt obliged to reciprocate the good will of the Powers at the Potsdam conference by joining actively the spiritual community of democratic nations and by participating unstintingly in their constructive work. The Hungarian Government is firmly convinced that at the time of the forthcoming international negotiations the strength of its proposals will be the fact that the Hungarian Government did not espouse any cause which is not in the common interest of all genuinely democratic countries. So the appreciation of the just and lawful Hungarian standpoint uill serve not only Hungary but the cause of the sincere reconciliation of all European nations and thereby further the interests of world peace.

It is the earnest wish of the Hungarian nation that at least a peace should be concluded which in conformity with their wishes would take into consideration the just claims of all the peoples living along the banks of the Danube. A peace settlement based on justice and morality taking into account the legitimate interests and fundamental rights of peoples will bring tranquility to the new world and will prevent another world-wide cataclysm.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

(signed) Gyongyosi.

DOCUMENT 22

EXCERPTS FROM THE MEMORANDUM

ADDRESSED BY STEPHEN KERTESZ

TO PRIME MINISTER ZOLTAN TILDY

ON DECEMBER 28, 1945,

CONCERNING THE HUNGARIAN PEACE PREPARATIONS.

151/res.Be. 1945

The memorandum reviewed the peace preparatory work of the Foreign Ministry since 1943 and described the organization established in 1945, the general program and the actual achievements of the various government agencies, scholarly institutions and experts. It called attention to the technical difficulties, lack of financial means, and asked for immediate appointment of delegates for

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the peace conference. It dealt, moreover, with the special political difficulties inherent in Hungary's postwar situation, emphasizing the necessity of taking a stand in connection with the responsibility for war, 1 and for the defense of the Hungarian minorities persecuted in the neighbouring states. At this juncture it objected to thc decree concerning the expulsion of the Germans from Hungary, issued on December 22, 1945, in the following manner:

"For a defeated small country it is of fundamental importance, almost to the question of survival, to profess consistently certain fundalmental moral, legal and political principles. Only in this way is it possible to win the support, understanding and respect of the civilized world.

"Therefore. the decision of the Hungarian govermnent concerning the expulsion of individuals of German mother tongue or nationality, might have disastrous impact on the development of our international position. We repeatedly made solemn statements to foreign powers to the effect that all expulsions would be made on the basis of individual and not on collective responsibility.2 Irrespective of these pledges, the government decided to promulgate a decree which entirely contradicted our former policy statements.

"This decision is all the more regrettable because the acceptance of the principle of collective responsibility might have a boomerang effect on the Hungarians living in the neighboring states. As a result, we shall miss in the future the principle which assured for us an unassailable moral superiority at the negotiations at Prague.3

"It is worthwhile to mention in this connection that the foreign policy of the great powers usually does not change basically, from one day to the other, in the fields of fundamental moral and political principles. A small and defeated country can afford such changes even less because its only strength lies in the consistent adherence to moral principles appealing to the whole civilized world.

"If the Hungarian government would continue to demonstrate such an unstable and inconsequent attitude in fundamental questions, then we would have no serious basis on which to build and the whole preparatory peace work might prove to be a useless endeavor. In any case, the government with this decision opened the way to the arguments which could be brought against us and with this step took the burden of an historical responsibility, yet of incalculable magnitude. Videant Consules . . ."

It was further pointed out that once the governmental policy decisions were made concerning peace aims, all public manifestations and the activities of the parties should be geared accordingly. The following passages criticized especially the lack of governmental experience of the coalition parties in the handling of foreign affairs and stated that:

"Their behaviour often produced the regrettable impression that the parties were more interested in party politics than in the vital problems of Hungary.

"Apparently a longer governmental experience is needed until the democratic parties discover that the viewpoints and means are quite different in domestic and foreign politics. Someone may be a good politician, an excellent organizer or propagandist, without understanding foreign policy or diplomacy, the agency charged with carrying out policies abroad.

---------1 Cf., pp. 167-168.

2 See, for example, above, Documents 10 and 11.

3 This reference was made to the Prague negotiations of December 2-6, 1945. Cf. pp. 123-124.

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"The inexperience of the present government in the realm of foreign policy is particularly apparent in the following two respects:

"a. During the last few months, foreign policy was made in Hungary not only by the Foreign Ministry, but also by the office of the Prime Minister; the various other ministries, the political parties and the Speaker of the National Assembly. This state of things is in part connected with our reduced sovereignty under the terms of the armistice agreement, and partially with the inexperience of official authorities in matters of foreign policy. The result is, in any case, that authorities unable to understand or to evaluate the questions involved, acted in foreign political matters without giving previous notice to the Foreign Ministry. In some cases the Foreign Ministry was not informed at all of important negotiations and decisions concerning foreign policy...."

"b. The other hardly comprehensible phenomenon is the fact that the parties wish to secure their influence in foreign policy through the appointments of their own party men in foreign service. One cannot admit the supposition that the parties intend to reward their own party men with diplomatic posts because this would mean the total moral degradation of our foreign service.

"In principle, it was proper to rejuvenate the personnel of the foreign service from the democratic parties. Afterwards, however, all party political intervention should have been stopped in connection with the appointments in the foreign service. Nowhere in the world do party politics influence the selection of diplomatic personnel, except the head of the diplomatic mission. ... It is only natural that the parties in democratic countries exercise influence on foreign policy through the parliament, committees on foreign affairs and the government but not through officials in sub-altern positions. In our country, however, party political protectionism has never brought such a pressure on the Foreign Ministry as in the course of the last months. This situation notwithstanding, no party is satisfied with the proportion of its party men in the foreign service.

"This phenomenon is all the more regrettable because the foreign service officers should represent the whole nation and not the interests of the single political parties. Such foreign senvice officers are needed whose way of thinking, past, and whole form of life correspond to the requirements of democracy. As a result of the incessant party-political interferences . . . the officers will not concentrate their efforts on the fulfillment of their official duties but in the interest of their own promotions, will prefer the building up of party political connections and the passing of information to the parties . . ."

"It was necessary to lay stress on the foregoing in connection with the peace preparatory work because the realization of the most noble principles, aims and decisions, depend on men able to execute them. Professional preparation, talent and firmness combined with elasticity and in general the qualities of a good character are such essential requirements in the foreign service that they cannot be replaced by any party-political background.

"The selection of foreign service officers to be sent abroad is of particular importance. Without good connections and objective informative activities in foreign countries the whole peace preparatory work would be nothing but a device for our own education. The establishment of diplomatic missions could break through our isolated position only in case we send the right men abroad.

"These viewpoints are even more valid for the selection of experts and delegates to the Peace Conference.

"It would be necessary, moreover, that the emissaries of the various ministries and political parties who travel abroad, should ask, as a matter of course, the

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Foreign Ministry for instructions. Otherwise, Hungarian activities abroad will remain disorganized, and will bring rather negative than positive results. It is to be mentioned in this connection that the reputation of democratic Hungary has been already greatly impaired by the fact that various official and semi-official emissaries used their trips abroad for foreign exchange and black-market operations. Such activities should be barred by severe measures of the Government."

The last passages of the memorandum enumerated the peace preparatory notes sent to the three major victorious powers and the conclusions summed up the most urgent governmental agenda in the following points:

"1. The Government's decision concerning our Peace aims and argumentations. Once such decisions are taken, we should manifest a consistent conduct with regard to accepted moral, political and legal principles.

2. The immediate appointment of experts to be sent to the Peace Conference so that they could begin the study of the material as soon as possible.

3. The establishment of an adequate Peace preparatory organization and of provisions assuring that the execution of the Peace preparatory work under the guidance of the Foreign Ministry should not have to be interrupted from time to time or limited to an insufficient framework because of technical reasons or constant lack of funds. Not only pengo, but also foreign currency must be provided for in time.

4. The Ministry of Industry as well as the Ministry of Finance should be advised by the Government to complete without delay their peace preparatory work.

5. All government agencies should be instructed with regard to our peace aims and accordingly an agreement should be made between the political parties aiming at uniform and consistent public policies under the guidance of the Foreign Ministry. The same unity of view should prevail on the radio, in the press and other publications, in the activities of the parties and in the course of official and semi-official travels abroad.

6. The elimination of petty personal and party political influences with respect to the organization of our foreign service and especially in connection with the selection of delegates to be sent to the Peace Conference.

"I ventured to mention above a few viewpoints which, in my modest opinion, are important in connection with the preparations for peace. I wanted to be absolutely straightforward in pointing out difficulties and causes of trouble because this is a primary duty to all those who took risks in difficult times for the establishment of a democratic Hungary.

"Finally, I would like to emphasize that Hungary, after a war which was lost politically, militarily, and to some extent even morally, is confronted with better prepared states whose diplomatic position is incomparably more favorable than ours. In addition, the rehabilitation of the country is being carried out amidst a great economic crisis and other difficulties by political parties which without their own fault have not, thus far, had any governmental experience.

"We must sincerely admit that the unfavorable diplomatic position of ours, and the difficult internal conditions of the country frequently hinder correct actions. Thus, it will not be easy to achieve success. Nothwithstanding difficulties, however, all of us, and first of all the responsible Government have to do all possible for the promotion of the Hungarian case at the Peace Conference. The future of Hungarian democracy depends largely on the success of this work.

Mister Prime Minister, I am awaiting your effective and urgent actions, and those of the Hungarian Government, and remain,

Respectfully yours,

(signed) Istvan Kertesz"

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