COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY

The news of Chamberlain's announcement on September 15 that for the sake of preserving the peace he would be willing to meet Hitler anywhere in Germany, spread like wildfire. As it came to light later, the news was a shocking surprise even to the German generals because, as Chief of General Staff Halder was to testify, Chamberlain's visit to Germany thwarted an imminent coup d'etat by the generals against Hitler.*³⁶⁵

This unexpected move was tantamount to the capitulation of England and France and the sacrificing of the interests of Czechoslovakia. It also presented a new situation the Hungarian government had to face.

Chamberlain met Hitler on September 15 in Berchtesgaden. Hitler, in a threatening tone of voice, demanded the unification of the Sudeten Germans with the motherland. In response to a question by Chamberlain, Hitler did concede that the Poles, Hungarians and Ukranians also had demands, but declined to act as their spokesman. Only the Sudeten German issue was discussed in Berchtesgaden and Chamberlain agreed to the transfer of territories with Sudeten German majorities to Germany. *³⁶⁶

The German government blamed Hungary for the failure to act on the Hungarian claims. Hitler was not fully satisfied with the Berchtesgaden agreement because the new status quo had greatly restricted his freedom of movement in the fulfillment of his further plans. In order to change the status quo without taking the blame for increasing the risk of war, Hitler resorted to fanning the Hungarian and Polish demands. He felt certain it would aggravate the situation without anybody blaming him for it.

On September 17, Foreign Minister Kanya briefed the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw about the latest Hungarian diplomatic moves. He said, "Through our Minister in London we informed the

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British Foreign Secretary that the Hungarian government would draw the farthest-reaching conclusions if the Hungarian minority were to receive a different treatment than the Sudeten Germans and we will assume no responsibility for the consequences of any resulting discrimination which the Hungarian government, too, would find intolerable. *³⁶⁷ In the presence of the Prime Minister, I gave the same message, in the strongest terms, to the British Minister in Budapest." *³⁶⁸ In Geneva, the Hungarian Minister held a similar conversation with the British envoy.

The Hungarian government requested Mussolini and Ciano to support Hungary's position. Regent Horthy sent a handwritten letter to Hitler. *³⁶⁹ The Hungarian Minister in Berlin addressed a similar appeal to Goring. *³⁷⁰ Not long afterward, Regent Horthy went hunting with Goring and they, too, discussed the question.

On September 17, the United Hungarian Party met in Pozsony and issued a proclamation, demanding the right of self-determination and plebiscite for the Hungarian minority. *³⁷¹ The proclamation noted that as a consequence of the Paris peace treaties the members of the Hungarian minority had to live in Czechoslovak territory but never had any doubt that they, too, like every nation and nationality, were entitled to all the rights enshrined in the laws of God, man and morality. For 20 years, this Hungarian national minority has always fulfilled its obligations as one of the most disciplined nationalities of the republic, but during those 20 years, the possessors of power have never taken into consideration the interests of the other nationalities, including the Hungarians. Every one of their legislative acts served only the concept of the Czech national state. It has been a faulty policy, running counter to the interests of Europe as a whole and endangering the peace of the world. The Hungarian national minority in Czechoslovakia wants to take charge of its destiny and wants to exercise the right of self-determination which was granted only to a few nations in 1918. *³⁷²

On September 18, Kanya summoned Maugras, the French Minister to Budapest, to discuss the just-concluded British-French talks in London and the agreements reportedly made there. It was said that instead of ordering a plebiscite in the Sudeten German territories, those territories would be transferred to Germany.

Kanya made it clear that the Hungarian government would consider most dangerous any solution which would entail discrimination against the Hungarian minority. "Order cannot be restored in the Danubian basin without meeting the just demands of all the national

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minorities in Czechoslovakia and it goes without saying that any solution which is discriminatory against the Hungarian minority would bring about an extremely tense situation between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. We decline in advance any responsibility for the consequences," reported Kanya in notes about his meeting with the French diplomat. He added: "The policies of the Hungarian government, I stated, have not been belligerent until now. Rather, we have been seeking compromises, as demonstrated by the Bled agreement, but we could not ignore the great outrage which, fed by rumors, is already palpable throughout the country..." *³⁷³

Barcza, the Hungarian Minister in London, was negotiating with Sir Alexander Cadogan. Cadogan had been representing Lord Halifax. In his report to Kanya on September 18, Barcza said: "I made absolutely clear the position of the Hungarian government that it demands without fail that the nearly one million Hungarians in Czechoslovakia receive the same treatment as the Sudeten Germans. The most basic justice and logic demand that there be no discrimination between the various nationalities. I noted that given the outstanding sense of justice and fair play which has been developed and honored by the British people and government over the centuries, I would not even dare to presume that a national minority which has tolerated for twenty years with exemplary patience the sufferings of living under foreign rule and which has demonstrated an amazing calm even in the turmoil of recent weeks, would be punished because it constitutes the second largest minority of Czechoslovakia and because instead of the bayonets of a nation of 75 million, it can depend only on the support of a government which is in search of a peaceful solution, and on justice itseff.

"If England," Minister Barcza continued, "would not show the same concern over the just demands of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia as it does over the Germans, it would no longer appear in the eyes of the world as the voice of justice, law and freedom, rather it would be seen as one who had bowed to the threats of the bully. I am convinced that England does not want to and will not accept the moral disgrace of such an action in the eyes of the entire civilized world."

Following the remarks of the Hungarian envoy, the British official remarked that "it is his purely personal opinion that from a moral point of view, there can be no doubt that rights which are the accorded one minority are the due of another also. But," he added, "it would be much more difficult to meet this demand than one would

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think because it would bring up the problems of national minorities in every country of the world." Cadogan also raised the question, what would be left for the Czechs if all the national minorities were to secede from Czechoslovakia?

Minister Barcza continued: "My response to Mr. Cadogan's first objection was that, in my opinion, with the mission by Lord Runciman and through Mr. Chamberlain's magnificent peace-keeping efforts, England has assumed the voluntary role of the world's foremost arbiter pacis in the problems of the minorities in Czechoslovakia. For the sake of peace and justice, it must maintain this role to the very end, playing it both firmly and impartially. And by no means would this mean that England would have to assume a similar responsibility regarding any or all of the world's other national minorities."

In response to Cadogan's second objection, Barcza declared: "Following the secession of the territories inhabited by its national minorities, Czechoslovakia would survive in the shape and size it should have been originally established. That is to say, the state created in 1919 should have conformed to the right of self-determination of various nationalities, as invented, proclaimed but, unfortunately, not applied by the victorious powers. Had they acted differently, had they not run counter to political foresight, historic, economic and moral consideration in putting together this artifical and -- as we are unfortunately witnessing today -- nonviable state, world peace would not be threatened today."

Cadogan did not reply to these remarks but promised to relay the Hungarian Minister's message to Lord Halifax the same day. And he expressed his appreciation for the peaceful policies of the Hungarian government. *³⁷⁴

In his September 19 message to Kanya, Minister Barcza reported that Prime Minister Chamberlain has received the memorandum of the Hungarian government. He replied: "I fully sympathize with Hungary, she has no need to worry. I will carefully remember Hungary's situation. I fully approve the peaceful and calm behavior Hungary has manifested heretofore and urge her to continue to do so."

In the same message, Minister Barcza made reference to another of his reports about information he had received from Grandi, the Italian Minister to London, to the effect that the British and French governments would consent to the transfer of the Sudeten German territories. *³⁷⁵

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The Hungarian government had learned from another Italian source, as well, about the question of the Sudeten German transfer. According to Ciano, the French government has not yet agreed to the British plan and, in any event, the plan was intended to satisfy the Germans only and it would not extend to the Hungarians and the Poles. Accordingly, the Hungarian Minister in Rome reported, "Mussolini has recommended that we should use every available means to give voice to our demands loudly, forcefully and most emphatically." *³⁷⁶ The French government did have initial reservations about the British plan, but eventually agreed to it. *³⁷⁷

On September 20, Lord Halifax received Hungarian Minister Barcia and told him that the question of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia has been discussed repeatedly, both in the cabinet and with members of the French government. The British government has taken note of the Hungarian diplomatic moves. At the moment, he said, the question of peace or war depends on finding a solution to the German-Czechoslovak problem, therefore the British government is totally preoccupied with this issue.

Lord Halifax said that even though the British government fully understands the Hungarian government's interest in the future of the Hungarian minority, it hopes that the Hungarian government has confidence in the British government. He urged the Hungarian public and the Hungarians in the detached territories to remain calm in this delicate situation. Lord Halifax "expressed his great appreciation for the Hungarian minority's discipline and calm and expressed the hope that this will remain unchanged. At the same time, he acknowledged the Hungarian government's proper and peaceful attitude." *³⁷⁸

On September 22, Kanya instructed the Hungarian Minister in Prague to request an immediate appointment with Foreign Minister Krofta and inform him that the Hungarian government demands for the Hungarian minority the same rights that will be granted the Sudeten Germans. Krofta took note of the message but reproached the Hungarian government for taking advantage of Czechoslovakia's difficult circumstances. *³⁷⁹

The Polish government called up several age groups and deployed them near the Czechoslovak border. Several clashes had occurred and Polish minority leaders demanded self-government for the Polish minority.

The Polish government was beginning to exert a growing influence on Hungary to change its reserved posture toward a more assertive stance. Polish Foreign Minister Beck had several

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discussions to this end with the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw. As early as September 16, he told him in greatest confidence that in the event of a German attack against Czechoslovakia, Poland, too would join the attack for fear that otherwise the Germans might not take into account the Polish interests. He also told the Hungarian Minister that in the event Hungary decides to make a military move against Czechoslovakia, Poland would be ready to conclude a political agreement, followed by a military alliance with Hungary, and the two nations would coordinate their joint military action. *³⁸⁰

On September 21, the Prague government complied with a strong British demarche from the day before and accepted a British-French note which had been delivered two days earlier. The note contained a demand to cede the Sudeten German territories to Germany. *³⁸¹ Hodza was one of the few in Prague who supported this Western move.

On September 22, Kanya instructed the Hungarian Minister in Rome to relay the Hungarian government's thanks for the effective support from the Italian government. "Now that the Czechoslovak government has accepted the British-French proposal for the solution of the Sudeten German problem, we request the return of the territories inhabited by Hungarians without any further negotiations. Moreover, we request full rights of self-determination for the Ruthenians and the Slovaks," said Kanya. *³⁸²

Also on September 22, the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw reported to Kanya that the Polish Foreign Minister had sent the following message to the Polish Minister in Prague and the Polish Consul in Pozsony: "As he has the national fate of the Slovaks on his heart, he wishes to bring to their attention that the Hungarian parts of Slovakia will secede and if they want to prevent a territorial division they urgently should come to terms with Hungary. It is time to make a decision regarding a transfer to Hungary." *³⁸³

As the next meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler had been scheduled for September 23 in Godesberg, the Hungarian government thought it necessary to discuss Hungary's position with the German leaders. On September 18, Goring invited Horthy for a hunt. On September 20, Imredy and Kanya met Hitler in Obersalzberg. Hitler reproached the Hungarian leaders once again for their indecisive behavior during the current crisis. This is the last moment for Hungary to join, otherwise he would not be able to take a stand for the Hungarian interest..."

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Hitler called on lmredy and Kanya to:

1. immediately demand a plebiscite in the territories they wanted;

2. to give no guarantees whatsoever for the possible new boundaries of Czechoslovakia and

3. to have Hungary quit the League of Nations at a later date.

The notes taken during the Obersalzberg meeting reportedly show that Hitler had proposed to Imredy that Hungary should launch military action against Czechoslovakia at the time of the Godesberg meeting because there is a risk that the Czechs may occupy everything and if that happens, the complete liquidation of Czechoslovakia would have to be postponed. *³⁸⁴

In the discussion of the Berchtesgaden negotiations we have noted that the agreement reached there was not really satisfactory for Hitler because the newly created respite greatly restricted his freedom of action as far as his further plans were concerned. He thought the fanning of the Hungarian and Polish claims would be the most suitable means to change this situation freeing him of blame for any new tensions.

Hitler's idea was that a Hungarian military move would provide him with an excuse to break off the Godesberg negotiations. That would make it possible to solve the Czechoslovak question on a territorial, rather than ethnic basis, in line with Hitler's original intentions.

The Hungarian leaders rejected any military move because they did not want to risk a political defeat. That would have created a confrontation between Hungary and the other two Little Entente states or even with the Western powers, too. Moreover, a military clash with those states also seemed inevitable.

Thus, the Obersalzberg talks generated a new conflict between Hungary and Germany, which made itself clearly felt when the Hungarian claims were introduced. The Hungarian leaders gave Hitler a memorandum listing the Hungarian demands and Hitler promised that he would present those demands in Godesberg -- all in vain. Only the German demands were brought up in Godesberg. The same thing happened with regard to the Polish demands, despite Hitler's earlier promise to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. *³⁸⁵

At about the same time, as we have noted in Part One, Father Tiso went to Prague to see Benes. Concurrently, he was also negotiating with the Hungarian government. As a result, he summed up in three points his conditions for having Slovakia attached to Hungary. As we have noted, the Hungarian government informed Father Tiso of the acceptance of those conditons.

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When the Godesberg negotiations broke off and the situation in Czechoslovakia became critical, a branch of the Slovak Peoples Party, led by Sidor, obtained significant concessions from Benes who was forced to do so by the circumstances. That, in turn, had a decisive impact on the talks between Father Tiso and the Hungarian government because, from then on, the Slovak Peoples Party was no longer interested in any offers made by the Hungarian government. *³⁸⁶

According to a coded message No.²²⁹ from the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw to Kanya, Sidor's declaration of loyalty, as broadcast by the Czechoslovak radio, caused quite a consternation in the Polish Foreign Ministry. Up until then, Father Tiso and his colleagues have shown an interest in coming to terms with Hungary. According to the Minister, "the Slovaks are apparently continuing their two-faced games." *³⁸⁷

The Sidor solution was basically more favorable for Hitler who wanted to extend his influence not only the Sudeten German territories but, sooner or later, over the entire Czechoslovakia. *³⁸⁸ This was behind the obviously two-faced German ploy, as we have noted in Part One, with Goring constantly inciting Hungary and reproaching it for the moderate nature of its demands on Czechoslovakia, while at the same time, assuring the Rumanian Minister in Berlin that Germany does not want Hungary to become too strong.

In the meantime, Hungarian public opinion became aroused and there was a massive demonstration in Budapest, demanding the return of the Highlands. Several age groups were called up, provoking a protest note from the British government. *³⁸⁹

The Hungarian Minister in London once again explained to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, that "even though the lot of the Hungarian minority, as the whole world knows, has been the most difficult, the Hungarian government has never ceased to urge a peaceful solution, both in Geneva and in direct negotiations. However, all of these peaceful and well-intentioned efforts were thwarted by the stubborn opposition of the Little Entente.

"The time has come, however, for us to enforce our claims to the same degree as the Germans do. And I believe we are justified in expecting that Britain, in its impartiality, will give the same weight to the just demands of the Hungarian minority as it does to the Germans. It is true that the Hungarians cannot depend on the military bayonets of a nation of 75 million but I assume that instead of yielding to German force, Britain pay heed to justice which is as much behind our cause as of the Germans."

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In response to a question by Lord Halifax, the Hungarian diplomat outlined the geographic distribution of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, noting that "a homogeneous group of some 800,000 Hungarians live in a territory immediately adjacent to the mother country, consequently their return to Hungary could be accomplished very simply and easily."

When Halifax wanted to know why these territories were incorporated into Czechoslovakia in 1919, the Hungarian Minister explained that the Czechs themselves had been forced to admit at the time that there was no ethnographic or political reason, they had claimed strategic and economic necessity for demanding the territories with a pure Hungarian population." Halifax said the British government would keep the Hungarian question in mind and consider it "at the appropriate moment." *³⁹⁰

The Hungarian government's assessment of the situation at the time was that "there appears to be willingness on the part of the French and the British to find a satisfactory answer to our claims regarding the territories with Hungarian inhabitants, but our demand for the establishment of a Polish-Hungarian corridor has met strong resistance." *³⁹¹

Once again, as could be expected, Goring reproached the Hungarian Minister in Berlin over the alleged assurances given by the Hungarian Minister in London to Lord Halifax that Hungary does not intend to take up arms against Czechoslovakia. He warned the Hungarian government that if Hungary were to stay away from the military action in which Poland is certain to participate, Hungary would be left out of the solution. "While the Poles are engaged in heavy combat, nobody hears of the Hungarians," Goring said.

The situation in Czechoslovakia became increasingly tense. On September 22, when the Hodza government accepted the British-French note, there were large demonstrations against the government's willingness to compromise. The Czechoslovak Communist Party was the loudest in demanding that the government resign. The combined opposition forces managed to overthrow Hodza and General Sirovy was named the new Prime Minister.

The new government did not accept the demands contained in the British-French note. Hitler was threatening with military action. *³⁹³ The Western powers demanded most emphatically that Prague meet the demands because they were afraid that otherwise war may break out. Further consultations were held in London around September 25 among Chamberlain, Halifax, Daladier and Bonnet. Daladier was the

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only one to oppose concessions to Germany but finally he was forced to yield. *³⁹⁴

It was in this highly tense situation that the Western powers turned to Mussolini to exert his influence for rescuing peace. Mussolini's response on September 28 was a proposal for a summit meeting among the four great powers. The proposal was accepted, the date was set for September 29 and Munich was agreed upon as the site of the conference.

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Hitler, who blamed Imredy and Kanya for the overly cautious nature of the Hungarian foreign policy, was reluctant to bring up in Munich the question of non-German minorities. Thus, at the suggestion of the Hungarian Minister in Berlin, Csaky was sent as an observer in Munich, with a letter of introduction from Horthy to Mussolini and another letter from lmredy, and was armed with ample statistical material. *³⁹⁵ Thus, it was to Mussolini's credit that the Hungarian question was brought up in Munich, and it was Csaky who gave him a thorough briefing. The Hungarian demands included immediate transfer to Hungary of territories which were determined to have been inhabited by Hungarian by the l9l0 census. Hungary also demanded a plebiscite within one month in Western Slovakia, Eastern Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. *³⁹⁶

Csaky had instructed the Hungarian Minister in London also to request the Prime Minister's support at the conference. *³⁹⁷ While in Munich, Csaky met Hitler also.

In his opening address at the conference, Hitler did emphasize that the German, Hungarian, Slovak, Polish and Ruthenian minorities had been forced against their will into a state against which they were now revolting. But he added that he could speak only on behalf of the German minority. *³⁹⁸ It was obvious that fanning the Hungarian and Polish demands was only meant to serve Hitler's tactical goal which was to increase tensions.

Following Mussolini's proposal for the solution of the Hungarian and Polish questions, a counter-proposal was tabled by Sir William Malkin, the legal expert of the British Foreign Office, and that served as the basis of the solution incorporated in the Munich Agree ment. *³⁹⁹

We have reviewed in Part One the decisions of the Munich conference. The immediate transfer of the Sudeten German territories

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to Germany; a three month moratorium with regard to the Hungarian and Polish questions, and direct negotiations between the interested governments -- these were the main decisions. The decisions in the Hungarian and Polish questions accomplished Hitler's purpose. He knew very well that the bilateral negotiations would lead nowhere. And Hitler also knew the Western powers would not interfere with those negotations, therefore the decision would remain in his hands.

We have also seen that Poland did not accept the Munich decision. It sent an ultimatum to Prague and then it occupied Teschen. We have pointed out that Hungary did not emulate either the German or the Polish example and did not use force because it bad hoped to be able to have its just demands met by peaceful means, with the support of the Western powers. We have emphasized at the same time that having failed to use force, Hungary had been pushed more and more into the embrace of the totalitarian powers.

We have also reviewed the Hungarian diplomatic moves following the Munich conference. At this time, we would like to present material pertaining primarily to the Hungarian demands, as well as information in support of Hungary's peaceful and patient policies in contrast with the coercive moves of Germany and Poland. This information should serve as bountiful source material to reach conclusions especially about the two-faced policies of the Germans and the Western powers -- policies which were swinging between exaggerated promises and harsh denials.

On October 3, Kanya instructed the Hungarian Minister in Prague to tell Foreign Minister Krofta that "the Hungarian government considers it most important to conduct its negotiations with Czechoslovakia in a friendly spirit and peaceful atmosphere. Therefore, it deems it necessary to raise certain preconditions to create a peaceful atmosphere." He listed in five points the preconditions which could be met without any difficulty, such as release of political prisoners, discharge of soldiers of Hungarian nationality, protection of life and property, and as a symbol of territorial transfers to come, transfer to Hungary of two or three towns near the border, and commencement of direct negotiations on October *⁴⁰⁰

On October 4, Kanya instructed the Hungarian Minister in Prague the tell Krofta immediately of the Hungarian government's surprise that "we have not yet received a reply to yesterday's note,

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even though Krofta had promised his reponse for today. We request immediate response," Kanya said.⁴⁰¹

Also on October 4, the Hungarian Minister in London reported that he had told Cadogan, the British Deputy Foreign Secretary:

"We have been admonished to be patient with our demands because of the threat of a world war. Now, with that threat having disappeared and even the question of Polish minorities having been solved, I believe we have reached the 'opportune moment,' mentioned by Lord Halifax in his letter of September 24, to support and solve the question of the Hungarian minorities.

"I stressed the great patience we have demonstrated under difficult conditions, as well as our constant willingness to find a peaceful solution. However, it is now high time for the Czechoslovak government to take practical steps to grant the right of self-determination to the Hungarian minority, as provided by the Munich Agreement.

"Now is the time to settle this question amicably in such a manner that it would not have a harmful effect on future relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Therefore I consider it most important for the Czechs not to wait until the end of three months, as provided by the Munich Agreement, but settle the question at once," said the Hungarian Minister in London. Cadogan assured him of the support of the British government. *⁴⁰²

Germany and, undoubtedly, Britain played the leading roles in the global crisis that had just ended. A report from Barcza, the Hungarian Minister in London to Foreign Minister Kanya on October 4 provided perhaps the best summary of Britain's role.

"Prime Minister Chamberlain's policy of "peace at any price" to the very end was mainly prompted by the recognition, as I was confidentially told by sources in his entourage, that a world war would have unforeseeable consequences for Europe, including England. I have heard that Mr. Chamberlain was concerned that an undoubtedly long war, with a massive toll in lives and material losses on both sides, would have increased Moscow's influence, bringing Europe ultimately under Bolshevik rule. In order to avoid this ultimate danger at all costs, he sacrificed the interests of the French and the Czechs. That was the price he paid for peace. Thus, the solution to the global crisis is nothing but 'defeat in a gift wrapping.'

"The Foreign Office, I understand, is very critical of Mr. Chamberlain's policies which it considers as deeply humiliating for England and dangerous for the future. Czechoslovakia is being

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referred to in these circles as "poor little Czechoslovakia" and its amputation is being labeled the greatest injustice of the century, forgetting the fact that this state came into being in 1918 through the much more unjust vivisection of three nations. Czechoslovakia is the 'victim' deserving full sympathy and it was immediately extended a loan of 10 million pounds.

"With the threat of a world war gone, I believe I am not mistaken in saying that with the signing of the annex to the Munich Agreement, the British government considers its commitment to us for the time being fulfilled. In the British view, the settlement of the question of the Hungarian minorities has been shifted to the track of direct Hungarian-Czech negotiations. *⁴⁰³

The Czechoslovak government, in view of its domestic political crisis, requested a delay in commencing the negotations. This crisis culminated in the abdication of President Benes. It ended an era of more than two decades which had a decisive influence on the destiny of Hungary and its neighbors, as well. Benes' abdication demonstrated that the political conception so closely tied to his name, which was built on force and the formation of military blocs rather than mutual reconciliation, could not be maintained for more than two decades. With changes in the European balance of power, his system collapsed like a house of cards. A regime which can be swept away so easily by any change in the balance of power of the European great powers carries the seeds of its own destruction.

In Part One, we have told about the Slovak interparty conference of October 6. The three Slovak parties, meeting in Zsolna (Zilina, Sillen) declared Slovakia's autonomy.

On October 5, Csaky, chief of staff of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, flew to Warsaw to discuss questions relating to the establishment of a common border between Hungary and Poland. In a message to Kanya, Csaky reported that Polish Foreign Minister "Beck shares our views about the need for a common border." *⁴⁰⁴

The Hungarian Minister in Prague had personally discussed with Prime Minister Imredy a draft resolution he was proposing for the corthcoming major meeting of the The United Hungarian Party in Pozsony. In his daily report, the Minister said that since he could not see Janos Esterhazy until the next day, he would have the Hungarian Consul in Pozsony deliver the draft resolution to the United Hungarian Party. The Minister emphasized that "as far as Kassa (Kosice) was concerned, the Slovaks must understand those deep, emotional ties

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which link the Hungarians to this sacred shrine of their history. I am convinced that it will be possible to come to an agreement, based on brotherly understanding, on this as on every other issue. *⁴⁰⁵

On October 7, Janos Esterhazy and Andor Jaross broadcast a major speech on Pozsony radio, outlining the resolutions of the United Hungarian Party. They included the following demands:

1. Withdrawal of the Czechoslovak army from territories inhabited by Hungarians.

2. Immediate discharge of all Hungarian soldiers in the Czechoslovak army.

3. Immediate release of all Hungarian political prisoners and hostages.

4. Immediate return, or appropriate indemnification for all property, horses, carriages and motor vehicles that the Hungarian population was compelled to turn over to the military.

5. Immediate indemnification of the Hungarian population for all losses suffered at the time of the mobilization.

6. Handing over of governmental authority in the Hungarian territories to the United Hungarian Party and, in the interim, securing freedom of press and assembly. It was also announced that the Parliamentary Club of the United Hungarian Party has formed a Hungarian National Council to represent the interests of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia until the question of the borders is settled. *⁴⁰⁶

On October 9, the Hungarian-Czechoslovak negotiations began in Komarom (Komarno). We gave a detailed account of the negotiations in Part One. The Czechoslovak delegation was led by Dr. Jozef Tiso, the new Prime Minister of Slovakia, and the participants included the future Foreign Minister, Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky, who was Minister of Justice at the time. During the negotations, the Slovak statesmen, as we have reported, had repeatedly flown to see Hitler. By this time, the Slovak political leadership was bidding for Hitler's favors and made all sorts of promises to secure his support. *⁴⁰⁷

To counter these moves, the Hungarian government decided to send Daranyi to Germany. His trip was set for October 14. In the meantime, the Hungarian government declared the Komarom negotiations terminated because, to quote the official statement: "We are persuaded that we cannot hope to be able to bridge at this conference the wide gap between the views represented by the two delegations about the basic principles of the settlement." *⁴⁰⁸

For a background to this statement, we would refer to Part One where it has been stated that the Slovak statesmen clearly must have known about Hitler's latest designs for Slovakia and that would account for their rigid and uncompromising attitude. They refused

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to agree to as little as 10 percent of the Hungarian territorial demands. The Hungarian government had to turn to the four signatories of the Munich protocols to request prompt settlement of the territorial demands.

As we have noted earlier, Janos Esterhazy and several other deputies of the United Hungarian Party stayed in Komarom during the negotiations. available for any assistance to the Hungarian delegation.

In Part One, we provided a detailed account of the feverish diplomatic activity following the Komarom negotiations, with both parties bidding for the favor of the great powers, especially Germany.

With regard to the Daranyi visit we might add that once again, Hitler did not fail to bring up the cautious and hesitant policies of lmredy and Kanya, which had resulted in the loss of a favorable opportunity. Hitler did not accept the Hungarian request for the convening of the four-power conference, nor the demands for plebiscite in Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. At that point, Daranyi had to make different promises, such as Hungary joining the Anti-Komintern Pact, quitting the League of Nations and establishment of closer economic ties with Germany. Obviously, this was exactly what Hitler wanted. He instructed Ribbentrop to take care of the details. *⁴⁰⁹

Despite lengthy diplomatic negotiations, as we have seen in Part One, the four-power conference could not be reconvened. Finally, German-Italian arbitration was agreed upon.

We wish to emphasize again that the Western powers were reluctant to interfere in Central European affairs. They provided ample evidence of that. Thus, according to a report by the Hungarian Minister in Paris, 'when it became known that we and the Czechoslovak government had requested arbitration by Germany and Italy, no objection at all was raised in the press to the exclusion of the Western powers from the settlement of this question of such a vital importance for Central Europe. *⁴¹⁰

On October 28, the Hungarian Minister in Rome reported that "the British Ambassador stated last night that his government would have no objection against a four-power conference but would much prefer arbitration by the Axis powers." *⁴¹¹ The French Minister in Warsaw told his Hungarian colleague that it may be better for Hungary not to bring its case to a four-power conference because this time France may not abandon Czechoslovakia. *⁴¹²

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We have discussed the Rome talks between Ciano and Ribbentrop where Ciano had persuaded the German Foreign Minister to give up the idea of the so-called Ribbentrop Line and agree to the transfer of the contested towns to Hungary. But he had to give up on the common border between Hungary and Poland.

We have also spoken about a journey to Rome by Janos Esterhazy and a delegation from the United Hungarian Party to brief Ciano. Ciano had told the Hungarian Minister in Rome that Hungarian claims on Pozsony are hopeless because of resistance on the part of the Germans and the concessions indicated by Esterhazy have no chance of success, except perhaps in cultural and religious matters. The Minister further stated that he and Esterhazy would arrive in Vienna Tuesday night. *⁴¹³

The arbitration session was formally opened in November 2 in the Belvedere Palace. We have given a detailed account of the proceedings and the decisions. We have quoted from an address by Slovak Prime Minister Tiso as broadcast by the Pozsony and Besztercebanya radio stations. Here is some more: "The responsibility rests on the shoulders of the Czechoslovak politicians who have been deciding our fate for twenty years without asking us about it. That is why the Vienna decision is unjust because strangers have judged us as if we were vanquished, without giving us any chance to influence the outcome." At the same time, much attention was paid to an editorial in the Agrarian Party daily Vecer, with close ties to the Foreign Ministry, openly stating that the policies of Benes were responsible for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The Vecer editorial was the first to say what had been hinted at for some time between the lines, but prevented by the censorship from being expressed openly in the newspapers. *⁴¹⁴

It is worth stressing over and over again that the Western powers bear a tremendous moral responsibility for admitting only the victors to the peace talks at Trianon and excluding the vanquished. It is an irony of fate that it was the dictatorial powers, into whose arms the vanquished nations had been pushed, which granted them this right in 1938.

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We have already discussed the impact of the Vienna Decision on the Hungarian people. Now, a look at various views, first of all by Hungarian scholars, on the question whether or not the Vienna Decision should be considered valid according to international law.

The Vienna Decision of 1938 was the only available peaceful solution for the ever growing problems that had existed for nearly 20 years. None of the other attempts for solution, short of using force, brought the slightest result. On the other hand, both interested parties had freely agreed to submit and abide by the arbitration.

It is a generally accepted fact that the roots of the Vienna Decision can be traced to the Paris peace treaties of 1919.

As a result of those treaties, Hungary suffered huge losses in population and territories. More than three million Hungarians were transferred without being asked to the newly established states, along with the country's most important mineral resources. For nearly two decades, Hungary had been seeking remedy at the League of Nations.

But neither the countless grievances submitted to the League of Nations, nor direct negotiations with the successor states had any result. As it became increasingly obvious, the League of Nations

had only served to preserve the status quo, while the direct negotiations with the successor states led nowhere because of the stubbornness of Benes' self-serving policies.

Hungary, thus, had no choice but to turn to the states which were against the status quo and, with their support, work peacefully for the fulfillment of its just demands. As we have pointed out earlier, it became clear as far back as 1920 to the makers of French foreign policy that the vanquished states would sooner or later fall into Germany's orbit, and they came up with a new conception to prevent it. But, again, the shortsighted policies of Benes prevailed and the Little Entente system of alliances came into being. unfortunately, it enjoyed the support of the Western powers until

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1938 when, as a result of shifts in the European balance of power, the entire system collapsed under its own weight. That is how Hungary came under the influence of Italy, at first, then Germany.

Hitler's Germany demanded a very high price for supporting Hungary's just demands: armed participation in his designs on Czechoslovakia. We have seen how Hungary had tried to refuse to do so, despite great difficulties and under tremendous pressure, with the German leaders, such as Hitler and Goring promising to meet the Hungarian territorial demands to the fullest extent. Hungary, by consistently rejecting Hitler's demands, lost the sympathy of the German leadership and that became very obvious in every encounter with them.

Following the failure of the Komarom negotiations, both parties, in accord with the Munich decisions, turned to the four great powers. Of the Western powers, Britain showed willingness to partipate in the four-power arbitration process and the British government informed Ciano that it was in principle in favor of transferring to Hungary territories with an overwhelmingly Hungarian population. *⁴¹⁵

On the other hand, as the Hungarian Minister in Rome reported on October 28, "the British Ambassador stated last night that his government would have no objection against a four-power conference but would much prefer arbitration by the Axis powers." *⁴¹⁶

As we have seen, the French government had no intention, either, to participate in the arbitration process. *⁴¹⁷ The French have apparently accepted Hitler's explanation to French Ambassador Francois-Poncet to the effect that by declining to act on Hungary's request to the four great powers, Germany has prevented a potential conflict among the great powers and forestalled a peril which would have arisen. *⁴¹⁸

It is a historical fact that the solution to the two decades' old problem between Hungary and Czechoslovakia had been discussed by the four great powers in Munich and they called on the two countries to find a solution through direct negotiations within three months. if they fail to do so, the four great powers would decide it for them.

As we have seen, the direct negotations brought no result and on October 24, the two interested states requested the four powers to make a decision." *⁴¹⁹ The Italian charge d'affaires ad interim in formed of this the French government the same day. Mussolini suggested that the foreign ministers of the four great powers meet early the following week either in Venice or in Brioni. Later, probably

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under German pressure, he withdrew this suggestion. *⁴²⁰ Ciano sent word that the Italian initiative to convene the conference has been cancelled and on behalf of Mussolini he recommended that if the direct negotiations fail to bring prompt results, German-Italian arbitration should be requested. And he repeated his regret over the cancellation of the conference. *⁴²¹

According to the October 23 report of the Hungarian Minister in Rome, Ribbentrop had said he was not in favor of arbitration and asked Ciano why could not this matter be entrusted to the four great powers? Ciano replied that that is what he had proposed on October 14. *⁴²²

Kanya telegraphed the Hungarian Minister in Berlin that according to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, since the Hungarian government has not found the latest Czechoslovak offer satisfactory, the Czechoslovak government has agreed to submit the question of the Hungarian minority to arbitration by Germany and Italy. Kanya also said that if Ribbentrop continues to refuse arbitration, Hungary would request the immediate convening of the four great powers.

On October 28, the Hungarian Minister in Rome reported in a telegram that he had spoken with Ciano. He reported that the Italian Foreign Minister, "citing the agreement of the British government, was demanding the most emphatically that Ribbentrop agree to arbitration." *⁴²⁴

On October 29, the Hungarian Minister in Rome reported that Ribbentrop who was in Rome at the time, has agreed to arbitration. The meeting will be held on November 2 in Vienna. *⁴²⁵

Prague did not agree to the Hungarian government's demand for a plebiscite, based on the 1910 census, in the contested territories. Therefore, Prague "wishes arbitration by the Axis powers but would like to know the British government's position in this matter." The British reply stated: "His Majesty's government saw no objection to the settlement of the Czech-Hungarian question by means of arbitration by Germany and Italy, if the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments agreed to settle their differences this way... If the two parties to the dispute preferred to refer the matter to the four Munich powers, His Majesty's government would be ready to join in any discussion." *⁴²⁶

Speaking of the Hungarian-Czechoslovak negotiations, Lord Halifax declared in the House of Commons on October 24: "I hope indeed that the rectification of the frontiers according to the racial distribution of the population which is now taking place in Central and

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South-Eastern Europe may contribute to the stability of peace. What we are now witnessing is the revision of the Treaty of Versailles, for which provision was made in the Covenant of the League (of Nations), but which has never till now been made effective." *⁴²⁷

According to the Hungarian view, the procedure in the League of Nations just cited by Lord Halifax, which has been ignored for many years, along with the growing severity of the situation with the expansionist efforts of the German empire which had repeatedly brought the directly involved states to the brink of war and might have resulted in a conflagration throughout Europe, provided the legal basis for negotiations as prescribed by the four power agreement in Munich and, following the failure of the negotiation, for arbitration. This procedure made it possible to find a quick solution for the problem and did not run counter to any provision of international law. *⁴²⁸

The absence of Britain and France from the arbitration did not render the procedure illegal, according to the Hungarian view.

The charge that Czechoslovakia was under "irresistible duress" to accept arbitration by the Axis powers, does not stand up, partly because it had been urged by the Slovak leaders and also because the two Western powers would have been willing to participate if requested by the interested states, but no such request had been forthcoming.

Speaking in the House of Commons on October 14, Chamberlain declared: "The Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments have agreed to accept arbitration by the German and Italian governments and to abide by their final decision. Accordingly, there has been no need for any further action by His Majesty's government. *⁴²⁹

It has also been argued by authorities on international law and by political writers that the Vienna Decision of 1938 ran counter to the procedures of international law. One argument has been that the decision was based on and was a direct consequence of the Munich Agreement. According to this argument, the Munich Agreement ran counter to international law and, consequently, so did the Vienna Decision. However, the de facto legality of the Munich Agreement did not cease until Hitler's Germany turned Bohemia and Moravia into a protectorate and, at the same time, established the independent Slovakia under German sponsorship.

According to the Hungarian view, the Munich Agreement and the Vienna Decision were two distinct transactions. Procedures for the Munich Agreement were chosen and agreed to by the four great powers as a mechanism sanctioned by international law to resolve the

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German-Ciechoslovak question. On the other hand, the Vienna Arbitration was a procedure chosen by the two interested states, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, because it offered the best chance to reach a mutually agreeable solution to the questions which had been unresolved between them for nearly twenty years.

The roots of the Hungarian-Ciechoslovak question, as we have seen, go back to the Paris peace treaties of 1919, long preceding the Sudeten German-Czechoslovak questions. Thus, the Vienna Arbitration was not a direct consequence of the Munich Agreement. Munich had only served as a trigger to launch bilateral talks. The Vienna Arbitration came about as a result Of an agreement between the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments. After the failure of the bilateral talks, they agreed to choose this procedure and committed themselves to abide by its decision, whatever that may be. *⁴³⁰

The decision of the Vienna Arbitration was based on the application of ethnic principles. This has been in sharp contrast with the economic, strategic and other considerations applied in the drafting of the Paris peace treaties of 1919. The application of ethnic principles, as noted by several authors, was by no means perfect or entirely free of bias. Nevertheless, its main strength was that it had been resting on the mutual consent of the interested parties.

In 1942, the British and French government declared the Vienna Decision null and void. It was invalidated de facto by the arrival of the Soviet army in late 1944 and the transfer to Czechoslovakia of the territories in question. It was set aside de jure by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. That restored the pre-Munich borders between Hungary and Slovakia. Subcarpathian Ruthenia was ceded by Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union.

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Returning to the situation following the Vienna Decision, we must take note of the festive session, on December 3, of the Upper House of the Hungarian parliament where the return of the Highlands Hungarians to the motherland and the recovery of the lost territories were celebrated. On the same occasion, a decision was made to invite the Hungarian deputies from the Highlands. Geza Szullo and Andor Jaross were present and received an enthusiastic welcome.

Aladar Huszar made the following statement amidst the warm applause of the members of the Upper House: "I believe I would be amiss if I did not extend greetings from this place to Janos Esterhazy and his colleagues. They remained beyond the borders to become leaders, protectors and guardians of the Hungarians who were left behind the new borders. Our affection and prayers accompany their work and struggles. We implore the All-mighty to bless and protect their every step." *⁴³¹

On December 3, Janos Esterhazy had a long talk with Dr. Tiso, the Prime Minister of Slovakia about the affairs of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the issue of equal rights for Hungarians living in Pozsony. *⁴³²

Also on December 3, Czechoslovak Prime Minister Beran said in Prague, that "following the settlement of the border issue, we wish to establish wide-ranging cooperation with Poland also, especially in the realm of economics, culture and transportation. The same is true of Hungary." *⁴³³

In his Christmas, 1938, statement Janos Esterhazy declared that "the strength of the Hungarians remains unbroken under the new circumstances." *⁴³⁴

Following the Vienna Decision, the diplomatic efforts of the Hungarian government were aimed at the securing of Subcarpathian Ruthenia and the establishment of a common border with Poland. The international situation appeared to be favorable, with the rationale

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being that both the Western powers and the Soviet Union would rather have this territory under Hungarian rule, instead of strengthenmg Germany's military might which was already too great.

Germany was opposed to any independent action by the smaller powers. It consented to such an action only if it could serve, directly or indirectly, German interests. Berlin wanted to take advantage of any unilateral action, either as a quid pro quo or as a tactical move against its neighbors. Accordingly, a Hungarian military move that had been planned for November 20, had to be cancelled in the face of German and Italian protests.

On November 23, Hungarian Prime Minister lmredy submitted his resignation but Regent Horthy asked him to try to form a new government. At the same, Count Istvan Csaky became the new Foreign Minister, replacing Kalman Kanya who had lost the confidence of the Germans.

A December 5 message from Ribbentrop hinted at certain changes. As a result, Ribbentrop was told that Csaky would accept his invitation for a visit next January.

Meanwhile, at the suggestion of Ciano, the Hungarian diplomats were trying to determine the likely impact among the Western powers of Hungary's anticipated joining the Anti-Bolshevik Pact. The news from the Western capitals was favorable. Only Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov was making threatening statements.

On November 13, 1939, Hungary did join the Anti-Bolshevik Pact and the Soviet government broke diplomatic relations with Hungary.

Even though on the advice of the Axis powers Prague had shown a degree of rapprochement toward Hungary, the Tiso government which was unable to accept the Vienna Decision and kept demanding that it be changed, was inciting border incidents and staging demonstrations. In Subcarpathian Ruthenia, Volosin displayed a similar attitude.

The most serious incident took place on January 6 at Munkacs where the Czechoslovak army opened artillery fire on the city, resulting in several dead and wounded. The day before there were reports of troop concentrations near Munkacs. Apparently, the incidents had been aimed at the retaking of Munkacs. The Germans did not interfere because the growing tension fit well into their political designs. Volosin was supported by Ukrainian guerillas. *⁴³⁵ The incidents had Karmasin's support also.

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Csaky's negotiations with Hitler and other German leaders began on January 16. Hitler, as was his wont, recited his accusations against Hungary. He found it particularly objectionable that even during the Czechoslovak crisis, Hungary's policies remained indecisive and hesitant; that Hungary had signed the Bled agreement and helped revive the Little Entente against Germany. Poland had acted at once, while Hungary did not do anything, Hitler claimed, adding that "Germany will not sacrifice itself for its friends who refuse to help at the decisive moment."

Csaky tried to put up a defense against Hitler's accusations, but without success for quite a while. Hitler calmed down only when Csaky promised that all German demands would be met. *⁴³⁶ Hitler hinted that he was planning military action against Czechoslovakia in March. And in return for the many promises he made, Csaky received almost nothing, except a half-promise of sorts regarding Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

Following Csaky's visit, Ribbentrop invited Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky to Berlin. To his great disappointment, Ribbentrop treated him in a very patronizing manner, produced a long list of accusations and raised new demands. This was natural beause the fate of Czechoslovakia had already been decided by then and Chvalkovsky was made aware of this. *⁴³⁷

Soon thereafter, on January 28, Durcansky and another Slovak minister visited Germany. Goring told them that they can count on the requested financial help only if they agree to Czechoslovakia's dismemberment. *⁴³⁸ To give the point greater emphasis, the German leaders loved to bring up the Hungarian territorial demands, saying that Germany was prepared to honor them provided that Berlin finds them suitable; that is, if the Slovaks do not secede from Czechoslovakia.

The decisive force behind these events was Hitler's newly reached decision to let Hungary have Subcarpathian Ruthenia. This was due to Csaky's total German orientation, the easing of Polish-Hungarian relations and realization by Germany that it would gain much more by establishing an idependent Slovakia and recognizmg its "independence."

Meanwhile there were changes in government both in Hungary and Yugoslavia. To the great regret of the Axis powers, Stojadinovic had been set aside and Cvetkovic was appointed Prime Minister. And in Hungary, lmredy who had drifted too far to the right, was

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replaced by Count Pal Teleki, a move which was not designed to please the Germans, either.

Teleki became Prime Minister on February 16 and began at once an intense diplomatic campaign to regain Subcarpathian Ruthenia. But instead of invoking the ethnic principles, he laid the emphasis on the economic facts of life which appeared to be much more convincing. Memoranda containing his views were sent London, Paris, Berlin and Rome. The French government received the moves of the Hungarian government with particular understanding. *⁴³⁹

Beyond trying to secure the support of the Western great powers for the return of Subcarpathia, he made a similar attempt in Prague. He sent the permanent deputy to the Foreign Minister to Prague to talk with Chvalkovsky. The Hungarian envoy spoke of good neighborly relations with Chvalkovsky and mentioned the possibility of other rewards. Chvalkovsky displayed some interest in the offer but left its acceptance up to President Hacha. *⁴⁴⁰

When the German learned that there was no complete agreement among Slovak leaders regarding the secession of Slovakia -- notably Sidor was opposed to it -- they informed Tiso and Sidor that with the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia being a foregone conclusion, it should coincide with the declaration of Slovak independence.

Prague, however, decided to rely on its army. On March 10, Beran replaced Tiso as Prime Minister. Tuka, Mach and others were jailed, Durcansky fled to Austria. With that the Germans exerted heavy pressure on the Slovaks and, once again, raised the specter of a Hungarian threat. All these moves favored the Hungarian political efforts.

Teleki spared no effort to regain Subcarpathian Ruthenia without any German assistance, if at all possible. On March 10, he obtained the Cabinet's agreement to have the Hungarian army occupy Subcarpathian Ruthenia when Slovakia declares its independence, even if the Germans do not agree to that. However, in view of the events in Slovakia, the Germans decided to give Hungary a free hand. On March 11, the German Minister in Budapest delivered a note, informing the Hungarian government of this decision.

The Germans set a few conditions, most of them of an economic nature, although some of them were political, pertaining to the rights of the ethnic Germans in Hungary, and the like. *⁴⁴¹ Hungary accepted the conditions. *⁴⁴² Hitler personally informed the Hungarian Minister in Berlin of these developments, saying that "Hungary has 24 hours to resolve the Ruthenian question. *⁴⁴³

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COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY