STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

Hungary's transformation into a republic occurred under unusual circumstances. With the German occupation in March 1944, the country lost its independence, and drastic changes occurred in domestic politics. The new government dissolved the labor unions and the opposition parties, like the Smallholders and Social Democrats. These parties continued political activities underground, and together with the illegal Communist and Peasant parties, formed the National Independence Front which became the structure of postwar politics in Hungary. The Citizen Democratic party and the Christian Democratic People's party were also admitted to the Independence Front, but the latter party was not allowed to play a political role.

In the autumn of 1944, the Red Army occupied eastern Hungary, and under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi a group of Hungarian Communists arrived who had emigrated to Moscow after the failure of the Béla Kun regime in 1919. Members of this group, the so-called Muscovites, moving around in army cars in Soviet-occupied territories, picked up available leaders of the underground parties and took them to Debrecen. This group of hand-picked politicians convoked a Provisional National Assembly. In the larger villages and towns the quickly formed National Committees organized meetings which elected representatives by acclamation. The Provisional National Assembly consisted of 230 deputies, of whom 72 were Communists, 57 Smallholders, 35 Social Democrats, and 12 members of the Peasant party. The other deputies were without party affiliation or belonged to insignificant small parties. When the Germans were driven out of Hungary, and the government could move to Budapest in April 1945, the number of deputies in the Provisional National Assembly increased to 495. With support of the Social Democratic and trade union representatives the Communists had an absolute majority.

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At the first session of the Assembly, on December 21, 1944, a leading Muscovite Communist, Ernő Gerő, emphasized that "the policy of the Communist Party is a Hungarian, democratic, and national policy." The next day the Assembly elected a provisional national government and authorized the new government to conclude an armistice with the Allied powers. The Muscovite Communists did their best to gain approval of the Hungarian public. The composition of the cabinet was an example. The Smallholders, Social Democrats, and the Communists each had two portfolios and the Peasant party one. Besides the seven party men, there were five non-party men in the cabinet. The prime minister, General Béla Dálnoki Miklós was commander of the First Hungarian Army, and he went over to the Russians after Horthys armistice proclamation on October 15, 1944. So did the minister of defense, General János Vörös There was even a count in the cabinet, Géza Teleki the son of the popular late prime minister, Pal Teleki and a general of gendarmerie, Gábor Faraghó A fifth non-party appointee, Erik Molnár, turned out to be a member of the Communist party. The apparent balance in the cabinet between the parties was offset by the fact that the Communists seized the effective power positions.

In the early postwar period the minuscule Communist party under Muscovite leadership advocated a coalition government, praised the principles of democracy, and preached the necessity of collaborating with the Catholic church. The Muscovites publicly extolled the bourgeois and peasant leaders of the coalition as progressive and reliable democrats who were entitled to share the leadership of the country.

The first important legislative act of the new regime was a radical agrarian reform, promulgated in March 1945 under the dictation of Marshal Klementy Voroshilov chairman of the Allied Control Commission (ACC). An agrarian reform was long-overdue in Hungary, but this decree enacted many provisions with exclusively political objectives. The reform had two major goals: one was liquidation of the old landowner class, the other to win support of the land-less peasantry and control over the whole agrarian population. Too-small allotments and the structure of the decree were designed to prove that private property cannot effectively operate in modern agriculture. The execution of the agrarian reform often went far beyond the provisions of the law. Excesses were facilitated by the Communist seizure of the police and the municipal administration. The minister of interior controlled domestic security, and this powerful portfolio was given to Ferenc Erdei, ostensibly a member of the Peasant party but

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actually owing allegiance to the Communists. Under his cloak and protection the Communists continued to organize the police all over the country. The political police became practically a branch of the Communist party and were supervised by the Soviet secret police.

The power of the police increased by the establishment of the People's Courts. This was one of the first institutions introduced in all countries under Soviet occupation. The activities of these courts contributed considerably to the creation of an atmosphere of fear, intimidation, and insecurity. The People's Courts were organized by decree in January 1945, at all the seats of courts of justice. Members were selected from a list prepared by the political parties which belonged to the National Independence Front. Later a decree authorized the Trade Union Council to appoint a member. Originally the People's Courts had arisen to judge war criminals, but later the various "conspiracy" and "sabotage" trials were staged before these packed courts. The police played an important role in preparation of these trials.

Communist seizure of municipal administration occurred at the outset of Soviet occupation through organization of National Committees in villages, towns, and counties. In theory, member parties of the National Independence Front and the trade unions were represented in these new administrative bodies. But in reality the committees were established almost everywhere by Communist emissaries who selected from all parties docile fellow travelers as members. From the very beginning of the new regime, the Communist-dominated National Committees handled all public affairs and the administration on the municipal level. The situation was particularly anomalous in the villages where the Communist party did not previously exist, the Social Democratic party had but a few members, if any, and the Peasant party just had begun to organize itself. The trade union membership meant everywhere the doubling of Communist representation. The population soon realized that through the National Committees they were being ruled by a new oligarchy of incompetent persons who were unknown or of dubious reputation. Since the peasants had bitterly complained, municipal elections were repeatedly promised but actually never held, except in Budapest.

The Communists were convinced that the working class districts of the capital would assure a sweeping victory of the united Communist Socialist ticket. For this reason it was part of Communist tactics to have the Budapest municipal elections on October 7, 1945, a month before the general elections. But the outcome of elections was a shocking disappointment to the Communist brain trust, for the

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Smallholders obtained an absolute majority of the votes in Budapest. Feverish Communist and Soviet activities followed the defeat. They proposed a single electoral ticket for the general elections; Voroshilovhimself intervened and offered 47.5 percent, of the single electoral list to the Smallholders, who refused. The embittered Socialists also insisted on separate electoral lists because they attributed their defeat in Budapest to the anti-Communist feeling of the population. Instead of a single block ticket, the four parties agreed to continue the coalition government whatever the result of the elections might be. It was a surprise to the Communists and the Soviets that at the general elections held on November 4, 1945, the Communists polled only 17 percent, and the Smallholders 57 percent. Seats in Parliament were divided as follows: Smallholders, 245; Communists, 70; Socialists, 69; Peasant party, 21; Civic Democratic party, 2. Only political parties authorized by the ACC could participate in the elections.

Defeat of the Communists and the victory of the Smallholder party in the Budapest municipal elections and at the general elections caused a short-lived optimism in the country and abroad. Western newspapers published editorials on these elections and saw an indication "that even in the areas beyond Anglo-American control . . . the peoples of Europe can be given a chance to choose their own officials honestly and openly."' After the elections Voroshilovwas quick to point out to the Smallholder leaders that "the Soviet Union wished to base its friend ship with Hungary on its relations with the Smallholders party."2 The Smallholders were greatly pleased by this statement, and they visualized a new era of constructive Hungarian-Soviet cooperation. The Communists were flabbergasted because this defeat proved that they had not gained overwhelming support from the agrarian proletariat which had been their greatest hope. As a whole, however, the political situation was favorable for them. The coalition parties agreed that the minister of interior should be a member of the Smallholder party, but Voroshilovhad vetoed the arrangement, and this important portfolio was given to the Communist party.

The Smallholders obtained an imposing number of seats in the cabinet but not the real power positions and had no majority. The prime minister, Zoltán Tildy one minister of state, seven other members of the cabinet, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and later the president of the republic - all were Smallholders. The Communist and the Socialist parties each obtained three portfolios and the Peasant party one.

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The Communist and Socialist parties each had a deputy premiership. The Smallholder electoral victory did not change the power of the Communists. They enjoyed the all-out support of the Soviets. An agreement of collaboration concluded with the Socialists in October 1944 provided for the merging of the two parties after the war. The same agreement provided for the immediate unification of the workers through the trade unions. When Charles Payer, the old leader of the Socialist party, was deported by the Germans, Árpád Szakasitsassumed leadership. He was eager to accept Communist suggestions when he reorganized the party after the war. Left-wing Socialists were put into key positions, and the moderate Socialists were declared rightist deviationists and traitors of the unity of workers.

Under these conditions Communists obtained an absolute majority in all agencies established by the coalition parties. The delegates of the trade unions and of the Social Democratic party supported invariably the Communist position. Since the Peasant party was infiltrated by Communists, the Smallholder representative usually remained isolated. Russians and Communists controlled all mass media of communication, like radio, movies, and newspapers. First the Russians, later the Communists, allocated all newsprint. Publication of newspapers was authorized through a licensing system. At the outset only the Communist and Socialist parties, and later only political parties belonging to the coalition, could publish newspapers. Even so Communists exercised strict control over all publications through the allocation of newsprint.

The first legislative act of the National Assembly declared Hungary a republic on January 31, 1946, and provisions of the new constitution corresponded to western standards of parliamentary democracies. Zoltán Tildywas elected president of the republic, and he appointed Ferenc Nagy, another leading Smallholder, as prime minister. Yet the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution became questionable when shortly afterward a law was promulgated to protect the democratic order of the republic. This law declared as criminal any statements which could be interpreted as contemptuous of the democratic state order or as harmful to the international prestige of the republic, whether the statements were true or false. And as the democratic order of the state gradually became identified with Communist tenets, this law began to be used against anyone who criticized Communist activities.

At the same time, the Communists, together with the Socialist

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and Peasant parties and the Trade Union Council, established a left wing bloc and addressed ultimate to the Smallholders in the name of the progressive Hungarian people. Politicians opposing the leftist demands were denounced as "Fascists" and "enemies of the people." Communist-organized mass meetings, synchronized with Soviet political and economic demands, pressed the government toward a leftist policy.

The Smallholder party was maneuvered into a self-liquidating process which began in March 1946, with the expulsion of twenty-one deputies, attacked by the Communists as "reactionaries." This was a compromise measure, since the Communists had originally demanded the expulsion of eighty deputies. Simultaneous with Communist actions, strong Soviet pressure was exerted on the Hungarian government. In the coming months this action was followed by the adoption of various Soviet and Communist-dictated political and economic measures. But the Smallholders still kept parliamentary majority. The ousted Smallholder deputies remained members of parliament and certainly did not strengthen Communist voting power. Under the leadership of Dezső Sulyok they formed a new opposition party which was later authorized by the ACC as the "Hungarian Freedom Party."

Subsequently the Smallholders took a stand against Communist abuses. Under the leadership of Béla Kovács the secretary general of the Smallholder party, they launched a counteroffensive and, in June 1946, handed the Communist party a list enumerating their political demands. The most important among them were: proportional representation in the administration in general and in the political police in particular; municipal elections in the fall of 1946; abolition of the People's Courts and reestablishment of the jury system; abolition of the internment; and passage of an act by the Assembly concerning the trade unions and another act for representation of peasant interests.

In the course of inter-party negotiations the Communists accepted, in principle, some of the Smallholders demands, such as their demand for municipal elections and a more adequate proportional representation in the administration and in the political police, upon condition that the Smallholders first liquidate all "reactionary" elements in their party. The Communists wanted to determine who was "reactionary" according to their doctrine and then compel the Small holders to exclude them from political life. The practical result of the negotiations was the gradual release of a substantial number of persons from the internment camps and the reinstatement of a few

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dismissed civil servants. In speeches and articles, Smallholder leaders challenged the Communist party and advocated the fulfillment of the Smallholder demands. The Communists reacted violently.

Despite all the ominous signs, a strange optimism prevailed in the coalition parties. Some politicians believed that the Communist defeat in the free elections created for Hungary an exceptional position in Russian-occupied Europe. This seemed almost a miracle, and many people hoped that after the conclusion of peace and evacuation of Soviet forces, developments along genuine democratic lines would follow. It was an important fact that the non-Communist parties in the coalition were progressive on social, economic, and cultural questions, and the Communists adapted their tactics accordingly to the general mood of the country.3 The coalition parties, during the Horthyregime, were all in opposition, and they cooperated to some extent with the Communists during the German occupation. As throughout Nazi-oppressed Europe, so in Hungary the common fight against the Nazi foe developed into a marriage of convenience, if not into a sort of camaraderie between the Communist and non Communist politicians. The mere fact that Hungary survived a disastrous war seemed a promise for a better future, and the leading politicians of the new regime were determined to make the most of a desperate situation. This task called for courage and an optimistic outlook, especially in regard to the possibilities of cooperation with the Russians and Communists. Western representatives in 1943-1944, gave encouraging advice to Hungarians as to the possibility of such cooperation. In the postwar period there were no alternatives. Above all there was a great common task before the parties: the rebuilding and rehabilitation of the devasated country. In that respect the Communists displayed zeal and energy. They controlled the industrial work force through trade unions and factory committees. Rakosi told H.F.A. Schoenfeld, American minister to Hungary, that "strikes for the improvement of working conditions or higher wages were not permissible in Hungary; they were a luxury which only the American economy could afford."4

Non-Communist leaders "thought it natural that the Communist Party should be more radical than other parties, but expected it would work shoulder to shoulder with the others in reviving the country."5 Largely because of apparent Communist moderation during the prelude of the postwar Hungarian drama, the opinion of some foreign observers was even more optimistic. For instance, Oscar Jászi, an American professor, who in 1918 was a member of Mihály Károlyis cabinet, rejected the suggestion that "what is taking place

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in Hungary is simply a repetition of what has occurred in the Baltic states, in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia."6 He characterized the Hungarian situation in the following manner:

"The old demagogy of the first Bolshevik revolution was completely absent, Communism had become respectable and gentlemanly. Even the criticism of certain Governmental measures by the Roman Catholic hierarchy was listened to with respect, and when Archbishop Mindszentyattacked the expropriation of the estates as a "product of hatred," the rejoinder was moderate and tactful. Though the large ecclesiastical estates were dismembered like the others, liberal grants in-aid were provided for the maintenance of the lower clergy, the Churches and parochial buildings. Generally speaking, there is not much talk about Communism in Hungary today; the leitmotiv is democracy with intensely patriotic overtones."7

It took some time to realize that this optimistic view was not justified. It became clear that in decisive questions the Muscovites did nothing but carry out the orders of the Russians, and that the Communist party was, in reality, a disguised branch of the Soviet administration represented in Hungary outwardly by the Soviet army, Soviet officials, and the ACC. In addition to Soviet support, the Muscovites had two other advantages. One was a concrete program - the Leninst Stalinist blueprint of conquest applied to the Hungarian situation. The other was the disregard of moral and political ethics in carrying out their plans. The Muscovites did not feel any obligation to keep promises but were outraged if others did not abide strictly by agreements or act according to expectations. They were proud of the political "know-how" learnt in the Soviet Union, but these methods would not have worked without Soviet intervention and the presence of the Red Army. In all phases of Hungarian politics, energetic Soviet actions helped Communist initiatives. If the Hungarian government was not responsive to Communist suggestions, there quickly followed threats, ultimata, and the use of sheer force. The methods by which Hungary's political structure was manipulated and transformed were repeatedly admitted and proudly praised by leading Communists. Joseph Révai pointed out retrospectively:

"We were a minority in Parliament and in the government, but at the same time we represented the leading force. We had decisive control over the police forces. Our force, the force of our Party and working class, was multiplied by the fact that the Soviet Union and the Soviet army were always there to support us with their assistance.8

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Rakosi said more explicitly that it was "the imperishable merit and the support of the Soviet Union that tipped the scales" and helped to establish the Hungarian People's Democracy. He pointed out that the presence of the Soviet army in Hungary precluded any attempt at armed rebellion, and protected the country "from imperialistic intervention."

Notwithstanding many difficulties and odds, political life in post war Hungary was rich in potential democratic leadership. A correspondent of the London Times noted (October 16, 1946) that a visitor in Hungary "will be surprised by the vigorous intellectual activity displayed both in print and in conversation. In comparison with the mental sterility and haunting fear prevalent in the Balkans, Hungary seems an oasis of culture and liberty."

The great issues were settled by external and not by internal forces. Hungarian democracy would have developed on sound lines and would have restricted Communist influence to due proportions - if a free political evolution could have taken place. The decisive factors in Hungary were not the shrewd Communist leaders but the occupying Soviet army, Soviet domination in the Allied Control Commission, the proximity of the Soviet Union, and the lack of Western assertiveness.

Armistice and Soviet Policy

The armistice agreement contained military, political, economic, and financial obligations, and reduced Hungarian sovereignty to a minimum. It established an Allied Control Commission; its chair man was Marshal Klementy Voroshilovwhose political adviser was Georgij Pushkin, a diplomat. Hungarian authorities were to carry out the orders and instructions issued by the Soviet High Command or the ACC. Voroshilov commander of the Soviet army in Hungary, or his deputy acted in the name of both. The ACC had American and British sections as well, but for all practical purposes it was run exclusively by the Soviets; they freely intervened in Hungary's domestic and foreign affairs. In the entire armistice period the Soviet technique in Hungary was to act in the name of the three major Allies while keeping Britain and the United States from meaningful participation. Article 18 of the armistice agreement stated:

"For the whole period of the armistice there will be established in Hungary an Allied Control Commission which will regulate and

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supervise the execution of the armistice terms under the chairmanship of the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

During the period between the coming into force of the armistice and the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Allied Control Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command."

While Article 18 of the Bulgarian and Hungarian armistice agreements provided for Soviet chairmanship until the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the earlier-concluded Rumanian armistice provided for Soviet control until the conclusion of peace and did not mention explicitly British and American participation.

At the outset, the American military mission believed that the provision for their participation in the execution of the armistice terms meant taking part in the work of the ACC. Colonel Dallas S. Townsend, the deputy commander of the American military mission in Budapest, prepared an elaborate plan for the operation of the ACC. As he described it to me in a letter of May 1955 (at that time he was assistant attorney general), the first and perhaps most important feature of this plan was the establishment of a Secretariat, which would have the function, and be charged with the duty, "inter alia", of receiving and translating all incoming and outgoing communications, furnishing copies to each Mission; and of authenticating and formalizing documents, maintaining liaison with other Missions not directly represented in the ACC, such as the French and the Czech, and so on. Upon the submission of our plan MarshallVoroshilovcommented that the Agreement said nothing about a Secretariat, a comment which had the merit of brevity, if not of profundity, and that was the beginning and the end of our plan . . .

After rejection of this plan the American military mission asked for copies of all communications the ACC received from the provisional government, and Townsend noted in his letter.

We were informed there were no communications from the Provisional Government to the ACC. Of course this was absurd. Moreover from our own Intelligence sources we received copies of notes from the Provisional Government to the Commission. On one occasion we had a copy of a note that had been submitted by the Hungarians to the Russians and had been returned with marginal notations by the very Soviet officer who told me there was no such note. Of course I did not

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tell him that I had a copy of it; that would only have led to trouble and would have accomplished nothing except perhaps the tracking down and execution of my informant.

In view of the end of hostilities against Germany, the Potsdam Conference agreed on a greater participation of the British and American missions in the work of the ACC in the three Danubian countries, but in reality only cosmetic changes took place. Control commissions remained under Russian domination throughout their existence. For example, General V.P. Sviridov deputy chairman of the ACC in Hungary, without consulting or informing the American and British representatives, dissolved certain Catholic youth organizations in June-July 1946, and he recommended dismissal of some government officials. Instructions were issued by the Soviet High Command regarding the size and organization of the Hungarian army, without consulting Western representatives. The chairman of the ACC refused the American members permission to visit Hungarian army units and free movement in the country. In short, the Soviet chairman consistently acted unilaterally in the name of the ACC, without consultation with, or notice to, the American and British representatives. Even a semblance of effective participation in the work of the ACC was denied to them. Sometimes the Soviet chair man simply stated that the matter was not within the jurisdiction of the ACC and must be referred to Moscow.

The argument that in this exclusion of the Western Allies from the business of the ACC in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, the Soviets followed the precedent set in Italy, is not without foundation.9 In Italy, the Soviets had membership only on an advisory council, which in fact did little. It was a joint Anglo-American agency, and the Soviets resented their exclusion. Legalistically the arrangements were comparable: one side ran the show and the other merely observed, although the institutions were not quite parallel. But in substance the role of the ACC was entirely different in Italy than in the Danubian states. The Western powers did not abuse the provisions of the armistice agreement. Italy had no reason to complain about the behavior of her liberators. She was not looted or otherwise abused by the Anglo-Americans but was in fact greatly assisted in her rehabilitation. As early as January 1945, the political section of the ACC in Italy was abolished, and in the following two years the remaining sections of the commission fulfilled only an advisory function. While the Allied powers did not restrict the activities of the Communist party in Italy, the ACC in the Danubian states brought ruthless pressure

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on the governments and, closely cooperating with the local Communist parties, engineered the political transformation of these countries.

The political advisers to the ACC were not accredited to the Hungarian government. An American representative with the personal rank of minister, H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, arrived in Budapest in May 1945. He functioned as the representative in Hungary for the general protection of American interests in addition to, and separate from, the ACC. He maintained informal contacts with the provisional Hungarian authorities. At the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in September 1945, Secretary Byrnes declared that the United States would not sign treaties with the unrepresentative governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, but was ready to recognize the government of Hungary on receipt of a pledge of free elections. This move clearly aimed at strengthening non-Communist elements in the Hungarian coalition. Molotovcountered by immediate and unconditional recognition of the Hungarian government. Thus the American and Soviet missions were changed to legations, and the American and Soviet diplomatic representatives to the ACC presented their credentials to the Hungarian government as plenipotentiary ministers. Britain was not willing to reestablish regular diplomatic relations with Hungary - a country still technically at war with the Allied powers - and appointed as British political representative to Hungary the British political adviser to the ACC, Alvary D. F. Gascoigne

Renewal of diplomatic relations with Hungary did not strengthen the position of the British and American representatives in the ACC. In the course of the execution of the armistice agreement the Russians committed many abuses, notably in enforcing their interpretation of "democracy" and "fascism." They had a wide choice of means in exerting pressure on Hungarian authorities. Personal liberty, as well as the daily bread of the population, and most of the necessities of life, depended on them.

One of the terrifying actions of the Red Army was the deportation of civilians. First, it was supposed that the largest number of civilians were taken as prisoners of war after the siege of Budapest. But later requests pouring in by the thousands into the Foreign Ministry from most parts of Hungary made it evident that the same practice was followed all over the country. This procedure was particularly cruel in east Hungary, where, in communities inhabited by people of German origin, the entire adult population of many villages, men and women alike, were taken into the Soviet Union. In other parts of the

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STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West