STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

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purchasing commission in the United States, with more than a thousand employees, for extensive industrial espionage.25

The British and Americans were, of course, preoccupied by the possibility of a Soviet collapse and separate peace with Germany, and there is evidence that Soviet and German contacts occurred in late 1942 and in the first half of 1943, although details are still in the dark. Molotovin June 1943 reportedly traveled two hundred miles into German-occupied territory to explore the possibilities of a separate peace with Germany. Stalin was deeply suspicious about the delayed Anglo-American landing in France and may have thought it appropriate to negotiate simultaneously with Germany and the Western Allies.26

This, then, was the complex political situation in which the first Big Three conference was held at Teheran in November-December 1943. Roosevelt was sensitive to the need to be cautious with the Soviet Union and decided to make it plain to Stalin that the Americans were not "ganging up" with the British against Russia. (The Teheran Conference was preceded, actually, by a meeting of the Americans and the British with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo in which the conferees discussed Far Eastern problems.) To this end, the conference was characterized by Roosevelt's endeavors to establish close personal relations with Stalin. On Stalin's invitation he moved into the compound of the Soviet embassy, and the two men had their first meeting without Churchill. Roosevelt went out of his way to please Stalin in condemnation of France and, according to Bohlen, some of his statements showed a remarkable ignorance about the Soviet Union.27

Procedure at Teheran was similarly unorthodox. No provision had been agreed upon for taking minutes of the conference proceedings. Each nation took its own minutes. Bohlen translated and took notes and dictated them in odd hours to four American soldiers with steno graphic skill.28 Joint records would have made the statements and decisions clear. When the State Department years later published a documentary volume on the Teheran Conference, the Soviet Foreign Ministry charged that the American record falsified history, and it released its own minutes of the conference.29 The Western allies may have thought that free-wheeling discussions would be conducive to agreement, and Stalin welcomed this approach that gave opportunity for maneuver and revealed disagreement between the British and Americans. Teheran was possibly the last occasion when the Western powers could have initiated a meaningful discussion for reorganization of Europe after the German defeat. But the president, in his

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opening statement, emphasized that the "members of the new family" were gathered at Teheran "for one purpose, for the purpose of winning the war as soon as possible." At the conference Roosevelt brought up the possibility of a northeastward drive from the Adriatic into Rumania to effect a junction of Anglo-American troops with the Red Army advancing from Odessa. The proposal disturbed Harry Hopkinsand was not supported by the United States Chiefs of Staff.30 Churchill agreed with Roosevelt's suggestion. But Stalin explained that it would be unwise to scatter forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and suggested that from Italy the maximum number of troops should be sent to southern France to provide a diversionary operation two months before the invason of northern France. General Marshalland Admiral Ernest J. King agreed with Stalin but suggested that D-Day should be the same for both operations in France, and the conference endorsed their proposal.

Stalin politely accepted Roosevelt's ideas as to a postwar security organization consisting of an Assembly, an Executive Committee, and a third organ described by Roosevelt as "the four policemen -- the USA, UK, USSR, and China--whose combined forces would check aggression throughout the world. Nobody brought up the possibility that an aggressor might be one of the four policemen.

The Polish question was not extensively discussed at Teheran, but Poland's postwar boundaries were practically arranged and this meant a partial abandonment of the American policy that all territorial questions should be settled at the peace conference. In a private meeting Roosevelt told Stalin there were some six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction; he did not wish to lose their votes during the forthcoming presidential election and for this reason could not take any position on Polish affairs, although he personally agreed with Stalin's view that Poland's frontiers should move to the west. At the formal session Roosevelt did not participate in the Polish discussion of Churchill and Stalin who, in vague terms, agreed on the future borders of Poland.31

Plans for dismemberment of Germany were discussed at Teheran but nothing was agreed, and it was decided that the subject would be considered by the EAC in London. On this occasion Stalin said he was "against the idea of confederation as artificial and one that would not last in that area, and in addition would provide opportunity for the German elements to control. Austria, for example, had existed as an independent state and should again. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria likewise."32

It was typical that the State Department was not informed of the

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negotiations and decisions at Teheran. Secretary Hull, who had not been present, complained to William C. Bullitt in March 1944 that "he still did not know what happened at Teheran and that he had no knowledge whatsoever of the constant stream of communications that was being exchanged between the President and Churchill and Stalin." Hull added that he had never known Roosevelt to be so aloof, and he thought "this might be due to the fact that the President was complaining of constant headaches."33

Between Teheran and Yalta decisive military action took place; the landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944 were a sweeping success. By the end of the autumn, massive Anglo-American forces were at the German frontier. The landing in southern France was something else and proved, m the event, to be unnecessary. General Henry Maitland Wilson, the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean, had foreseen as far back as March 1944 that logistical problems would delay the landing in southern France and had reported that the best course was "to abandon any attack on the Riviera and concentrate on Italy."34 Occupation of the Istrian peninsula would have allowed a push through the Ljubljana Gap toward Vienna, and invading Western troops could have attacked German forces from the flank and moved in the direction of Hungary. This British proposal was rejected by the president and General Eisenhower in June 1944, Roosevelt referring to the strategy accepted at Teheran, and Eisenhower considering the second landing important for his campaign. Landing at the Riviera took place only in mid-August when Eisenhower's troops already con trolled extensive ground in Normandy; and in retrospect it is clear that the second landing had little military importance. Roosevelt and Churchill in their message to Stalin on September 19 mentioned that in the event of a rout of German forces in Italy, Allied military operations should be possible toward the Ljubljana Gap.35 But the German army retreated in orderly fashion, and the Allied offensive in the direction of Vienna did not take place.

Seeing the advance of Soviet troops in Rumania and the drift of Western strategy, Churchill tried to secure some British influence in the Balkans, primarily in Greece, by negotiating with Stalin and offering him controlling influence in Rumania. Secretary Hull opposed the arrangement, but during his absence from Washington (the secretary was increasingly ill and was to resign in November 1944) President Roosevelt accepted in July the Churchill-Stalin arrangement for a three-month trial period. In June Churchill proposed to Stalin that Bulgaria should be in the Soviet sphere and Yugoslavia in

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the British. However, the validity of the three months' arrangement was doubtful.

Meanwhile events were moving rapidly . On August 23, 1944, King Michaelof Rumania surrendered to the Russians, appointed a new government of national unity, and promptly declared war on Germany. The armistice agreement with Rumania (September 12) gave full power to the Soviet High Command in the Allied Control Commission, until the conclusion of peace. Moscow declared war on Bulgaria in early September without notifying London and Washing ton, while the British and Americans were negotiating an armistice with the Bulgarian government in Egypt. The Soviet army then occupied Bulgaria without firing a shot, and the armistice negotiations were transferred to Moscow.

Under the circumstances Churchill decided to negotiate directly with Stalin; Roosevelt, in a message to Churchill and Stalin, ex pressed reservations concerning their bilateral meeting. He said that in the global war there was no question in which the United States was not interested and notified them that he considered their meeting as preliminary to a conference of the Big Three. The prime minister and Eden arrived in Moscow on October 9 and began negotiations with Stalin the same day. After a discussion on Poland they turned to the affairs of the Balkan peninsula, and Churchill ex pressed in percentages the relative influence that Britain and Russia should have in specified countries. Churchill proposed 90 percent British influence in Greece and 90 percent Russian influence in Rumania; in Hungary and Yugoslavia 50-50 percent influence; and in Bulgaria 75 percent influence for Russia. It appeared in Churchill's dramatic narrative that Stalin accepted these percentage figures.36 Yet Foreign Office records released in 1973 showed that Stalin recognized overwhelming British influence in Italy and Greece but claimed in the case of Bulgaria the same 90 percent influence as in Rumania. Eventually they agreed that Eden and Molotovwork out an agreement.

The Eden-Molotovmeeting was complicated by the Bulgarian armistice negotiations and Soviet proposals to change the percentages in these countries, and concessions were combined with power in the Allied Control Commission. Eventually Molotovoffered a compromise of an 80-20 percentage division in Bulgaria and Hungary and a 50-50 percentage in Yugoslavia, and he proposed to insert a provision in Article 18 of the Bulgarian armistice that until the conclusion of hostilities against Germany in the ACC the Soviet High

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Command execute the armistice terms with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.37 The British were satisfied with the compromise. Eden noted on October 11 that "We obtained what we wanted on almost all points. I should say 90 percent overall. In particular they will summon Bulgars out of Greece and Yugoslavia tonight."38 This last point was most important because the British were afraid that the Soviet army might march to Greece and eventually to Istanbul.

During this period the West also suffered a defeat when Britain and the United States could not support the Polish uprising in War saw, for on this occasion Stalin showed his hand; the Soviet army stopped at the gates of the city for political-military reasons, and when Western Allied planes sought to take supplies to the Poles, Stalin refused to allow them to land and refuel at Soviet airfields. The Poles fought under desperate conditions from August 1 to October 2, 1944.39

All this was a prescription for disaster in Eastern Europe. Developments in the autumn of 1944 made clear what was in store for Poland and the Danubian countries. Stalin's position in inter-Allied relations strengthened when Hitlerbegan his initially successful offensive in the Ardennes (Battle of the Bulge, December 16, 1944) and the Western Allies asked for a Russian offensive to divert German pressure from the West. Churchill addressed a special message to Stalin on January 6, 1945, who replied favorably the next day, and the Soviet army occupied Warsaw on January 17.40

Since the military decisions made at Teheran had been carried out to the letter, the Allied forces remaining in Italy and the eastern Mediterranean were not strong enough for decisive military actions. Therefore the Soviets could safely suggest a landing on the Balkans in early 1945. When Stalin proposed to Churchill at Yalta that British and Soviet troops meet at Vienna, Churchill said nothing. Both men knew there were no British troops available for such an undertaking.

The Yalta Conference (February 4-11, 1945) was preceded by a high-level Anglo-American meeting at Malta (January 31-February 2).41 The Combined Chiefs of Staff were in session for several days, and Churchill and Eden exchanged views with the new secretary of state, Stettinius, and with Ambassador Harriman. On the last day of the conference Roosevelt steamed into Valetta harbor aboard the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Quincy met the military leaders and entertained Churchill, Eden, and Stettinius for luncheon and dinner, and talked informally of political issues to raise at Yalta; that same night transport planes took the two delegations, seven hundred persons, to

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the airfield of Saki in the Crimea. The British and American delegations left Malta without having agreed on policy or tactics for confrontation with the Soviets.

When the Big Three met at Yalta Soviet troops were sweeping through Poland. had reached the Oder, and occupied most of Hungary. Possession of key territories created a favorable negotiating position for Stalin. The State Department had prepared a Declaration on Liberated Europe which promised democratic governments established through free elections. The declaration at first had been combined with a proposal for a four-power Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe that was to supervise the application of the declaration. But Roosevelt decided to present only the declaration, which the Russians accepted after a short discussion.42 Correct application of its principles might have made possible democratic institutions in East European countries.

In the case of Poland and Yugoslavia, East and West at Yalta backed rival governments, and so it was decided that the Communist dominated provisional government of Poland should be reorganized "on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad." A similar recommendation was made in the case of Yugoslavia. The Curzon line was slightly changed in favor of Poland and recognized as the Soviet Polish border. The conference also recognized that Poland must receive substantial accession of territory in the north and west and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should "await the Peace Conference."

Zones of occupation in Germany were approved. These zones, including Berlin's anomalous position, were not results of shrewd Soviet diplomacy; they were proposed by a British cabinet committee in 1943, approved later by the United States and the European Advisory Commission, and accepted by the Russians at Yalta. Churchill noted that in 1943 "a common opinion about Russia was that she would not continue the war once she had regained her frontiers, and that when the time came the Western Allies might well have to try to persuade her not to relax her efforts.43

Thanks to Churchill's efforts, and Roosevelt's change of mind, Stalin reluctantly accepted France as one of the occupying powers in Germany and Austria and as a member of the Allied Control Council in both countries, but the French zones were carved out from the ones assigned to Britain and the United States.44

To make sure of a timely Russian intervention against Japan, Roosevelt negotiated with Stalin a secret agreement in which the

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United States promised to support territorial concessions to Russia in the Far East. On the last day of the conference Churchill was in formed of the agreement, and he signed it grudgingly.

By February 1945 events had demonstrated that -- contrary to the original American policy -- settlement of fundamental issues was not postponed to a peace conference. Decisions at the Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta Conference, armistice agreements, and military occupations shaped postwar Europe.

In dealing with the Soviet Union, a multinational imperialistic Great Power, a country that respected military power more than the principles advocated by the West, one has to recognize that fatal misunderstandings had affected Western policies throughout the war. It is part of human affairs that the American, British, and Russian historical background influenced the result. So did Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin and their respective states of health. In summit conferences clear agreements were made in military matters, but important political questions remained in limbo. Usually the Soviets gained immediate advantages and made empty gestures accepting vague principles. Since there were no Anglo-American joint policies, Stalin had a field day at tripartite meetings. Eden considered him a superb negotiator and noted: "He never wasted a word. He never stormed, he seldom was even irritated."45

Relations between the Big Three and their tactics at summit meetings influenced policies. The fact that on some occasions Roosevelt and Churchill competed separately for Stalin's cooperation had not been helpful for Western interests. The president was fond of Churchill, and after September 1939, they exchanged more than 1,700 letters, telegrams, and other messages and participated in eight bilateral meetings, in addition to the Teheran and Yalta conferences with Stalin and conferences at Cairo with Generalissimo Chiang Kai shek and the president of Turkey, Inonu.46 Yet Roosevelt considered the leader of the British Empire as a representative of a bygone world of nineteenth-century colonial imperialism and was convinced that the United States and Russia must get along in the postwar world. At Teheran he thought that Churchill and Stalin were competing for influence in the Balkans and told his son Elliott that he saw "no reason for putting the lives of American soldiers in jeopardy in order to protect real or fancied British interest on the European continent."47 Both Roosevelt and Churchill were convinced that each could get more from Stalin through direct personal contact than through tripartite negotiation.

With President Roosevelt's sudden death, Harry S. Truman assumed

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the nation's highest office with a broad historical background and sound political instinct but next to no knowledge of the Roosevelt Churchill-Stalin meetings, inter-Allied agreements, and other war time decisions. He was not involved in White House discussions on foreign policy and was not even informed of such an undertaking as the Manhattan Project. It was a failure of the Roosevelt administration that the vice-president did not receive systematic briefing. The time span of less than three months between inauguration day and Roosevelt's death is an explanation but not an excuse of this omission. On April 12, 1945, the day Truman became president, he noted in his diary, "I knew the President had a great many meetings with Churchill and Stalin. I was not familiar with any of these things and it was really something to think about but I decided the best thing to do was to go home and get as much rest as possible and face the music."45 Lack of political purpose during the war was followed by Western passivity during the immediate postwar period. President Truman continued policies established by the Roosevelt administration, despite changed circumstances, and the American military leaders in Europe were impressed by the Russians. A few days before the Potsdam Conference General Lucius D. Clay, second in command to Eisenhower for German affairs, told Bohlen that "the key to getting along with the Soviets was that you had to give trust to get trust."49

The sudden demobilization of the American army in 1945-46 changed drastically the power equation. There was an almost irresistible popular desire too bring the boys home and return to normalcy. General Marshallhad to carry out this policy, and his predicament was truly pathetic. In the early autumn of 1945 he asked the journalist Marquis Childs to see him, and Childs noted the conversation:

Disbanding the 7 million Americans under arms with reckless haste meant abandoning vas military stores, he said. Supplies worth billions were being bulldozed under the earth or dumped into the sea. What I am to do? he asked. This is an advertisement to the world that we are giving up our positions of strength everywhere.50

Marshallcommented later on the result of demobilization and told an audience at the Pentagon that when as secretary of state he at tended the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March 1947 he was urged constantly by radio messages to give the Russians hell.

At that time, my facilities for giving them hell -- and I am a soldier and know something about the ability to give hell -- was I and 1/3 divisions over the entire United States. This is quite a proposition when

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you deal with somebody with over 260 and you have l and 1/3 We had nothing in Alaska. We did not have enough to defend the air strip at Fairbanks. . . 51

A distinguished diplomatic historian, Raymond J. Sontag, pointed out some years ago that during the months between the Second Quebec Conference of September 1944 and the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945 the United States attained a peak of strength unparalleled in American history. During the same period "the decisions were made which were to place our country, and the Free World, in a mortal peril which continues to this day." Then Sontag developed his thesis that "despite clear evidence of Soviet bad faith and Soviet ambitions . . . and despite the warnings of the Acting Secretary of State (Joseph Grew) and our Ambassador to the USSR. [Averell Harriman], the positions of strength were abandoned, and the western world placed in mortal peril: Why?"52

To this question historians have given a variety of inconclusive answers. There might be truth in the allegations that Roosevelt's in creasing illness in 1944-4553 and wrong military estimates concerning Japan's military capabilities and intentions54 played a role at Yalta. But the Yalta Agreements, and especially the unassertive Western policy in 1945, cannot be explained by such factors. Roosevelt's health could have made the difference in decisions of lesser importance, but Yalta as a whole was the logical result of the wartime policy of the Western powers, their military weakness at the outset, and neglect of postwar problems in wartime diplomacy and at summit meetings. As John J. McCloy, a prominent member of the American establishment put it: "We concentrated so heavily on the actual conduct of the war that we overlooked the need for political thinking."55 Whether this or that was decided at Yalta or elsewhere in the closing period of the war was of little consequence in view of the absence of Anglo American determination to reestablish a reasonable European system and check Soviet expansion. Disbanding the American army was unavoidable for domestic reasons, but in an unsettled world it symbolized a lack of political will in the international arena, giving the green light to Stalin in Eastern and Danubian Europe. Whatever the explanation, the new status quo in Europe greatly reduced the rim-land necessary for defense of the Western world and shifted one hundred million people into the zone of Soviet domination.

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West