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but, for my own enlightenment, asked for their stand with regard to peace aims. For several months I did not receive any proposal from the parties, and I interpreted this passive attitude to mean that I could proceed with the preparatory work without further ado. My position was made easier, though this did not change the political difficulties.

Besides lack of positive peace aims, a further obstacle arose from the fact that left-wing representatives in the coalition government considered the members of the war governments, including that of Kállay (which initiated negotiations with Britain and the United States), as war criminals. Rakosi ironically remarked to me, "Mr. En- voy, you may soon greet your former boss, Kállay, here in Budapest, when he will stand before the People's Court." The foreign minister warned me at the outset that the coalition parties would strongly pro test all arguments tending to exonerate the former governments and political leaders. This punitive attitude toward the past was not entirely of Hungarian origin. In the postwar period the Horthyregime was unpopular in both East and West. In the eyes of the victorious powers Hungary was a junior partner of the Axis and, with its revisionist claims, one of the chief troublemakers in European politics. Few people gave a second thought to the cause of Hungarian revisionism, the fact that after the First World War over three million Hungarians, almost one third of the Magyar people, were forced to become citizens of foreign countries without plebiscite or any popular consultation. Hungary's reluctant participation in the Second World War and endeavors toward an early armistice were not considered. Unlike other Axis satellites, Hungary did not change sides effectively during the hostilities, and the fact that some Hungarian troops fought with the Germans until the last became a special reproach to Hungary. It changed the image of the unwilling satellite to that of Hitlers last satellite.

The new Hungarian regime under the orders of the ACC had to carry out the policy of the victorious nations in punishing some members of former governments and leading politicians of the Arrow Cross and other pro-Nazi parties. As things stood it would have been difficult to adopt a different attitude. These actions were not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Hungarian government. The armistice agreement compelled Hungary to "cooperate in the apprehension and trial, . . of persons accused of war crimes," and the Russians were greatly dissatisfied with the "lax" Hungarian attitude in the matter. The ACC under Soviet chairmanship gave the Russians a legal channel for intervention. The notion of "war criminals" was interpreted

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broadly at Nuremberg and elsewhere. At the close of hostilities legal and moral principles, let alone political wisdom, were not the most important sources of inspiration throughout Europe.

Even under such political conditions it was necessary to find ways to tell as much of the truth as possible. In view of the imposed limitations, the only alternative was to explain that a majority of the Hungarian people resisted nazism and that even the "reactionary pro-German" governments resisted under pressure of popular feeling. On December 28, 1945, in a memorandum addressed to Prime Minister Tildy I summarized my views concerning the extent of war responsibility:

My opinion concerning our responsibility for the war is that we have to present every possible argument which is apt to reduce such charges or at least explain reasons for our conduct during the war. Since the personality of the state remains the same in international relations, irrespective of a change of regimes, our international responsibility is not affected by internal changes. Therefore, we should not assume responsibility for the Hungarian nation above that which is absolutely necessary. To do so would be contrary to the best interests of the people.5

Even for the Communists it was difficult to reject this reasoning openly. Although the left-wing elements of the coalition disliked and criticized such arguments, they did not veto them. Thus it was possible to develop these ideas in pamphlets and books. The aim of such publications was to show by specific examples that even during the period of alliance between the German and Hungarian governments the mass of the Hungarian people opposed Nazi ideas and policies. The pamphlets and books moreover contained data concerning the fate of Allied war prisoners and political refugees in Hungary. They dealt with information concerning the Jewish problem, sabotage and resistance to Germany, economic help given to territories under Get man occupation, and explained some results of democratization of the country. 6

Besides political difficulties there were many obstacles that disturbed the peace preparatory work, and a good illustration is the Soviet interpretation of the armistice agreement concerning destruction of Fascist literature. In fulfilling the terms of the armistice agreement, the Hungarian government appointed a commission to establish a list of Fascist books. Dominated by Communists, the commission determined the Fascist character of the publications according to Soviet wishes. All individuals, libraries, and public institutions were obliged to surrender all books on the list for destruction. Only two

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libraries were exempt, to preserve Fascist literature in closed rooms for use of authorized persons. Since the Foreign Ministry and other government agencies did not receive exemption, I attempted to persuade the Communists that it was practically impossible to explain Nazi ex- pansionism or fifth column activity in Hungary if the relevant Nazi literature was not available. My explanations were not accepted, and all alleged Fascist books in the Foreign Ministry or belonging to the scholarly institutions associated with us were destroyed.

The Soviet commission controlling the destruction of Fascist books gave only limited consideration to the list established by the Hungarian commission. In some libraries, they declared as Fascist, and thus destroyed, German economic and statistical periodicals dating from the last decades of the nineteenth century. In the catalogue of the Library of the National Museum the Soviet Commission was looking for the word "Horthy" and asked for all the books catalogued under similar headings. Thus they destroyed all books on "horticulture," some published in the seventeenth century, claiming that such works spread Horthypropaganda. In this case the minister of religion and public instruction, Géza Teleki personally intervened, albeit without result. Intervention in such cases was considered pro Fascist not only by Soviet authorities but by Hungarian Communist leaders who were anxious to carry out promptly all Soviet orders and satisfy the wishes of Soviet authorities.

In addition to the official peace preparations, a group of scholars worked in secrecy under the leadership of Géza Teleki after his resignation from the cabinet. This private group produced two mimeo graphed volumes with four annexes under the title, "The Hungarian Nation's Proposals and Basic Principles in Regard to the Peace Treaty." This substantial work discussed the general problems of Central Europe and Hungary's special problems with Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and proposed solutions according to the traditions inherited from Pal Teleki The presentation disregarded the restrictions of the coalition government and the political conditions of post war Hungary. Through confidential channels the volumes were sent to Western political leaders, diplomats, and scholars, and deposited in some large libraries.

In the long course of history this work might be useful, but in the context of peacemaking in 1945-46 it had no effect. Scholarly arguments and suggestions emanating from an ex-enemy country could not penetrate the frame of peace negotiations established at Potsdam and at the Moscow conference in December 1945. My private contacts with Telekiwere not unobserved, and in early 1947

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the political police interrogated the personnel of the Pal TelekiInstitute of Political Science concerning my relations with Telekiduring the peace preparatory period.

Proposals for the Peace Settlement

Some politicians, particularly in the right wing of the Smallholder party, emphasized the necessity of foreign propaganda in view of the coming peace conference. They did not realize that as long as the coalition parties did not agree on peace aims, there was not much to publicize. It was obvious that the Hungarian government could not freely inform foreign countries about our fundamental troubles and especially our difficulties with the Soviet authorities. In view of Hungary's diplomatic isolation, and especially because of the meager finances at the disposal of the Foreign Ministry, any propaganda could have boomeranged. The wartime solidarity between the Soviet Union and the Western powers had its full effect on Danubian Europe. The Western Allies made it understood that they were not disposed to antagonize the Soviet Union on Hungary's account. Fur- thermore, Moscow could prevent all official Hungarian activities in foreign countries through the ACC.

To circumvent the difficulties and break down our isolated position, I began to draft peace preparatory notes, but the problem was how to use them. In the course of this procedure the difficult questions were: To whom could the notes be addressed? What could be said? How far could we go without arousing the Soviet Communist wrath? The alternatives were poor. One of them was siding completely with the Soviet Union in the hope that Moscow would give substantial support for Hungary, or at least the burdens of the Soviet occupation would be alleviated. This policy was proposed by the Communist party, the left wing of the Social Democratic party, and the fellow travelers in the National Peasant party. I listened to their arguments many times. They explained that a pro-Soviet foreign policy would assure Hungary's survival and adaptation to the new power constellation in Europe, and would receive Soviet good will and support. Time and again Rakosi pointed out that Hungary should imitate Petru Groza's democratic government in Rumania. I may add that in the early stage of Soviet occupation, there was a sincere desire in all coalition parties to get along with the Russians, if not for other reasons, then because of national survival. The German

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occupation and atrocities committed by the Nazis and the Arrow Cross regime automatically generated sympathy for the Russians. At the close of hostilities no other Great Power existed in continental Europe. Britain was weak and showed little interest in Hungary's fate before and during the war; and afterwards the British were busy rehabilitating their country. The United States as the strongest world power was the ultimate hope of many Hungarians, but the attitude of the American minister in Budapest, Arthur Schoenfeld, made it clear that Washington might give some economic aid but was not thinking of supporting the Hungarians politically. Before his departure to Budapest, Schoenfeld received the instructions that the United States "would not, of course, take position of supporting Hungary against the Soviet Union . . . The United States government recognizes that the Soviet Union's interest in Hungary is more direct than ours."7 We did not know about these instructions, but the inaction of the American and British diplomats in Budapest demonstrated ad oculos on many occasions the policy of Washington and London.

Although support was not coming from Western quarters, cooperation proved to be difficult with the Russians. They expected unconditional submission. Though I listened attentively to politicians who advocated exclusively Soviet orientation, my problem remained that I had not seen any Soviet willingness to support Hungarian claims no matter what we did. It became obvious that Moscow was following a punitive policy, although we did not know at that time that during the war Stalin expressed several times his dislike of Hungarians. Ac cording to a memorandum by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles (March 16, 1943)

Mr. Eden said that he had encountered upon his last visit to Moscow great antagonism towards Hungary. I asked Mr. Eden if he could tell me specifically what Stalin might have stated with regard to Hungary and Mr. Eden replied that he thought all that was said was that Stalin demanded that "Hungary be punished." Lord Halifaxsuggested that this might mean that Hungary would be obliged to make territorial concessions to the future Rumania. Mr. Eden said that he thought it was likely.8

It was a puzzling question how the Hungarian government could inform the victorious Great Powers about our peace proposals. Having lost our independence with the German occupation in March 1944, we knew little of inter-Allied decisions that shaped the postwar world; we had received only scattered news from abroad. After the

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Soviet occupation, Hungary became even more isolated because the representatives of neutral powers were expelled, Hungarian officials could not leave the country without a Soviet exit permit, and we could not renew diplomatic relations without approval of the ACC.

It was necessary to break through our isolation, and I drafted a few memoranda and diplomatic notes about our urgent problems and proposals for the peace settlement. I presented some procedural alter natives to Gyöngyösifor dispatching notes to the victorious Great Powers, and he decided to address the first peace preparatory note only to the Soviet government. He did not wish to assume full responsibility for the content of the draft I presented to him and sub- mitted it to the cabinet. The Council of Ministers toned down the note, to be signed by the prime minister, General Béla Miklós, who was in turn to present it personally to Marshal Voroshilov Several days later the foreign minister by chance discovered that the prime minister had signed but not delivered the note dated on July 4, 1945. In those times, presentation of complaints to the Russians was not an enviable task, apt to result in unpleasant repercussions. Finally the foreign minister took courage and handed the note to Pushkin.9

This note contained propositions dealing with economic difficulties of the country, the persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, and the new territorial settlement to be established by the peace treaty. Among other things, the note complained that the industry of the country was disrupted because the Soviet army had confiscated raw materials, machine tools, and manufactured products. The note requested that these materials either be restored or that they be regarded as reparation deliveries, because under international law they could not be considered war booty.10 Moreover, it proposed that confiscatory actions by the Soviet army should be categorically forbidden in the future.11 The second part of the note described the drastic anti Hungarian measures in Czechoslovakia, comparing them with Nazi methods. It asked for Soviet intervention to halt these discriminatory measures and persecutions. Concerning the new territorial settlement, the note proposed the adoption of the principle of nationality and plebiscites. The Soviet government did not even acknowledge receipt of this note.

The overbearing Soviet attitude and passivity of the Western powers generated a feeling of helplessness, and it was difficult for Hungarians to see any light at the end of the tunnel. Disorder and lawlessness in East Central Europe demonstrated that the centuries old international system had come to an end. Despite, or rather

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because of, these desperate conditions, the only honorable policy was to make proposals for creation of a better world in Danubian Europe through institutionalized cooperation. At the same time we had to take a stand for the interests of the Hungarian people within and out side the boundaries of Hungary. Naturally the defense of the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring states was very difficult under the existing conditions, especially in Czechoslovakia. Realizing the ineffectiveness of our interventions with the ACC or the Soviet government and the complications caused by discussions in the Council of Ministers, I proposed to the foreign minister not to submit the peace preparatory notes to the cabinet but to deliver them directly to the representatives of the three major powers in Budapest, and after ward to send a copy to the coalition parties. As a result of the lesson learned from the first peace preparatory note addressed to the Soviet government, the foreign minister accepted this plan. He knew that he had to assume political responsibility for this procedure, which violated the rules of the ACC and the coalition government at the same time, and was willing to face the music later. Consequently the Communists, confronted with a fait accompli, could cause trouble only after our notes had been delivered.

The Hungarian peace aims were presented for the first time to the representatives of the three major powers in a note of August 14, 1945,12 a note advocating close economic cooperation among the Danubian nations and an increased industrialization of Hungary to be carried out in the course of economic reconstruction of the Danubian region. It proposed international cultural commissions for the advancement of friendly cooperation among the Danubian peoples:

The Hungarian Government thinks it desirable to set up international cultural commissions within the framework of the new world organizations -- or at least limited to South-Eastern Europe which would undertake to investigate in a friendly spirit those biased statements and harmful tendencies appearing in the press, school books and political publications, which are liable to hamper international cooperation and good neighborliness.

This commission could achieve positive constructive work by the promulgation of those tenets which would create a friendly atmosphere between the Danubian peoples. These principles could then be popularized by the different countries in their press, school books, and radio. 13

As for territorial settlement at the peace conference, the Hungarian government suggested that if boundaries lost their significance,

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the ideal state of affairs would appear. Failing this, the cause of inter national cooperation would be best served if the boundaries were determined in conformity with the freely expressed wishes of the populations:

The most effective measure to counteract national antagonism, which is still rampant in countries corrupted by Fascist doctrines and constantly stirred by chauvinist elements, would be the delimination of boundaries according to the freely expressed wish of the population and to the principles of nationality wherever the nationalities live on contiguous territories . . .

The Hungarian Government is well aware of the fact that a settlement according to the principles of nationality is not sufficient in itself to solve economic problems. The economic problems of South-Eastern Europe cannot be eliminated by adjusting the boundaries one way or another but by extensive economic cooperation. On the other hand if the boundaries are delineated in conformity with the wishes of the population concerned, this would bring about the political stability necessary to economic cooperation.

Since the Hungarian government realized that ethnic minorities would remain outside the mother country, however the borders might be drawn, the note emphasized the necessity of providing for institutional protection of national minorities under the aegis of the United Nations.

Although ideas concerning political integration of the Danubian nations were hidden between the lines, the Communist party objected to the general principles expressed in the note. Rakosi declared that proposals for full-fledged cooperation of the Danubian nations were premature. These countries, he argued, must become truly democratic, and afterwards they would cooperate automatically. Coincident with Communist objections, Pushkin presented strong Soviet criticisms. The Western powers did not react at all. In this situation the Hungarian political peace aims could not be developed in further detail, and I decided to prepare notes dealing with seemingly technical problems to which the Communists could not easily object. These were regulation of problems connected with citizenship, Hungarian water routes giving access to the sea, and improvements of hydrographic problems and development of water power in the Carpathian basin.

A note of October 31, 1945,14 dealing with the citizenship question, explained that as a consequence of the Trianon Treaty, thousands of inhabitants of prewar Hungary, who had never left the

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country, had been deprived of their Hungarian citizenship without opportunity of acquiring citizenship in any of the successor states. The origin of this situation was the complicated and frequently contradictory provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, which enabled certain states to deny citi2enship to members of an undesirable minority. These people were left in the neighboring countries without the enjoyment of the rights connected with citizenship, and greatly handicapped in their economic and other activities. In reference to this situation, the note proposed measures to be incorporated into the peace treaty in order to prevent such an anomaly. A note dated November 12, 1945,15 dealt primarily with an elaboration of landlocked Hungary's problem concerning free access to the sea. It proposed numerous improvements in the Danubian Convention of 1921, and the second part of the note was devoted to the Carpathian Basin waterways and suggested solutions that would have resulted in a development similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority. This note insisted on the maintenance of the international character of the Danube. It urged revival and strengthening of inter national control over the river, with continued participation of nonriparian states in an effectively functioning commission, and advocated freedom of navigation in the Danubian Valley. This aspect of the note later was referred to by Cavendish W. Cannon, head of the American delegation at the 1948 Danubian Conference in Belgrade, in the following statement:

It is interesting to note that the postwar government of Hungary on November 12, 1945, addressed a note to the United States, British, and Soviet Governments, giving its views on the Danube question. It called attention to the great importance to Hungary of a regime which guarantees full freedom of navigation. It suggested that the prewar system of international navigation be reconstituted with provisions for changes required by new conditions. The Hungarian Government did not envisage elimination of nonriparian representation, for it suggested consolidation into one Commission of the Danube Both Commissions, as the Conference is aware, had nonriparian representation. There have been changes since 1945 but we believe the long-term economic interests of Hungary remain the same.16

Such, then, were some of the efforts aimed at lasting peace and constructive cooperation with neighbors. Surely the task was difficult and full of frustrations. To some of us it was beginning to appear an almost hopeless undertaking.

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Deadlock and New Efforts

In the second half of 1945, Soviet pressure for the expulsion .if all Germans from Hungary and the persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and Rumania became acute. These issues were ad- ministratively outside the peace preparatory division and belonged within the jurisdiction of the political division of the Foreign Minis try. I was not always informed of the steps taken, but intervened whenever I could relate these issues to peace preparations.

Defeat of the Communists and victory of the Smallholder party in the Budapest municipal elections in October and at the general elections in November 1945, caused a short-lived optimism even in foreign affairs, although the new coalition government created under the premiership of Zoltán Tildy(November 15, 1945 proved no stronger than the Miklós government. Despite a Smallholder majority in parliament, the all-powerful Ministry of Interior remained in Communist hands.

Soviet engineered consolidation of the Communist-dominated puppet governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, in violation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, presaged a gloomy future for the new Hungarian regime. Soviet malevolence was especially evident in connection with Soviet endorsement of persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Soviet abuses violating the armistice agreement, and in general the extreme exploitation that characterized the Soviet Union's treatment of the Hungarian economy. Of course it had been clear that Russian influence would increase after the war and that under the new political balance in Europe, Hungary's political, social, and economic structure would undergo important changes. Russian abuses, methods, and general intolerance nevertheless caused bewilderment and consternation.

Despite all the difficulties, the preparations for the peace conference and a stand for the interest of the Hungarian people appeared to be both a political necessity and an elementary duty. Continuation of the peace preparatory work, however, became almost impossible because the new government -- despite some consolidation of Hungary's internal and international affairs -- could not decide on peace aims. The government did not take a stand on any fundamental question of foreign affairs. Despite my repeated proposals, it did not designate delegates and experts for the peace conference. It was an anomalous situation that while the Hungarian peace aims were ex pressed to the major victorious powers in our note of August 14,

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1945, the very same principles were not endorsed explicitly by the government and could not be debated by the coalition parties. The Communist party and the left-wing of the Socialist party criticized the principles and proposals expressed in this note. In answer to my pressing inquiries, the foreign minister informed me that disagreement on peace aims might easily blow up the coalition, and that such a situation might open the door for developments similar to those in Rumania and Bulgaria. And so, Maul halten und weiter dienen (to shut up and do our duty) was necessary in the hope of a better future.

Another difficulty was that the Foreign Ministry remained at the mercy of party politics. When I criticized this situation, the foreign minister in turn complained to me that he was not able to resist Communist wishes in connection with the appointment of their party men in the foreign service, because of the precedents created by the Smallholder and Social-Democratic parties. Since I was a civil servant without party affiliation, Gyöngyösitried to persuade me to enter the Smallholder party. I refused and expressed the opinion that a civil servant must consider the general interests of the nation and should not be influenced by allegiance to a party and participation in party politics. Although this reasoning seemed outlandish at that time, he respected my view. I argued that my position would be stronger both domestically and internationally if I remained a non-party man.

Reflecting on the political stumbling blocks in peace preparations, I first informed Prime Minister Tildyin mid-December 1945 that the peace preparatory work had reached a deadlock, and on December 28, I presented to him an exhaustive memorandum. The memorandum described the history, progress, and actual state of peace preparations, analyzed the main problems, and very frankly discussed some of the outstanding political difficulties. As already mentioned, I explained my views concerning the handling of Hungary's war responsibility and dealt at some length with a decree concerning the expulsion of the Germans from Hungary issued on December 22, 1945. I thought it necessary to emphasize the danger of accepting the doctrine of collective responsibility in regard to any group of Hungarian citizens. The memorandum pointed out that it was not sufficient to make decisions concerning our peace aims and the arguments to be used, but it would be necessary to concentrate our efforts upon carrying out the accepted policies. In this connection I referred to the lack of governmental experience on the part of the coalition parties, especially conspicuous in the handling of foreign affairs. I developed my objections to the disintegration of Hungarian foreign policy under

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West