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the coalition regime, especially some abuses in party political appointments in the foreign service. I summed up the urgent agenda in the following points:

1. The Government's decision concerning our Peace aims and argu- mentations. Once such decisions are taken, we should manifest a consistent conduct with regard to accepted moral, political and legal principles.

2. The immediate appointment of experts to be sent to the Peace Conference so that they could begin the study of the material as soon as possible.

3. The establishment of an adequate Peace preparatory organization and of provisions assuring that the execution of the Peace preparatory work under the guidance of the Foreign Ministry should not have to be interrupted from time to time or limited to an insufficient framework because of technical reasons or constant lack of funds. Not only pengő, but also foreign currency must be provided for in time.

4. The Ministry of Industry as well as the Ministry of Finance should be advised by the Government to complete without delay their peace preparatory work.

5. All government agencies should be instructed with regard to our peace aims and accordingly an agreement should be made between the political parties aiming at uniform and consistent public policies under the guidance of the Foreign Ministry. The same unity of view should prevail on the radio, in the press and other publications, in the activities of the parties and in the course of official and semi-official travels abroad.

6. The elimination of petty personal and party political influences with respect to the organization of our foreign service and especially in connection with the selection of delegates to be sent to the Peace Conference .

I ventured to mention above a few viewpoints which, in my modest opinion, are important in connection with the preparations for peace. I wanted to be absolutely straightforward in pointing out difficulties and causes of trouble because this is a primary duty to all those who took risks in difficult times for the establishment of a democratic Hungary.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that Hungary, after a war which was lost politically, militarily, and to some extent even morally, is con fronted with better prepared states whose diplomatic position is in comparably more favorable than ours. In addition, the rehabilitation of the country is being carried out amidst a great economic crisis and other difficulties by political parties which -- without their own fault -- have not, thus far, had any governmental experience.

We must sincerely admit that the unfavorable diplomatic position of ours, and the difficult internal conditions of the country frequently

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hinder correct actions. Thus, it will not be easy to achieve success. Not withstanding difficulties, however, all of us, and first of all the responsible Government have to do all possible for the promotion of the Hungarian case at the Peace Conference. The future of Hungarian democracy depends largely on the success of this work.

Mister Prime Minister, I am awaiting your effective and urgent actions, and those of the Hungarian Government, and remain,

Respectfully yours,

(signed) István Kertész 17

For a short time this memorandum caused consternation in high governmental circles, and as a result I received promises from the prime minister and the foreign minister that they would take steps to eliminate the difficulties. They authorized me to prepare new peace preparatory notes that had to be in line with the general views of the government in foreign affairs. Yet difficulties did not cease. Friendly pledges could not change the fact that the coalition parties could not agree on principles in foreign policy -- particularly as to our specific aims at the peace conference.

Tildyeventually called an inter-party conference in mid-January 1946, which I attended as the official in charge of peace preparations in the Foreign Ministry. The conference was frustrated by the dynamism and dialectics of the Communist leader Rakosi whose obvious goal was to prevent any decision. The representative of the Social Democratic party, Szakasits supported him with enthusiasm. The issue that occasioned the longest debate involved the decree of December 22, 1945, concerning the deportation of the Germans from Hungary. I pointed out that this decree was a fundamental mistake from the point of view of our peace preparations and national interests and asked for its revision. In my opposition to the in discriminate expulsion of the Germans, I was supported only by the Smallholder undersecretary of state, István Balogh The other Small holder representatives and the Social Democrats sided with Rakosi or remained silent. In regard to other issues connected with our prepara- tions for the peace conference, the representatives of the Smallholder party (Tildy Gyöngyösi and Balogh remained passive. The representative of the Peasant party, Imre Kovács, firmly stated that we must take a stand for the claims vitally affecting the nation. Other wise, he added, the Peasant party would be obliged to reconsider its participation in the coalition government. This was a strong statement, but most participants in the meeting suspected that the Peas ant party was infiltrated by Communists, and in case of a showdown

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would not follow Kovács Eventually the inter-party conference ended without having made any substantial decisions.

In addition to the territorial and nationality questions, it was necessary to decide upon economic problems to be submitted to the peace conference, as well as the manner of their presentation. In this respect Soviet and Communist interventions again frustrated progress. Envoy Pushkin said that the Hungarian territorial and political grievances and claims were vestiges of the Horthyregime, and refused to consider them. He urged the "democratization" of Hungary and acceptance of the Czechoslovak demands concerning the exchange of population and transfer of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia to Hungary. He suggested, confidentially, that Hungary should stress territorial claims against Rumania, which as a former satellite was in the same political category as Hungary. Marshal Voroshilovintimated to Prime Minister Tildythat Hungary might obtain territorial compensation from Rumania if it behaved well and accepted the Czechoslovakian proposals concerning the Hungarian question in Czechoslovakia.

Pushkin was more concerned that the Hungarian government might reveal the country's plight to the Western public -- especially the Soviet methods for exploiting devasated Hungary. When he discovered that the Hungarian government was compiling data on war damages by means of detailed questionnaires, to be answered by all inhabitants of Hungary, he peremptorily demanded the cessation of this work and destruction of the data. He asserted that the ACC had not authorized this action and charged that the questionnaires clearly indicated that the goal was to establish statistics concerning damage caused by the Soviet army. In due course the Foreign Ministry transmitted the Soviet protest to the Ministry of Finance. Eventually an elaborate reply to Pushkin explained that the war was caused by German aggression, and therefore the Hungarian government intended to attribute war damage to the Germans. Because the questionnaires covered different periods during which the damages occurred, those caused by the Germans and the Soviet army were easily distinguishable. The balance was decidedly unfavorable to the Soviet army.

In harmony with Soviet policy, the Communist party made efforts to sabotage preparations of economic questions for the peace conference. Communist cabinet ministers hindered nomination of the chief economic delegate to the peace conference. I initiated the appointment of Arthur Kárász, director and former president of the National Bank of Hungary. Time and again, Gyöngyösibrought up the matter in cabinet meetings, but the Communist ministers always

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asked for time to consider the problem. Finally, when Karasz was about to leave the country on an official mission, the Council of Ministers agreed to his appointment. After his return he prepared a memorandum revealing the economic situation of the country and proposing that we should ask for a reduction of reparation payments. When this memorandum was read in the peace prepatory ad hoc sub committee of the parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Communists reacted violently. Chief Communist delegate to peace preparations, Joseph Révai, launched a sharp attack and concluded: "Because of this memorandum a head must fall," adding obligingly, "of course, only politically." The political decapitation of Kárász took place promptly. General Sviridovdemanded that the president and managing director of the National Bank and Kárász be removed and prosecuted because of mismanagement of the ruble fund in the National Bank. The charges were absurd and the Hungarian government resisted for some time. Eventually the three leading officials were dismissed but not prosecuted.18

In a note dated January 25, 1946, I found it expedient to request the three major powers to appoint a committee of experts to investigate problems connected with the Hungarian peace settlement. 19 The memorandum attached to this note pointed out some of the mistakes and errors at the peace conference after the First World War and suggested that the organizational weakness of the conference in 1919 facilitated and partly explained why the Treaty of Trianon incorporated exaggerated claims against Hungary.

In a note dated February 1, 1946,20 it was possible to insert passages describing the anti-Nazi conduct of the Hungarian people during the war and to make statements on Hungary's responsibility in the sense I had indicated in my memorandum addressed to Tildy A later memorandum dealt in detail with Hungary's responsibility in the Second World War. Another explained the handling of the Jewish question in Hungary. Both memoranda were handed later to the powers participating in the Paris Conference.21

The note of February 1 pointed out that the Hungarian problem after the Second World War must not find an isolated solution. A proper solution would consider the interests of all Danubian peoples in an institutional reorganization of the Danubian basin. The note emphasized that the settlement of Southeast European problems did not present "insurmountable difficulties," and remarked that

similar conditions of life brought about by geographic factors, the influence which for centuries one nation had been exercising over the

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other, the effects of intermarriage and more especially the cooperation of the long period preceding the epoch of exaggerated nationalism had long ago produced forms of life which bore a certain resemblance to each other. The small states are in fact separated from each other only by differences of language and an exaggerated and improper interpretation of their historical traditions, and the chauvinist propaganda to which the former gave rise. Large sections of the population, above all the working classes and the peasants who struggle against the same social evils, have no difficulty in understanding each other. The first step towards the furthering of mutual prosperity through peaceful cooperation would be an honest and institutional attempt to uproot the nationalism which, for the last century, has been fostering the growth of differences

After such explanations the note concluded that the settlement of Southeast European problems should be based on the following principles:

1. Harmonization of questions of territory and nationality.

2. Establishment of economic and cultural cooperation.

3. Elimination of factors that give rise to political and social discord between countries.

Not until May 1946 were we able to present a note to the three major powers that put forth more detailed propositions. In the interval several incidents characteristic of our situation occurred. In early February 1946 the Social Democratic party delegate to the peace preparatory work, Sándor Szalai called at my office to inform me in the name of his party that the peace preparations under my direction had become partly useless and partly harmful. He accused me of nationalism and suggested that the Foreign Ministry try to find a practical solution by removing the Hungarian minority from Czechoslovakia, thus assuring amicable relations with our northern neighbor. I rejected his suggestions and replied that the peace preparatory work was not my personal enterprise; if there were such essential political objections, they should be raised at a higher level and reported to the foreign minister and prime minister. Simultaneous with the move of the Social Democratic party and the Communist party, the Soviet envoy, Pushkin, expressed dissatisfaction with the peace preparatory notes. He pointed out to Gyöngyösithat our notes had the character of policies followed under the Horthyregime and could have been sent by that regime. A few days later the Social Democratic press launched a campaign against the foreign minister.22

Gyöngyösithen refused to sign a note he had previously approved, which dealt with territorial and ethnographic questions, particularly

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with problems of Transylvania. He called an inter party conference in the Foreign Ministry and submitted the text of the note to the representatives of the coalition parties.

At this inter-party meeting the delegates of the Communist party, supported by Vilmos Bohm, delegate of the Social Democratic party, refused to accept the ideas and terms of the proposed note. The Com- munists did not offer any specific suggestions. They stated only that the note contained veiled revisionist tendencies against Rumania, that Hungary should by no means weaken "Groza's democracy," and that before a stand could be taken Soviet support must be sought. Our actions, they said, must be governed by Soviet advice. The inter party meeting eventually accepted this suggestion and advised the foreign minister to find out more about Soviet intentions as to the peace settlement. I could not make it known that it was Voroshilovand Pushkin who had suggested that Hungary should raise territorial claims against Rumania.

The draft note rejected by the inter-party meeting developed the idea that the Hungarian nation should have a territory corresponding to the proportion of the Hungarian population in Danubian Europe. It was reemphasized that the conditions brought about by Trianon had contributed greatly to the dissatisfaction of the Hungarian nation and had developed the revisionist and irredentist movements. As to the future, the note again proposed the setting up by the victorious powers of an expert committee whose duty would be to examine the nationality and territorial problems. The Hungarian government declared it was willing to accept a plebiscite regarding the fate of any territories affected by a new settlement. The Communists and Socialists especially objected to the following passage of the note dealing with Transylvania:

For the present, the Hungarian Government only wishes to point out that a territorial rearrangement affects Hungary most closely where the question of Transylvania is concerned. With the satisfactory solution of the problem of Transylvania -- by settling equitably the political and economic claims of Hungary and Rumania -- this territory could form a connecting link, rather than a dividing line between the two states. In any case, the solution must be such that any division of the mountainous region of Transylvania Iying between the areas of the original settlement of these two neighboring nations -- both of which have populations of about the same size, 11-12 million Hungarians, 13-14 million Rumanians, of whom the greater part inhabit the Great Plain -- should be affected in such a manner that it should complete most advantageously the economic systems of both countries, and

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that, from a national point of view, it should also create a stare of equilibrium .

After the inter-party meeting the peace preparatory work came to a standstill. The Smallholder party did prepare a memorandum concerning peace aims, but the party leaders did not want a showdown with the Communists since it might have caused the breakdown of the coalition government.

Meanwhile the technical part of the peace preparatory work was nearing completion. All important problems that could have been dealt with at the peace conference were worked out in detail by competent experts and then synthesized. There were hundreds of memoranda and other materials brought into a comprehensive system.

Because of lack of peace aims on the part of the government and the breakdown of cooperative efforts by the parties, we could not use the materials for any specific purpose; in this situation I felt that my duties had been fulfilled and I could do nothing more. On March 13, 1946, I asked the foreign minister for release as head of the division for peace preparation and suggested the division be dissolved. I explained that the division had accomplished its mission, and the necessary political decisions must be made by the government. Since my request went unheeded I sent a letter to Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy on April 5, 1946, informing him of the deadlock in peace preparations and expressing disagreement with the government's dilatory policy. I stated that under the circumstances I could do no more useful work and requested that the government release me from my assignment.

Shortly after I dispatched this letter to the prime minister, the foreign minister informed me confidentially that perhaps the situation was not hopeless. He told me that leading members of the Hungarian government, following an invitation of the Soviet government, shortly would visit Moscow. He asked me to prepare material for the delegation and asked me to accompany them as their political adviser. Next day the embarrassed foreign minister regretfully in formed me that Pushkin had removed my name as well as the name of the economic adviser 23 from the list, stating that the conference would negotiate issues of great political importance and therefore only leading politicians were needed and experts were unwanted. Under the circumstances, this was scarcely bad news for me.

I found it amusing that the delegate of the Social Democratic party to the peace preparations called on me again and excitedly asked for maps and materials concerning territorial claims against Rumania.

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This was the same man, Szalai who a few weeks before had character- ized the peace preparatory work as partly useless and partly dangeros. He now explained enthusiastically that this material would be needed by the Social Democratic party leader, Szakasits in Moscow. He indicated that the chances of regaining territories from Rumania were good and this would strengthen Hungarian democracy.

Faced with dissatisfied public opinion and strong Smallholder pressure, the government decided to ask for Soviet support concerning the settlement of the problem of Transylvania. The Communist party apparently received the green light from Moscow, reversed its attitude toward national aspirations, and suddenly became the champion of Hungarian territorial claims against Rumania, an attitude previously branded as Fascist and reactionary.

The government delegation under the leadership of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy left on April 10 and was received in Moscow with boundless hospitality. Stalin devoted several hours to discussions with the members of the Hungarian delegation. The atmosphere seemed friendly, and Stalin's benevolent attitude inspired optimism for a favorable solution of Hungary's territorial claims in Transylvania.24 Besides the friendly atmosphere, the meeting produced some positive results. The period for the fulfillment of the reparation liabilities was extended from six to eight years. Stalin promised an early return of the Hungarian prisoners of war and recognized the validity of the Hungarian claim for equal rights of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet demand for $15,000,000 for the restoration of Hungarian railroads was cancelled,25 and the delegation believed that the Soviet leaders showed understanding for Hungary's territorial claims against Rumania. Although the Soviet negotiators made no promises, as a first step they recommended bilateral negotiations with the Rumanian government.

After the Moscow visit some confident politicians concluded that Stalin seemed to be a reasonable man of good will with whom the Smallholder politicians would be able to negotiate without the mediation of the Hungarian Communists. (It should be noted parenthetically that Stalin made similar favorable impressions on several Western politicians. ) This optimism vanished when the leaders of Rumania refused to discuss Hungary's territorial claim with a special Hungarian envoy, Paul Sebestyén, dispatched to Bucharest. The Foreign Minis try promptly forwarded on April 27 a note defining Hungary's territorial claims to representatives in Budapest of the three major victorious powers.26

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Because of dissatisfaction and reproaches from many quarters and because of the general depression of public opinion caused by inactivity of the government in foreign affairs, the foreign minister decided to send me to Paris where at that time the Council of Foreign Ministers was in session preparing drafts for the peace treaties. Push kin once more refused to grant me permission to travel abroad, saying I would not be needed for peace preparation in Paris. Gyöngyösiunder attack at that time even in the Smallholder party -- was adamant and told Pushkin that if he was not allowed to send a high official of the Foreign Ministry to Paris to make preparations for the peace conference, he would no longer consider himself as foreign minister and would act accordingly. Not wanting to make a political issue of this trifle, Pushkin suggested I be appointed counselor to the Hungarian legation in Paris. He explained that such an appointment would enable him to grant me the necessary permit to leave the country. (Later Moscow reprimanded Pushkin because he gave me permit to leave for Paris.) Gyöngyösipromptly appointed me minister counselor to the Hungarian legation in Paris and asked me to assume the role of the secretary-general of the Hungarian peace delegation. I left by plane on May 9, 1946. Shortly before my departure news arrived that the Council of Foreign Ministers at a meeting on May 7 had decided to accept the Trianon boundary between Hungary and Rumania as final.

A few days before I left, the president of the republic, Zoltán Tildy asked me through a confidential go-between, Béla Demeter, whether I would be willing to lead the Hungarian peace delegation as foreign minister. Demeter informed me that a group of Transylvanian politicians had discussed with Tildythe problems connected with the peace settlement. In the course of these conversations they had criticized the weaknesses of Hungarian foreign policy, and Tildyhimself expressed concern because of the general discontent with Gyöngyösi He was considered pro-Soviet even in his own party. In as much as national unity was of utmost importance before the peace conference, they had agreed with Tildythat I, as a civil servant without party affiliation, should take over the portfolio for the period of the peace conference. I replied that I was a government official and as such would do my best as administrative leader of the Hungarian peace delegation, but I would not consider accepting a cabinet position as long as the country was under Soviet occupation. I added that probably a few things could have been done differently in the past, but it was questionable whether the Russians would have tolerated a more assertive Hungarian foreign policy. Through military occupation

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and the camouflage of the ACC, Hungary was practically under Soviet rule. Since the Western powers did not mean business in Danubian Europe, no Hungarian foreign minister could have changed this situation. It is difficult to play cards if you do not have a partner and your opponents hold all the aces. Moreover, the Smallholder party was playing for time and wanted to avoid a showdown. Thus no one could have followed a foreign policy substantially different from that of Gyöngyösi The only question was whether someone was willing to play a political role under such circumstances. I did not feel suited for this role and was convinced I could do more useful work in my administrative capacity.

Another surprise was in store for me. Ossukin, the English-speaking counselor of the Soviet legation, asked me to visit him. After a conversation about travel formalities concerning my trip to Paris, he suddenly opened a drawer of his desk and took out a thick folder. He explained that the files in it contained documentation of atrocities committed by the Hungarian army in the Soviet Union. After reading the dates, names, and other particulars of a few cases, he pointed out that it would not be prudent for the Hungarian delegation to bring up in Paris some of the alleged abuses of Soviet soldiers in Hungary because the Soviet government could make public much worse atrocities committed by the Hungarian army in Russia. I told Ossukin that I was not in a position to discuss such cases since I had no knowledge of them. I added that at the Paris Conference our object was to argue our peace aims along the lines we had developed in notes ad dressed to the three major victorious powers. He hardly reacted to my statement. As we were talking about different things and no meeting of minds was in sight, I used an excuse and left. Ossukin was considered the most powerful man at the Soviet legation, allegedly an intelligence operative disguised as diplomat. This strange threat, or blackmail, might have originated from his real profession. It was difficult to understand his motive because the atrocities committed by the Soviet army in East European countries were well known in Western Europe, and it would not have served our interests to bring them up in Paris.

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West