STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

The coalition parties did not want to support any policy similar to the revisionism of the Horthyregime, which was anathema both in the East and in the West. The Hungarian people had been exhausted by the war years, frustrated by Nazi and Soviet devasation of the country; they wanted peace and a fair settlement with all neighbors. Most politicians realized that the country was close to a political, economic, and social collapse, similar to that of Germany in 1945. In Hungarian politics in 1945-46 there were no traces of revisionist or imperialist tendencies.

Yet mistreatment and persecution of Hungarians in neighboring states had been a reality, and the fact remained that the peace treaty after the First World War had attached a large number of Magyar people, against their wishes, to neighboring states. The Hungarian peace delegation in 1920 had vainly proposed a plebiscite for the territories in dispute. It was obvious after the Second World War that to raise territorial claims against victorious states like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia would be futile. Without support of some of the victorious Great Powers, such claims would have met with general disapproval in Allied countries, and in home politics would not have been feasible anyway because of the opposition in the coalition parties, not to mention the ACC and the occupying Soviets.

In view of this predicament, it is pertinent to examine the wartime American approach toward Hungary's territorial and nationality problems, the American ideas of 1941-45. During the war, the State Department prepared several memoranda concerning Hungary's relations with its neighbors, and the briefing papers prepared for the second Quebec and Yalta conference set out succinctly the American position. A briefing paper of September 1944 stated:

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In regard to the territorial settlement, the United States favors, as a matter of principle, the restoration of the pre-Munich frontiers, and any consideration of the boundary disputes between Hungary and its neighbors should start from that point. However, we do not regard the pre-Munich boundaries as unchangeable and believe certain changes to be desirable in the interest of a stable settlement.

Thus, in the case of the frontier with Czechoslovakia, if an opportunity arises for revision by agreement which would leave to Hungary certain overwhelmingly Magyar-inhabited districts, the United States would favor such a solution. In the case of the frontier with Yugoslavia, the United States sees some merit in a compromise solution which would leave to Hungary the northern part of the Voyvodina, although this Government should not, we feel, press for such a solution. In the case of the frontier with Rumania, the American position will be more or less frozen by our agreement to the armistice terms for Rumania which provide for the restoration to that country of ''all or the major part of Transylvania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement.,' In the final settlement the United States would favor, at the least, a revision of the pre-war frontier on ethnic grounds' transferring to Hungary a small strip of territory given to Rumania at the end of the last war. 1

The same briefing paper declared that the "United States does not contemplate participation in military operations in Hungary or in the occupation of that country. American troops in that area could probably be used more effectively, in the political sense, than either British or Soviet armies, but such participation would inevitably involve this Government as an active agent in the political questions of Southeastern Europe".2 This statement left unanswered the question of how United States influence could be effective in territorial or other important issues in the area without being involved politically. Idealistic thinking in Washington seemed hardly sufficient under the circumstances. The briefing paper's solution was to send political representatives to Hungary in the period after surrender. It was thought that such representation would be able to support the general American objectives of "promoting a just and stable political and territorial settlement, as well as securing accurate first-hand political and economic information, and protecting American interests."3

A summary of the briefing paper on Hungarian problems prepared for the Yalta Conference suggested, in a similar fashion, that it would be desirable to secure agreement of the British and Soviet governments to three principles, of which the third was as follows:

The desirability of reaching a settlement of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier dispute and of encouraging an eventual settlement between

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Hungary and Czechoslovakia and perhaps between Hungary and Yugoslavia by friendly mutual negotiation, which would take into account the Hungarian ethnic claims.4

Subsequently the paper characterized the motives of the American position:

The long-range interest of the United States in Hungary centers in our desire to see established peaceful and stable relationships among European nations. The United States has an interest in the achievement of solutions of Hungary's boundary disputes and its political and economic problems which will promote orderly progress and peace with neighboring states. We believe this interest would be served by a territorial settlement which would rectify the frontier with Rumania in favor of Hungary on ethnic grounds. While Hungary must of course renounce the territorial gains made at the expense of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia with German help, the United States would favor, for example, an eventual negotiated settlement which would transfer to Hungary some of the predominantly Hungarian-populated districts of southern Slovakia.5

A further suggestion was made that it was not in the interest of the United States ''to see Hungary deprived of its independence or of any of its pre-1938 territories or saddled with economic obligations which would cripple its economy and thus delay general European recovery."6 Then the paper set out American policy in the armistice period:

While the United States would not, of course, take the position of supporting Hungary against the Soviet Union, it is possible that American and Soviet policies toward Hungary during the armistice period may not be In harmony....

The United States Government recognizes that the Soviet Union's interest in Hungary is more direct than ours. We have had no objection to the Soviet Government's taking the lead in the negotiations for the armistice and in the control of Hungary in the armistice period until the surrender of Germany. We do not, however, consider that the Soviet Union has any special privileged or dominant position in Hungary....

The interests of the United States would be served by the conclusion of peace with Hungary at the earliest practicable date. Such a step would put an end to many of the powers of control which under the armistice will be exercised by the Soviet Union, and by opening the way to the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Hungary would give the United States Government a better opportunity to protect American interests in that country.

It is also in our interest that free elections be held and that Hungary be left to manage its own internal affairs as soon as possible.7

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The briefing paper on Rumanian problems also spoke of ''the desirability of finding a solution of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier dispute which will give some satisfaction to Hungary's legitimate claims and promote peaceful relations between the two states".8 The paper thoughtfully suggested that

It would be advantageous if reassurances could be obtained from the Soviet Government that: . . . The Soviet Government will agree to work with the other principal Allied Governments for a just and stable solution of the boundary dispute between Rumania and Hungary.9

From briefing papers and other more extensive documents available in the National Archives it appears that policymakers in the State Department were influenced by reasonable ideas. They defined the American objectives in rational, benevolent terms. They desired ''peaceful and stable relationships among European nations.,, Friendly relations between Hungary and its neighbors were part of this scheme. The State Department was looking for just solutions of long-standing conflicts in Danubian Europe. The idea was the application of distributive justice under the assumption that the Soviet Union and the minor victorious powers,. such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, would be interested in a just territorial settlement based on ethnic principles. The assumption might have been realistic if leaders of the Soviet Union had been enlightened archangels or if American troops had participated in the occupation of Danubian Europe beyond Austria. But such involvement was considered and rejected in Washington. Probably it was thought in the State Department that a general peace conference would allow a reasonable application of the principle of self-determination. In reality things have worked out differently.

The Sub-Carpathian Territory

The postwar Hungarian government first confronted the problem of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. According to a Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement of June 29, 1945, this region and thirteen communities from Slovakia had been annexed to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In this area according to the 1930 Czechoslovak census were 123,129 Hungarians, the majority of whom lived in territories contiguous with Hungary.10 In the course of the execution of the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement, the Soviet envoy Pushkin demanded that Hungary recognize and welcome the union of the Sub-Carpathian

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region with the Ukraine. This Soviet demand was satisfied by a public statement of the foreign minister. In connection with this event the peace preparatory division of the Foreign Ministry raised the possibility of reunion of the southern part of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine with Hungary; this area was overwhelmingly inhabited by Hungarians and was geographically part of the Hungarian Plain. The Trianon Treaty of 1920 had annexed it to Czechoslovakia, partly for economic reasons but mainly to secure the east-west railroad and a highway connection with Slovakia and between Rumania and Czechoslovakia. After the attachment of the Sub-Carpathian territory to the Ukraine, these reasons no longer existed. The valleys between the mountains running north-south, provided excellent lines of communication and transportation with the Ukraine. From the point of view of transportation, the Soviet Union--in contrast to Czechoslovakia--had no need for the plain at the foot of the mountains.

We realized in 1945 that defeated Hungary, at the mercy of occupying Soviet forces and the ACC, could not make such a claim publicly against the Soviet Union. Yet it was our obligation to raise the issue, pointing out that this slight territorial concession, unimportant to the vas Soviet Empire, would have a tremendous psychological effect on the Hungarian public. When our memorandum was completed on this subject the foreign minister gave it to Pushkin, inquiring whether the Soviet Union would be willing to consider the cession of that narrow strip inhabited by Hungarian as a friendly gesture toward Hungary. Pushkin advised the foreign minister not to raise the question. He asked whether the Hungarian government wanted the same thing to happen in Sub-Carpathia as was happening in Czechoslovakia, where thousands of Hungarians were being expelled; such would be the case, he said, if the Hungarian government should raise the fate of the Hungarians living in Sub-Carpathia.

Shortly after this rejection, the Foreign Ministry was informed through private channels that the Soviet Union intended to annex the small portion of territory between Sub-Carpathian Ukraine and the Tisza River, inhabited by Hungarians and belonging to Hungary. Soon the Soviet army invaded that territory from Sub-Carpathia and took measures indicative of a permanent occupation. The Hungarian government protested this action to Marshal Voroshilov who promised to investigate, and a few days later the Soviet army withdrew Hungarian authorities never received an explanation. So ended the Soviet-Hungarian pourparlers over the fate of more than 100,000 Hungarians in Sub-Carpathian Ukraine.

One should mention that a State Department memorandum of

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region with the Ukraine. This Soviet demand was satisfied by a public statement of the foreign minister. In connection with this event the peace preparatory division of the Foreign Ministry raised the possibility of reunion of the southern part of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine with Hungary; this area was overwhelmingly inhabited by Hungarians and was geographically part of the Hungarian Plain. The Trianon Treaty of 1920 had annexed it to Czechoslovakia, partly for economic reasons but mainly to secure the east-west railroad and a highway connection with Slovakia and between Rumania and Czechoslovakia. After the attachment of the Sub-Carpathian territory to the Ukraine, these reasons no longer existed. The valleys between the mountains running north-south, provided excellent lines of communication and transportation with the Ukraine. From the point of view of transportation, the Soviet Union--in contrast to Czechoslovakia--had no need for the plain at the foot of the mountains.

We realized in 1945 that defeated Hungary, at the mercy of occupying Soviet forces and the ACC, could not make such a claim publicly against the Soviet Union. Yet it was our obligation to raise the issue, pointing out that this slight territorial concession, unimportant to the vas Soviet Empire, would have a tremendous psychological effect on the Hungarian public. When our memorandum was completed on this subject the foreign minister gave it to Pushkin, inquiring whether the Soviet Union would be willing to consider the cession of that narrow strip inhabited by Hungarian as a friendly gesture toward Hungary. Pushkin advised the foreign minister not to raise the question. He asked whether the Hungarian government wanted the same thing to happen in Sub-Carpathia as was happening in Czechoslovakia, where thousands of Hungarians were being expelled; such would be the case, he said, if the Hungarian government should raise the fate of the Hungarians living in Sub-Carpathia.

Shortly after this rejection, the Foreign Ministry was informed through private channels that the Soviet Union intended to annex the small portion of territory between Sub-Carpathian Ukraine and the Tisza River, inhabited by Hungarians and belonging to Hungary. Soon the Soviet army invaded that territory from Sub-Carpathia and took measures indicative of a permanent occupation. The Hungarian government protested this action to Marshal Voroshilov who promised to investigate, and a few days later the Soviet army withdrew Hungarian authorities never received an explanation. So ended the Soviet-Hungarian pourparlers over the fate of more than 100,000 Hungarians in Sub-Carpathian Ukraine.

One should mention that a State Department memorandum of

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May 27, '944, had discussed American policy toward Czechoslovakia and proposed hat the United State "should favor the restoration of Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia with the frontiers established in 1920, subject to such frontier adjustments as Czechoslovakia might be willing to make as part of a border settlement of the issue in dispute in between it and Hungary."11 The memorandum marshaled arguments against incorporation of Ruthenia into the Soviet Union and pointed out hat "Although the Rutenians are ethnically related to the Ukrainians, the Soviet Union apparently favors the restoration of Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia ."12 Dispite this assumption it concluded that

the Soviet Union should annex Ruthenia, however, the United State should favor the establishment of a ethnic line which would leave the great body of Magyars, in the valley of the Upper Tisza River, to Hungary, since Ruthenia would then be part of the Soviet economy and its communication with the west would be less important.13

I could not find any evidence that the United States suggested to the Soviet government the establishment of a new boundary that would have attached to Hungary the great body of Magyars in the valley of the upper Tisza River.

Relation with Yugoslavia: 1945-1946

Then there was the post- 1945 question of the approximately half a million of Hungarians in Yugoslavia. After the First World War the boundary proposed by the United State at the Peace Conference in 1919-1920 would have left much of the Magyar population in Hungary. 14 Such was not the case, and they went to Yugoslavia. The peace preparation division, in 1945-1946, as a matter of routine prepared some reasonable plans for boundary revision on ethnic grounds and considered the possibility of a mutually advantageous exchange of territory; but such project never entered the realm of practical politics. The coalition parties agreed unanimously the Hungary should not raise territorial claims against Yugoslavia. Under the existing political circumstances such claim would have boomeranged.

Hungary's position toward Yugoslavia after the Second World War was complicated for several reasons. A pact of eternal friendship was signed with Yugoslavia on December 12 1940, and Prime Minister Telekihoped that this bilateral agreement would strengthen Hungary's position by leaving pen possibilities for the future. Hungary

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and Yugoslavia could have formed a neutral bloc, but these hopes were destroyed by the course of events. On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav government adhered to the Tripartite Pact, and two days later the Cvetkovic government was overthrown by a coup d'état. Germany considered this move a hostile act, and Hitlerpromptly demanded Hungarian approval for the passage of his troops as well as active military cooperation against Yugoslavia.15 This demand was preceded by direct and confidential parleys between the German and Hungarian general staffs, without knowledge of the Hungarian government. General Paulus later testified in Nuremberg that he arrived in Budapest on March 30 and had a conference with the chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Henry Werth, and with Colonel László, chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff, discussing deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and participation of Hungarian troops in the forthcoming attack on Yugoslavia. Paulus noted that these conferences were brief and orderly and achieved the desired results.16

Quick understanding between German and Hungarian high army officers was not an accident. The chief of the German General Staff, General Franz Halder, had informed General Werth as early as November 1940--that is, before the conclusion of the pact of eternal friendship between Hungary and Yugoslavia--that in the spring of 1941 Yugoslavia ''would have to be compelled, if necessary by force of arms, to adopt a definite position in order to exclude, at a later date, the menace of a Russian attack from the rear. In this preventive war, possibly against Yugoslavia and definitely against Soviet Russia, Hungary would have to participate if only in her own interests.''17 Werth had agreed with Halder and asked that Germany complete the Hungarian rearmament program. A Hungarian armament commission thereupon was invited to Berlin, and close contact was maintained between the two general staffs. In March 1941, Halder urged Werth to mobilize certain army corps in order that Hungary be prepared for war against Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia.18

The Hungarian General Staff wholeheartedly supported the German plans, made the necessary preparatory steps, and thus confronted the political authorities of the country with a fait accompli. When the decisive moment arrived the Hungarian government had little leeway. Unable to alter the course of events, Prime Minister Telekicommitted suicide on April 3, 1941, the eve of the crossing of Hungary's boundary by German troops marching to attack Yugoslavia.19 On the evening of April 2, he received a telegram from the Hungarian envoy in London stating that the British Foreign Office

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had informed him that if Hungary took part in any German action against Yugoslavia, she must expect a declaration of war upon her by Great Britain. Winston Churchill noted in his memoirs: ''His suicide was a sacrifice to absolve himself and his people from guilt in the German attack upon Yugoslavia. It clears his name before history. It could not stop the march of the German armies nor the consequences".20

With the death of Telekia new era began. Up to that time the Department of State and the British Foreign Office had appreciated the merits of Hungary's moderate and dilatory policy, particularly during the sad days of the invason of Poland. This appreciation was repeatedly asserted to the Hungarian ministers in Washington and London. The ambassador of France in London, M. Charles Corbin characterized the Hungarian attitude as an acrobatie diplomatique digne de toute éloge. Telekis successor was his foreign minister László Bárdossy, a professional diplomat, but a man of scant political experience. Death had prepared the way for his ill-fated career.21 He had been Hungarian minister to Rumania at the time of the second Vienna Awardand upon the sudden death of Count Csákyin January, 1941, had succeeded him as foreign minister. Although a patriot and originally an anti-Nazi, he followed a pro-German policy. Impressed by the successful pro-Nazi policy of the Rumanian dictator General Jon Antonescu, he believed that a limited cooperation with Germany was the only means for maintaining some independence for Hungary. In the course of this policy he committed grave mistakes and proved especially weak in his dealings with the Hitlerte element in the Hungarian army.

Germany attacked Yugoslavia on April 6. A death blow was soon administered to the Yugoslav army in the south by German troops previously massed in Rumania. On April 10 the independence of Croatia was proclaimed in Zagreb. Thereafter Regent Horthydeclared that, since Yugoslavia had ceased to exist, the Hungarian army would protect the Magyar population living in territories taken from Hungary by Yugoslavia in 1918. Between April 11 and April 14, and without serious fighting, the Hungarian army occupied part of the former Hungarian territory attached to Yugoslavia by the Trianon Treaty.22

Besides Hungary's violation of the eternal friendship pact, a tragic incident exacerbated relations with Yugoslavia in January 1942, during the last weeks of Bárdossy's premiership. In some areas reattached to Hungary from Yugoslavia, Titos partisans were particularly active and repeatedly carried on raids against units of the Hungarian armed

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forces. The military commanders in the area received orders to take punitive measures against the partisans, and under the pretext of reprisals the Hungarian army and gendarmerie carried out organized massacres of the Serbian and Jewish populations, especially in the triangle of Zsablya and in Ujvidek (Novi Sad). The army instituted a regime of terror and isolated the area while local civilian authorities were intimidated and blocked from all intervention. The indiscriminate murders were accompanied by extensive looting. The numbers of victims totaled over three thousand, many of whom were thrown into the Danube through holes in the ice. This was the figure established by the investigating inter-ministerial committee appointed by the Kállay government in 1943. Although the local population had nothing to do with these massacres, one of the results was reprisal by Titos partisans who in 1944-4S tortured, murdered, and deported innocent Hungarians by the thousands. In some villages the Hungarian population was wiped out, and the victims greatly outnumbered those of Ujvidek and Zsablya. These appalling massacres against the Hungarians were considered by the Yugoslav authorities as a just punishment for misdeeds or ideologically motivated class persecutions. The Titoregime did not officially make a distinction between nationalities, except the Germans, but persecuted all social classes and individuals considered politically dangeros.

After the massive atrocities of the early postwar period, persecutions of ethnic groups took place increasingly within the framework of Communist ideology. Anyone could be severely punished if he was considered dangeros by Titos partisans. Alas, the coalition parties in Hungary followed an ostrich-like policy toward abuses in Yugoslavia. They simply chose not to notice any of the atrocities and other anti-Hungarian actions of the Titoregime. Of course it was next to impossible to check the data the Foreign Ministry received through private channels. Moreover, in legal terms Hungarians were not persecuted because of their ethnic backgrounds. The Yugoslav government--unlike the new regime in Prague--expressly recognized the equality of all nationalities, except the Germans.

There were rumors in early 1946 that Yugoslavia intended to claim some boundary readjustments from Hungary. Later the Foreign Ministry in Budapest understood that the Yugoslav government had abandoned those plans. The Hungarian Communist party alleged that Belgrade dropped these claims because of the intervention with Tito The Yugoslav delegation at the Paris Conference did not raise territorial claims but proposed voluntary exchange of population and agreement on hydraulic questions.23

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West