STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

It is a curious fact that the Soviet Union was the first Great Power during the Second World War that showed a willingness to support revision of the frontier between Hungary and Rumania. When Soviet troops occupied Bessarabia and part of Bucovina at the end of June 1940, and during the following days and weeks, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotovmade several friendly statements and promises to the Hungarian envoy in Moscow, József Kristóffy who reported them in telegrams to Budapest. He later summed up Molotovs statements in a report: the Soviet Union has no claims whatever against Hungary; is striving to establish good neighborly relations with Hungary; considers Hungary's territorial demands against Rumania well founded and will support them at the peace conference; its attitude

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will remain as explained above, in case of a conflict between Hungary and Romania; is ready to begin negotiations for a trade treaty with Hungary.1

Molotovs expression of good will toward Hungary and his promise of support were not new in Soviet diplomacy. His predecessor, Litvinov, in the mid-1930s showed much understanding of Hungarian political aspiration and promised support. But such conversations took place between the Hungarian envoy and the Soviet foreign minister or his deputy within the Kremlin's walls.

The summer of 1940 was an exceptional period because the Soviet army occupied Bessarabia and part of Bucovina. Those days Moscow not only encouraged Hungary through diplomatic channels, but Soviet radio and Tass reports were unexpectedly friendly toward Hungary. Erdmannsdorff the German minister to Hungary, reported on Julu 1, 1940, a conversation with Foreign Minister István Csáky during which Csákystated that:

The political director in the Foreign Commissariat had expressed to the Hungarian Minister in Moscow spontaneously and as his personal opinion (his Government's) disinterest in Transylvania and the trans-Carpathian territory. It was striking how the Soviet Minister here was encouraging Hungary to take armed action against Transylvania. The Soviet Minister had expressed himself to me in a similar vein. 2

Hungary established diplomatic relations with the USSR in April 1934, and Moscow severed diplomatic relations in February 1939 because Hungary adhered to the Ant-Comintern Pact. Diplomatic relations were renewed between the two countries on September 1939. At that time the extreme right in Hungary praised the wise cooperative policy of the two greatest powers in Europe - Nazi Germany and the Soviet Russia. Telegraphic communication and railway connection were established between Hungary and the Soviet Union. The Hungarian government in October 1940 released two Hungarian communist leaders, Mátyás Rákosi and Zoltán Vas then in Hungarian jail. In March 1941 the Soviet government returned to Hungary the banners taken by the Russian army in 1849, when it intervened on behalf of Austria in crushing the war of independence in Hungary. Despite such gesture the anti-Soviet attitude of the Hungarian public was virulent, expecially during the Russo-Finnish war (November 1939-March 1940) when demonstrations were held and collection organized for Finland, and Hungarian volunteers fought in Finland against the Soviet aggressor.

In late 1939 Rumania began to worry about the possibility of a

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Soviet attack, and an emissary of the Rumanian king asked the Italians to ''work on the Hungarians," because any Hungarian threat on the Rumanian rear would ''oblige the Rumanians to come to an agreement with the Russians.''3 Foreign Minister Csákyassured the Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano that ''Hungary will not take the initiative in the Balkans and thus spread the fire."4 He emphasized Hungary's demand for equality of treatment for the Hungarian minorities in case Rumania should cede territory to Russia or Bulgaria without fighting.5 Hungarian policy was expressed even more clearly by Prime Minister Count Pál Telekion a visit to Rome in March 1940 Cianonoted that ''he [Teleki will not do anything against Rumania because he does not want to make himself responsible, even indirectly for having opened the doors of Europe to Russia . . . Telekihas avoided taking any open position one way or the other but has not hidden his sympathy for the Western Powers and fears an integral German victory like the plague."6 Later Telekitold Cianothat he hoped for ''the defeat of Germany, not a complete defeat--that might provoke violent shocks--but a kind of defeat that would blunt her teeth and claws for a long time".7

Shortly thereafter Hungarian hopes for possible Italian help against the Germans diminished. On the pretext that Russia would soon move into Bessarabia, Germany intended to occupy the Rumanian oil fields. The German General Staff approached the Hungarian General Staff and requested passage through Hungary and possibly Hungarian military participation. The reward for Hungary's cooperation allegedly would have been Transylvania. The Hungarian government sent a special messenger to Rome who explained that ''For the Hungarians there arises the problem either of letting the Germans pass, or opposing them with force. In either case, Hungarian liberty would come to an end".8

During these Hungaro-Italian negotiations the Germans began the occupation of Denmark and Norway, and the Italian ambassador to Germany, Bernardo Attolico, denied the rumor of a German attack on Rumania. The Duce advised the Hungarians to ''keep calm and moderate, and . . . accede to the German requests.'' Cianocommented: ''This was not the answer the Hungarians expected and hoped for. They went so far as to ask whether, in case of military resistance, they could count on Italian help. Mussolini smiled; ''How could this ever be,'' he said, ''since I am Hitlers ally and intend to remain so?"9

The spectacular occupation of the smaller Western European states by Germany, and the unexpected collapse of France, deeply impressed

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the Hungarian public and, in fact, caused general consternation. The government press maintained a dignified reserve, and when Italy declared war on France and Great Britain, Csákystated that Hungary would continue its non-belligerent status.

Soviet Russia reacted to the German victories in the West by the incorporation of the Baltic states and Rumanian territories. Following a Russian ultimatum, Rumania evacuated Bessarabia and northern Bucovina and ceded these territories to the Soviet Union. Simultaneous with these events, Hungary made military preparations along the Rumanian frontier and decided to solve the question of Transylvania by force if necessary. Hitlervetoed Hungarian military action and invited Telekiand Csaky to a conference in Munich, where they met on July 10 in the presence of the German and Italian foreign ministers, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Ciano Hitlerwarned against unilateral action, advised the Hungarians to initiate bilateral negotiations with Rumania, and promised to support their initiative in Bucharest. The Rumanians procrastinated and would have preferred Hitlers arbitration instead of bilateral negotiations with Hungary. King Carolinformed the Germans of Rumanian willingness to return to Hungary 14,000 square kilometers of the territory the Trianon Treaty transferred to Rumania.

In August the Rumanian government agreed in principle with Bulgaria concerning retrocession of South-Dobrudja, but declined to entertain the Hungarian claims. The Hungarian government could not accept the negative Rumanian attitude; eventually the Rumanian government agreed to bilateral negotiations, but when the Hungarian and Rumanian delegations met in Turnu-Severin (August 16-24) they could not find a basis for agreement.10

Meanwhile Rumania renounced the Anglo-French guarantee of Rumania's political independence (July 1940), and some great powers expressed approval or understanding of the Hungarian thesis. As noted, Molotovdeclared to the Hungarian envoy, Kristóffy on July 7 , 1940, that the Soviet government considered the Hungarian claims well founded and would support them at the peace table. At the time of the negotiations in Turnu-Severin, Molotovagain stated to Kristóffythat the Hungarian claims were justified.11 According to reports of the Hungarian envoys in London and Washington, George Barcza and John Pelényi respectively, high officials in the British Foreign Office and in the Department of State showed an understanding of Hungary's policy in the Transylvania dispute

After failure of the bilateral negotiations both Hungary and Rumania mobilized, and a conflict seemed imminent; under these

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circumstances Hitlerresolved to take a direct hand in the affair since conflict in southeastern Europe would have complications for Germany and hinder the flow of Rumanian oil. The possibility of Russian intervention in a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict also existed. Later the German leaders repeatedly pointed out to the Hungarians that Germany had to settle the Hungaro-Rumanian conflict in order to save Rumania from collapse and from Russian intervention.12 The German and Italian governments invited representatives of the Hungarian and Rumanian governments to Vienna. The day before the meeting Hitlertold Cianothat he was leaving the decision up to him and Joachim Ribbentrop; the only thing he had at heart was that "peace be preserved there, and that Rumanian oil continue to flow into his reservoirs".13

The Vienna Awardand German Domination

The Hungarians thought the Axis powers would mediate but were not prepared to submit the issue for arbitration. Ribbentrop assailed the recalcitrant Telekiin Vienna; he accused Hungary of having adopted anti-German policies on more than one occasion and his words were ''rather threatening."14 Finally the Hungarian delegation asked Budapest for full powers to submit the issue to Italo-German arbitration; the document was deposited at the German legation in Budapest only half an hour before the second Vienna Awardwas delivered on August 30, 1940. A Crown Council in Bucharest similarly authorized the Rumanian delegation to accept the arbitration. Based mainly on ethnographical considerations, the award restored the northern part of Transylvania to Hungary. At the same time Germany and Italy guaranteed the territorial integrity of Rumania, which retained the major and economically more important part of Transylvania with a minority of more than a half million Hungarians.15 There was an outcry in Rumania against the award, and at the same time disappointment in Hungary, for the new frontier created difficulties from the point of view of communications, and it left under Rumanian control the most important mineral assets and major resources of Transylvania such as the district of Meggyes-Kissármás with mineral, oi1, and natural gas deposits. King Carolresigned in favor of his son Michaeland left the country. Thereafter Prime Minister Marshal Ion Antonescu became the dictator of Rumania.

The award caused serious friction between Moscow and Berlin. Germany informed the Soviet Union only after the Vienna decision

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had been delivered, and Molotovclaimed that Germany violated the Non-aggression Pact providing for consultation in questions of common interest to both countries. Molotovdeclared that the German government ''could not have been in doubt that the Soviet Government was interested in Rumania and Hungary.'16

Hungary's position was made more difficult by the pro-Nazi reorientation of Rumania's foreign policy, a change achieved with amazing speed. Rumania resigned from the League of Nations and the Balkan Entente and began to transform the internal structure of the country according to National Socialist principles. The most dangeros step was the invitation extended by Rumania in early October 1940 to the German ''instructor corps" General Friedrich Paulus stated in his deposition at Nuremberg that an entire panzer division was transferred to Rumania, manifestly as a training unit but actually for the purpose of preparing the Rumanian army for war. These troops had to cross Hungary, and some military personnel remained in Hungarian railroad stations ''to maintain the lines of communication between Rumania and Germany . " 17 Although Telekirestricted the Germans to a few important railroad stations, this was the beginning of German military penetration into Hungarian territory. Shortly after these events Hungary adhered to the Tripartite Pact (November 20, 1940) concluded on September 27, 1940, in Berlin between Germany, Italy, and Japan. This was considered a way to maintain the relative independence of Hungary in Axis Europe. 18 But the Hungarian government refused to accept a secret additional protocol that aimed at the implementation of the pact for newspapers and propaganda. Such cooperation would have ended anti-Nazi opposition newspapers in Hungary.19

Hungary's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was followed by catastrophic events. Prime Minister Telekicommitted suicide on April 3, 1941, the eve of the crossing of Hungary's boundary by German troops marching to attack Yugoslavia, and his successor was Foreign Minister LaszlóBárdossy. Under him Hungary's international position rapidly deteriorated. On April 8, 1941, Britain severed diplomatic relations with Hungary. Following the outbreak of the German-Russian war, Bárdossy was induced by the General Staff to declare war on Russia onJune 27, without consulting parliament. The town Kassa (Kosice) allegedly had been bombed by Soviet planes on the preceding day, and Bárdossy considered this action a casus beli.20 The declaration of war caused violent protests from the opposition parties . At the time the chief of staff of the Hungarian army, General Henry Werth, suggested that war against Russia would be just a matter

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of weeks and Hungary must not be late this time. He had announced the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union at a secret meeting of Hungarian army corps commanders in May 1941' and stated that Rumania and Hungary would take an active part on the side of Germany.21

The British declaration of war against Hungary (December 6, 1941)22 and severance of Hungarian diplomatic relations with Washington (December 12, 1941) was followed by an Axis-enforced declaration of war against the United States.

Hungary's entry into war with the English-speaking powers was not without dramatic incidents. When the American minister to Hungary, Herbert Pell, representing also British interests in Hungary, handed over on November 29, 1941, the British ultimatum, Bárdossy according to his own record of the conversation replied: ''Your information comes as a surprise. I never believed it would go that far nor that England could help the Soviets, only by declaring war on us. . . There are no Hungarian forces fighting in Russia now. We have withdrawn our forces from the front. The Hungarian Government is not participating in any direct military action.... Most of the Hungarians placed their faith in English fairness to judge the present situation. They will feel hurt by such a decision of the British Government.''

In the course of the ensuing conversation Pell showed an understanding attitude toward Hungary. Counselor Howard K. Travers stated that the American legation tried every means to prevent a declaration of war by England on Hungary, after the first rumor of such a decision, and Pell said that he considered the decision of the English government as his own defeat.23

After Pearl Harbor, Hitlerdeclared in the Reichstag that a state of war existed between Germany and the United States. As a subterfuge the Hungarian government simply stated its solidarity with the Axis and severed diplomatic relations with the United States. According to the files of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, in answer to the question of Minister Pell, ''Does it mean war?,' Bárdossy replied with a categorical, ''No."

The Italian minister and the German chargé d'affaires at Budapest called next day on Bárdossy, urging the Hungarian government to declare war on the United States, 24 and the Hungarian declaration of war was dispatched. This declaration, together with those of the other satellites, was accurately characterized later in a note of the American government delivered in Budapest by the Swiss legation on April 7, 1942. This note considered the satellite declarations of war as made

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''under duress, and . . . contrary to the will of the majority of the peoples of the countries in question." Similarly President Roosevelt stated in a message to Congress on June 2, 1942, that although the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania had declared war against the United States, ''I realize that the three governments took this action not upon their own initiative or in response to the wishes of their own peoples but as the instruments of Hitler" On recommendation of President Roosevelt, Congress declared war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania on June 4, 1942, and the next day Roosevelt signed the declarations of war.25 The state of war with the United States and Britain was considered a great misfortune in Hungary, yet it proved to be a blessing in disguise at the armistice and peace negotiations, for without it the affairs of the Danubian countries would have been settled unilaterally by the Soviet Union.

The reluctance of Hungary and the other Danubian satellites to declare war on the United States reflects the limited options of small nations in a world conflagration. Bárdossy aptly described the tragic dilemma of Hungarian statesmen when he told Mussolini's representative in Budapest, Filippo Anfuso: ''God confronted us with Hitler If the Germans demand something, I always give a quarter of it. If I refused categorically, they would take everything, which would be worse."26

From the autumn of 1941 onward the German attitude toward Hungary stiffened, for up to that time Hungarian military help in Soviet Russia had been of token value. Time and again the Nazis pointed out that the Rumanians, Slovaks, Czechs, and Croats were more cooperative and Hungarian unfriendliness might have unpleasant consequences. Ribbentrop himself came to Hungary in January 1942 to convey Hitlers insistence upon 100 percent mobilization of Hungarian resources needed for speedy termination of the war. He dangled the idea of Transylvanian territorial concessions, their magnitude depending on the amount of Hungarian support. This, combined with threats, was the usual German method. Ribbentrop extolled Antonescu, the Rumanian dictator. He pointed to Rumania's full participation in the war as a shining example for Hungary tO follow.

Seeking to reduce to a minimum Hungarian participation in the war, Bárdossy refused to yield to German pressure for complete mobilization and argued with Ribbentrop that Hungary could not send all its military forces abroad, leaving the frontiers undefended. This had been the main cause of Hungary's First World War catastrophe.

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Germany's interests, he said, could not be served by an unruly Hungary, in which all production would be seriously curtailed. Ribbentrop expressed regrets about this unexpected reply, intimating that it was likely to lessen Hitlers good will toward Hungary. Eventually Bárdossy agreed to Hungary's increasing participation in the war, and Hitlers next move was to dispatch General Keitelto Budapest with a large military suite to discuss details. Even so, for the spring offensive in Russia he could bring about the mobilization of but one-third of Hungary's military forces.27

Because Regent Horthywas dissatisfied with Bárdossy's policy, he had to resign in March 1942. His successor, Miklós Kállay, sought to extricate Hungary from the German grasp--no easy undertaking as the country was encircled by German satellites and German-occupied territory. In the face of the growing assertiveness of Hungarian independence, the Germans whipped up interest in the formation of a Rumanian-Croat-Slovak bloc against Hungary. Hungary's relations with the two German-protected puppet states, Monsignor Tiso's Slovakia and Ante Pavelic's Croatia, were unfriendly, and relations with Rumania were even worse, having at times approached the point of a severance of diplomatic relations. Both Hungary and Rumania were manifestly preparing for a private showdown at the end of the general war, if not sooner.

As first secretary of the Hungarian legation in Bucharest in 1942, I had a special assignment regarding the affairs of the Hungarian minority in southern Transylvania, 28 and thus I witnessed the Antonescu regime apply ruthless measures against members of the Hungarian minority group. Thousands of tragic cases accumulated in the files of our legation and consulates. I received dozens of desperate people daily who came to the legation, but we had only limited means to help. The Rumanian authorities confiscated all food, and the destitute Hungarians could not feed their children. Diplomatic protests had no results. The Rumanian government complained about persecution of the Rumanians in northern Transylvania. The whole situation seemed utterly hopeless. We proposed to Budapest severance of diplomatic relations.

Hitlerenvisaged a war between Hungary and Rumania but desired to postpone it and explained his views on the matter to Mussolini, recalling how he had stated to the Rumanians and Hungarians that

if, at all cost, they wanted to wage war between themselves, he would

not hinder them, but they would both lose by it. However, it would

be a problem if both countries now withheld petroleum for the war

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which they wanted to fight between themselves later. It would be the duty of the Foreign Ministers of the Axis to deal with both countries persuasively and calmly so as to prevent an open break.29

To avoid an open conflict in the Axis camp, Berlin and Rome decided in the summer of 1942 to appoint an Italo-German commission headed by a German and an Italian plenipotentiary minister (Hencke and Rogeri) to study the complaints of the Hungarians in southern Transylvania and those of the Rumanians in northern Transylvania. I was recalled to Budapest and then sent to northern Transylvania to prepare memoranda on the political and economic situation of the population. I composed a questionnaire which was sent by the minister of interior to the chief official of each county (főispán). When I visited them in their county hall office, the collected materials were handed to me and in a day or two I prepared a memorandum on conditions in the county to be presented to the Italo-German Commission. In some cases one of the officials attached to me by the central government made inquiries on the spot. The Italo-German Commission spent almost two months in southern and northern Transylvania, investigated hundreds of cases, and prepared a long report that recommended several measures to the Hungarian and Rumanian governments to ameliorate the situation of the minorities. 30 Italo-German military commissions established in northern and southern Transylvania informed the German and Italian governments of discrimination against minorities and other troubles and tried to improve the situation by intervention with the local authorities.

By the end of 1942, the Rumanian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Mihai Antonescu, under a strange misunderstanding, initiated a conciliatory policy toward Hungary, and the Hungarian government reciprocated. Both governments made some small conciliatory gestures and prepared a list of questions to be settled through bilateral negotiations. Kállay appointed a Transylvanian and former foreign minister, Count Miklós Bánffy to begin informal negotiations with a Rumanian representative. Banffy's official mission was connected with another Rumanian initiative. The Transylvanian leader of the democratic opposition in Rumania, Iuliu Maniu believed in early 1943 that British and American paratroops wouli be sent to Danubian Europe and he wanted to meet secretly with a former prime minister of Transylvanian origin, Count István Bethlento discuss Hungaro-Rumanian cooperation against Germany. Bethlenreceived Maniu,s confidential message and wanted contact with him,

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West