STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

I arrived in Paris on May 9, 1946, as minister-counselor of the Hungarian legation, with the understanding that I would be secretary-general of the Hungarian peace delegation. Soviet authorities in the ACC delayed an exit visa to Paul Auer, designated Hungarian minister to France, so he could get to Paris only a few days before my arrival. When we met, he was in a pessimistic mood because the Council of Foreign Ministers recently had decided to reestablish the Trianon boundary between Hungary and Rumania. We agreed promptly on diplomatic steps to be taken in the period preceding the Conference of Twenty-One Nations. In following weeks the substantial material I took with me made it possible to address notes to the British, French, United States, and Soviet representatives on the Council of Foreign Ministers. Until that time such notes had been addressed only to envoys of the three principal victorious powers in Budapest.

On June 4, 1946, the legation forwarded to the council, with a covering letter, the ten most important peace preparatory notes and aide-memoirs that were originally sent between August 14, 1945, and May 20, 1946, to the British, Soviet, and United States representatives in Budapest. A follow-up note asked the council to grant a hearing to Hungary's representative in connection with two questions: (1) persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia; and (2) the May 7 decision of the council concerning reestablishment of the Trianon boundary between Hungary and Rumania.1

After dispatching these notes I visited the council's secretary-general, de La Grandville, and inquired about the prospects of our request for a hearing and generally the prospects of our proposals. Grandville could not give me an official answer, but in the course of our private conversation I learned about the council's working method and policies. I understood that a hearing of Hungary's representative was not in the cards. Grandville indicated that the council

182

183

was unwilling to create a precedent in view of the requests for hearings submitted by governments of several states. Governments of ex-enemy countries would be invited to state their cases at the Conference of Twenty-One Nations. Another discouraging piece of information was that the council would examine only the draft peace treaties prepared by the deputy foreign ministers. This meant that the council would not consider our carefully and sometimes boldly prepared proposals.

The meeting with Grandville clarified some other questions. I had heard of an initiative to establish a permanent international committee to evaluate Italy's capability to pay reparations and inquired about the possibility of creating a committee of this nature for the other ex-enemy states. Examination by an international body of Hungary's ability to pay reparations would have revealed our catastrophic financial situation and the need of lowering reparation payments. Grandville relied that Molotv opposed the creation of a committee to evaluate Italy's financial capability, probably for two reasons--that such a committee would secure for the Anglo-Saxons a lasting influence in Italy, and it also would become a precedent for the other ex-enemy countries.

Finally, I asked Grandville about the council's channels of information to the press, for the benefit of countries not participating in CFM deliberations. He replied that joint communiqués would be in order, but if such were not forthcoming, each delegation might inform the press. He pointed out that a daily press conference took place at the United States embassy.

Information from Grandville made clear the stark realities of peacemaking in 1946, and contacts with several Western representatives corroborated and supplemented this information, deflating any hope for constructive negotiation. Sometimes even knowledgeable people are inclined to assume that reasonable arguments and ''justice" prevail at a peace conference. In reality after both World Wars the major victorious powers discussed the terms of peace settlement among themselves, and the outcome depended on their respective power, national interests, and ideologies. We had received desperate letters from Hungarian citizens of Czechoslovakia and Rumania. The writers believed that their better future depended on our steadfast stand and pleading for their cause at the peace conference. It was heartbreaking to know that we could do very little for them. Even if defeated countries stated their cases in Paris, without support of principal victorious powers their proposals and claims remained voices in the wilderness. Peacemaking after both World Wars was a far cry from the Congress

184

of Vienna in 1814-15, when France was admitted to the high council of the victors, and the resultant Vienna settlement secured general peace in Europe for a century.

During my first days in the familiar atmosphere of Paris I felt like Rip Van Winkle in political matters. During the war and especially after the German occupation in March 1944, we had received little reliable information about inter-Allied agreements, and in our isolated situation in 1945-46 we did not have a clear idea of the peacemaking machinery established by the Potsdam and Moscow conferences. Our legation in Washington had suggested that I go to London in the spring of 1946 because the deputy foreign ministers would meet there to prepare draft peace treaties for the CFM. Pushkin had refused to give me an exit visa to Switzerland, where our peace preparatory material had been deposited early in 1944. He told Gyöngyösithat such material would not be needed. So it was hopeless to ask for a visa to London.

I had hoped that the Western powers--especially the United States--would support our proposals, primarily economic and cultural, for cooperation in Danubian Europe. It seemed to me that an honest presentation of some longstanding problems of the Danubian nations would serve the general interests of Europe and would be a first step toward reconciliation, cooperation, and integration in this long-suffering area. But Moscow opposed regional integration in its sphere of influence.

I note at this point that in Hungary such leading statesmen as Count Pál Telekihad been convinced even in the mid-1930s that the United States would play a decisive role at the next peace settlement in Europe. He expressed this view to me before I left for Yale as a Rockefeller fellow in 1935. During the war the officials in charge of peace preparations in the Foreign Ministry had assumed that the United States, as the strongest world power at the close of hostilities would exercise a decisive influence for economic reorganization of the Danubian region. At the Paris Conference in private conversation American and other Western representatives recognized the rationality of our proposals. But after observing the Soviet attitude and policy in CFM conferences they questioned their feasibility. The Kremlin would champion all integration in favor of Moscow and would not tolerate any Danubian integration until they had control of the whole area, and then only in associations in which the USSR was a member. Such considerations were the reason for the subdued Western attitude at the conference table, both in the CFM and the Paris Conference. Titos Yugoslavia, Groza's Rumania, and Benes's

185

Czechoslovakia were all competing, caps in hand, for Moscow's favor. Under such conditions it could have been self-defeating to initiate a movement for an institutionalized cooperation of the Danubian countries. The Eastern European experts of the Western Great Powers were well informed in Danubian affairs, but in light of their experiences with Moscow, they were convinced that for countries under Soviet occupation Moscow would call the tune.

If the CFM was unwilling to grant a hearing to the Hungarian government, it still seemed important that Auer and I visit, together or separately, the ambassadors of selected countries. To them we explained Hungary's political and economic predicament, gave out memoranda, and asked support. While I was engaged in these activities, Foreign Minister Gyöngyösiinformed me, first in a cipher telegram and then in a letter, that he had designated me as chief political delegate of Hungary to the Paris Conference. I declined this position, and he wrote another letter on July 15 in which he said he did not understand the reason of my refusal because things had developed more favorably than we expected, adding:

You may claim with satisfaction that the evolution of domestic politics has justified both of us; myself as politician who assumed responsibility, and yourself as public senant and a good patriot who accomplished honorably your task. Everybody refers now to the note of last August 14, [1945] as a unanimous decision of the coalition, whereas the two of us know best that this was not at all the case and that we went those days much beyond the position of the coalition and the government. So far this has been a great satisfaction to both of us and I admit with pleasure the fact that first of all to you who all the time represented the standpoint of national honor and common sense . . .

I could not share Gyöngyösis optimism, based on momentary superficial improvements in Hungarian politics. National unity seemed greater at that time because the Communist and Socialist parties, contrary to their initial positions, openly supported national aspirations, especially in the Transylvanian question. Yet the country's predicament remained the same. As long as Hungary was occupied by Soviet troops and practically ruled by the Soviet chairman of the ACC, I did not want to accept a political position, preferring to remain secretary-general of the Hungarian peace delegation. This position had secured me more influence, through behind-the-scenes operations, than would the conspicuous title of a political delegate. I could achieve more through quiet diplomacy; in a political position I would have become a hostage of the coalition parties which often worked at cross purposes.

186

I suggested to Gyöngyösithat a chief political delegate was superfluous because the foreign minister himself would be the political leader and chairman of the Hungarian delegation. If the government wished to appoint a chief political delegate he should not be a civil servant but a prominent political figure, preferably a leading member of the Communist party. I made this latter suggestion in view of Auer's suspicion that Communists did not want to participate in the peace negotiations. Absenteeism would have made it possible for them to blame the punitive peace treaty on the Smallholder party. When the Communist deputy foreign minister, Elek Bolgár, refused to accompany the delegation to Paris, because of illness, Auer informed Frederick T. Merrillof the United States delegation that this was a diplomatic illness, as Communist policy was ''not to participate in presenting the Hungarian case to the Conference.,, Auer had ''wired the Prime Minister recommending that a leader of the Communist Party be included in the Delegation in order that all members of the coalition and not the Smallholder Party alone should bear the onus of a failure tO modify a proposed treaty now considered by most all [SlC] Hungarians as little less than catastrophic."2

The twenty-one victorious states at last formally opened the peace conference at the Luxembourg Palace, on July 29' 1946, in response to an invitation from the governments of Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. By this time the Soviet delegation was ready and confident for whatever might result. For several days prior to the session of the conference, members of the delegation arrived from Budapest. Gyöngyösiand his entourage came a few days before the initial meeting.

Our delegation came together for two conferences each day--one political, the other administrative. Gyöngyösichaired the political conferences in which Paul Auer usually participated, together with Aladár Szegedy-Maszák minister to the USA; Gyula Szekfu', minister to the USSR; Paul Sebestyén, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary; László Faragó director of the Financial Institutions Center in Budapest, chief economic delegate; Colonel István Szemes delegate for military affairs; and various short-term visitors. Depending on questions under discussion, specialists attended political sessions.

As secretary-general, each morning I chaired a conference in the secretariat at 9:00 A.M., a meeting dealing with schedules and other administrative matters and drafting of texts. I participated in the daily policy session for which I prepared the agenda and substantive materials and carried out decisions through the secretariat and with

187

collaboration of select members of the delegation. This meant drafting notes, aide-memoirs, memoranda, speeches and preparing diplomatic moves.

Coordination of all these activities was time-consuming. In view of short deadlines on several occasions I had to be ''the whip." I maintained contact with the conference secretariat and the secretariat of the CFM. As a rule Auer or other members of the delegation, sometimes including myself, accompanied Gyöngyösiwhen he visited the chairmen of delegations, ambassadors, foreign ministers, or other dignitaries. I negotiated specific questions with other delegations or asked a member of the Hungarian delegation to perform such tasks. Szegedy-Maszákmaintained contact with several members of the American delegation. Denis Nemestóthy, counselor to the Hungarian legation in Paris, was most helpful and acted as liaison between the legation and the delegation. Finally, my responsibility was to sign or forward for Gyöngyösis signature the outgoing notes, aide-memoirs, and memoranda.

The first administrative conference established sections of the delegation and determined activities, priorities, and plans. Sections of the secretariat dealt with Rumanian, Czechoslovak, economic, and military affairs, and there was a section for miscellaneous categories. The drafting committee and the group of translators played an important role. Iván Boldizsár was in charge of public information and press affairs. In addition to resident members, visitors attended some sessions of the delegation, and István Bede Hungarian minister to the United Kingdom, visited Paris on two occasions (August 6-10 and September 7-21).

Eventually a leading Communist, Ernő Gerő, minister of commerce and transportation, replaced Bolgár as deputy chairman of the Hungarian delegation. While in Paris, August 22, to September 9, he attended some of the political conferences and expressed a nationalistic view concerning our conflicts with Czechoslovakia and Rumania. After the Moscow visit of the government delegation in April 1946, the Hungarian Communist party took up this line.

Gerő strongly supported our claim for boundary rectification with Rumania, and in connection with Auer's address in a joint session of the Hungarian and Rumanian Territorial and Political Commissions he emphasized that even a small territorial gain would demonstrate that the new democratic regime of Hungary was able to revise the Trianon Treaty in ways that Horthys Hungary could not have achieved. Rumor circulated that during the darkness of night Gerő visited Communist dignitaries, including Molotov members of the

188

Yugoslav delegation, and the head of the Ukrainian delegation, Dimitrii Z. Manuilsky, formerly his colleague in the Comintern. Such visits probably occurred, but Gerő did not inform me of his nocturnal and other activities, and after his departure Molotovs negative policy had not changed in questions affecting Hungary's interests.

One of the short-term visitors in Paris was Count Mihály Károlyi provisional president of the Hungarian republic in 1918. In 1946 the Hungarian government appointed him envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary as well as a member of the peace delegation. His lack of comprehension of postwar Europe's political conditions and Hungary's problems at the peace table was pathetic. He reflected the atmosphere of the 1918 revolution and was pro-Communist and anti-American. When Károlyiattended one of the daily political conferences, he suggested that we emphasize that ''the counts and bishops" had caused Hungary's catastrophe. Apparently he did not realize that nobody was interested at the peace table in the Hungarian counts and bishops; the issue for us in Paris was Prague's proposal to expel 200,000 Hungarians. Gyöngyösistated at the plenary session of the conference, August 14, 1946, that if Czechoslovakia insisted on forcible removal of the Hungarian minority, ''the Hungarian Government would be compelled to maintain the principle that the land is the people's." Károlyicommented in his memoirs that Gyöngyösis speech was addressed to the Hungarian nationalists." He often visited Jan Masarykand appealed to him ''to use his influence on behalf of the 500,000 Hungarians outlawed by the Slovaks." Masaryk sharing his indignation, said; ''How can you imagine that I approve such inhuman proceedings? Don't forget that I am Thomas Masaryks son. But it is not me you should try to persuade, but Clementis.''3

The status of the delegations of defeated countries was much more liberal in 1946 than after the First World War, for representatives of the ex-enemy states could move around freely without control or special permission. They were not confined to their headquarters, as were the delegations of ex-enemy states in 1919-20. The Quai d,Orsay had assigned hotels to delegations, and ours was the Claridge on the Avenue des Champs-Elysées. We lived there with the delegation of the Union of South Africa, the chairman of which was Field Marshal Jan Christiaan Smuts who had participated in the peace conference after the First World War and was familiar with Hungary's problems and especially the situation of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. I had several pleasant and informative conversations with him but politically he could not help much.

189

A problem at the Claridge was overbooking; it was impossible to get the rooms we needed. Our large conference room was satisfactory for daily meetings, but the delegation's secretariat was squeezed into two small rooms. We had to leave the bulk of our material at the Hungarian legation where conferences of a confidential nature were held. The dual location of background papers caused much waste of time.

The French government courteously put at our disposal several weather-beaten automobiles, with Algerian chauffeurs, a great help in view of the scarcity of automobiles in 1946. The Algerians were well-trained but reckless drivers who casually disregarded traffic regulations in Paris. One day I wanted to have a confidential conversation with Gyöngyösi and we decided to take a walk in the Bois de Boulogne. We boarded the best automobile assigned to the foreign minister and reached the Bois after a hair-raising ride. Suddenly flames appeared at the front of the automobile, and we got out. The driver did not seem disturbed. Waving his hand in a gesture of futility he explained in broken French, ''This happens all the time.,, When we returned from our walk the necessary repair had been made; we got into the automobile with some misgivings and returned to the Claridge.

Members of an ex-enemy delegation could attend conference sessions only when invited. The ex-enemy countries were not negotiating partners; they played roles comparable to those of defendants in criminal proceedings. Nemestóthy and János Erős, counselors to the legation in Paris, attended sessions of the conference and prepared reports for the delegation. Boldizsár also supplied information, as he and a limited number of his confreres from the Hungarian press were permitted to attend any session.4

The interests and policies of the ex-enemy countries, of course, differed greatly. Italy was recognized as a co-belligerent and enjoyed Western support, especially in Trieste-related questions, and was granted hearings by the CFM on several occasions. Although the fate of many more people was affected by the peace settlement in Transylvania or Slovakia than on the Italian-Yugoslav border, the Trieste area became one of the most important issues because Trieste was on the frontier between the Soviet and Western zones. All Hungarian problems were in the Soviet zone, where the Western powers had little influence.

The Rumanians were self-confident because they enjoyed all-our Soviet support. The Groza government was Communist-dominated and Rumania had ceded Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. The army had followed King Michaels order when Rumania changed sides suddenly

190

in August 1944; the new government declared war on Germany, and Rumanian divisions fought alongside Soviet troops. All these events might have influenced Soviet policy in the Transylvanian question.

Bulgaria, as Germany's ally, had been at war with Britain and the United States but had maintained diplomatic relations with the USSR. Moscow declared war on Bulgaria in early September 1944, followed by a peaceful march of Soviet troops into Bulgarian territory and transfer of the armistice negotiations from Egypt to Moscow. The Soviet Union emerged as the main actor in Bulgarian affairs.5 A new Bulgarian government declared war on Germany and the Soviet Union recognized Bulgaria as a co-belligerent. In the fight against Germany, Bulgarian troops lost about 32,000 men. In view of these events and the historically strong pro-Russian feeling in the country, Bulgaria expected forceful Soviet support at the peace table. The Bulgarian minister to France, Ivan Marinov informed me that his government was not going to sign the peace treaty unless Bulgaria received access to the Aegean Sea. The peace treaty did not give the Bulgarians any satisfaction on their claim.

The Finns thought at the outset that they might argue their case seriously at the peace table. Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala had arrived with three cabinet ministers, leading representatives of political parties, and a galaxy of experts, prepared to negotiate any questions connected with the proposed peace treaty. Pekkala went with members of his delegation to the press gallery at the first session of the Political and Territorial Commission for Finland. Although it was an open meeting, their group was asked to leave, but Finnish journalists were permitted to stay. The Finns realized the nature of the conference, and most of the delegation returned to Helsinki, Foreign Minister Carl Enckell remaining with a few officials of the Foreign Ministry.6

Finland's situation was exceptional among the ex-enemy countries. The Finnish army had fought bravely but had not penetrated deeply into Russian territory. The country possessed experienced political leaders and a less important geographical location, from the Soviet point of view, than countries on the highway to Central Europe or Istanbul. Last, but not least, the treaty with Finland was prepared almost entirely by the Soviets. Britain played a small part in it. Finland was not at war with the United States. When I visited Finland's envoy to France, Johan Helo he told me his government would accept the peace treaty without much discussion. He implied that the Finns were not in a good position to resist Soviet demands.

191

In the plenary session of the conference, the foreign minister of Finland, Enckell, pointed out that cooperation with Moscow was the basis of his country's foreign policy. He asked for modification of territorial clauses of the treaty and made a mild plea for a one-third reduction in the $300 million reparation.7 Molotovsaw no reason for modification and said Finland had not been occupied, implying that, unlike Hungary and Rumania, Finland had not had to bear occupation costs and other inconveniences of occupation.8

One may conclude that delegations of the ex-enemy states came to the Paris Conference with a variety of political aspirations and expectations. In view of their divergent interests they had hardly any contact with the other ex-enemy delegations.

My personal situation was exceptional. As minister-counselor to the Hungarian legation, I was accredited to the French government; consequently, I enjoyed all privileges of resident diplomats and was invited to French and other diplomatic receptions. From the French point of view, I was not a representative of an ex-enemy state since Hungary was not at war with France. French soldiers who had escaped from Germany had found refuge in Hungary during the war.9 All members of the Hungarian delegation enjoyed personal freedom, but we had to struggle with many handicaps. Several experts we needed in Paris were not permitted to leave Hungary. The chief delegate for economic affairs, Arthur Kárász, was dismissed for political reasons, although he was able to come to Paris for a short visit in connection with an official trip to Switzerland.

We had some outstanding experts for territorial and ethnic problems, crucial in debates over Transylvania and the fate of Hungarians in Slovakia. They produced reliable memoranda under the leadership of István Révay, head of the TelekiPolitical Science Institute. Specialists drafted most of the texts in Hungarian, and ranking officials of the Foreign Ministry prepared the French and English translations. I usually checked the text in the language in which it was delivered or dispatched. Short deadlines made thorough checking of translations in the second foreign language impossible. There was a shortage in typists and translators, and on some occasions the collaboration of the bilingual French professor Aurélien Sauvageot was a great help. In several instances members of the secretariat had to work twenty-four hours and, in a few cases, over forty-eight hours without letup. They did their best, cheerfully, in conditions of great discomfort.

Among our operational difficulties were belated notifications from the conference secretariat. Several times we received information at the last minute concerning a deadline for notes or invitation to sessions

192

of the conference. The Hungarian delegation was notified by telephone on August 18, at 8:00 P.M., that the deadline for Hungarian observations concerning the proposed peace treaty was August 20, midnight. 10 I telephoned the conference secretariat for written confirmation, which we received after the deadline on the morning of August 21. When Foreign Minister Gyöngyösipaid a courtesy call on Secretary Byrnes on August 19, he expressed hope that Hungary would have full opportunity of presenting her views on the peace treaty in the Political and Territorial Commission, but ''noted with some dismay that comments on the Treaty must be in by tomorrow night.'' Byrnes explained that this would not be the final opportunity for Hungary to comment on the treaty; he expected the committee to consult the Hungarian delegation on disputed points and give every opportunity for presentation of Hungarian views.11

Gyöngyösiwas sensitive to this matter since similar difficulty had developed in connection with his address at the plenary session on August 14. Because of the short notice, his speech and the translations had been completed just before delivery; the usual distribution in advance in two languages was possible only at the last minute.12 I protested repeatedly the short deadlines, but the secretariat could not be blamed. The conference wasted precious time on procedural points, and only a limited time remained for discussion of questions of substance. The secretariat simply carried out instructions from the committees of the conference.

As soon as committee chairmen realized how little time remained for substantive questions, the procedure became speedy, if not erratic. Ex-enemy countries were at the bottom of the totem pole. Under these conditions it was a great help to have the full peace preparatory material in Paris. Without it we would have been unable to draft notes and addresses in a few hours. We were well prepared for discussion of any Danubian problem. It was handy to have a 73-page index of peace preparatory material.

Technical inconveniences appeared insignificant in comparison to our difficult political situation. Within a lifetime, Hungary had appeared for the second time as a defeated country at peace negotiations following a world war. In the First World War the major ally of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the German Reich' which was declared undemocratic and imperialistic. But in the Second World War, Hungary was considered a junior partner of Hitlers Germany, and the Nazis had committed horrendous crimes well publicized after the war. Representatives of the victorious powers repeatedly reminded the Hungarians of this situation. We would have liked to

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West