STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

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discuss the circumstances of our involvement in the war, but such topics could not be clarified. Even outsiders came to see me and offered materials in this category. They presumed that this matter would be discussed. But responsibility for the war or for wartime behavior was hardly mentioned in Paris. We had submitted a substantial aide-memoire on Hungary's responsibility and hoped it would be read and discussed.13 Responsibility for the war was not debated; perhaps this was not desirable, because the Soviet Union had negotiated the MolotovRibbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, which made possible the German Blitzkrieg against Poland.

The Soviet bloc countries considered the active contribution to the military defeat of Germany more important, and from this point of view Hungary was in a less favorable position than the other ex-enemy countries whose peripheral location made possible their early surrender. Although the provisional national government of Hungary declared war on Germany on December 28, 1944, reorganizing the Hungarian army took time. In the session of the ACC on June 5, 1945, Voroshilovpointed out that Hungary had supplied two full and one incomplete infantry divisions, but only the First Division saw any active service against the Germans.14 He might have added that Soviet authorities were not in a hurry to give weapons and equipment to Hungarian divisions.

In this difficult situation the Hungarian delegation had to find ways to present Hungary's international problems and at the same time defend the vital interests of the nation. Here, again, an important task was to protect the mistreated Hungarian population in neighboring states. Our peace preparatory notes discussed the pertinent problems and proposed measures for correction of intolerable situations. Auer and I presented these questions orally to several ambassadors before the conference. When Gyöngyösivisited the heads of delegations and asked support, he emphasized the predicament of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. In the course of such visits we met with much good will, but also with an amazing ignorance in regard to conditions in Danubian Europe in general and in Hungary in particular. Several delegations showed interest in Hungary's predicament. The American delegation was understanding and American support was crucial, but it was restricted to a few important cases. When Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia proposed the transfer of materials from Hungarian archives, and Envoy Gyula Szekfű asked General Walter Bedel Smith, American representative in the Hungarian Committee, for support, Smith pointed out that it was more important to avoid human suffering with expulsion of

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Hungarians from Czechoslovakia than to block transfer of archival materials. 15 It was clear that the United States did not want to appear in the role of Hungary's protector against Allies. As John C. Campbell put it:

In general, the United States sought fair terms for Hungary, but it did not want to place itself in the position of Hungary's champion against Allied nations. American relations with Czechoslovakia had to be considered. Furthermore, Hungary's record as a junior partner of the Axis, both before and during the war, hardly entitled her to over-sympathetic treatment at the peace settlement. That was the main reason why the Hungarians, despite the validity of many of the arguments they presented, found so few friends at Paris, even among the democratic nations outside the Soviet bloc.16

We forwarded through the conference secretariat to all twenty-one delegations fifteen peace preparatory notes together with geographic and ethnographic maps.17 Such unsolicited documents, emanating from an ex-enemy state, were not officially considered but some of our arguments proved to be effective. Several delegations, especially the Australians, studied our notes carefully and made proposals along the lines of our reasoning. But such interventions seldom brought practical results.

Besides notes of protest against the persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, the Hungarian government pointed out the importance of reviving and strengthening provisions for international protection of minority rights. The Hungarian delegation submitted an elaborate draft treaty for protection of minority rights, with a system of regional mixed commissions and tribunals to enforce them under supervision of the United Nations. 18 This draft treaty was similar to ideas and proposals expressed in a State Department memorandum on ''The Problems of Minorities in Europe," prepared and approved by the Inter-Divisional Committee on the Balkan Danubian Region, Russia-Poland, and Greece on November 21, 1944.19 This material was not used in the post-Potsdam era. It was regrettable that the CFM inserted in the draft peace treaty only an ineffective clause concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms. The council decided that special provisions on the protection of minorities were not necessary. It was unrealistically believed that protection of minorities was not a matter for the peace treaties but for the recently established United Nations. Our extensive draft treaty on protection of minorities was not considered.

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Relations with the Great Powers

All the while, as the business of settling affairs for the Paris Conference of the Twenty-One Nations was going along, it was necessary to keep up diplomacy with the major powers, and there was a considerable activity. Our relations in this regard with the Soviets, Americans, British, and French were delicate and difficult, and almost unending before and during the peace negotiations.

The French government hosted the Paris Conference and in most cases took a neutral attitude. Although France had not participated in the preparation of the Hungarian Peace Treaty, French diplomats in Paris occupied key administrative positions in the Council of Foreign Ministers and in the secretariat of the conference. We established good working relations. Auer had been legal adviser of the French legation in Budapest during the inter-war period and was persona grata nor only in the French Foreign Ministry but also in French political circles. Through his interventions, the Quai d'Orsay and other offices made several gestures toward us. Thanks to a private arrangement, I could use the apartment of a distinguished French family to meet inconspicuously members of delegations participating in the conference. From the legation, Nemestóthy handled the invitations for these gatherings, and the secretariat at Claridge was not involved in this activity. On one occasion I could not accept Molotovs invitation for the luncheon he gave for the Hungarian delegation because I had invited to this apartment several ranking diplomats. Samuel Reber came from the American delegation. American opposition to expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia was all-important. But at the same time we had to obtain the support of as many countries as possible, large or small, because Secretary Byrnes pledged the United States would automatically accept any decision voted by two-thirds majority in the plenary session of the conference, where Czechoslovakia had many friends.

The negative Soviet attitude toward Hungarian interests had indeed made clear before and during the conference that our diplomacy must look for Western support. Although events had shown that in the Soviet zone of Europe the Western powers had little influence and in some cases their policy seemed uncertain if not counterproductive, Hungarian policy in the course of peace preparatory activities had continued to appeal to the West, in the face of Soviet opposition. Of course, we were aware of the new power equation along the Danube but it was a question of national honor to take a

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stand for our own sake, irrespective of outside support. As it turned out, this attitude was no exercise in futility. Without strong United States opposition, 200,000 Hungarians would have been expelled from Czechoslovakia. In this case and in connection with a Czechoslovak claim to a piece of Hungarian territory opposite Bratislava across the Danube, we had close contacts with the American delegation. John C. Campbell characterized this relationship:

On these questions, with my colleagues Philip Mosely and Fred Merrill I was in close contact with Stephen Kertész and with Aladar Szegedy-Maszák the Hungarian Minister to the United States. We consulted. They asked our advice about their delegation's draft statements, about what they should say that might have a chance of getting support and acceptance by the United StatesX what might be the best strategy at the conference meetings in dealing with what the Russians and the Czechs might do, and so on. There was perhaps, something incongruous in this business of representatives of a defeated enemy state and of a victorious allied state getting together to concert a strategy against other victorious allied states, but that's the way it was . . .

And it was right, I thought at the time and I still think now, for the United States to support the Hungarian position on those issues. We were trying to save whatever chance there might be for the democratic elements in Hungary to prevail or at least to survive in their country, and there were questions of principle involved in the question of the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. We stood, as Hungary stood, for the principle that there is no collective guilt, and no collective punishment, for those of a particular ethnic group for whatever reason. It was a principle, incidentally, which we had already violated at the Potsdam conference with respect to Germans from eastern Europe, but that was no reason why we should violate it again. 20

The United States proposed in the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Paris Conference to reduce the total amount of reparations to be paid by Hungary from $300 million to $200 million. These efforts failed.

It was obvious that the Kremlin had a clear line of policy toward the Danubian countries from the beginning of Soviet occupation. The result of the Hungarian elections in October and November 1945 baffled the Soviets and probably delayed the Communist seizure of power at least by one year. Unlike the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the Communist seizure of power in Hungary did not take place by one stroke; it was a gradual process which continued during the Paris Conference.

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It was exceptional at the peace table that a country in the Soviet zone would request support of the Western powers concerning issues in which Moscow was following a different policy. Since in such matters there were no secrets in Paris, I thought it advisable to inform the Russians personally about our objectives. I visited the Soviet embassy several times before the opening of the conference and talked with AlexanderE.Bogomolov1">AlexanderE. Bogomolov and Fedor T. Gusev, ambassadors to the French and British governments respectively, and with A. A. Lavrishchev, head of the Southeastern European division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. I outlined Hungary's political and economic problems, emphasizing our conflicts with Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and described our proposals for reorganization of the Danubian region on the basis of self-determination. I received polite, stereotyped answers, mainly about the general purposes of Soviet foreign policy. This was a graceful form of evason. On one occasion I reminded Bogomolov of Lenins doctrine of self-determination of peoples and quoted Lenins severe criticism of the Versailles Treaty and argued that a genuine Danubian settlement should be made on the basis of self-determination of all nations. Bogomolov introduced his lengthy, philosophical, but entirely negative answer with the statement that principles have only a relative meaning. Conditions change. What seemed just and true after the First World War may no longer be true, he said. While Gusev appeared to be a reserved and taciturn Russian type, Bogornolov was more outgoing and willing to argue.

After the liberation of France, Bogomolov established close relations with de Gaulle's government, and it is worthwhile to recall his checkered background. At the outbreak of the war he was Soviet ambassador to France and followed the French government to Vichy, remaining there until the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union. When the Vichy government severed relations with Moscow, Bogomolov was transferred to London. He functioned there as Soviet representative to the French National Committee. In this capacity he established friendly relations with General de Gaulleand his entourage. Since de Gaulles position was precarious and he had been involved in controversies with Churchill and rebuffed by Roosevelt, the French appreciated Bogomolov's courtesies and friendly gestures. He handled de Gaulleas a chief of state, despite Stalin's contempt for France. In the spring of 1943 Bogomolov was sent to Algiers, where he was loosely attached to Eisenhower's headquarters as ambassador to represent the Soviet Union in relations with France. Ambassador Murphy noted that ''Bogomolov deserves a major share of credit for de Gaulles tolerance toward--sometimes practically an alliance with--French

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Communists in Algiers and later in France in 1944_45 ,,21 When the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Big Three created in October 1943 an advisory council for matters relating to Italy, Bogomolov became Vyshinsky's deputy as Soviet representative. His success in France was facilitated by his education in pre-revolutionary Russia, his gracious manners and refined taste in food and other amenities of life.

Lavrishchev belonged to a younger generation. He was a typical Soviet-educated diplomat, reportedly with secret service background. He had been an envoy to Bulgaria for five years, and after the war became political adviser to the ACC in Sofia. He was familiar with anti-Hungarian measures in Czechoslovakia but questioned the mistreatment of Hungarians in Rumania. I explained that after a period of atrocities and merciless persecution under the preceding governments, Groza was trying to alleviate the fate of Hungarians in Transylvania, but his endeavors were often sabotaged by a reactionary chauvinistic administration and by many local abuses. I gave some recent examples to illustrate my contention.

The Soviet diplomats always received me in the same room at the embassy, where most probably our formalistic conversations were recorded. It was easier to have interesting discussions with them around a white table, but they accepted social invitations only in groups. On one occasion Lavrishchev politely accompanied me into the corridor of the embassy, and I invited him to have lunch with me. He became embarrassed and could hardly mumble an evasve answer. French colleagues were amused because they had similar experiences with Soviet diplomats.

We did our best to smoke out the Russians, but real human contact did not develop on any level, although even Molotovwas friendly and sometimes cracked jokes at diplomatic receptions. On social occasions liquor made communication with Soviet diplomats easier, but small talk was of no consequence. A lunch Auer gave at the Hungarian legation in honor of the Soviet delegation was instructive. As usual in the course of such contacts with Russians, everybody had to join in the toast game, and after several drinks the atmosphere was rising. As the round of toasts were delivered, my assignment was to greet Lavrishchev. I expressed hope that his work would contribute to peaceful and cooperative relationships in the Balkan peninsula and referred to the role of Balkan problems in European politics. Molotov my vis-a-vis at the table, laughed in a slightly inebriated state, while pounding the table with his glass and saying cheerfully ''The Balkans, the Balkans are very important.'' Vyshinsky in his toast

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emphasized that we should forget bygone unpleasant aspects of Soviet-Hungarian relations and talked in glowing terms about the promising future of Soviet-Hungarian friendship. Remembering that at conference sessions he had strongly attacked Hungary's case, when the clinking of glasses subsided, I could not help remarking to Molotovthat ''Pilate also washed his hands.'' Molotovburst into laughter and retorted, ''Young man, be careful, there are dangeros comparisons.,,

My neighbor at the table, Bogomolov, was in a more relaxed mood than any time I saw him at the Soviet embassy. Apropos Vyshinsky's friendly toast I related to him a story about the famous Hungarian playwright, Ferenc Molnár, who met by chance in the washroom of a hotel the critic who had published an unfavorable review of the premiere of his play. The critic started to apologize and praised the play, saying that he had a bad headache, felt miserably, and left after the first act and had to write the review at home in a hurry. Next day he read the play carefully and was most favorably impressed. Molnár replied, ''This is fine. But I hope next time you will praise my play highly in the newspapers and criticize it severely in the washroom." Bogomolov was amused by the story and suddenly began to make allusions to some phases of my career. Among other things, he mentioned my Rockefeller Fellowship at Yale in 1935-36 and in Oxford and Geneva the following year. Apparently his purpose was to let me know that he had a file on me. Perhaps his disclosure was a warning.

When we visited the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegations the reception was friendly, the hospitality first class, the discussion long and frustrating, and the result from our point of view, negative. We received a lot of information about their suffering during the war. What they said was true enough but did not alleviate our problems. The heads of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegations were not professional diplomats. They were talkative and colorful people and ranking Communists. They informed us about the Soviet position in very different surroundings from those of the diplomats of the USSR. We would receive an appointment at the Byelorussian delegation at 9:00 P.M. The head of the delegation' Kuzma V. Kiselev, would receive us courteously and offer seats around a white table where he was sitting with his advisers. First he offered a variety of cold cuts, exquisite fruits' cheese, then plenty of vodka. When we characterized the plight of Hungary and suggested a substantial reduction of our reparation payments, Kiselev described in detail the suffering of Byelorussians during the military operations. He said that entire villages were destroyed and people still lived in caves and dugouts.

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After a long discussion of Hungary's and Byelorussia's problems, we left empty-handed. Dimitrii Z. Manuilsky, head of the Ukrainian delegation, handled us in similar fashion. Such was the usual result of our visits at Soviet headquarters.

As noted, Gerő's visit in Paris and our efforts did not influence Soviet policies one iota. The Soviet line increasingly reflected self-confidence and rigidity. Molotovs trip to Moscow between August 3 1 and September S, and the instructions he received from Stalin, may have played a role in this process. According to a United States observer in Paris, ''Soviet policy, as evidenced by their actions here and elsewhere, since visit of Molotovto see Stalin, is that of interim change in emphasis on objectives, tending for the moment to put in secondary emphasis their efforts to strengthen Communism in Germany, France, and Italy while making first priority the firming up of control over and more strongly supporting Slav nations inside curtain. ,,22

It should be brought up at this point that the routine peace preparatory activities in Budapest and Paris were supplemented by visits of a government delegation to the capitals of the three major victorious powers. The April visit in Moscow was followed in June by visits to Washington and London, with a stopover in Paris on the return trip. These visits preceded the Paris Conference and their purpose was to present Hungary's problems and ask for support at the peace table. The delegation, under leadership of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, included Deputy Prime Minister Mátyás Rákosi, representative of the Communist party, Minister of Justice István Riesz, representative of the Social Democratic party, and Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi The delegation arrived in Washington onJune 11, 1946, stayed in Blair House, and departed New York on June 19,23 President Truman, Secretary Byrnes, and after his departure, Acting Secretary Dean Acheson and other officials in the State Department received the Hungarian delegation. Nagy described the economic plight of Hungary and peace aims of the government and asked for political support and economic aid. Byrnes informed him that last autumn in London he had proposed that in the case of Transylvania the boundary should follow ethnic lines so far as possible, but the Soviets wanted all of Transylvania to be transferred to Rumania and he eventually yielded. In a follow-up conversation with the deputy director of the Office of European Affairs, John D. Hickerson, Gyöngyösisummed up the Hungarian position regarding Czechoslovakia and Rumania and suggested several categories of economic aid. The Hungarian government asked for restitution of displaced goods located in

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the American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, including the gold reserve of the Hungarian National Bank amounting to $32,000,000, stock of the Hungarian state railroads, and ships belonging to Hungarian steamship companies; an increase in the amount of UNRRA assistance; a loan through the Export-Import Bank; an increase to $20,000,000 of the $10,000,000 surplus property purchase credit.

Next day Nagy submitted the same requests to Acting Secretary Dean Acheson, who in turn indicated that ''it would be easier for his government to consider such matters with sympathy if a similarly helpful approach were forthcoming on certain matters of interest to the United States in Hungary." He noted that his government had endeavored to obtain information from the Hungarian government concerning the country's economic situation but such information had not been furnished. Similarly his government had endeavored to obtain landing rights for American aircraft in Hungary, which request had been denied by the Hungarian government. Nagy replied that information concerning Hungary's economic situation was common knowledge, but the government was precluded from meeting the American request by regulations issued by the ACC. As to landing rights, Hungary would be happy to welcome American aircrafts as soon as the occupation ceased. Landing rights were under exclusive jurisdiction of the High Command of the occupying power. The acting secretary at a subsequent meeting gave Nagy a memorandum that contained the department's replies. It was important for Hungary that Washington was prepared to return the gold reserve of the Hungarian National Bank, a necessary step to stabilization of the monetary system. American commanders in Germany and Austria were instructed to proceed with restitution of some categories of displaced property. The United States government was prepared to consider sympathetically the Hungarian request for increase in existing credits to Hungary for purchase of surplus property. The memorandum recognized that implementation of an air transport agreement might require arrangements between the United States and the military force occupying Hungary. The necessity of such arrangements did not preclude Hungary from an agreement with the United States. The memorandum emphasized that access to official information concerning all aspects of Hungary's economic condition and commercial relations would facilitate consideration of Hungarian requests.

Nagy was appreciative of the American action. He regarded the American position on landing rights for American aircraft as reasonable, and said he again would raise this question with the cabinet and

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requested that the United States approach the ACC once more concerning freedom of the Hungarian government to give economic information.24 The Americans stated they would do so.

Gyöngyösiheld a press conference at Blair House, and Nagy made a statement over the State Department's International Broadcasting Division. The delegation visited the Tennessee Valley Authority and spent three days in New York before leaving the American shores.

In London the cabinet and a group in the House of Commons entertained the delegation, but politically the visit was less rewarding. Hungarian peace aims did not impress British statesmen. In connection with the minority rights of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Philip Noel-Baker asked the question: ''Don't you find it slightly unusual that you desire support for a defeated nation at the expense of a victorious one?,,25 Prime Minister Clement Attlee lectured on the criteria of democracy and pointed out to the delegation of the Hungarian coalition government that a true democracy needed an opposition in Parliament. This statement was odd because Attlee, as a member of the war cabinet, was informed of the Churchill-Stalin percentage agreement concluded in October 1944, which gave Russia 80 percent influence in Hungary. Fortunately, Attlee did not oppose the return of Hungarian property from the British zone of occupation in Austria and Germany.26.

During a short stopover in Paris on June 25, the delegation paid a courtesy call to Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and visited Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Prime Minister Nagy brought up the May 7 decision of the CFM that reestablished the Trianon boundary, disregarding the large number of Hungarians under Rumanian rule. He called Bevin's attention to the fact that 650,000 Hungarians were in Czechoslovakia and approximately 50,000 persons might be exchanged. This meant that 600,000 Hungarians would remain in Czechoslovakia, deprived of human rights. Nagy asked that the peace treaty guarantee equal civil rights to the Hungarian minority and expressed hope that the Great Powers would settle pending questions according to the Atlantic Charter.

Bevin replied that at the London session of CFM he was inclined to support the American secretary of state's proposal concerning revision of the boundary between Hungary and Rumania, but the CFM realized that in that region of Europe it was impossible to establish satisfactory boundaries. After Rumanian elections and settlement of other complex problems, it would be easier to work out a sensible solution through bilateral negotiations. As to the question of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Bevin believed that there were plans for

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transfer of a large number of people and this action would cause enormous economic difficulties. The peace treaties contained a clause for the protection of human rights, and he was hopeful the United Nations would develop a moral code of universal validity for the protection of minorities. This would be a better solution than specific agreements. Bevin pointed out that during the war he had tried to convince the leaders of the East European governments in London, among them Benes and General W. Sikorski that establishment of a customs union would serve the interests of ali of them. For the same reason he emphasized freedom of navigation on the Danube and stated that after conclusion of peace and normalization of conditions it would be possible to give Hungary some badly needed economic aid and find solutions for the common problems of all nations in the Danubian Valley.

Nagy informed Bevin that for the solution of the boundary question the Hungarian government had proposed bilateral negotiations in Bucharest. Since the Rumanian government was unwilling to negotiate, the CFM should reconsider the Hungarian-Rumanian boundary. If that would not be possible, the Hungarian government requested insertion in the peace treaty of an article providing for reexamination of the boundary between Hungary and Rumania by an international forum. Bevin replied that he would consider this question .27

The Hungarian government delegation also used their stay in Paris to call on Molotovto inform him that the Americans would be willing to support revision of the boundary with Rumania if the Soviet Union would take the initiative. When after friendly conversation about the American trip Nagy referred to the boundary revision, Molotovs friendliness disappeared. He assumed his habitual stone face and simply referred to the CFM's decision accepting the proposal of Secretary Byrnes that reestablished the Trianon boundary.28

All the while Soviet pressure was increasing in Hungary.29 The leading Smallholder politicians saw the handwriting on the wall, became desperate, and Gyöngyösisuggested that Prime Minister Nagy again visit the delegates of the Great Powers in Paris. Nagy arrived in early September and called on General Smith, the United States ambassador to the Soviet Union and United States representative in the Hungarian Commission. The prime minister described the difficult and delicate political course he had been forced to take to preserve a Western form of democracy in a country almost entirely surtounded by Communist-controlled states. He ''intimated quite clearly that unless Hungary could get Western support for the easement

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of the treaty provisions, he could not hold out much longer as prime minister."30 Ambassdor Smith replied that it was Secretary Byrnes's ''firm opinion that the ex-enemy states of Eastern Europe must be given a chance to breathe again and that this was not possible until the occupation forces were withdrawn. This was the foremost objective of the United States Government.,, (Emphasis added) He pointed out that the American government had taken a great interest in Hungary, particularly in economic matters. The United States always believed in the right of all nations to trade freely and had advocated that international waterways such as the Danube should be accessible to all on an equal basis. Finally he asked what Hungary wanted specifically. Nagy emphasized that it was important that part of Transylvania be returned to Hungary and went on to say that it would be impossible for Hungary to accept the transfer of 200,000 Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. Ambassador Smith reassured Nagy that the United States opposed the expulsion of Hungarians. During the ensuing discussion regarding the Czechoslovak territorial claim on Hungary, the so-called Bratislava ''bridgehead,,, the ambassador expressed hope that this demand might serve as a basis for some give-and-take and that both sides should be willing to make concessions in order to reach an agreement.31

Subsequently the Prime Minister had conversations with Secretary Byrnes and, in Molotovs absence, with Andrei Vyshinsky, deputy foreign minister. According to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery's report, Nagy pointed out to Byrnes that ''he was one of the few Peasant leaders left in Europe leading fight against eastern interpretation of democracy and then elaborated on Soviet pressure on Hungary as well as Communist domination of neighboring states.,' He noted that Hungary had not gained much by holding a free election in November 194S. Byrnes replied that ''Hungary unlike other satellites had advantage of being a sovereign state and had more independence. . . . He greatly sympathized with Hungary's problem and hoped to hear of progress made to overcome economic difficulties and further developments towards attainment of political freedom."32 According to Nagy's version, Byrnes said to him that it would be in Hungary's best interest to sign a peace treaty as soon as possible. ''If we introduce the Transylvanian question and cause difficulties regarding a settlement, peace with Hungary will be delayed. We are doing everything in our power to free you both politically and economically as soon as possible. For this reason we are expediting a peace treaty . . . once the independence of Hungary is assured, a firm economy will follow. We will assist you in this also." Vyshinsky,

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in turn, brought up the possibility of negotiations with Rumania about Transylvania after the peace treaty had been signed.33

Because of such inconsequential conversations in Paris, Nagy returned to Hungary in a dispirited and deeply pessimistic mood, prepared to resign if the conference voted for expulsion of the Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. His conclusion was that the Western democracies either were unwilling or unable to oppose Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. Of course Bedel Smith's statement that withdrawal of the occupation forces was ''the foremost objective of the United States Government,, had sounded like music to Hungarian ears. Unfortunately, there was little reality behind this assertion.

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West