STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

Dispute with Rumania

In postwar Hungarian politics the revision of the boundary with Rumania or some other settlement of the Transylvanian question and the protection of Hungarian minorities in Rumania, remained the foremost consideration. The Hungarian government informed the Great Powers and the other participants in the Paris Conference in aide-memoirs of the grievances of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and pointed out that the redressing of these grievances and the securing of satisfactory conditions for the Hungarians were the sine qua non of the reconciliation between Hungary and Rumania. A booklet 1 submitted to the conference provided an overview of the situation in Transylvania since 1918 and enumerated the anti-Hungarian discriminations and atrocities committed between August 1944 and May 1946. For the future the Hungarian government proposed the application of the principles of self-determination and the institutionalization of the protection of minorities under the aegis of the United Nations.

In Budapest we were forced to live behind a diplomatic iron curtain and knew little of the CFM activities, but in Paris I gradually reconstructed the chain of events in the Transylvanian question. Despite Voroshilovs and Pushkin's encouragement given to President Tildyand Gyöngyösiconcerning Hungary's territorial claims in Transylvania, the Russians had been unwilling to consider the modification of the Trianon boundary in the first session of the CFM and at the subsequent meeting of the deputy foreign ministers in London. In view of the unyielding Soviet position, an American document submitted in the second session of the CFM in Paris, on May 7, 1946 proposed restoration of the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier as it existed on January 1, 1938. In the report of the deputy foreign ministers on the Rumanian treaty (April 18 and 19) the article on Rumania set forth:

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The decision of the Vienna Awardof August 30th, 1940, is declared null and void. The frontier between Rumania and Hungary existing on January 1st, 1938, is hereby restored, [the whole of Transylvania being thus included in the territory of Rumania.] [Nevertheless, the Allied and Associated Powers would be prepared tO recognize any rectification of the Roumanian-Hungarian frontier that may subsequently be mutually agreed between the parties directly concerned and which would substantially reduce the number of persons living under alien rule.]

The brackets in the text indicate unagreed provisions in the article. The first bracket was a Soviet proposal, and the other delegations suggested deletion of that addition. The second bracket was an American proposal. Then Byrnes stated in the May 7 session of the CFM that the United States would withdraw the sentence in the second bracket if the Soviet delegation would withdraw the words in the first bracket. He thought the article would be improved as a result of the withdrawals. Molotovand Bevin agreed and accepted the text preceding the brackets.2

Byrnes's proposal meant that the American delegation gave up its tentative endeavors for a modest rectification of the Hungarian-Rumanian boundary on ethnic grounds, fully accepting the Soviet position in the Transylvanian question. Four months later, in the Rumanian and Hungarian commissions respectively, Harriman and Bedel Smith vainly tried to revive the idea of bilateral negotiations between Hungary and Rumania for settlement of outstanding questions. These belated actions had a gesture value at best, in view of Byrnes's withdrawal of the original American proposal for bilateral negotiations. One should recall at this point that Molotovand Dekanozov had strongly recommended bilateral negotiations to the Hungarian government delegation in Moscow in April 1946. Soviet duplicity in this case was a prize example of the seamy side of Muscovite diplomacy.

Because in the CFM the four powers made all decisions unanimously' and the Russians were unwilling to consider any boundary rectification, the council's action was final, according to information I received from official sources in Paris. But in Hungarian politics it was impossible to accept this verdict as definitive. The delegation led by Prime Minister Nagy continued to bring up the Transylvanian question in encounters with Soviet, United States, and British representatives. Auer and I did the same when we visited ambassadors in Paris. Such visits brought a few surprises. At the Polish embassy the ambassador interrupted our presentation to tell us that our colleague

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from London had visited him recently and had given him all information about the Transylvanian problem. We suggested that this was impossible because the Hungarian envoy to Britain would have informed us of his visit to the Polish embassy. We continued to explain the intricacies of the conflict between Hungary and Rumania. The ambassador interrupted again and said, ''Gentlemen, I will call my secretariat and will prove to you that your colleague from London visited me a few days ago and gave me the same information.,, He went to the telephone and after a brief conversation said, ''I apologize. My visitor was the Rumanian ambassador from London." On several occasions we witnessed such a lack of knowledge about Danubian affairs.

Despite hopeless political conditions the Hungarian delegation decided to raise the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier question at the conference, and for this purpose we needed American support. Auer and I visited Philip E. Mosely, the foremost East European expert of the American delegation, on May 17, and he told us that at the London meeting of foreign ministers, Secretary Byrnes ''had not advanced any proposal for a revised frontier but had merely pointed out that the question existed and should be studied to see if the boundary could be improved over that established in 1920 and of which the United States Government had been critical at that time." Mosely pointed out that ''the Soviet Delegation had been unwilling at all times to admit even that the question deserved study." To the question whether Hungary would have an opportunity to raise the question at the conference, Mosely stated his personal understanding that ''Hungary would be free to present its view on any aspect of the treaty which affected its position or interest.,, Concerning Hungarian suggestions for boundary readjustment, he avoided detailed discussion but stated that the concept of a numerical balancing of minorities on opposite sides of the frontier ''might seem somewhat mechanical in approach and might be interpreted to imply a willingness to provide for large-scale exchanges of population." He stated as his strictly personal view that ''a moderate suggestion for rectification based mainly on ethnic and economic factors might have a better hearing.3

Mosely's cautious statements reflected the American position, of which he had been one of the architects. When the Hungarian government asked for a hearing, the Soviet bloc countries opposed even a debate about the frontier between Hungary and Rumania, but strong American support of the Hungarian request prevailed.

When Foreign Minister Gyöngyösivisited heads of delegations he brought up the frontier dispute with Rumania, and in a plenary session

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of the conference on August 14 he asked reattachment to Hungary of 22,000 square kilometers of Rumania, that is, he repeated the request expressed in the Hungarian note of April 27. As Mosely had told us in cautious diplomatic terms three months earlier, this proposal had no chance although a position paper of the State Department had considered a similar solution among several alternatives.4

At the meeting of the Political and Territorial Commission for Rumania on August 29, Mr. Officer from the Australian delegation proposed that the commission hear the views of Hungary on Article 2 of the draft treaty, which dealt with the boundaries of Rumania. Bogomolov of the USSR saw no need to consult the Hungarian government, since the text of Article 2 had been agreed to by the CFM. After a long debate, a Czechoslovak motion for adjournment was defeated by 8 votes to 4 and the Australian proposal carried by vote of 8 to 4. 5 The commission decided that both the Hungarian and Rumanian delegations be invited to appear to express their views on Article 2, the Hungarian delegation speaking first.

On August 31 , in a joint session of the Hungarian and Rumanian Commissions, Auer delivered an address. In view of the unfavorable decision of the CFM and in harmony with Mosely's personal view, he asked the reattachment to Hungary of only 4,000 square kilometers along the boundary; this would have meant reattachment of approximately a half million persons--about two-thirds of whom were Hungarians--and with them some major cities along the boundary. Auer emphasized the necessity of international protection of Hungarians remaining in Rumania.6 The foreign minister of Rumania, Gheorghe Tatarescu, opposed Auer's proposals in a speech at a joint session of September 3, arguing for the maintenance of the boundary established by the Trianon Treaty.7

Such addresses had only symbolic significance, because the conference had no power to change the decisions of the CFM. When the Hungarian delegation asked the Russian delegation for support in the Transylvanian dispute, their answer was that they could not do anything because Secretary Byrnes had withdrawn his proposal concerning revision of the boundary between Hungary and Rumania. Technically this was true. But Byrnes had acted this way because the Soviet Union was unwilling to consider a boundary change, and he decided to eliminate a point of friction between the United States and the USSR to expedite the convocation of the Paris Conference. Invitations could not be sent without Soviet agreement. In view of the fact that both Hungary and Rumania were occupied by Soviet troops and unanimity in the CFM was necessary for all decisions, American

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diplomacy had little clout in the Transylvanian question.

At the meeting of the Rumanian Commission on September 5 the Australian delegate, Officer, wanted to hear from the representative of one of the states responsible for drafting Article 2, so the commission would know the reasoning that guided the council. Harriman, responding to the Australian request, said that

the United States had not been a strong supporter of the proposed text but wished to make it clear that he would vote for it since it had been agreed by thc Council. He said that during the discussions in the Council the United States Delegation had made certain proposals for a study of possible modification of the frontier which might, by reducing the number of persons under alien rule, contribute to stability and to mutual cooperation between Hungary and Rumania The other members of the Council of Foreign Ministers had not shared this view and, in view of the desirability of reaching unanimous agreement, the U.S. had not insisted on its position. Mr. Harriman reiterated his statement that he would vote for Article 2 as drafted but wished to take the occasion to say that, in view of the differences on various subjects evident in the statements of the Hungarian and Rumanian representatives, the United States hoped that progress might be made through direct negotiations between them toward a mutually satisfactory settlement of the outstanding questions.8

After statements by the Soviet, British, and French delegates, Officer proposed that Article 2 be adopted ''with a rider in the form of a recommendation that the Council of Foreign Ministers, before putting it into the final treaty, make a further effort to secure, in cooperation with the two interested parties, an adjustment by which some additional Hungarian centers might be incorporated in Hungary.,' This proposal was not accepted, and eventually Article 2 was adopted by 10 votes, with 2 abstentions.9 Thus Australian attempts to reopen the Transylvanian question failed.

The American position concerning the dispute between Hungary and Rumania was reiterated on September 23 in the Hungarian Commission by Bedel Smith, who read into the record a statement similar to that by Harriman in the Rumanian Commission ''regarding the desire of Rumania to sign a protocol with Hungary or any bilateral arrangement which the United States Delegation felt would tend to improve relations and good understanding between the two countries. ,,10

Meanwhile the Hungarian territorial claim presented by Auer on August 31, had been evaluated by a senior East European specialist of the American delegation, John C. Campbell, in a memorandum

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of September 2. He pointed out that this claim was based purely on ethnic considerations; it was about the same as the hypothetical ethnic line worked out in the Department of State. He made some additional suggestions for the case of a review of the frontier between Hungary and Rumania. Discussing the pros and cons of the Hungarian proposal, he concluded that if there was any disposition on the part of the other members of the CFM to make any change in the frontier, "we might give as our view that the Hungarian claims appear reasonable with the exception of the claim for Arad and the immediate vicinity.,' Campbell also raised the possibility of direct Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations.11

At the plenary meeting of the conference on October 10, Molotovstated that ''the treaty with Rumania was a matter of great importance for the peace of Europe. Rumania was now a democratic state and it was essential that the question of Transylvania be settled to the satisfaction of the Rumanian people.12

The Hungarian government addressed a note on November 8, 1946, to the Council of Foreign Ministers which was deliberating the final text of the peace treaties in New York during November-December 1946. This note proposed that the third article of the Rumanian draft peace treaty should be supplemented by a clause, according to which the rights of the Hungarian minority in Rumania should be defined through direct negotiations between Hungary and Rumania. ''Should these direct negotiations between Hungary and Rumania result in failure, the Hungarian government should be given an opportunity to apply to the Council of Foreign Ministers for a final adjustment of this problem.,,13 The council disregarded the Hungarian note.

The Czechoslovak Amendments

The greatest direct threat to the Hungarian nation at the Paris Conference was the Czechoslovak proposal for transfer of 200,000 Hungarians from Slovakia to Hungary. Because the Hungarian government refused to considered a bilateral agreement on the transfer of Hungarians from Slovakia, the Czechoslovak delegation on August 21 proposed the following amendment to the peace treaty with Hungary.

Czechoslovakia is authorized to transfer a maximum number of

200,000 inhabitants of Magyar ethnic origin from its territory to that

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of Hungary and the latter is bound to receive these persons on its territory and to recognize them as nationals.

When the Czechoslovak government proposed transfer of Hungarians, the Hungarian answer was that the territory in which the Hungarian people had lived for centuries belonged to them. The ethnic boundary between the Hungarians and Slovaks has not changed for centuries. At a plenary meeting of the conference on August 14 the foreign minister of Hungary again expressed willingness to accept the Hungarians together with the territory in which they lived. He formulated the Hungarian position in the following terms:

The forcible eviction of the Hungarians from Slovakia is not only morally and politically unjustifiable, it would confront Hungary with an economic, social and political problem which she is unable to solve. It must not be forgotten that the problem involves the eviction and resettlement of the mral population uprooted from their ancestral homes and land.

Gentlemen, however serious and desperate our position may be, the defeated party can never be denied the right of believing that such a demand is contrary to morality and humanity. And if a Hungarian Government could be found willing to accept it under outside pressure, it would be digging its own grave and the grave of Hungarian democracy by so doing. The land and the people who have tilled it for centuries and implanted their civilization therein, are indissolubly linked together. Such a bond could only be forcibly broken by violation of the fundamental laws of human existence. Czechoslovakia wants to keep territory inhabited by Hungarians. In that case let her keep the Hungarians also and give them the full rights of the individual and the citizen. If for any reason Czechoslovakia refuses to do so and insists on the forcible removal of the Hungarian minority, the Hungarian Government would be compelled to maintain the principle that the land is the people's.14

Next day the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, Jan Masaryk accused Gyöngyösiof keeping his speech a well-guarded secret until the last moment, contrary to usage.15 He declared that the address reminded him of Hungarian revisionist speeches of 1918-38 and asked, ''Who won this war--the United Nations or Hungary?" Kiselev, chief of the Byelorussian delegation, together with Vyshinsky, supported Masaryks contentions.17

Simultaneous with the proposal for expulsion of the Hungarians, Czechoslovakia demanded in a second amendment transfer of five Hungarian villages for enlargement of the Bratislava bridgehead on the right bank of the Danube. At the seventh meeting of the

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Hungarian Commission (September 6), the Czechoslovak representative, Juraj Slavik, contended that this territory was necessary for proper development of the city and port of Bratislava. The Hungarian delegation was invited into the session, and Paul Sebestyén requested the commission to reject the Czechoslovak claim on the grounds that Bratislava's development had never been in the direction of the south bank and the existing bridgehead had not been used for this purpose; that that claim was contrary to the Atlantic Charter and to ethnic principles and that the people living in the territory had no desire to be attached to Czechoslovakia; and that it would be an economic hardship to Hungary to construct a detour of 25 kilometers for the main highway to Vienna.18

At the ninth meeting of the Hungarian Commission (September 9), General Smith stated that the Czechoslovak proposal deserved some sympathetic consideration, but he added that reduction in the size of the territory might help meet the economic and ethnic objections raised by the Hungarian delegation. He pointed out that the proposal involved transfer of Magyars to Czechoslovakia at a time when that country was proposing to transfer Magyars to Hungary. He concluded that ''the two Czechoslovak amendments were a part of the larger and unsettled problem between the two countries and should be examined simultaneously." He emphasized the strong feeling of the United States delegation that the principle of forced transfer of population should not be inserted in a peace treaty. After long debate, the commission accepted an Australian proposal to set up a subcommittee that would not only study the facts in the dispute but maintain close connection with the Hungarian and Czechoslovak delegations. The subcommittee included Australia, New Zealand Canada, the Ukraine, and Czechoslovakia.19

The thirteenth meeting of the Hungarian Commission (September 18) was devoted to a speech by the Hungarian representatives, Aladár Szegedy-Maszák who replied in detail to the Czechoslovak argument for transfer and pointed out that after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire Hungarian minorities were incorporated in neighboring states without being consulted. Now only Czechoslovakia expressed a desire to get rid of these minorities by such drastic means. Czechoslovakia was endeavoring to have the Potsdam decision include Hungarians. No other country ''had requested that 200,000 innocent people accept the stigma of collective responsibility or had attempted to persuade other hundreds of thousands of its inhabitants to deny the nationality of their forefathers by accepting Slovak citizenship in order to assure right of life and liberty." Instead of Munich,

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Szegedy-Maszákurged the commission to remember ''the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, for which the war was fought."20

At the fourteenth meeting of the Hungarian Commission (September 20), Clementis spoke in refutation of Szegedy-Maszáks statement, questioning Hungary's statistics, and came to the conclusion that revisionism still existed in that country. General Smith explained that

the United States was trying to avoid a situation where it would be necessary to vote against the Czech proposals, which it would have to do if it were necessary to incorporate in a peace treaty the principle of a forced transfer of populations. This principle was unacceptable.

Then he urged a bilateral approach and proposed that the question be referred to the commission's subcommittee for a constructive solution.

Vyshinsky spoke in support of the Czechoslovak amendment. He saw nothing unethical about a transfer of population and felt that ''the return of people to their Motherland should be encouraged and that the best solution of the nationality problem is to free a given state of the nationals of another state.'' He stated that ''500,000 people had been moved from Hungary to Germany, as General Smith knew, so there was lots of room in Hungary and even a forced transfer would not be inhumane.,,21

At the fifteenth meeting of the Hungarian Commission (September 23), the Yugoslav delegate traced the history of revisionism in Hungary from 1919 and took note of the same spirit of revisionism in certain circles of the new democratic government in Hungary. He reminded the delegates of the Backa massacres and ''twenty years of plotting on the part of the HorthyGovernment,, and pointed out that Yugoslavia had solved its minority problems by giving rights to its minority peoples. ''Here was the chance for the sons of the mother country to return on an organized basis and the net result would be to remove a lack of confidence in Hungary which now existed.'' The delegate of Byelorussia in a long speech supported the Czech amendment. He stressed that Hungarians were ''in the process of expelling half a million Germans. Should the Hungarians refuse to accept the return of the Hungarians now living in Slovakia, it would demonstrate that they did not wish to cooperate with their neighbors."

Viscount Hoodof England expressed sympathy with the aims of the Czechoslovak delegation but pointed out that ''unilateral solutions cannot and should not be imposed.'' He hoped ''the problem could be solved by bilateral agreement; it was the only way."

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West