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Masarykstated that he had resolved to erase hatred from his heart and wanted nothing more than friendship among the nations of Central Europe. ''The Czechoslovak Delegation had believed that the transfer of 200,000 Hungarians would be the beginning of a new era and that they would be received in Hungary with open arms as Slovakia would receive its returning sons." He mentioned that Potsdam solved the problem of the German minority in Czechoslovakia and asked why the problem of Hungarians could not be solved at Paris. He pledged to proceed in an attempt to solve the problem in the best way but described the transfer ''as the removal of a cancer by surgery, quickly and cleanly." Masarykagreed to refer the matter to the subcommittee 22

The Czechoslovak and Soviet delegates time and again used the argument that transfer of 500,000 Germans from Hungary would make plenty of space for Hungarians from Slovakia. Yet the number of the Germans in Hungary was less than half a million and a considerable group of them had moved to Germany with the retreating German army in 1944 23 Although the Hungarian government protested against the application of the Nazi principle of collective responsibility, the recurring use of this argument explained why the Soviet authorities in Budapest had pressed the Hungarian government since the spring of 1945 for expulsion of all Germans from Hungary. To increase pressure on the Hungarian government, at the Potsdam Conference the Soviets, in a surprise move, had proposed the transfer of the Germans from Hungary. Although the British and Americans at Potsdam would not contemplate such action, they did not oppose the Soviet proposal. Cavendish-Cannon, President Truman's senior adviser, tried to warn the president not to accept the sudden addition of the Germans from Hungary,24 but his intervention was of no avail. After this Soviet maneuver the tripartite agreement stated that ''transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree, that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.''

On November 20, 194S the Allied Control Council in Berlin approved a plan for transfer of Germans and allocation between zones of occupation including a schedule of movement of the German population. According to this plan 500,000 Germans from Hungary were to be admitted into the American zone.25 American and British diplomacy seemed embarrassed if not hypocritical in this matter.26

Returning to the Paris Conference, it is worthwhile to note that at the outset Masarykshowed a willingness to make territorial concessions

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in connection with transfer of the Hungarians. Visiting the American delegation on August 3, 1946, he informed Samuel Reber

in the strictest confidence that he is prepared to consider an adjustment of the frontier with Hungary if such a cession will solve the questions of the transfer of Hungarian minorities. As this is contrary to the expressed views of the Czechoslovak Government, he does not wish anything said about it at this stage of the Conference but has indicated that if Czechoslovakia does not receive satisfaction with regard to the expulsion of the Hungarian minorities this may provide a solution.27

In the course of direct negotiation between the Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations in the subcommittee (September 29), the Hungarian delegation declared readiness ''to admit Hungarians on her territory partly with, partly without territory.,' At this meeting Masarykwas unwilling to consider any territorial adjustment. He pointed out that his government had bound him concerning that principle of transfer.28 A few days before the Czechoslovak-Hungarian direct negotiation, members of the Hungarian delegation discussed with the Canadian delegation in Hotel Crillon, with the United States delegation in Hotel Meurice, and with the British delegation in Hotel George V the Hungaro-Czechoslovak conflict and particularly the combination of a territorial settlement with an exchange of population. On September 28, a member of the British delegation, James A. M. Marjoribanks visited the Hungarian delegation and discussed with our specialists the conditions of a territorial settlement. Next day Marjoribanks gave a memorandum with British suggestions to Gyöngyösiand Masarykbefore the subcommittee meeting in the Luxembourg Palace. In the course of these contacts the Hungarian delegation put forward proposals; regrettably such backdoor endeavors had no result.

In the last stage of the bilateral negotiations with the Czechoslovaks, the Hungarian delegation offered (private session of the subcommittee, September 30) to accept two-thirds of the Hungarian minority with the territory in which they lived and one-third without territorial compensation and expressed willingness to give the frontier rectification a reciprocal character.29 Such an appeal to reason did not succeed, because the Czechoslovak delegation was dominated by jingo-nationalists unable to think in long-range historical perspective. They felt powerful because of all-out Soviet support.

During the critical period of negotiations I was involved in semiofficial conversations that threw light on the way of thinking of several delegations. My reports, especially those concerning negotiation

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with the delegates of Canada and New Zealand, showed that several delegations had recognized the validity of the Czechoslovak proposal. General Pope, representative of the Canadian delegation in the Hungarian subcommittee invited me to luncheon in his Hotel Crillon apartment on September 15, and during our long conversation tried to persuade me of the necessity of compromise in connection with transfer of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.30 I explained to him the reasons of our position and was glad to see that Canada eventually refused to support the Czechoslovak amendment.

A few days later Lord Hoodinvited me to visit him at the headquarters of the British delegation in Hotel George V. He was interested in my evaluation concerning the probable votes of various delegations with respect to the Czechoslovak amendment, and I shared with him all the information we had. Then he asked me what the Hungarian delegation would do if the conference accepted the amendment. I told him that the Hungarian government would send new instructions and added that personally I would buy a railroad ticket to Budapest because I did not see any reason why the Hungarian delegation should remain in Paris after such a catastrophic decision. I pointed out that the coalition government surely would collapse. On September 23, Hoodopposed the imposition of unilateral solutions concerning the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia. After some hesitation Britain and later Canada decided to follow the United States in opposing the Czechoslovak amendment.

Costello, a delegate of New Zealand, rapporteur of the Hungarian subcommittee, came to see me unexpectedly in the Claridge on September 29 and informed me during luncheon that his government had instructed his delegation to support the Czechoslovak amendment for expulsion of Hungarians. He pointed out that the United States, Britain, Australia, and the Union of South Africa were against the amendment, but that the five Slav states together with France and New Zealand would vote for it. With possible support of India, Canada, and some other states, the amendment might obtain the two-third majority that would change the position of the United States. In view of this possibility he recommended a compromise, the transfer of Hungarians in ten years, with a yearly quota of 20,000. He expressed fear that in the case of our refusal the Hungarian population of Slovakia would be transferred to remote parts of the USSR. I refused to entertain this possibility and told him we were not willing to accept the transfer of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia under any conditions, in any shape or form. Costello became strikingly depressed during our conversation and concluded that he was ''fright

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fully sorry," because of the negative result of our exchange of views.31 Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi Auer, and I visited Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and asked for French support against the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. Bidault replied that he told the Czechoslovaks that he didn't like it. Auer asked him: "Does this mean that France would vote against the Czechoslovak amendment?'' Bidault answered in the affirmative and we were greatly relieved. A few days later I understood through the grapevine that France would support the Czechoslovak amendment and suggested to Auer that he clarify the French position at the Quai d' Orsay. He was reluctant to do so and asked me: "Didn't you hear what Bidault said?" When I detected in Lord Hoods attitude that he seemed certain that France was supporting the Czechoslovaks, I asked Gyöngyösito instruct Auer to go to the Foreign Ministry to ascertain the French position. He did so and the secretary-general informed Auer that in case of a vote France would support the Czechoslovak amendment. This incident showed a strange communication gap between Bidault and his Foreign Ministry.

Eventually the conference did not accept the Czechoslovak amendment concerning transfer of 200,000 Hungarians, but the peace treaty obligated Hungary to enter into negotiations with Czechoslovakia to solve the problem of the latter's inhabitants of Magyar ethnic origin (Article 5). United States policy and in the last stage British opposition to the transfer of Hungarians was decisive at the Paris Conference. 32

Molotovwas aware from the outset of the importance of American policy in this case. President Benes in a conversation with the American ambassador, Lawrence Steinhardt, on May 7, 1946, stated that

in the course of the talks between the Czech representatives in Paris and Molotov when the former had stressed the desire of the Czech Government to transfer its Hungarian minority to Hungary, Molotovhad indicated his acquiescence but had added, ''l must first find out how the Americans feel about it as without the Americans I can do nothing." Benes added with obvious relish that he had repeated Molotovs remark at a cabinet meeting yesterday for the benefit of the Communist members of the Government who had been visibly ''shocked'' to learn that the Soviet government did not regard itself as omnipotent.33

As we have seen, as soon as the Kremlin installed reliable Communist governments in Budapest and Prague the Hungarians no longer were considered a threat to Czechoslovakia, their equal rights for citizenship were recognized, and the bilateral negotiations provided

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in the peace treaty to solve the problem of the Magyar population in Slovakia were not considered necessary.

The other Czechoslovak amendment, which demanded transfer of five Hungarian villages for enlargement of the Bratislava bridgehead on the right bank of the Danube, ended with a compromise. Although it was difficult to find compelling reasons for this Czechoslovak proposal, except expansion for expansion's sake, the peace treaty transferred three villages to Czechoslovakia: Horvátjárfalu, Oroszvár, Dunacsún. The conference would not approve the Czechoslovak amendment for expulsion of 200,000 Hungarians, and the Allied powers, in a spirit of diplomatic compromise, apparently wanted to give some satisfaction to Prague.

Encounter with Yugoslavia

During the busiest days of the conference the Yugoslavs, in a surprising ultimatum, demanded that the Hungarian delegation sign within forty-eight hours an exchange of population agreement and an agreement on hydraulic questions. This incident occurred under curious circumstances. The secretary-general of the Yugoslav delegation, Joze Vilfan urgently asked me to meet him on August 17, that is, three days before the August 20 deadline for proposal of amendments to the draft peace treaties. Vilfaninformed me that unless the Hungarian delegation was willing to sign the two agreements within forty-eight hours, the Yugoslav government would ask the conference for insertion of the amendments in the peace treaty. In the course of a hurried conversation I tried to convince him that without adequate preparatory work, including consultation of experts from Budapest and Belgrade, it seemed next to impossible to negotiate agreements, let alone sign them, in a couple of days. It was my impression that the impromptu proposals were results of a sudden decision in the Yugoslav delegation, but according to more pessimistic interpretations the Yugoslav pressure was unusual, and SzegedyMaszákexpressed our apprehensions to the American delegation.

Vilfanapparently knew little of the intricacies and technical problems in the proposals. He did not bring background paper to our meeting. Although it was necessary to gain time, I did nor want to antagonize Vilfan because our important issue at the conference was the Czechoslovak amendment aiming at expulsion of 200,000 Hungarians. To neutralize the Yugoslavs as much as possible in our conflict with Prague, I assured Vilfanof our willingness to consider the proposals and suggested further negotiation.

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The Yugoslav delegation had submitted amendments to the conference and the Hungarian government's Observations on the Draft Peace Treaty had commented on this Yugoslav initiative as follows:

The Hungarian Delegation welcomes the initiative of the Yugoslav Delegation and adheres, in principle, to the Yugoslav proposal, under which Hungary and Yugoslavia should settle hydraulic questions affecting both countries by an agreement. It wishes to point out, however, that the matter has a wider scope, and that a satisfactory solution can only be arrived at if the countries of the Carpathian Basin settle these questions by joint action. It feels that the Conference would reach the desired results if all the Danubian countries were to participate in this settlement.34

The chairmen of the two delegations, Foreign Minister Gyöngyösiand the Deputy Prime Minister Edvard Kardelj, exchanged letters in September concerning the questions raised by Vilfanand agreed that on the basis of a voluntary exchange of populations, Hungary and Yugoslavia could exchange a maximum of 40,000 inhabitants from each country.35 This exchange agreement was born in the muddled atmosphere of the Paris Conference and never carried out. Ambassador Caffery in a succinct telegram informed Washington of withdrawal of the Yugoslav amendment and included the statement by the Hungarian legation concerning the agreement between Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Another agreement dealt with hydrographic questions. It proposed a two-man bilateral committee for maintenance and improvement of hydrographic installations divided by the boundary between Hungary and Yugoslavia. A technical agreement seemed to serve the interests of both countries.36 Well before the conference, the Hungarian government in a memorandum of November 12, 1945, addressed the three principal victorious powers on problems arising from the hydrographic unity of the Carpathian Basin and the Danubian waterway to the sea. This memorandum proposed a treaty with all the neighbors of Hungary. Such a Danubian and hydrographic treaty would have guaranteed the international status of the Danube and served the interests of all states in the Carpathian Basin.37

Human Rights without Enforcement

The peace treaties obliged the defeated states to take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under their jurisdictions, "without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of

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human rights and of the fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.38 International control for the enforcement of these rights, or an adequate machinery for the settlement of disputes concerning the execution and interpretation of the peace treaties, was not established. An Australian proposal aiming at the creation of a European Court of Human Rights was rejected.39 The British, United States, and French delegations proposed that any dispute concerning the execution or interpretation of the peace treaties, which could not be settled by direct negotiation, might be referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any party to the dispute.40 This proposition, strongly opposed by the Soviet delegation, was accepted at the conference by a vote of 15 to 6. The Council of Foreign Ministers, however, under Soviet pressure, eliminated from the final draft all reference to the International Court.

The course of events demonstrated that the system for solution of disputes inserted in the peace treaties did not prove satisfactory in the face of the tactics of the Communist-dominated Danubian countries. Their sabotage was supported, if not instigated, by the Soviet Union.41 When Great Britain and the United States in 1948 charged Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania with having violated their obligations under the respective peace treaty provisions requiring them to secure to all persons under their jurisdiction the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, they refused to recognize the existence of a dispute. The Danubian countries denounced the English and American notes as illegitimate interferences in their domestic affairs and stated that they had complied with the human rights provisions of the peace treaties. Subsequent proceedings before the General Assembly of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice brought no result.42

The Danube Question

Because the Danube is the only waterway to the sea for landlocked Hungary, it was natural that Budapest suggested that the prewar system of guaranteed free international navigation be reestablished and strengthened by provision for changes required by new conditions.

Along these lines the Hungarian government, in a note of November 15, 1945, advocated full freedom of navigation on the Danube and proposed changes in the Danube Convention, signed in Paris

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in 1921, reinstating the International Danube Commission and the European Danube Commission, possibly in a merger. Article I of the Danube Convention of 1921 provided that ''navigation is to be unrestricted and open to all flags, on a footing of perfect equality, on the entire navigable portion of the Danube, i.e., from Ulm to the Black Sea." When the Hungarian delegation visited Washington in June 1946, Prime Minister Nagy announced that he favored international control of the Danube. Secretary Byrnes noted that this was ''a surprising demonstration of independence on the part of a satellite state. "43

Freedom of navigation on the Danube was debated time and again in the CFM and in the Paris Conference, and Molotovinsisted that the question should not be settled in the peace treaties with Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria but that after the conclusion of peace all riparian countries should participate in the settlement of Danubian problems. It was obvious from the outset that Molotovs purpose was to secure exclusive control over the Danube for the riparian states, including the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. Bevin remarked that Britain, as a victorious state, wished to reestablish the position with respect to the commission of the Danube which existed in 1939, but he was not proposing that the Soviet Union be excluded from the regime of the Danube. The thrust of his proposal was the reestablishment of the regime which provided for freedom of trade and various shipping rights. Byrnes at one point suggested the following language: ''Navigation on the Danube River, its navigable tributaries and connecting canals, shall be free and open on terms of complete equality to the nationals, merchant vessels and goods of all states."44

The Soviet delegation proposed a restricted modus vivendi with validity ''so long as Allied forces are stationed on the Danube.''45 A British proposal combined features of the American and Soviet ideas.46 The repetitious debates continued without resolving the conflicting views.47

In the Economic Commission of the Paris Conference five votes were cast in favor of the Soviet proposal (Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, USSR, and Yugoslavia) and nine against (Australia, Canada France, Greece, India, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and USA). Both the United Kingdom and the USA delegations withdrew their elaborate proposals and accepted a new proposal tabled by the French delegation, a compromise solution for the much debated questions. The first paragraph was a declaration of principle on the freedom of navigation on the Danube, and the sec

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ond proposed the convocation of an international conference with the object to establish an international regime for the Danube. The commission cast eight votes for the French proposal and five against, with one abstention.48 The plenary session of the Paris Conference accepted this proposal, fourteen votes to six, with one abstention.49

At the New York session of the CFM, Molotovopposed the article on the Danube in the form adopted by the Paris Conference, but after much delay and postponements he was willing to sponsor a general declaration on the Danube.50 The council agreed to adopt the following Soviet text, amended by the United Kingdom delegation, for inclusion in the treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania:

Navigation on the Danube shall be free and open for the national vessels of commerce, and goods of all states, on a footing of equality in regard to port and navigation charges and conditions for merchant shipping. The foregoing shall not apply to traffic between ports of the same State.

This watered-down declaration was far from reestablishing the international regime of the Danube; no enforcement mechanism was attached to it and no reference was made to the validity of the 1921 Danube Convention. But the CFM agreed at the same time to call within six months of the coming-into-force of the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria' and Hungary, a conference to work out the new convention regarding the regime of navigation on the Danube to be composed of the representatives of the Danubian states: USSR, Ukrainian SSR, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and representatives of the USA, United Kingdom, and France.51 The peace treaties came into force on September 1s, 1947, and the United States proposed then the calling of a conference.

The conference met in Belgrade in the summer of 1948 and practically abolished the international regime of the Danube which was institutionalized by the Treaty of Paris in 1856 and further developed by the Danube Convention of 1921. The conference accepted by majority vote the text of the new Danubian treaty Vyshinsky brought from Moscow; he controlled the seven votes of the riparian states. Arguments and proposals of the three Western powers were disregarded. It was a Soviet concession that Austria participated in the conference ''in a consultative capacity.'' At the opening session Vyshinsky proposed the exclusion of English as an official language, and the satellite majority voted for it. Next day Vyshinsky told the Western delegates: ''The door was open for you to come in; the door is open for you to leave, if that is what you wish.'' Negotiations did not

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take place at the conference, and the seven-vote majority automatically rejected the 28 Western amendments and accepted the Soviet draft. The international regime of the Danube came to an end. The new Danube Convention was signed on August 18, 1948, without participation of the Western delegates.52

L'Europe s'en va

When I left Hungary for Paris I was still optimistic despite many disappointments, hoping that the principles proclaimed by the Allied powers during the war would influence peacemaking at the conference table. In this spirit our aide-memoires and notes addressed to the victorious powers considered not only the affairs of Hungary, but the conditions necessary for a lasting peace in Europe. During the conference I went through periods of acute despair. It became clear that we had to play the game without much hope for a just and constructive peace along the Danube. During my return trip to Budapest I recalled Mallet du Pans saying in a different context in 1792, I'Europe s'en va--Europe is vanishing. Europe certainly was vanishing for nations beyond the Iron Curtain. The conflicting ideologies and values and Soviet imperialism made impossible constructive negotiations. The differences between East and West had not been eliminated by Western concessions, and it was discouraging to see the lack of purpose and stamina in Western policies.

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West