STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

The Hungarian government ordered its diplomats who resigned abroad to return and report to the state security police. The announcement indicated that punishment for refusal to return was deprivation of citizenship and confiscation of property and other belongings in Hungary. Although confrontation with the political police, famous for brutality and torture, was a tempting proposition, to my knowledge nobody accepted the invitation.

Despite a new electoral law that facilitated abuses, during the elections held in August 1947 the Communist party had polled only 22 percent of the votes. After this electoral failure the Communists set out to liquidate the opposition parties and void the parliamentary mandates of opposition members. Many deputies escaped from Hungary to avoid arrest. The Smallholder president of the republic, Zoltan Tildy was forced to resign, and his son-in-law, Viktor Csornoky, was executed for treason. Single-list elections were held in May 1949, and on August 20 Hungary was declared a People's Republic. Despite the inglorious end of the Hungarian Republic, an important psychological factor remained: the Hungarian people had defeated the Communists in elections and acquired some practice in the ways of democracy under very difficult conditions.

Simultaneous with seizure of political power, the Communists applied their usual methods in banking, industry, commerce, collectivization of agriculture, in religious and cultural affairs. Prominent Catholic and Protestant churchmen were intimidated, forced to resign, or jailed. Joseph Mindszentys trial and imprisonment for life in February 1949 had particularly strong repercussions.1 A merger of the Socialist and Communist parties eliminated old-time Socialist leaders and created the Hungarian Workers party 2 in June 1948. As the Cominform rift with Titobecame more embittered, a sweeping purge began in the Hungarian Communist party. A former minister of interior and foreign minister, László Rajk, and other potential

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leaders of a national Communist movement were executed. A large number of Communists were jailed for years and some of them tortured, including János Kádár a former minister of interior, who was jailed from 1951 to 1954.

Political and social changes in Hungary were directed by a small group of Moscow-trained Communists under the leadership of Mátyás Rákosi. This Soviet-dictated reign of terror lasted until the political ''thaw" that followed Stalin's death in 1953. The new masters of the Kremlin realized the necessity of political changes in Hungary, and summoned the leaders of the Hungarian Communist party to Moscow in June, blamed Rakosi for worsening conditions in Hungary, and ordered Imre Nagy to form a government and inaugurate new policies.3 In July 1953, in his first public address as prime minister, Nagy confessed the overall failure of Communist policies and outlined a ''New Course.,, He ended deportations and emptied concentration camps, freeing Communists and non Communists alike. Peasants were allowed to leave collective farms which they did on a large scale. A People's Patriotic Front was established to win popular support. Nagy, however, did not enjoy Moscow's support for long. Rákosi remained first secretary of the Cornrnunist party, and by the end of 1954 had undermined Nagy's position in Moscow; he branded the ''New Course" as ''right-wing deviationism." Nagy had to resign and later was expelled from the Politburo and the Central Committee and, in November 1955, from the Communist party. His successor, András Hegedüs by that time Rákosi's puppet, modified the new course by placing emphasis on heavy industry and farm collectivization. But there was no complete reversal, and a measure of criticism continued within the Communist party.

While the struggle of the pro- and anti-Stalinist groups raged in the Hungarian Communist party, the Hungarian press echoed Moscow's propaganda against colonialism and foreign intervention. The Bandung Conference, Khrushchevs and Bulganins trip to India their spectacular reconciliation with Titoand the Declaration of Belgrade, which emphasized every country's right to choose its road to socialism, and above all, Khrushchevs condemnation of some of Stalin's crimes at the Twentieth CPSU Congress, February 24-25

1956, strengthened the anti-Stalinist and liberalizing trends in Hungary. Opposition to Rákosi became more vocal, and an almost Inevitable rapprochement took place between Communist intellectuals and the Hungarian people.

The Central Committee elected a new Politburo, which

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rehabilitated several hundred party officials. Hungary's chief prosecutor admitted that hundreds of people had been unjustly jailed and executed. Communist intellectuals expressed criticism: the Writer's Union, and later the Petőfi Circle, (authorized as a debating club in March 1956) and students, organizations, demanded punishment of Rákosi, calling for his resignation and Imre Nagy's return to office. In one meeting of the Petőfi Circle, Rajk's widow demanded punishment of her husband's ''murderers.'' Students and writers were seismographs that reflected the feelings of the people.

Riots in Poland influenced developments in Hungary. In the name of the Soviet Presidium, Anastas T. Mikoyan demanded Rákosi's resignation at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist party. Rákosi resigned and was replaced by his close collaborator, Gerő. The slow liberalization continued. The government submitted to questioning by parliament. In September, the Budapest radio announced an amnesty for Catholic priests. At the end of the month Gero joined Marshal Titoand Khrushchevat Yalta reportedly for talks on loosening Soviet control over Eastern Europe.

It is outside the scope of this epilogue to discuss the dramatic events in October that led to the glorious days of the Hungarian revolution. Soviet military intervention united the country almost to a man. Communist-educated youth, indoctrinated workers, and soldiers--in whose name the regime ruled--organized and fought a revolution against tyrants and foreigners who exploited them in the name of the fatherland of the proletariat. The Communist party, which numbered almost 900,000, disintegrated. Revolutionary and Workers Councils sprang up all over the country.

Belatedly the Communist leadership tried to take the wind out of the revolutionary sails. At a stormy meeting in the early hours of October 25, the Central Committee appointed Imre Nagy prime minister and selected a new Politburo and Secretariat. Next day Soviet tanks escorted Mikoyan and Mikhail A. Suslovto headquarters of the Communist party. Gerő was then removed as first secretary of the Party, succeeded by János Kádár

Apart from the state security police and a hard core of party elite, Moscow had no support in the country. In the first phase of the revolution the unorganized freedom fighters stalemated the Soviet army in Budapest. The center of military resistance was the Kilian Barracks under command of Colonel Pál Maleter and the revolt began to spread outside Budapest.

Nagy moved to the parliament building and formed a new government on October 27 that included Communists and non-Communists.

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He dissolved the hated security police and abolished the one party system, promising free elections and the end of collectivization of agriculture. His actions were supported by Kádar, who called for a new Communist party to defend socialism and democracy, ''not by slavishly imitating foreign examples, but by taking a road suitable to the economic and historic characteristics of our country.'' Mikoyan and Suslovagain flew to Budapest seeking compromise. On October 30, the Soviet government declared:

Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation, the Soviet Government has given its military command instructions to withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon as this is considered necessary by the Hungarian Government. At the same time the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into the appropriate negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.

In harmony with this statement the Soviet army withdrew almost completely from Budapest. Nagy reconstituted his government on October 30 and undertook to form a broad coalition based on parties that had existed in 1945. Non-Communist parties began to reorganize. Alarming reports came that Soviet armored divisions were arriving on Hungarian territory. Nagy energetically protested to the Soviet ambassador, Yuri Andropov, on November 1 and 2. When Andropov professed to have no knowledge of these troop movements, Nagy announced Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, declared Hungary's neutrality with unanimous approval of the Council of Ministers, and asked the United Nations to consider the Hungarian situation. He appealed to Dag Hammarskjöld and requested him ''promptly to put on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations the question of Hungary's neutrality and the defense of this neutrality by the four great Powers. "4

Nagy again reconstituted his government on November 3, and the Smallholders' Social Democrats, and Communists obtained three ministers each and the Petőfi (Peasant) party two. Minister of Defense Pal Maleterwas a non-party man. The same day, negotiations between representatives of the Hungarian government and the Soviet High Command on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary progressed so satisfactorily that general agreement was reached by afternoon. The Soviet High Command invited Maleterand other representatives of the Hungarian army to Soviet army headquarters

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near Budapest to discuss the settlement of remaining technical details. Hungarian delegates attended a banquet given them by the Soviet High Command--Maletereven telephoned Nagy to report progress in the talks. The delegates never returned. After dinner they were arrested--reportedly by General Ivan Serov, chief of the Soviet security police.

Simultaneously, Soviet armored divisions began to encircle Budapest, attacking the city in the early hours of November 4. Imre Nagy then delivered his last radio address to the Hungarian people:

Today at daybreak Soviet troops attacked our capital with the obvious intent of overthrowing the legaJ democratic Hungarian government. Our troops are in combat. The government is at its post. I notify the people of our country and the entire world of this fact.5

Ruthless fighting went on in Budapest for three days, and armed resistance continued in the city and in isolated spots throughout the country for a few more days. Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty freed during the revolt, sought refuge at the United States legation. Nagy and several of his followers were granted asylum at the Yugoslav embassy.

During the last days of Nagy's premiership the turn of events frightened many Communists, who sensed that Moscow would not tolerate return to a multi-party system and Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Among them was Kádár who disappeared and returned to Budapest a few days later in the wake of Soviet tanks as the head of the new Soviet-sponsored government. Although he promised to maintain achievements of the revolution, a policy of terror and repression followed for some years. Most of the atrocities reportedly were committed by Soviet authorities, but Kádárhad to assume responsibility. In an agreement with the Yugoslav government he gave a pledge of safe conduct to Imre Nagy and his collaborators who had received asylum at the Yugoslav embassy and stated that the Hungarian government did not desire to punish them for past activities. Nonetheless Soviet soldiers arrested Nagy and his associates when they left the Yugoslav embassy, and inJune 1958 the condemnation and execution of Imre Nagy, General Pál Maleter and several others was announced. The Hungarian people were shocked by the treachery that befell persons who believed in Soviet and Communist pledges.

After a period of repression Kádar's rule relaxed, and in the 1960s he made gestures for reconciliation with the Hungarian people. The public began to appreciate the improved living conditions and some freedom, including trips to Western countries. The key to Kádárs

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success has been a tripartite compromise by his government, by the Kremlin, and by the Hungarian people.

Systematic appraisal of Kádárs rule over the past quarter of a century and more would need a separate volume, and I limit my comments to a few observations. Kádárrealized he could not obtain popular support without liberalization and knew from the outset that without the Kremlin's support no major policy changes, let alone reforms, were feasible. Hence, he has established a solid working relationship with Moscow. Nikita Khrushchevput him in power and was his staunch supporter. After Khrushchevs dismissal Kádársucceeded in winning the confidence of Leonid Brezhnev who praised Kádárs policy publicly on several occasions.

The Hungarian people had defeated the Communists by ballots in 1945 and vainly tried to regain freedom with bullets in 1956, but then they saw in Kádárs policy a better alternative--the other course being repressive Stalinist rule. All the while, Western notes of protest and United Nations resolutions did not affect Soviet abuses in Hungary. Bitter experience made clear to Hungarians that they could not expect effective Western action for alleviation of their fate

In the course of his reforms Kádárhimself visited West European capitals, and foreign dignitaries visited Budapest. This practice, begun in the mid-1960s, had intensified as the years went by. The idea of Danubian cooperation was revived. Hungarian spokesmen emphasized the common destiny of Danubian nations and the necessity of collaboration. They mentioned Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia as a nucleus for a Danubian cooperative structure.6 Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 put an end to such schemes, which Moscow always opposed.

In domestic affairs one of the most daring steps was introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in January 1968. Hungarian specialists recognized that the built-in inefficiency of the centrally directed Communist economic system was the major cause of economic stagnation, and they introduced aspects of market economy, allowing operation of the law of supply and demand and including decentralization and increased responsibility of managers. Central planning was retained, but enterprises obtained autonomy in regard to output, marketing, and sales. For managers, performance became all-important. Progress was not continuous because recession in Western countries had adverse effects on the Hungarian economy and hard liners in the Communist party slowed down the efforts of NEM. But in the late 1970s reforms continued for an accelerated adjustment of the economy to the world market on the basis of a more

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realistic wage and price structure. Since in the orthodox Communist economy there was little correlation between production cost and subsidized market prices, food and other consumer commodity prices were boosted several times. Higher prices of agricultural products tended to reflect the reality of production costs, discourage domestic sales, and facilitate export. But wages and salaries have increased less than food prices, and this has caused hardship for the population. Yet in Hungary both white and blue collar workers may supplement their income in a flourishing private economy. Moonlighting has been widespread for many years, and in January 1982 economic reform legislation allowed formation of private small business companies. Since industry badly needed modern technology, Hungarian enterprises concluded several hundred joint ventures, co-production, and other cooperation agreements with German, Austrian, American, and other Western firms, mainly in machine-building, light industry, and agriculture-related industries.

Contrary to over-industrialization in most Communist countries, resource-poor Hungary decided to invest in all forms of agriculture. Industrial production methods in large collective farms were important to the success of the Hungarian economy. American machinery and production methods were successfully applied. Major American companies, like International Harvester and the Heston Corporation, closely cooperated with Hungarian enterprises like the Rába Works a heavy machinery factory in Győr. Co-production and licensing agreements were the usual forms of cooperation. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report of December 1981 noted that ''In Hungary, a combination of centralized planning with a high degree of individual economic initiative and market orientation has probably contributed to the success of the agro-food sector." The report concluded that Hungary was likely ''to improve its food export position in Eastern and Western markets."

Tiny household plots of collective farmers in Hungary are important in agriculture; they provide not merely for the home market but for export to hard-currency countries and the Soviet Union. Managers of state and collective farms run their operations like businesses. After their shifts, workers rush home to till their home plots. At the Party Congress in February 1981, Brezhnevtold delegates that the Communist world should learn from Hungary's agricultural policy.

At the present time in Russia's Europe, Hungary probably enjoys the best reputation in Western countries for achievement in economic and financial matters, intensification of cultural relations with Western countries, liberalization of life as much as possible in

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a Communist country under Soviet occupation, and, not least skillful handling of foreign dignitaries in Budapest and abroad. But the social fiber of Hungarian society is in critical condition. The national life has ominous features not noticed by casual visitors.

Because ballots in 1945 and bullets in 1956 failed to bring freedom and independence in the Western sense, Hungarians turned to consumerism. Carpe diem. Pleasure became the goal of many people not influenced by higher purpose and the nation's future. Abortions, divorces, alcoholism, and suicide rates have been at record highs for many years, and population growth is stagnant because of the low birth rate. This is a danger signal for a small nation in a strategically important crossroad along a highway of invason. While more than half of Poland's population is under the age of thirty, Hungary has an aging population, with all its problems and forebodings. Admittedly, living conditions are still difficult. Many dwellings were destroyed in Hungary during the war, especially during the siege of Budapest, and later in the Hungarian revolution. Despite efforts to rebuild, housing remains critically short, and this situation has far-reaching social consequences for young couples unable to find decent housing. Privileged people receive housing within a short time, while others have to wait ten years or more for a modest home. As a result of rapid industrialization and introduction of industrial production methods in collective farms, the influx to cities from villages has accelerated and made the housing crisis worse. Government measures have improved the situation of working mothers, giving benefits especially to families with more than two children; but without a change in the moral climate the long-range predicaments of the nation will not change. Children are conspicuously absent even in affluent families. When there is a choice between a child and an automobile, or a trip abroad, the child loses. Churches do not have enough authority and cannot be effective in moral matters as long as their primary obligation is to give all-out support to official policies. Yet individuals and nations do not live by bread alone. There are signs in Hungary in recent years that consumerism no longer satisfies some groups of young people. This trend is perhaps a sign of a better future for the Hungarian nation.

Irrespective of success or failure of domestic policies, Hungary's political predicament remains. Soviet troops in Hungary are not conspicuous; but the government, the army, and security forces at home and intelligence abroad remain under Soviet control. It is paradoxical and symbolic that the sophisticated military fortifications along Hungary's western border have remained, although visa requirements

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with neutral Austria were dropped. The future is uncertain because of aging leadership in Moscow and Budapest. The Kremlin tolerated reforms in Hungary because Kádárcarefully consulted Moscow in advance. Khrushchev Brezhnev and Andropov recognized and openly praised Hungary's achievements, especially in agriculture. But Kádárs success has been a unique phenomenon in Eastern Europe, and Hungarians anxiously ask the question; will Kádársm survive Kádár The Soviet Politbureau and Kádárs successors will determine freedom in politics and economics, in culture and religion. Hungarian authorities are still controlled by Moscow, partly through intergovernmental relations, partly through Communist party channels and the ubiquitous KGB.

In the long haul of history the captive status of the East European countries is bound to change. The USSR is the last multinational imperialistic empire, and in many ways it is a reactionary Great Power. It is not the wave of the future, as people suggested in 1917 and after. Recently Jean-Baptiste Duroselles seminal book, tout Empire périra,7 reminded that all empires in the past perished and will do so in the future. Yet the declining period of a militarily strong empire could be uncomfortable for subjugated people; disgruntled and frightened rulers are increasingly inclined to use force to prolong their domination. An outright collapse of Russia would create enormous problems, although a dissolution of the Soviet Empire would be in the interest of the world community, and it may take place under unforeseen and unsuspected circumstances. Rapid growth of non-Slavic people in the USSR might lead to internal tension and increasing discrimination. Disregard of elementary needs and interests of large segments of the population combined possibly with competition of antagonistic power groups might cause additional problems. Such developments might expedite change. Although Western diplomacy could cautiously support liberalizing trends and reasonable transformations in the USSR, in reality Western states have seldom used their superior technology and economic power for such purposes. Sharing of Western know-how has helped time and again the growth of Russian industrial and military strength, and Soviet intelligence has carried out many successful operations in this area. Trade and reasonable financial arrangements could be mutually advantageous between Western countries and Eastern Europe. But it should not be a oneway street as it often was during the cozy period of detente and especially in the late 1970s. Transfer of high technology and financial transactions facilitated the gigantic Soviet armament developments

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both in the conventional and atomic fields and in outer space. At the same time Moscow engaged in expansive and aggressive actions on a global scale.

All the while the external debt of East European states increased rapidly. After 1973, OPEC countries deposited large sums in Western banks, which were eager to lend them in a profitable, safe manner. The credit-worthiness of Communist countries was taken for granted, and Western governments guaranteed many loans. Normal banking procedure would have required examination of the general economy and management of countries soliciting loans, scrutiny of specific projects, and establishment of conditions for loans. Under easy-going banking practices the USSR and other East European countries accumulated approximately $80 billion loans. In most East European states debts to Western banks and governments increased far more than their export potential to Western countries. In this, Hungary has been a notable exception; despite a large foreign debt, it is still considered credit-worthy abroad.

There are other complicating factors in East-West relations. As a result of the Second World War the overlord of the East European countries became a Great Power with largely non-European political and cultural traditions. While most East European nations had participated for ten centuries in West European political and intellectual developments, Russia did not. Greek Orthodox Christianity formed a link with the Eastern Roman Empire, and after the fall of Constantinople the Russians considered Moscow a ''Third Rome" that is, the center of true Christianity. In the thirteenth century the Tartar occupation severed Russia's political and cultural relations with the West and later the Russians lived under the authoritarian rule of the Czars. Even if some of them, like Peter the Great or Catherine the Great, were interested in European industrial development or intellectual currents, such interests did not affect authoritarian rule in Russia. In the twentieth century efforts were made to introduce a parliamentary system, and in 1917 the Kerensky government held nation-wide elections on a multi-party basis. But the Bolsheviks seized power and by military force dissolved the democratically elected parliamcnt in which Communist deputies formed a minority. The basis of their power has become a doctrine, not popular approval. Because of this background, any substantial reorganization of the Soviet Union would be a pas dans l'inconnue. Russia did not participate in the major Western intellectual currents, such as the Renaissance, Reformation

Counter-Reformation or the Enlightenment and understood few of

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the ideas of the American and French revolutions. The Russian people did not have experience with a free government. The authoritarian rule of the Czars was followed by a totalitarian dictatorship. Religious zeal of a "Third Rome,' was replaced by a Communist doctrine of global aspirations. The Bolsheviks liquidated the Western-oriented intellectuals and social classes.

Although Leninand Stalin, like Hitlerand Mao, announced clearly what they wanted to accomplish, Western statesmen did not believe what the dictators said--it seemed sheer propaganda. In our time the shortcomings of Communist political and economic systems have become clear in widely separated regions of the world and the attraction of freedom has been nearly ubiquitous, although in some cases blunders of Western diplomacy have annulled the appeals of democratic systems. In the era of radio and other means of mass communication, dictatorships cannot hide the facts of life forever. In the Soviet Union people have little influence on allocation of resources; decisions are made by a handful of persons, usually members of the politburo; production of consumer goods has been neglected, and enormous quantities of armament, both conventional and atomic, have been produced. Moscow has established military bases in faraway regions such as Cuba and countries in Asia and Africa. But people in Communist countries and the Third World cannot eat tanks missiles, and fighter planes--the major Soviet export items, other than raw materials.

In case of political upheaval in Russia's Europe there would be a general desire for a more humane, cooperative, and productive society in terms of availability of consumer goods and, above all, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom. Under favorable political conditions Eastern Europe could be reorganized in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and other declarations approved by the principal victorious powers during the Second World War. If the principle of self-determination would be applied, subjugated nations might have several options. One would be a democratic Danubian federation or a larger East European unit. Alternatives have been proposed, but in a fluid situation much would depend on the political acumen and vision of leaders of the East European countries.

The economy of this borderland between East and West needs a massive amount of industrial raw materials and sources of energy from Russia and modern technology from Western states. A neutral East European federation hence could contribute to a cooperative state system, from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the Urals and beyond.

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Such developments are in the clouds of an uncertain future. Under existing conditions, national character, humanity, stamina, and intelligence will play a role in East European countries. Ability to maneuver will depend on world politics, primarily on the Kremlin,s policy and the interaction of three power centers: Washington , Moscow, and the Western European states. In the immediate future Hungary and the other East European countries will have to muddle through, as best they can, while not losing hope for a better future.

This is a melancholy conclusion because the aspiration of people associated with me since the 1930s was the creation of a democratic federation in Eastern Europe. In this union the centrally located Hungarian people could have cooperated constructively with all neighbors. Such plans were swept away by the Second World War and postwar peacemaking. But it is a consolation and encouragement that the Hungarian nation showed resolve, resistance, and joie de vivre amidst apocalyptic events.

Generations of East Europeans fought and refought battles for their freedom. The Hungarian revolutions of 1848-49 and 1956 showed that a small nation cannot prevail against the overwhelming military might of Great Powers. Yet one should not lose faith in the just cause of people living in the borderland between Central Europe and Russia. If leaders of these nations believe in the righteous cause of a cooperative Eastern Europe, some unexpected turn of history might bring opportunity for its realization. People associated with me did not lose faith during difficult years, and I hope that such faith will guide the leaders of East European countries long after I and my contemporaries have passed on.

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West