STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

2. Vladimir Clementis, ''The Czechoslovak-Magyar Relationship, The Central European Observer ( 1943): 69.

3. ''1 fought desperately against everything. 1 had an internal front, the so-called Sudeten-German front, then the Slovak front, and the French and English front and besides there was Hitler', Dr. Eduard Benes, Sest Let Exilu A Drűihe Svetove Války (Praha: Orbis, 1946), p. 16. In his enumeration President Benes did not mention the Hungarians, who probably did not cause him any uneasiness. For detailed material see the two memoranda submitted by the Hungarian delegation to the Conference of Paris on September 19, 1946: 1. ''Czechoslovak declarations concerning the loyal and democratic attitude of the Hungarians in Slovakia" and 2. "The Slovaks and the disintegration of the Czechoslovak Republic.", Hungary and the Conference of Paris, vol. 4, pp. 48-59, 79-81.

4. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, Munich. Prologue to Tragedy (London: Macmillan, 1948). For subsequent developments in Czechoslovakia see George F. Kennan , From Prague After Munich--Diplomatic Papers 1938-1940 (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1968); Wenzel Jaksch, Europe's Road to Potsdam (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 328-48.

5. Jaksch, Europe's Road to Potsdam, pp. 3S1-458.

6. FRUS 1944, 3: 967.

7. Serie Y, Carton 45, Dossier 6, Archives du ministere des Affaires etrangeres (hereafter MAE).

8. Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War, p. 227. Benes stated in early 1944: ''For twenty years we have settled the Ruthenian question temporarily, but the final settlement can only be union with the Soviets." Compton Mackenzie, Dr. Benes (London: George G. Harrap, 1946), p. 290.

9. Mastny, "The Benes-Stalin-MolotovConversations in December 1943" New Documents, pp. 367-402.

10. Pnipevky k historicke demografi Slovenska; (Praha, 1928), pp. 306, 311.

11. See for the pertinent facts and bibliographical references, the memorandum submitted to the Conference of Paris by the Hungarian delegation on September 14, 1946, under the title ''The Hungarian Population of South Slovakia.'' Hgagary and the Conference of Paris, vol. 4, pp. 128-75.

12. For the list of discriminatory laws and decrees see, Hvaga7y and the Conference of Paris, vol. 2, pp. 150-52; and vol. 4 pp. 176-86.

13. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 1-3

14. Ibid., pp. 10-12.

15. For the list of the protests, see Ibid., pp., pp. 155-63.

16. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

17. Ibid., pp. 15-29.

18. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

19. Ibid., pp. 54-SS. The latter part of the British refusal referred to certain Hungarian proposals put forward at the negotiations in Prague in December, 194S by the Hungarian delegation and communicated to the three powers by the note of December 11, 194S. Ibid., pp. 50-53.

20. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

21. Ibid., p. S.

22. Ibid., pp. S-7.

23. Nepszava, October 25 and 27, 1945.

24. Hungary and the Conference of Paris, vol. 2, pp. 30-34.

25. Ibid., pp. 35-38.

26. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 29.

27. Statisticky Zpravodaj, Official Bulletin of the Czechoslovak Statistical Office, 1945, no. 6, p. 114.

28. ''The number of Slovaks in Hungary vasuncertain. In the twenties it had been about 150,000, but it had decreased. Fantastic figures were current in Slovakia. The Slovak Communists showed themselves wilder chauvinists than the Slovak nationalists, even more than the Fascists of Tiso. Husak, the communnist chairman of the Board of Commissioners, claimed that there svere 400,000 Slovaks in Hungary, and that 400,000 Hungarians could therefore be expelled." Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York, 19S1), p. 344. Seton-Watson remarked that he personally heard these fantastic figures from the mouth of Husak, in April 1947. Clementis repeatedly alleged at the Prague negotiations and in September 1946, at the Conference of Paris, that there were 450,000 Slovaks in Hungary. Hungary and the Conference of Pans, vol. 4 pp. 28, 62.

29. Hungary and the Conference of Paris, vol 2. pp. 42-43.

30. Ibid., pp. 44.-47

31. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

32. My report of this conversation was deposited in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry (76/Be - 1946).

33. Hungary and the Conference of Paris, vol. 2, pp. 50-53.

34. Ibid., pp. 61-64.

35. Before we left for Prague, a Transylvanian politician, Bela Demeter, informed me at the railroad station that Marshal Voroshilovrecently told the president of the republic, Zoltan Tildy that the problem of Transylvania would be solved to our satisfaction if we took a more conciliatory attitude toward Czechoslovakia and, as a first step of a reasonable policy, would conclude the population exchange agreement with Prague.

36. For the text of the Czechoslovak reply and my note of the conversation with Krno see Hungary and the Conference of Pans, vol. 2, pp. 65-66.

37. Ibid., pp. 78-79.

38. For the text of the agreement concerning the exchange of populations, with Annex, Protocol, and the letters exchanged, see Hungary and the Conference of Paris, vol. 2, pp. 69-87. The subsequent narrative in this chapter is based on published documents and other texts included in the Confidential Gazette prepared by the political division of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry in 1947-48, for the information of Hungary's diplomatic representatives abroad. Francis Wagner, Hungarian consul in Bratislava until November 1948, gave me valuable information concerning the execution of the population exchange and related happenings.

39. For the text of the debates, see Nemzetgyülési Értesitő, (Official Gazette of the National Assembly) sessions 31, 32, 33, pp. 7-19, 37-115.

40. Hungary and the Conference of Paris, vol.2, pp. 88-90.

41. Ibid., pp. 91

42. Ibid., pp. 131-138.

43. Ibid.., p. 137.

44. Ibid., p. 119.

45. For the full text of the two notes, see ibid., pp. 92-130.

46. Ibid., vol. 4, pp. 41-42.

47. Ibid., p. 67.

48. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

49. The commission was formed according to the provisions of the population exchange agreement and began its sessions in Bratislava on June 3, 1946.

50. See for the full text of the Clementis-Gyöngyösiexchange of letters, Hungary and the Conference of Pans, vol. 4, pp. 120-24.

51. Pravda, Bratislava, November 1, 1946.

52. Narodna Obroda, November 13, 1946.

53. Pravda, Bratislava, November 16, 1946.

54. For a detailed description of concrete cases, see The Deportation of the Hungarians of Slovakia (Budapest: Hungarian Society for Foreign Affairs, 1947).

55 . Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger stated on January 50, 1947, that 30,000 Hungarian workers (with their families, 90,000 persons) were removed from Slovakia.

56. The Hungarian representatives complained because of the persistent expulsion and deportations of Hungarians. Moreover, the promised social assistance was not given to Hungarians who have been deprived of their employment or pensions. The confiscation of properties of Hungarian individuals and churches were continued.

57. The text of the agreement was published in the March-April 1947 issue of the Confidential Gazette of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, pp. 18-24 .

58. György Lázár, ''A népek barátságáért, a reakcio és a sovinizmus ellen" (For the friendship of peoples, against reaction and chauvinism), Tiszatáj (1981): 24-30.

59. These data were included in a report by the East European Research Institute in Budapest. Cf. Francis S. Wagner, Hungarians in Czechoslovakia (New York: Research Institute for Minority Studies, 19S9), pp. 11-37; idem, "'The Nationality Problem in Czechoslovakia After World War Il," Studies for a New Central Europe, series 2, no. 2 (1968-69): 73-82.

60. Yuraj Zvara, A magyar nemzetiségi kérdés megoldása Szlovákiában. (The Solution of the Hungarian Nationality Question in Slovakia) (Bratislava, 1965), p. 36. See also Kalman Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority 1945-1948 (New York: Social Science Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, 1982.) The author is a Czechoslovak citizen who described the experiences of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia during the era of persecution. This volume was published in Hungarian in Munich in 1977, under the title, A hontalanság évei (The Homeless Years). The translator, Stephen Borsody, wrote a preface and Gyula Illyes, the Introduction.

61. The number of the actually expelled ''war criminals,' outnumbered several times this figure.

2 W. Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World, (London: George & Unwin, 1971), p. 44.

3. FRUS 1943 ''Teheran Conference,'' pp. 566-67.

4. Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 53.

5. Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (Garden City, NJ.: Doubleday, 955), p. 350.

6. Pierson Dixon, Double Diploma (Hutchinson of London, 1968), pp. 17S-77

7. Ibid., p. 176.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 177.

10. See for the pertinent exchange of notes, FRUS 194S, 2 ''Conference of Berlin," pp. 1543-56.

11. Ibid., p. 1SS3.

12. A British witness, Sir Pierson Dixon, described the emotional debates of the Big Three concerning the interpretation of the Potsdam formula for peace negotiations. Dixon, Double Diploma, pp. 183-94. Prime Minister Attlee addressed a long telegram to Stalin on September 23 in which he summarized the Western interpretation of the Berlin Protocol and asked Stalin to authorize the Soviet delegation to adhere to the decision taken on September 11. Francis Williams, A Prime Minster Remembers (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 151-S3.

13. I received this information from a member of the American delegation, Philip E. Mosely. Molotovs question was facetious. He had recognized the Hungarian aspiration for Transylvanian territory when he proposed in 1940 that Hungary cooperate with the Soviet Union against Rumania. He considered the Hungarian claim justified and promised support.

14. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 104-5.

15. Bulletin 13 (1945): 710.

16. For the text of these documents, see FRUS 1945, S: 633-41. Cf. Mark Ethridge and C.E. Black, ''Negotiating on the Balkans, 1945-1947," in Negotiating with the Russians, ed. Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951), pp. 171-206; Cyril E. Black, ''The Start of the Cold War in Bulgaria: A Personal View.,, The Review of Politics 41 (1979): 163-202.

17. Harriman, Special Envoy, pp. 511-22; James F. Byrnes, All In One Lifetime (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), idem, p. 319; Speaking Frankly, p. 108. Harriman informed the French ambassador to the USSR General Georges Catroux of his negotiations with Stalin and Molotov and Catroux had sent reports to Paris although he did not receive satisfactory explanations why France was left out from the forthcoming meeting of foreign ministers. MAE, Serie Y, Carton 45, Dossier 7, 194S, Conference de Moscou.

18. Harriman, Ibid., p. 523. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 109; idem, All in One Lifetime, pp. 326-27.

19. See Bonnet's report of December 8 to Paris. MAE Serie Y, Carton 4S, Dossier 7, 1945, Conference de Moscou.

20. For the United States record of the Moscow Conference, see FRUS 1945, 2: 560-826. Byrnes reported on the Moscow meeting of foreign ministers in a radio address on December 30, 194S, see Bulletin 13 (1945): 1033-36, 1047.

21. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 2S5. For President Truman's criticism concerning Byrnes, actions and behavior in Moscow, see Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 546-53.

22. Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), pp. 60-72

23. See Chauvel's memorandum of the conversation, December 31, 1945. MAE Serie Y, Carton 45, Dossier 7.

24. There is no evidence that Molotovneglected Bevin on social occasions. Cf. Dixon, Double Diploma, pp. 199-206.

25. Dejean's telegram of January 3, 1945. MAE Serie Y, Carton 45, Dossier 7. After a victorious battle in June 1807, Napoleon met AlexanderI and Frederick William III on a raft in the Niemen River and concluded with Russia and Prussia the treaties of Tilsit of short duration.

26. Ibid.

27. See Ibid., Bonnet's report of December 31, 1945.

28. For the full text see the press release issued simultaneously in London, Paris, and Washington on January 15,1946. Bulletin, January 27, 1946: 112. For Ambassador Caffery's reports see FRUS 1946, 2: 1-6

29. Truman, Year of Decisions, pp. 547-52. The letter was first published in 1952 in William Hillman's Mr. President, and Byrnes denied immediately that Tmman ever had read it to him; in his memoirs, All in One Lifetime, he characterized their meeting aboard the Williamsburg as ''cordial" (p. 343) and quoted Truman's press conference of January 8, 1946, when he ''repeated the commendation of my course at Moscow which he wholeheartedly gave me on the Williamsburg after my return." (p. 347) About the letter controversy see, Ibid., pp. 400-403. Cf. Ferrell, Off the Record, pp. 78-80. George Curry, James Francis Byrnes, vol. 14 in The American Secretaries of St3te and Their Diplomacy (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1965), pp. 183-90, 313-14.

30. For the conference of Deputies see John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs' 1945-]947 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 111-18. Cf. FRUS 1946, 2: 10-87.

31. Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 255.

32. FRUS, 1946, 2 ''Council of Foreign Ministers," pp. 124-26.

33. Ibid., pp. 146-48

34. FRUS 1946, 2: 277-78, 309.

35. For the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers see FRUS 1946, 2: 88-940. Cf. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 124-37; idem, All in One Lifetime, pp. 357-80; The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 19S2), pp. 262-303; My Name is Tom Connally, Senator Tom Connally as told to Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1954), pp. 297-303; Curry, James Francis Byrf7es, pp. 210-83; Campbell, United States in World Affairs, pp. 118-45.

36. FRUS 1946, 2: 852-54. Article VII provided that ''The Conference may decide to amend or suspend the provisions of the rules of procedure after their adopting."

37. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 187-94; idem, All in One Lifetime, pp. 367-70.

38. FRUS 1946, 4: 875, footnote 71. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 239-48; idem, All in One Lifetime, pp. 371-76. Truman, Year of Decisions, pp . 3 S 5-60 .

39. Philip E. Mosely, ''Peace-Making, 1946,'' International Organization l (194G): 31.

40. FRUS 1946, 3: 645-48.

41. Harold Nicolson, ''Peacemaking at Paris: Success, Failure or Farce?" Foreign Affairs 2S (1946-1947): 190. He mentioned in the article that an unofficial poll was taken among the journalists of 27 countries who had followed the proceedings. They were asked whether they regarded the conference as having been (a) a success; (b) a failure; (c) a farce? ''Of these journalists, 51 replied that it had been a success, 56 that it had been a failure, and 33 that it had been a farce." Ibid.

42. Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 2S5-56. Cf. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 152-54; idem, All in One lifetime, pp. 382-83.

43. For the record of the New York session see, FRUS 1946, 2: 965-1563.

44. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 19G2), p. 114.

45. Secretary Brynes defended vigorously the Potsdam arrangement for peacemaking in Speaking Frankly, p. 159.

46. Article 22 of the Hungarian treaty provided: ''Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty, all Allied forces shall, within a period of 90 days, be withdrawn from Hungary, subject to the right of the Soviet Union to keep on Hungarian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria." (The same text is Article 22 in the Rumanian Peace Treaty.)

47. Philip E. Mosely, ''Hopes and Failures: American Policy Toward East Central Europe: 1941-1947" in The Fate of East Central Europe, ed. Stephen I). Kertesz (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), p. 74.

1. La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 178-81.

2. fERUS 1946, 3: 84.

3. Memoirs of MichaelKárolyi(New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957), p. 333. During the war Károlyisupported the idea of a federal Europe in which the Danubian federation would have formed a part. Ibid., p. 303.

4. Ivan Boldizsár published his notes and comments on the Paris Conference in a Hungarian periodical, Kortárs, March and April, 1982.

5. For complexity of Bulgarian developments in 1944-1947, see Cyril E. Black, ''The View from Bulgaria," in Witnesses to the Origin of the Cold War, ed. Thomas T. Hammond (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), pp. 60-97.

6. Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 22-23 .

7. FRUS 1946, 3: 239.

8. Ibid., p. 242.

9. Refuge en Hongrie 1941-1945 (Paris: 1946), published by the escaped French war prisoners.

10. For the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers, see SUS 1946, 4: 102-9; for Observations on the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary by the Hungarian Government, ibid., pp. 249-82; for the Report of the Political and Territorial Commission for Hungary on the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, ibid., pp. S26-68; for the Record of Recommendations by the Conference on the Draft Peace Treaty with Hungary, ibid., pp. 957-49.

11. FRUS 1946, 3: 258.

12. Foreign Minister Masarykcomplained about this incident. The comments appearing in Newsweek (August 26, 194G, p. 36) on Gyöngyösis speech reflected the atmosphere in Paris:

The Hungarian spokesman, Foreign Minister János Gyöngyössy, turned out to be a mild but tough man of peasant stock with a lined face and silver hair, who stayed up nearly all night to write his speech and then delivered it clearly in French. When he finished the Luxembourg corridors echoed with: "What cheek . . . what a nerve . . .quel toupet." For Gyöngyösis had chosen two of Russia's friends as targets. He asked for an investigation of the status of Hungarian minorities in Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The next day Jan Masarykasked: ''Who won this war--the United Nations or Hungary?"

The Russians gave the Hungarians no support in this question, but Vyshinsky seized the occasion to insist that Russia ''wished to aid in the restoration of Hungarian economy.... The real sources of economic disorder in Hungary.... reside equally in the fact that a great quantity of Hungarian wealth was taken away .... and that most of this wealth is located at the present time in the American zone." He omitted to mention that the Hungarian gold reserve had just been returned from Germany by the Americans.

13. La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 79-90.

14. FRUS 194S, 4: 823-24.

15. For questions involved in the transfer of archival materials, see the notes of September 24 and October 3, 1946, addressed to Sinisa Stankovic chairman of the Hungarian Commission. Article 11 of the peace treaty with Hungary was a compromise solution.

16. John C. Campbell, ''The European Territorial Settlement,,' Foreign Affairs 26 (1947-48): 214.

17. La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 182-83.

18. La Hongrie et La Conference de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 13S-71.

19. Notter File Box 144, RG 59, National Archives.

20. John C. Campbell, ''Diplomacy and Great Power Politics," published in Diplomacy and Values: The Life and Works of Stephen Kertesz in Europe and America, ed. Kenneth Thompson (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), pp. S1-S2.

21. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 207.

22. Telegram to the War Department on September 20, 1946, by Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel, Adviser, United States Delegation. FRtJS 1946, 4: 874-75.

23. Regarding the visit see, Bulletin (June 23, 1946): 1091, and the prime minister's account, Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 225-34.

24. For the Summary of the Memorandum and the conversations in the State Department, See FRUS 1946, 3: 306-17.

25. Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 234-35.

26. Ibid., p. 23S.

27. The source of the conversation with Foreign Secretary Bevin is a record prepared by Janos Erős, counselor to the Hungarian legation in Paris

28. Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 23G-37.

29. See FRUS 1946, 6: 318-41.

30. FRUS 1946, 3:370.

31. Ibid., pp. 371-72.

32. Ambassador Caffery's report of September 7 to the Acting Secretary of State FRUS 1946, 6: 332-33.

33. Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 272-73.

1. Le Probleme Hongrois par rapport a la Roumanie (Budapest: Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1946). For the grievances of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, sec notes of May 20, 1946, and of July 15, 1946, addressed to the great Powers and sent to all countries participating in the Paris Conference.

2. FRUS 1946, 2: 259-60, 309-10.

3. FRUS 1946, 2: 441-42.

4. Territorial Problems: Transylvania, Box 99. H-43a, RS 43, April 20, 1944, National Archives.

5. The following delegations supported the Australian motion: Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Greece, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, USA. The following delegations voted against it: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, USSR. See for details, FRUS 1946, 3: 311-12.

6. Ibid., pp. 330-31.

7. Ibid., p. 339.

8. Ibid., pp. 375-76.

9. Ibid., pp. 376-77.

10. Ibid., p. S28.

11. FRUS 1946, 4: 851-S3. John C. Campbell, United States in World Affairs, pp. 67, 115, 117, 123, 142 and ''The European Territorial Settlement,' Foreign Affairs 26 (1947): 211-213. Philip E. Mosely, ''Soviet Exploitation of National Conflicts in Eastern Europe, " in The Soviet Union, ed. Waldemar Gurian (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951), p. 75.

12. FRUS 1946, 3:761.

13. FRUS 1946, 2: 1074-75.

14. FRUS 1946, 3:217.

15. The truth of the matter was that the Hungarian delegation had a short deadline for the drafting of the foreign minister's address and so the usual distribution several hours in advance was impossible.

16. FRUS 1946, 3: 222.

17. Ibid., pp. 226-28, 236.

18. Ibid., pp. 381-82.

19. Ibid., pp. 410-12.

20. Ibid., pp. 481-82. For the full text see Hungary and the Conference of Paris, vol 4, pp. 35-47. See in the same volume the speeches supporting the Czechoslovak amendment concerning the transfer of 200,000 Hungarians from Czechoslovakia to Hungary, delivered by Masaryk Clementis, Kiselev, and Vyshinsky.

21. FRUS 1946, 3: 498-500.

22. Ibid., pp. 525-27.

23. According tO census figures of 1941 the number of German vernacular in Hungary amounted to 477,0S7, while those of German nationality to 303,419.

24. The source of this information was Philip E. Mosely who was a member of the American delegation.

25. A press release of the State Department published the decision of the Allied Control Council on December 7, 1945.

26. See for details, Stephen Kertesz, ''The Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary; A Study in Postwar Diplomacy," The Review of Politics 15 (1953): 179-208.

27. FRUS 1946, 3: 122-23. A United States delegation memorandum of August 18, 1946, noted Masaryks inclination for territorial cession and added that "part of his delegation, particularly Clementis (Foreign Ministry Under Secretary, who is a Slovak) opposes and this group is desirous of carrying out the full deportation of the Hungarian minority without delay." FRUS 1946, 4: 836.

28. See for the discussion of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations on September 29, 1946, Hungary and the Conference of Pans, Vol. 4, pp. 89-94.

29. Ibid., pp. 95-100.

30. A report of my conversation with General Pope was deposited in the archives of the Hungarian Peace Delegation (859. Konf. 1946).

31. My report of the conversation was deposited in the archives of the Hungarian Peace Delegation (860. Konf. 1946).

32. The Hungarian Commission made the final decision on the Czechoslovak amendment on October 3, 1946. F1tUS 1946, 3: 642-45.

33. For Ambassador Steinhardt's full report, see RG 43, Box 96, National Archives. Clementis took it for granted in early 1945 that the expulsion of Hungarians could be done on the basis of an agreement between the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

34. FRUS 1946, 4: 275. The Hungarian Observations brought up some important hydraulic and hydrographic questions which required multilateral settlement in the Carpathian Basin.

35. Szigoruan Bizalmas Értesítő, kiadja a Magyar Külügyminiszterium politikai osztálya (Budapest, February 1, 1947): 23. (Strictly Confidential Bulletin published by the political division of the Hungarian Foreign Minister).

36. Ibid., p. 24.

37. La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 21-36.

38. Art. 2, par. 1, Hungarian Treaty. The same provisions are embodied in Art. 2, Bulgarian treaty; Art. 6, Finish treaty; Art. 15, Italian treaty; Art. 3, par. 1, Rumanian treaty. These provisions are due to American initiative and were considered a better alternative to the minority protection system adopted at the peace settlement after the first World War. Cf. Stephen Kertesz, ''Human Rights in the Peace Treaties," Law and Contemporary Problems 14 (1949): 627-47. In a memorandum addressed to the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Hungarian government pointed out the importance of reviving and strengthening provisions for the international protection of minority rights. Later the Hungarian peace delegation submitted an elaborate draft treaty for the protection of minority rights, with the system of mixed commissions and tribunals to enforce them under the supervision of the United Nations. Cf. La Hongrie et X Conference de Pans, vol . 1, pp. 135-71.

39. The Australian proposal intended that ''a new Part should be included in the Treaty providing for the establishment of a European Court of Human Rights with jurisdiction to hear and determine all disputes concerning the rights of citizenship and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in the treaty. The Australian case for this proposal rested on the belief that the general declarations contained in the treaty in support of human rights and fundamental freedoms were not sufficient, standing alone, to guarantee the inalienable rights of the individual and that behind them it was essential that some sufficient sanction and means of enforcement should be established. It was proposed that the Court of Human Rights should have the status parallel to that of the International Court of Justice and that the Court would have the additional obligation of making reports to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on its working in relation to the rights within its jurisdiction. It was contemplated that the jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal should be voluntarily accepted by States as an essential means of international supervision of the rights of individuals and as necessary method of U.S. Department of Stite, Pans Peace Conference' 1946' Selected Documents (hereafter, Selected Documents), pp. 444-45.

40. Selected Documents, p. 608.

41. Cf. Martin Domke' ''Settlement-of-Disputes Provisions in Axis Satellite Peace Treaties," American Journal of International Law 41 (1947): 911 -20.

42. Cf. Yuen-Li liang, ''Observance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Request for an Advisory Opinion on Certain Questions," American Journal of International Law 44 (1950): 110-117; Kenneth S. Carlston, ''Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, and Rumania, Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice," American Journal of International Law 44 (1950): 728-37.

43. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 130.

44. FRUS 194G, 2: 261-64.

45. Ibid., p. 613.

46. Ibid., p. 629.

47. Ibid., pp. 630-33, 640, 683.

48. FRUS 1946, 4: 547-48.

49. FRUS 1946, 3: 833-34 Cf. FRUS 1946, 4:923.

50. FRUS 1946, 2: 1067-68, 1090, 1312-13, 1334-37, 1339-40, 1427-28, 1436.

51. Ibid., p. 1446.

52. For details see, John C. Campbell, ''Diplomacy on the Danube," Foreign Affairs January 1949): 315-27.

1. BaloghSándor, A népi demokratikus Magyarorszag külpolitikája, 1945-1947 (Foreign policy of the people's democracy of Hungary, 1945-1947) (Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiadó, 1982). This well-researched book has 1166 footnotes and several chapters on peace preparation in Hungary and the Paris Peace Conference, but the author did not use pertinent documents of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, and the three volumes published by the Foreign Ministry in 1947, Hungary and the Conference of Paris. For this reason the narrative is incomplete.

2. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 166.

3. Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 545, 3G5. Cf. FRUS 1947, 4: 294, 298.

4. The chief of the United States representation on the ACC for Hungary, Brigadier General George H. Weems, submitted a report on December 31, 1946, to the War Department on the arrests and conspiracy accusations. FRUS 1946, 6: 357-59.

5. FRUS 1947, 4: 273-7S.

6. Ibid., pp. 277-78.

7. Ibid., pp. 280-81, 285-86.

8. See for details, Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 311-400; FRUS 1947, 4: 260-91. Emilio Vasari, Die ungarische Revolution 1956' (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1981). pp. 72-96. Imre Kovacs, Magyarország Megszállása (The Occupation of Hungary) (Toronto: Vörösáry Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 348-460.

9. Because of such articles and the announcement in Budapest, I received scores of congratulatory telegrams, and several serious publications included my name as foreign minister of Hungary in 1947. The American Annual 1948 relates these events with the remark that ''on May 31 Foreign Minister Janos Gyöngyösiwas replaced by Istvan Kertesz" (p. 319). It is interesting that a book published in Budapest in 1970, mentioned my name as foreign minister from May 31 till September 4, 1947. See Isvan Kende, Forró Béke - Hideg Háboru' A Diplomáciai Kapcsolatok története (Hot Peace Cold War, A History of Diplomatic Relations) 1945-19S6, p. 324. Such errors are understandable, but I was surprised to find my narne listed as foreign minister of Hungary in Regenten und Regierrungen der Welt (Sovereigns and Governments of the World), famous for accuracy, and edited originally by Minister-Ploetz (Wurzburg: A.G. Ploetz Verlag, 1964).1 asked for correction of this error, and the editor promised to do so in the next edition.

10. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman' 1947 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 262-266.

11. FRUS 1947, 4: 312. Cf. ibid., pp. 314-15.

12. I did not know at that time that the State Department and the

British Foreign Office considered taking the Hungarian case to the United Nations but eventually rejected this course of action. Ibid., pp. 311, 313-14, 332, 349.

13. New York Times, July 8, 1947.

14. Ibid.

15 . Ibid. , July 9, 1947.

16. See for an explanation of the events, New York Times, July 11, 1947; Ivo Duchacek, ''The February Coup in Czechoslovakia," World Politics 2 (1950): 516-17; and Hubert Ripka, Le Coup de Prague (Paris, 1949), pp. 48-6S .

2. The name of the party was changed after the revolution of 1956 to Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. This chapter will continue to call it Communist party, since this corresponds more to reality.

3. Imre Nagy, On Communism (New York, 1952), p. 2S2.

4. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Second Emergency Special Session, 4-10 November 1956' Plenary Meeting and Annex (Doc. A/32S1), Annex, p. 1.

5. Free Europe Committee, The Revolt in Hungary: A Documentary Chronology of Events (New York, 1956), p. 82.

6. Janos Peter, ''Hungary and Europe," The New Hungarian Quarterly 7 (1967); Tibor Pethő ''Modern Forms of Cooperation in the Danube Valley,', Hungarian Quarterly 8 (1967): 10-16; Charles András, ''The Slow Drift to Danubian Cooperation,'' East Europe 17 (December 1968): 19-25.

7. J . -B . Duroselle tout Empire perira (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 1981).

The notes in Transylvanian affairs addressed by the Hungarian government to the victorious Great Powers, and subsequently to the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Conference; and envoy Paul Auer's address delivered in the joint session of the Hungarian and Rumanian Commissions at the Paris Conference on August 31, 1946, were published in a book, Transylvanta, edited by John F. Cadzow, Andrew Ludanyi, and Louis J. Elteto, Kent University Press, 1984.

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West