Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944

President Wilson was alarmed. Lansing plied him with telegrams about Hungary from Vienna and also provided the President with analyses of Hungarian events.⁽³²⁾ General Tasker H. Bliss, the President's military adviser, directly accused the French military of having planned and anticipated the Hungarian reaction to the Vyx ultimatum, thus being responsible for Bolshevik radicalism. He even went so far as to claim that every evidence in the secret documents clearly proved that the French military and diplomatic authorities not only welcomed but stimulated the Soviet revolution in Hungary with the idea of forcing military action and military settlements. General Bliss held it probable that these militarist intrigues took place behind Clemenceau's back and by elements hostile to him. He charged that the Bolshevik seizure of power in Hungary was the direct result of action by the Supreme Council on February 26, 1919, an action politically unwise and one that could not be morally justified to the people of the United States. He also urged that the United States not only refuse participation in any armed intervention for the purpose of enforcing the decision of the Supreme Council of February 26. but also that it insist on reversal of this decision.⁽³³⁾

Marcel Cachin, member of the American Peace Delegation, reinforced General Bliss. According to Cachin, Karolyi's fall was precipitated by the affronting and narrow-minded actions of local French generals who claimed to act for the Peace Conference. In Cachin's opinion the only sure way to arrest Bolshevism was to stick to the Wilsonian principles and not allow them to be compromised by French militarism. ⁽³⁴⁾ William C. Bullitt, another member of the American Delegation, immediately after his return from Moscow on April 6, 1919, told the President in a letter that now that the Hungarians had followed the Russian example he was face to face with a European Revolution:

For the past year the people of Europe have been seeking a better way to live for the common good of all. They have found no guidance in Paris. Now, they are turning towards Moscow; but the impulses are remote from theoretic communism. . . Six months ago all the peoples of Europe expected you to fulfill their hopes. They believe now that you cannot. They turn, therefore, to Lenin.⁽³⁵⁾ Professor Philip Marshall Brown, the second-ranking member of the Coolidge Mission, who stayed at his Hungarian post throughout the reign of Bela Kun, also characterized the Hungarian Communism as a national protest. He wired to Paris that since the mass of the people were not even remotely Socialist and since Soviet Russia was too far off to assist local radicals, by prudent action the Allies could still prevent Hungary from becoming completely Bolshevik. Personally he preferred a conciliatory course spearheaded by an assurance that the Peace Conference "had no intention of mutilating Hungary or of breaking her up without due regard for the wishes of the people."⁽³⁶⁾ President Wilson himself was firmly convinced that certain French circles were responsible for the communist seizure of power in Hungary. Ray Stannard Baker, Press secretary of the President, informed him that he was blamed on all sides for the events in Central Europe. Baker suggested that the President would have to show what the real causes of the chaos were. "If I were to do that," the President replied, "it would immediately break up the Peace Conference - and we cannot risk it yet. . . I should have to tell the truth and place the blame exactly where it belongs - upon the French."⁽³⁷⁾

Among the members of the American Peace Delegation Professor Robert J. Kerner, one of the junior experts on Eastern Europe, had the distinction of being the only one to attribute more importance to the internal causes of the Hungarian turmoil. In his view the occupation of additional Hungarian territory was only the ostensible cause. The real cause was the fear of the Social Democrats, especially the radicals among them, that they would fail to get an absolute majority in the coming elections. Among contributing internal causes he also cited peasant unrest over land reform as well as Karolyi's undue mildness toward "Bolshevik agitators, editors, press agents and politicians."⁽³⁸⁾

Kerner's observations, however, were not unfounded. While the Entente's responsibility for Hungarian communism could not be denied, the entire Hungarian people, all Hungarian political parties, and especially Karolyi himself, must share the blame for a singularly unjustified optimism they held in regard to the country's boundaries and peace terms. Karolyi, furthermore, realizing the failure of his Wilsonian orientation and the misjudgment of his political advisers, in all probability believed that Bolshevism could conquer all over Europe. Mainly because of this belief, he handed over power to the Communist-dominated Hungarian Socialist Party and legitimized the peaceful transformation of Hungary's "People's Republic" into Europe's second Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Doing so, he became a "traitor" to Hungarians, who never forgave him. As one of the most scholarly Hungarian historical books puts it:

Michael Karolyi, the Hungarian Kerenszki, stole away from Hungarian history on March 21, 1919. Ruins marked his coming, and ruins remained after him. His sin is, that in the most critical period of his nation's history, he claimed the leadership for himself, to which he had no qualification. He

forced this leadership for himself by such illusions, which were unfounded. The judgment of history given against him never will be softened. ⁽³⁹⁾

On the other hand, some historians recognize Karolyi's good will. His naivete. however, is beyond question. Karolyi did not realize that no one of the victorious nations in Europe took Wilson's ideas seriously. Hungary's neighbors, for example, organized their new national armies with great haste, while Karolyi abolished the Hungarian army under such slogans as: "We do not want to see soldiers anymore ! We are pacifists ! Wilson makes order! We want Wilsonian peace!" and so on.

It is also true, and be it said in Karolyi's defense, that the whole Hungarian nation was very much influenced by Wilson. Count Julius Andrassy, the last Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, wrote later:

We were particularly hard hit by Wilson's action. Demagogues and some naive souls asked whether it was not revolting treachery to continue the war if Wilson declared, in the name of the great American Republic, that the war is not conducted against nations, but against the autocratic system which caused the war and which the people did not wish to tolerate any longer anyhow . . . Anyone who did not believe the promises of the American President was mercilessly stamped as an agitator for war. Wilson, "the enemy", was more popular than the very statesmen of the people.⁽⁴⁰⁾

On March 21, 1919, Budapest, in the heart of Europe, became the second capital of Bolshevism. The Council of People's Commissars, in which Bela Kun was the real power, declared martial law, appealed for law and order, and called for maximum economic effort. At the same time, the Council decreed a

number of revolutionary measures: the abolition of titles and privileges; the separation of church and state; the preparation of elections of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Councils; the establishment of a revolutionary tribunal; and the socialization of factories, apartment houses, and latifundia. The Council also announced that it would make an alliance with Soviet Russia; that it placed Hungary under the protection of the Red Army; and that it was resolved to defend the Soviet regime to the last drop of blood. ⁽⁴¹⁾ In foreign policy, the new course, as we have seen, was based upon the expectation that "we ought to get from the East what the West denied us " In a radio dispatch to Soviet Russia, the new rulers dutifully reported to Lenin that a proletarian dictatorship had been established in Hungary and simultaneously saluted him as the leader of the International proletariat, thus clearly subordinating themselves to Moscow's authority. The Hungarians then asked for a treaty of alliance with Russia and requested pertinent instructions. Lenin, in turn, told the Hungarian comrades of the huge enthusiasm which their revolution had aroused in Russia. ⁽⁴²⁾

From its inception, Hungarian communism not only looked eastward but also turned to her immediate neighbors, to Germany, and to all the workers of the world. In an appeal "TO ALL," the Hungarian Socialist Party (as the party called itself after the fusion of Social Democrats and Communists) extended its greetings to the working classes of Great Britain, France, Italy, and America and called on them not to tolerate the infamous campaign of their regimes against the Soviet Hungarian government. It also appealed to the workers and peasants of the adjoining victorious countries: Bohemia, Rumania, and Serbia, encouraging them to form an armed alliance against the Boyars (estate-owners) and dynasties. Finally, it called upon the workers of the vanquished states, Germany and German-Austria, to follow the example of the Hungarian proletariat, to make a final break with Paris and to link up with Moscow. The Soviet Hungarian regime appealed to the European proletariat not only to prevent an attack of their bourgeoises upon Soviet Hungary, but also extend the base of social revolution throughout Europe. Kun and the Hungarian Soviet government stressed that Soviet Hungary could be secured and saved through international proletarian solidarity. ⁽⁴³⁾ Bela Kun knew that propaganda was a very important weapon in saving communism in Hungary. He also saw with equal clarity the importance of military strength. The absence of a reliable army was one of his major problems. The organization of a Red Army, both patriotic and loyal to socialist ideas, was a

necessity. Due to very skillful propaganda, patriots and thousands of Trade Unionists volunteered for military service. Hungarians were summoned to fight against both imperialism and robber neighbors, and in May the Hungarian troops had been increased to 200,000. The proclamation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Hungary was quickly followed by the withdrawal from Budapest of all Entente missions. Official diplomatic relations between Soviet Hungary and the Entente were thus virtually nonexistent. A few remaining contacts were provided by the presence of various individual Allied officials, although these were not authorized to act as Allied spokesmen or to make any binding agreements.

Among the most prominent agents of Western powers in Hungary were Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli, previously member of the Italian Military Mission in Hungary, and Philip Marshall Brown, previously member of the American Military Mission in Hungary, who stayed in Budapest at his own request. The British Sir Thomas Cuningham and Professor Coolidge used neighboring Vienna as a base for their operations, visiting Budapest rather frequently. These men served as eyes and ears for the Allied Powers, and their reports to Paris were given close and careful attention.

On his arrival in Paris on March 26, 1919, Captain Nicholas Roosevelt reported to the American Peace Delegation on the Hungarian revolution. He told the Delegation that the revolution was precipitated by the presentation of the Vyx note; that it was accomplished with comparative quiet; and that there were unconfirmed rumors of German as well as Italian complicity. In his judgment the revolution was essentially nationalistic, making use of Bolshevism for national goals. Hungary was openly defying a decision of the Peace Conference by holding the club of Bolshevism over the Allies and asking : "What are you going to do about it?" According to Roosevelt there were three alternatives : the Czechs and Rumanians could advance and occupy Hungary, but this would be bloody and, besides, they might not

be up to the job. Secondly, the Allies could undertake this task themselves. Lastly, the Allies could rely on a rigorous blockade.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Clemenceau wanted an immediate Allied intervention. President Wilson was firmly against it. An intervention, according to the President, raised the question of whether the Western Powers possessed the necessary troops and sufficient material means for military action, and whether public sentiment supported such a policy. The use of American troops was impossible, according to the President, and public opinion in America would definitely be opposed to any aggressive Allied move. There was doubt in the President's mind whether the revolutionary movements could be arrested with the help of the army. Wilson concluded that nobody knew fully what actually caused this movement. He felt that one of the causes was no doubt the misery of the people and their insecurity in regard to their frontiers and their government; the only means to kill Bolshevism was to fix the frontiers and open all avenues of commerce. Lloyd George strongly supported the position of President Wilson.

On March 26, 1919, Philip Marshall Brown sent two dispatches from Budapest to Paris. He reported that the new regime was styled on the Soviet Russian model. The communist faction of the government, which was in constant communication with Moscow. was pressing for extreme measures. In Brown's view "this was not an amateur, but; a professional revolution." It all "looked like Red Terror." In Brown's judgment the mass of the people were "neither extreme nor even socialistic"; they were "intensely nationalistic"; and only the threat of dismemberment had brought about the "unnatural partnership of nationalism and communism." The mass of Hungarians would welcome "military intervention by British and American troops combined with conciliatory assurances, but not by others." Brown estimated that not more than 30,000 troops would be required for this intervention.⁽⁴⁵⁾

On the next day, however, the Council of Four clearly rejected intervention against Soviet Hungary either by their own forces or those of Hungary's neighbors. This Allied decision was the result of numerous factors and considerations. Demobilization was already proceeding at too fast a pace and public opinion was adverse to intervention.

The situation became more confused when, on March 29, 1919, Kun's first message reached Paris. This first communication of the new Hungarian Government to the Great Powers was significant and revealing both in its assertions and in its denials.

The new Government of Hungary, the Council of Commissioners of the People, recognize the validity of the Treaty of Armistice signed by the former government in Belgrade and do not think that the non-acceptance of the note presented by Colonel Vyx has infringed it. When the new Hungarian government had asked Russia to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Hungarian republic, it had not thought that this might be interpreted as an expression of its desire to break all diplomatic intercourse with the Powers of the Entente. The alliance with Russia is not a formal diplomatic alliance. It is a natural friendship justified by the identical construction of their respective constitutions, and has in no way any aggressive purpose. The new Hungarian Republic, on the contrary, has a firm desire to live in peace with all the other nations and to devote its activities to the peaceful social reorganization of its country. The Hungarian government wishes to negotiate specifically on the basis of self-determination, a principle as important to President Wilson as to Lenin. The Hungarian government would gladly welcome a civil and diplomatic mission of the Entente in Budapest and would guarantee to it the right of extra-territoriality and provide for its absolute safety.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Map not available

The major purpose of this message transmitted by Budapest was to persuade the Allies regarding the moderate character of Hungarian Bolshevism in external and internal affairs. The communique found the Allies in a receptive mood and contributed to their early restraint in their dealings with Soviet Hungary. If Hungarian Bolshevism was reasonable and moderate, Allied policy had to be similarly marked by reasonableness and moderation.

After the reception of Kun's note, the Allies sent a delegation headed by Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts to Budapest. This mission, without recognizing the new Hungarian government on behalf of the Allies, was to enter into discussions with it about matters of Allied concern. However, by sending Smuts to Budapest and having him talk with Bela Kun and his government, the Allies had risked lending prestige to the new regime. Bela Kun, nevertheless, made the most of General Smuts' visit to Budapest. The Hungarian press maintained that Smuts dealt with Kun not in his capacity as soldier, but as diplomat. Nepszava observed that until recently the Entente had refused to engage in any negotiations and had merely sent ultimatums; now, however, "the same Entente which had not deigned to have any dealings with the half-bourgeois Government of the People's Republic except through the medium of ultimatums," had entered into negotiations with the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

No doubt a Hungary governed by a bourgeois administration would have pleased the bourgeois Entente better than a Soviet government. But Imperialism had no use for sentiment in politics . . . Bourgeois Hungary had been feeble; therefore, she had to feel the whip. Because the Soviet Republic was powerful, negotiations were in order.⁽⁴⁷⁾)

General Smuts and his party arrived in Budapest in the morning of April 4, 1919. On the same day Smuts reported to Paris in

a telegram about his first meeting with Bela Kun and two important members of the government, President Alexander Garbai and Sigismund Kunfi, Commissar for Education. In a second telegram to Paris, on April 6, Smuts referred to a plan of the Hungarian government relating to a conference of states bordering on Hungary. According to this telegram, while the Hungarian government recognized the principles of nationality laid down by President Wilson, it made clear that the definite settlement of the boundary questions ought not to be reached by the Great Powers at the Paris Peace Conference. Rather it should be agreed upon at meetings between representatives of the Hungarian, Austrian, Bohemian, Serbian, and Rumanian governments. Here the Entente Powers were not represented. Bela Kun suggested, furthermore that Smuts himself might preside at these meetings and Vienna or Prague would be the meeting place for this conference. In return for acceptance of the decision of the Peace Conference, Smuts held out a promise of territorial negotiations; and he implied a degree of recognition and economic concessions. ⁽⁴⁸⁾

The two parties could not agree. The conversation broke off between Smuts and the Hungarians on the same day, and Smuts left Budapest for Paris. In conclusion, Smuts expressed his conviction that the Hungarian Soviets were weak and were rent by internal divisions likely to lead to their fall at an early date. The Hungarian cabinet held that many of the concessions made by Smuts represented merely personal promises and would not be binding on the Paris Peace Conference. Furthermore, the acceptance would provoke a nationalist reaction which might well lead to a counter-revolutionary coup. At the same time it would call for a break with Soviet Russia and thereby endanger the revolution.

In May, 1919, the Hungarian Soviet Republic was politically isolated. Russia's Red Army was far from the Hungarian borders:

the Austrian government survived only as a satellite of the Entente; and three hostile neighbors were eager to occupy further Hungarian territories. A counter-offensive against the Czechs promised a small chance of a link-up with Russia's Red Army across the Carpathian Mountains in the northern direction. The war against the Czechs proved successful beyond all expectations. By early June, more than one third of Slovakia had been lost to the Hungarian troops; and the Czechs were still retreating along the entire front However, it became clear that Soviet Russia was in no position to extend military assistance to the Soviet sister republic. on June 18, 1919, Lenin sent a code message to Bela Kun, advising him to negotiate an armistice with the Entente.⁽⁴⁹⁾

Meanwhile, the Paris Peace Conference terminated its work relating to Hungary's frontiers. In response to Eduard Benes' three desperate appeals for help, Clemenceau sent two sharply worded ultimatums to Bela Kun. In his second note on June 13. he informed the Soviet Hungarian government of the new Hungarian frontiers and demanded, under threat of penalties, the immediate withdrawal of the Red Army from Czechoslovakian territories. Clemenceau promised in exchange for evacuation of Slovakia that the Rumanians would withdraw from Hungarian territories. But, while the Hungarians left Slovakia, the Rumanians made no move to withdraw from Hungary; and the Peace Conference made no effort to compel them to carry out its orders. What was more, the Allies demanded a reduction of the Red Army to six divisions as a precondition for Rumania's withdrawal. Considering this fact, Bela Kun claimed now to fear a Rumanian

offensive, whose troops were at the Tisza River about eighty miles from Budapest. He took into consideration a preventive blow before the Rumanians could be ready for an offensive and started an attack against Rumania on July 21, 1919. The breakdown of Soviet Hungary on August 1, 1919, came in consequence of the failure of this offensive against Rumania.⁽⁵⁰⁾

32 U.S., For. Rel., Peace Conference, 1919, XII, 41~19, 424.

34 U. S. Commissioners to Wilson, March 28, 1919, Woodrow Wilson papers (in the Library Or Congress).

35 William C. Bullitt Papers, April 6, 1919 (in the Sterling Memorial Library of Yale University: Edward M. House Collection).

36 U. S., National Archives, Document 184.01102/286.

37 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1923), XXII, 135-36.

38 Robert J. Kerner, "The Question in Hungary," in Edward M. House Papers, March 24, 1919 (in the Sterling Memorial Library of Yale University.

39 Miklos Asztalos es Sandor Petho, A Magyar Nemzet Tortenete (The History of the Hungarian Nation) (Budapest: Lantos, 1933), p. 532.

40 Count Julius Andrassy, Diplomacy and the War (London: Grant Richards, 1921), p. 243.

41 Nepszava (Budapest daily), March 23, 1919.

42 At 5:00 P. M. on March 22, 1919, Radio Budapest called Lenin. Twenty minutes later, in the Moscow station, he said, "Lenin at the microphone. I want to speak to Comrade Bela Kun." Budapest replied that Kun was at a meeting. Ernest Por, Kun's substitute, declared:

"The Hungarian Soviet Republic offers the Russian Soviet government an armed alliance against all the enemies of proletariat. Please inform us immediately about the military situation."

Lenin understood that Hungary needed military assistance to survive. But he wanted assurance before he acted. Lenin, therefore, sent a radio dispatch to Bela Kun on the next day:

"Please state concrete guarantees you have that the new Hungarian govemment is actually communist and not merely socialist, that is, social-traitors. Do the communists have a majority in the government? When will the Congress of Soviets meet?. .. I should like to know what, in your opinion, are the real guarantees."

Collected Works of V. I. Lenin, ed. by N. I. Bukharln, V. M. Molotov, and M. A Savelev (Moscow - Leningrad: State Publishing, 1929), XIV, 7-8. The German original, in Lenin's handwriting, is printed in ibid., opposite p. 180. Lenin's doubts were due to the participation of several Social Democrats in the Bela Kun cabinet.

43 Nepszava (Budapest daily), March 27, 1919.

44 U. S., National Archives, Document 184.01102/254.

45 U. S., National Archives, Documents 184.01102/266, 276, 282, and 286.

46 U. S., For. Rel., Paris Peace Conterence, V, 18

47 Nepszava, Budapest, April 5, 1919.

48 U. S., For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, V, 62.

49 "It is necessary to make the maximum use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us." Bela Kun, La Republique hongroise, p, 216.

50 Bela Kun, La Republique hongroise, p. 214. On August 1, 1919, Bela Kun left Hungary and went to Austria. After remaining there about a year, he was smuggled out of the country. Austria put him into a transport with prisoners-of-war returning to Russia, and dispatched him through Bohemia and Germany toward Russia. In Moscow he was received with honor. The Soviet party leaders, the Trade Unions, and the Red Army met him at the railway station in Moscow with words of welcome. He was sent on an important mission to the Southern Russian Army of which he was appointed Political Commissar. He went on important missions during the following years. Finally, during the great purge of Stalin in 1937, his life ended before a firing squad in Moscow.

Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944