Maracz: Hungarian Revival

(3) Hungary should exercise an independent and self-conscious foreign policy

For centuries, it has not been possible for Hungary to exercise an independent foreign policy. Since the battle of Mohacs (1526), Hungary has always been under the wing of greater powers and used to unilaterally orient itself to a greater centre of power. One of the reasons why the Treaty of Trianon (1920) hit the Hungarians so hard was, because up until the time of the First World War Hungary, as part of the Dual Monarchy, had been almost exclusively oriented towards Vienna and had built up hardly any political connections with the West. It is a mistake that must not be repeated. Hungary must adopt a multi-tracked foreign policy. In the geo-political situation of the present, it would be incorrect to aim at being only one-sidedly oriented to the West. It would be better if, alongside of its affiliations to the West, Hungary also sought to establish good relations with Russia, the Middle East and the Far East. If they want to build up meaningful contacts with these regions, the Hungarians do already have quite a few advantages.

The Hungarians can easily integrate into the West, because of their cultural-historical ties, their shared Christian norms and values, their geographical position and the economic cross connections that have been developing rapidly since 1989. As far as Russia is concerned, Hungary can easily build up ties, because of its geographical situation, because of economic interests - the KGB, the Russian intelligence service is one of the biggest investors in Hungary - and because of the fact that, like Hungarians, many Russians now live outside their own heartland. Another important point is that, on the whole, Russians look up to Hugarians. Since the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and because of the leading role taken by Hungarians in the changes of -198-9 the Russians have come to respect the Hungarians. This was also reflected in the map of Europe drawn up by the Russian aggressive extreme nationalist Vladimir Zjirinovski. According to Zjirinovski, Hungary might be justified in taking Transylvania away from Rumania.206 Hungary has access to the Far East because of

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cultural-historical links that are now being rapidly exposed. Hungarians will, therefore, easily be able to form ties with countries in the Far East such as Korea, China and Japan, all of which will expand rapidly during the course of the next century. Conversely, such countries as these will be interested in investing in Hungary in the future because of its 'neutral' status as a region surrounded by Slavic, Germanic and Latin peoples.

(4) Hungary should take the lead when it comes to the matter of reconstructing the Carpathian Basin

Hungary must work on restoring the Carpathian Basin, which is a perfectly balanced geographical, economic and climatological entity. If the Carpathian Basin becomes a strong and independent region offering no threat to other countries it will be important to both the West and East. Such a stable entity will also be militarily-strategically easier to defend and is, thus, preferable for reasons of security. Regenerating old cultural, economic and human ties and networks is in the best interests of all the peoples living in the Carpathian Basin. A number of nations there, such as the Croats and Slovenes, have started re-evaluating the history of Central Europe and their own history, since the wall fell and have started ridding themselves of manipulative, falsifying and distorting influences. It is a step in the right direction. The Slovaks and Rumanians of Transylvania have not yet reached that stage.

The Slovaks are currently still on an anti-Hungarian political course and oriented predominantly to the Byzantine East. The preamble to the Slovak constitution of 3rd September 1992 states that the Slovak people accept the spiritual legacy of the Orthodox apostles Cyril and Method. What exactly this Orthodox Byzantine myth of the Slovaks means in the light of the thousand year long Hungarian-Slovak co-existence is completely unclear. The alleged legacy of the Orthodox apostles Cyril and Method and the Great Moravian Empire abberation cannot replace this. If Slovakia wants to find its rightful place in Central Europe and become a fully accepted nation then it will have to stop misusing history for nationalistic ends. The

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same applies to the Rumanians who cling to their Daco-Roman myth. It is the moral duty and obligation of Hungarians to refute such myths, not only in the interest of human and historical dignity, but also for these nations themselves. The Slovaks and Rumanians will have to accept their own history and roots, if they are to become fully fledged nations. On 4th May 1995 Hungarian intellectuals from the Carpathian Basin made a collective appeal to the neighbouring peoples of the region during the IV. Workshop on Bilingualism and Cultural Ecology held at the Agricultural University of Godollo. In this appeal, it was argued that a 'new' Carpathian Basin should be created free of the present cultural-ecological war that is ruining the culture and environment of the Carpathian Basin and is detrimental to all the peoples in the region.

(5) Hungarian foreign policy must be 'Realpolitik', just like that adopted by every other state

National interest should be the issue underlying Hungarian foreign policy. Hungary should only support the interests of the West and the EU insofar as they correspond to Hungary's interests.

With respect to the neighbouring countries that oppress Hungarian national communities and employ expansionistic politics towards Hungary the only suitable kind of political approach is to adopt an offensive strategy instead of signing empty treaties aimed only at confirming the status quo by Hungary for the umpteenth time. As is the custom in international relations, there will have to be means of pressure to push back this expansionism directed at the Hungarian heart of the Carpathian Basin. Such pressure politics will not of course involve direct military confrontation, but the setting up of political and economic 'levers'.

The only kind of politics that will work with aggressive Slovakia is the politics of containment and encirclement. Hungary must start co-operating more closely with Slovakia's neighbouring countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria and the Ukraine in order to isolate Slovakia. What is, furthermore,

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important is that Slovakia is included in Central Europe's economic network. It was, therefore, a good move on the part of the Antall administration to purchase Interbanka, the Prague bank which has a branch in Bratislava. If necessary the economic lever can always be brought down.

An aggressive Rumania must be dealt with in the same way as an aggressive Slovakia, namely by being contained and encircled. Hungary can bring pressure to bear on Rumania by co-operating with the powerful neighbouring countries with which it lives in discord. Rumania has territorial claims directed at the Ukraine and long-term plans to establish unity with independent Moldavia (Moldova). This will certainly meet with resistance from Russia, which will not tolerate the fact that within its sphere of influence a Greater Rumania might emerge that could operate as a bridgehead for other major European powers such as France. In the eastern region of Moldova, Russians and Ukrainians have already proclaimed the existence of the Dniester Republic. The independence of this republic is safeguarded by the presence of the Russian army. In this way, Russia has effectively defined the borders of Rumania for the future. Both Russia and the Ukraine are Hungary's allies, when it comes to matters concerning Rumania. The same goes for Bulgaria, which flanks the southern side of Rumania where Rumania is also in territorial conflict because of Dobrudja that has been annexed by the Rumanians.

Sometimes there has been doubt as to whether Rumania that extends over the regions of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania can be regarded as one and the same nation. Culturally and historically there are rather many differences between the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Rumanians of Old Rumania. Those living in Transylvania have been influenced by Western Christian culture through Hungary and their own Rumanian Uniate Church, while the Rumanians of Old Rumania have been much more influenced by the Eastern Byzantine tradition. As was particularly clearly illustrated by the distribution of the results of the presidential election of 20th May 1990, this divided historical development

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corresponds exactly with the natural geographical division existing within Central Europe in the form of the range of mountains known as the Carpathians.

The map shows that the eastern part of Rumania, historic Rumania, reflects more or less equal distribution, that is to say, a high score for the ex-Communist Iliescu. There was a sharp contrast with the results in western Transylvania, where the opposition candidates did considerably better. The distribution of the election result would, therefore, indicate that regional-historic factors had much more influence than national-ethnic factors. The way in which Transylvanian Rumanians voted was much closer to the way that Transylvanian Hungarians - who did not have a candidate of their own - voted than to the way in which the ethnically connected Rumanians of Old Rumania did. The economic interweaving of Hungary and Transylvania will reinforce the Transylvanian 'separatist' tendencies that will highlight internal Rumanian ethnic differences. It is not inconceivable that in Rumania a similar process will take place as has taken place in Italy where, through federalization the wealthier north has tried to shake

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itself free of the poorer south. It would seem fair to assume that the inherent cultural-historic realities are deep-rooted. Because of the increasing regionalization taking place in Rumania, Hungary will be able to develop a buffer against the expansionism radiating from Bucharest. The only way in which Rumania could protect itself from Hungary's influence in the matter of internal regionalization would be by hermetically sealing itself off from the outside world. This would be like placing a time bomb under the country's social-economic structure which might turn out to be catastrophic.

As far as the containment of Serbia goes, encirclement politics would not be the best option. Because of the war with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, western access to the West will remain blocked for a long time to come. Hungary has, thus, become Serbia's window to the West, which puts it in a powerful position where Serbia is concerned. In order to prevent Serbia's expansion politics from continuing at the expense of the Hungarians, Hungary will have to make use of Russia's influence on Serbia. This political line was first laid down in a treaty signed between Hungary and Russia on 11th November 1992 in Budapest on the rights of national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. With this treaty Hungary succeeded in breaking down the Trianon-coalition between Russia, France and Great Britain existing within the international contact group for ex-Yugoslavia. It is partly thanks to this treaty with Russia and partly thanks to the perseverance and tact of the Vojvodina-Hungarians themselves that the Hungarian community in Lesser Yugoslavia did not fall victim to the massive ethnic cleansing conducted by the Serbs. Had Western politicians, such as Lord Carrington been the only decisive factor, the Hungarians of the Southern Lands would have been wiped out long ago. It is true that such politicians have done little to free the Hungarians and also the Albanians of Lesser Yugoslavia from the deplorable situation in which they have found themselves.

In the light of the conflict between Russia and Rumania the joint Russian-Hungarian treaty on minority rights came to be

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regarded as a threat. President Iliescu criticized the treaty saying that he found it dangerous and not in line with internationally recognized norms on minorities. To counteract this Russian-Hungarian axis the Rumanian media declared itself in favour of establishing a new Little Entente with Slovakia and Serbia along the lines of the anti-Hungarian alliance set up in the inter-war years between Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Rumania.207 It will be difficult to introduce such a Little Entente, because it will be in Russia's interests to put moderate pressure on Serbia on Hungary's behalf.

As far as the Ukraine is concerned, it will be best for Hungary to continue the policy of partnership and co-operation. Using peaceful and economic means Hungarian foreign policy will have to be aimed at achieving autonomy for the Hungarians of Subcarpathia and special status for Subcarpathia by, for instance, insisting upon creating a free trade zone. The arguments, notably the economic ones, that Hungary can produce for the Ukrainians are impressive. The Ukraine can never expect to become a member of the EU, but Hungary's membership is inevitable. In exchange for securing autonomy for the Hungarian national community, Hungary could offer to champion Ukrainian interests in its future capacity as a member of the EU.

(6) Hungary will have to support the Hungarian national communities in their struggle for the right to self-determination

Hungary must not revert to pursuing revisionistic politics, neither must it give up the fight until the Hungarian national communities are able to enjoy autonomy safeguarded by the great powers of the US, Russia, France and Great Britain. Hungary will have to push back the expansionistic policy that has been pursued since Trianon at the expense of the Hungarians where the primary aim was to destroy Hungarian national communities and blackmail Hungary. Supporting self-determination and autonomy for Hungarian national communities, therefore, increases Hungarian security. Together

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with her natural 'allies', the Hungarian communities, Hungary will have to work on reconstructing the Carpathian Basin. If, instead of relying on the Hungarian national communities Hungary depends on the nationalistic-expansionistic forces existing within its neighbouring countries, the Carpathian Basin will turn into a European disaster area.

The Hungarian national communities will have to follow their own course. They will have to find peaceful and democratic ways and means of effecting their emancipation struggle for self-determination and equality. In this struggle the Hungarian national communities will have to be chiefly self-reliant. All they can do is to keep on reminding the European and mondial forums of their grievances until these are universally recognized. Because of the fact that in recent years different post-Communist Hungarian administrations have given higher priority to integrating into the EU and NATO - hence displaying a lack of realism - than to the situation of the Hungarian national communities, these communities will have to adopt an independent foreign policy. This has already been demonstrated well by the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement in Slovakia which, by becoming a member of the European organization of Christian Democratic parties successfully opened up its own political and information channels. Hungarian national communities can only possibly hope for the support and sympathy of international public opinion, if they are prepared to carry out active politics in their own interests and make sacrifices. Where necessary the Hungarian diaspora will be prepared to help the Hungarian national communities in their endeavours.

A consequence of Hungary's individual initiative, it might well be that new Hungarian nations emerge in Central Europe. It is the contention of the Transylvanian Hungarians that all the ingredients needed to create a nation are present. The Hungarian community in Transylvania is almost 2.5 million strong and has enormous intellectual potential at its disposal, structures and institutions of its own and even its own traditions, when it comes to political independence. The Szekler-Hungarians are

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politically independently aware and Transylvania has been an independent state. At present, the appeals for the formation of an independent Transylvanian nation are weak, but as the struggle for autonomy gets under way these pleas will strengthen. It might even be in Bucharest's best interests to carefully start supporting such separatist Hungarian tendencies. In his 1995 report (Nagyvarad, 1995) on the position of the Transylvanian Hungarians, Zsolt Mester wrote the following: "If the Transylvanian Hungarians keep on being rejected by their mother country then a process will be started that will ultimately result in the emergence of a new 'Transylvanian-Hungarian nation'. Culturally, such a nation will be Hungarian, but it will also have its own unique characteristics and it will become ever more different from Hungary. Thus, the resultant Transylvanian-Hungarian community will not only be a partner-nation for the Rumanians, but also for the Hungarians of the Danube-Tisza region. The German-Austrian relationship might be cited as analogous."

If internal regionalization continues within Rumania, possibly boosted by the economic attraction that Hungary has for Transylvania, and if the Transylvanian Hungarians start to form a nation of their own partly because of the dismissive attitude adopted by Hungary towards them and their problems, then it is conceivable that a new Transylvanian nation might emerge that would be composed of Rumanians, Hungarians and other nationalities that have lived in the region for a long time. This would explain why the Bucharest regime encourages the activities of extreme nationalists who create discord between Transylvania's native Rumanians and Hungarians. Until now these activities have stood in the way of effective dialogue between Transylvania's Rumanians and Hungarians which might have led to the establishment of common interests against centralized power in Bucharest.

Now that the Second World War is behind us for good, the consequences of the system drawn up in Versailles that deeply

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influenced all the political and ideological structures of this century, are becoming visible. As far as international public opinion is concerned ever more people are coming to the conclusion that the injustices of Trianon should be questioned and that Central Europe should be given a new place within Europe. The well-known French commentator, Thomas Schreiber, recently wrote in an article that Georges Clemenceau and his friends "had believed that in creating the successor states and in annexing three and a half million Hungarians the nationality questions in the region might be resolved. But what happened was exactly the opposite. The folly of the Trianon 'recipe', of blindly creating boundaries is now coming to the surface. During his lifetime one particular inhabitant of Kassa (Kosice) found that he had been a citizen of five different states and the Hungarian writer Sandor Gal and his grandmother, aged respectively 9 and 82 years of age, were both proclaimed to be war criminals."

The Dutch researcher, J.W. van der Meulen of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', concluded that Eastern European peoples' right to self-determination might not be a priori refused.208 Van der Meulen observed that in the West there is resistance to introducing and supporting concepts such as 'collective rights for ethnic minorities', because such concepts cannot be reconciled with the constitution of Western democracies. Hence his conclusion that "proposals to allow ethnic groups to operate as legal entities conflict so sharply with the democratic norms that they might just as well be immediately dropped." (p.41). Van der Meulen is also sceptical about the general feasibility of achieving territorial or other kinds of autonomy for national communities. When it becomes apparent that territorial or personal autonomy provides no workable solution, then it seems to Van der Meulen that border corrections and border changes are the only solution.

According to Van der Meulen, applying the right to self-determination must be restricted by a few conditions, such as, for instance, liberating a national community from an oppressor

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state. It was a point of view that was also shared by the Dutch Christian Democratic Party (CDA) which stated, in 1992, that: "When a national community forms part of a bigger state body in which another national group dominates, when there is no guaranteeing that an identity may be preserved when the state can only remain intact by oppression and the violation of human rights and when those involved have been able to express their wishes democratically then the right to self-determination must be able to lead to constitutional independence, to liberation or to joining up with another state" (p.40). The circumstances surrounding the Hungarian national communities of Central Europe, as sketched in part two, match this criterium perfectly. In view of the systematic oppression to which these communities have been subjected applying and honouring the right to self-determination is the only way of securing freedom. Van der Meulen contends that it is also important to look at the way in which the borders that are to be changed came into being in the first place. "If the borders were established before the right to self-determination applied, like in the nineteenth century, then the decision made could turn out to be different from the one made about borders decided upon by external powers that have contravened the then already applicable rights to self-determination. The latter situation was the case with the borders of Hungary after the First World War" (p.40).

Europe now takes into consideration the possibility of border changes. When former Yugoslavia crumbled, the Swiss newspaper Neue Zurcher Zeitung headed one of its articles "On the road to new borders in Eastern Europe."208 In this influential Swiss paper, it was argued that "maintaining borders may never be a goal in itself, but only a way of seeking to keep the peace. The original claim about the inviolability of borders put forward by the Soviets was aimed at the OSCE in order to retain their territory fought for in 1945. The conference did not, however, exclude peaceful border revisions." Raising the issue of peaceful border revision is, of course, not a matter of specific Hungarian interest, but

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rather one that opens the possibility to the reconstruction of Central Europe.

Central Europe is currently faced by the following problems: (1) small nations wrestling with nationality issues, (2) the small nations of Central Europe are themselves too weak to successfully counteract German and Russian expansion drives in the region and (3) because of lack of co-operation in economic areas, limitations where free trade and traffic are concerned and, in some states, because of investing in nationalistic programmes aimed at homogenizing and anti-Hungarian ethnocide the prospects of economic revival are bleak. Sooner or later, the EU and NATO will be forced to deal with these unresolved problems. Problems (1) and (2) relate to security and stability in Central Europe and are, therefore, important to Western Europe. Neither the EU nor NATO will be able to resolve the national and ethnic conflicts existing within Central Europe. If any of the Central European nations joins NATO this will weaken the organization, because all the mutual conflicts will be brought in and because Russia will grow suspicious if the West expands towards the East. Problem (3) relating to the lack of economic growth in the region, will also be disadvantageous to Europe. Western Europe cannot have an explosive social-economic situation in young developing democracies on its periphery. But bear in mind that this periphery is in the middle of the European continent.

For a number of publicists the solution to this collection of almost irresolvable problems lies in restoring Central Europe to its former state, to the dimensions and composition of the former Habsburg Empire.210 Such a conglomeration of states, which to my mind would also be preferable, would be strong enough to counterbalance Russia and Germany politically. Because of the fact that a politically and economically powerful Central Europe does not need to belong to NATO, it would, thus, not form a threat to Russia. Having open borders in the region could be of help in solving the nationality

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problems and in improving economic and trade relations in the region. What might a renewed Central Europe look like?

The Hungarian political scientist, Gusztav Molnar, sees possibilities for realizing Central European integration on a regional scale.211 The sovereign states situated on the territory of the former Habsburg Empire could form a Central European confederation consisting of Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As a consequence, these states would have to give up part of their national sovereignity. When it comes to the matter of resolving the Hungarian question, a small Central European confederation would also offer possibilities because Molnar claims, it is unlikely that the Hungarian national communities, which have lived separated from Hungary since Trianon and have been through different historical and emotional developments, could possibly be simply reintegrated into the Hungarian nation state.

The falling apart of Yugoslavia has made it crystal clear that the fractures in political civilization and the continuity of the existing judicial system are stronger than the supposed homogeneity of linguistic nations where the various parts have been through totally different historical and cultural developments. It is simply impossible to merge together into one single state regions with a Western Christian culture and regions that belong to the Eastern Christian culture. Should such a small Central European confederation adhering to Western Christian culture come about then regions that were once also a part of the Western Christian sphere of influence, but which fell under Eastern Christian rule after the First World War, including Subcarpathia, Transylvania and Vojvodina would once again be able to join Central Europe. For the Hungarians, this would be extremely important. Hungary should, thus, support the political aims of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians, the Transylvanian Rumanians and the Serbs of Vojvodina all of whom would certainly be interested in developing economic and cultural ties with the Central European confederation in their struggle against Ukrainian, Rumanian

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and Serbian nationalists. These nationalists are already conducting a preventive campaign against the Subcarpathian Ruthenians, the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Serbs of Vojvodina in which they are accused of treason against the state. Ultimately, much will depend on the outcome of these struggles between Ukrainians and Ruthenians and amongst Rumanians and Serbs whether the Ukraine, Rumania and Serbia, in their entirity, will seek alliance with Europe.

The autonomy of Subcarpathia, Transylvania and Vojvodina will also depend on Russia which, it would seem, has special vested interests in the Ukraine, Rumania and Serbia. It is probable that Russia will support the autonomy of these regions as long as it receives a guarantee that Subcarpathia, Transylvania and Vojvodina will not be used as bridgeheads for anti-Russian expansion. In such a case, it might be possible to create a buffer zone between the Western Christian and the Eastern Christian spheres of influence in south-east Central Europe that would surround Hungary like a protective shield. Redefining Europe in terms of Western and Eastern Christian spheres of influence and marking a buffer zone is, therefore, my answer to the problem posed by Hugh Seton Watson 'What is Europe, Where is Europe?' discussed at the beginning of this book. With a buffer zone there would be the guarantee that the Western and Eastern Christian cultural areas would no longer be able to expand at one another's expense as has been the case in previous centuries. Thanks to Trianon, Orthodox Christianity has seen westward expansion during the past 75 years at the expense of Western Christian cultural areas. The Hungarians were, and still are, the victims of this expansion. If a buffer zone is introduced between the Western and Eastern Christian spheres of influence, then this might help Europe to regain its old shine that has been dulled during the course of this century. Only when such a buffer zone is introduced can Western and Eastern Christianity begin working together again in cultural, economic, political and other areas. Only then will Europe, free of internal tensions, be able to compete with other continents and world powers in order to secure a prominent position in the world for itself.

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Maracz: Hungarian Revival