The New Central Europe

In the spring of 1945 Churchill saw the Soviet menace clearly and definitely. Not even Churchill, however, could foresee the extent of Communist post- war expansion or the slowness of Western reaction to it. Two years were to pass before Russia was confronted with the slowly awakening Western will to resist Soviet aggression in Europe. By that time the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe was nearing completion, while in Asia the final phase of communism's triumph had just begun. And, in the worldwide struggle between communism and democracy, the communization of China, completed in 1949, was a gain of even greater political importance than the Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe.

Stalin's actions did not indicate that he had any "revolutionary master plan" for the Communist conquest of Eastern Europe. Indeed, as Isaac Deutscher pointed out, if he anticipated Communist domination of Poland, why did he not let the Poles keep Lvov? What difference would it have made whether Lvov was in Soviet Poland or the Soviet Ukraine? Or, if Stalin planned to establish Communist dictatorships over all Eastern Europe, including Eastern Germany as the nucleus of a Communist Germany, why did he champion expulsion of the Germans, and why did he insist upon the unpopular reparation demands from the former enemy states? Such actions could not fail to have a damaging effect on the Communist cause in those countries.

But, improvised and incoherent as Stalin's actions seemed to be in the early phases of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, he did not take long to replace improvisation with a coherent plan for Soviet subjugation. The plan called for the creation of "people's democracies." It was a flexible plan, but the final aim of seizing power by a tyrannical oligarchy was never compromised. The "coalition governments" of the post- war era figured in the Soviet plan as legal tools by which the power of the democratic parties participating in the coalitions could be reduced by stages. Hugh Seton- Watson, in describing these stages, labelled the types of government operating in Eastern Europe during the period of Communist seizure of power as, first, "genuine coalitions," which then changed into "bogus coalitions," and finally gave way to what the Communists called "monolithic" unity.[2]

Sometimes stages were skipped, and sometimes they had different durations; but the appearance of legality was preserved. The model for turning the Central and Eastern European countries into Soviet satellites was not the Russian civil war, but the "peaceful revolution" by which Mussolini and Hitler had seized power. H. R. Trevor- Roper aptly called this method "a policy of learning from the success of fascism."3 But Stalin's triumph did not depend solely upon methods by which local opposition to Soviet aims could be liquidated. Even more important in the Communist scheme was the exclusion of Western influence from Eastern Europe.

From the beginning there was a great consistency in the Soviet determination to act unilaterally, rather than, as the Yalta agreements stipulated, "jointly" with the Western Powers, in the liberated countries. Military occupation was of course the primary source of strength that enabled the Russians to act unilaterally. But there were other factors which also played into their hands.

First of all, the Western Powers, in the spirit of the Yalta program, willingly recognized Russia's special interests in Eastern Europe. This Western disengagement from Eastern Europe was conceived in good faith; partly as a recognition of the claim that Soviet security required the establishment of "friendly" governments in the countries along Russia's western boundaries; and partly as a concession to secure Russia's cooperation in building a new world order within the organization of the United Nations. The cooperative attitude of the Western Powers was not, however, reciprocated by the Russians. Western concessions did not induce the Soviet Union to follow the agreed course of Allied policy, nor did Western protests deter the Soviet Union from violating treaty obligations. Western demobilization, especially the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, contributed immensely to Stalin's feeling of security as he plotted to convert Eastern Europe into an exclusive sphere of Soviet influence without running the risk of retaliation.

There must also have been a feeling of insecurity, however, which counselled Stalin to convert the Middle Zone countries into Soviet satellites. For how could he afford to let these countries have "free elections," if the peoples of the Soviet Union themselves did not enjoy such democratic privileges? And what assurance could he have that these "freely elected governments" would promote friendship toward the Soviet Union? Stalin, at Potsdam, was said to have expressed the view that "a freely elected government in any of these countries would be anti- Soviet, and that we cannot allow."4 And then, too, the safest way to protect Russia against Germany was to seize control of the territory lying between the two countries, especially since this territory was actually in Soviet hands as a result of the victorious war. The establishment of Soviet satellites in the Middle Zone jeopardized, of course, the friendly relations between Russia and the Western Powers. But the Soviet leaders, by the very nature of the regime they had created in Russia, must have preferred solutions attained by force to arrangements secured by the organization of the United Nations. The Western leaders were not quite unaware of these dangers, but they believed, as Stettinius said in discussing Roosevelts views, that they "could do much through firmness, patience, and understanding, over a period of time, in dealing with the Soviet Union to influence its evolution away from dictatorship and tyranny in the direction of a free, tolerant and peaceful society."[5]

Unfortunately, Western patience toward the Soviet Union was not coupled with understanding of the Soviet goals, and Western firmness was both late and insufficient to halt Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. Western policy was still based on the wartime idea of "getting along with Russia," whereas post- war Soviet policy already gave ample evidence of its undisguised hostility to the democracies. Western ingenuity was very slow indeed in inventing means by which to try to sway Soviet Russia's evolution away from dictatorship and tyranny. Nor did the West exert itself within the Soviet zone of influence, where the political trend was moving toward Communist dictatorship and Soviet tyranny. From the point of view of democratic interests, Western influence on the post- war policies of the Middle Zone nations was just as ineffective as was Western influence on the evolution of Soviet Russia's policy. What type of guidance the Western democracies, as liberators, would have extended to these peoples in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War can never be known. Soviet occupation blocked free contact with the West. But such political guidance as the democratic leaders in the Soviet orbit did receive from the West was mainly in the form of encouragement to get along with Russia and the Communists, while the Communists were bent upon destruction of these democratic elements.

The Czech democrats did not even need Western encouragement to get along with Russia. They were the pioneers of Soviet friendship in the Middle Zone. The bitter memory of Munich lay heavily on their minds and they were prepared to stake their future security on the Soviet orientation in any case. In Yugoslavia, the former partisans, who formed the core of the new regime headed by Tito, were of course devoted Communists, and as yet loyal admirers of the Soviet Union. But in all the other former Nazi- occupied countries too, political alliances between democrats and Communists in post- war coalition governments were considered, by many democrats at least, as the logical outcome of the common struggle against the Germans and their Nazi accomplices. Moreover, common revolutionary objectives in the post- war reconstruction era gave to cooperation between democrats and Communists an impetus similar to that which had encouraged their cooperation against the Nazi foe during the war.

The old social order was either completely destroyed or seriously dislocated when the war ended. Revolutions were bound to sweep across Eastern Europe, not only because liberation by the Red Army was an invitation to social revolution, but also because the oppressed and humiliated masses, resentful of the past, were overwhelmingly in favor of radical change. In this revolutionary excitement, a great many democrats who considered themselves loyal to the Western ideals of democracy found themselves nevertheless in agreement with the social and economic reforms advocated by the Communists; they also favored swift revolutionary solutions because of fear that any delay would endanger the success of reforms. On the other hand, reactionary opponents of such popular demands as agrarian reform, nationalization of big industry, mining and banking, sprang to the defense of "democratic processes" and appealed to the West for support. Thus situations arose in which to a great many people, social reaction seemed to be supported by the West, while progressive aspirations seemed to be backed by the Soviet Union. Another popular sentiment which aided the Soviet cause in Central and Eastern Europe was Slavic nationalism. With the exception mainly of the Romanians and Hungarians, the population of the territories liberated from the Nazi- German yoke by the Red Army was Slavic. The degree of Russian and Communist sympathy among the Slavs varied considerably; it was highest, perhaps, among the Czechs and lowest among the Poles. But more than ever before, all of the Slavs responded to the wartime slogans of Slavic solidarity, propagated from Moscow, and all of them hailed the defeat of Nazi Germany as the beginning of a glorious "age of the Slavs."

Nazi cruelties and inhumanities incited the Slavs to hatred and desire for revenge, and also to retribution in kind. Communist disregard for the laws of humanity only added further impetus to an already well advanced process of demoralization. The wild outburst of Slavic nationalism at the war's end was sad evidence of Central and Eastern Europe's dehumanization. Reckless national aspirations were popular with both Communists and non- Communists. In fact, the program to expel the non- Slavs from Czechoslovakia was originated by President Benes, who was not a Communist.6 And the anti- Communist Polish emigre government in London was as much in favor of the Oder- Neisse frontier, including the expulsion of millions of Germans living east of this frontier, as was the Soviet- sponsored Polish government in Warsaw.

In Poland's case, to be sure, the desire for revenge was coupled with an undeniable - though exaggerated - claim for territorial compensation. The territories taken by Poland from Germany in the west were in compensation for the territories Russia took from Poland in the east. The Czech scheme for expulsion, on the other hand, was one of Slav revenge pure and simple.

In December 1946, the first post- war Slav Congress met in Belgrade. This congress turned out to be also the last occasion when the delegates of all the Slavic nations gathered to celebrate their triumph and brotherhood. Slav solidarity remained a slogan of Soviet policy, but the organization of the "people's democracies" in Eastern Europe became for Moscow a more urgent task than the organization of Slav congresses. And the "people's democracies" of the Soviet satellites caused bitter disappointment to the Slav nationalists as well as to the progressive democrats who had believed they could work with the Communists to obtain social reforms and improved conditions for the working masses. At the end of the long line of Russia's disappointed friends in Eastern Europe stood the not- so- few native Communists, who discovered that the Soviet sphere of influence was a dangerous place to live in, even for Communists. From the beginning, Soviet conduct in Central and Eastern Europe was such that it took a great deal of optimism to have faith in Russian cooperation. The Red Army's atrocities, their looting and raping, far exceeded anything that could be explained by the dehumanizing effects of war. However, optimism was sustained by those pacifist sentiments that arose naturally as an emotional reaction to the sufferings of war. Also, preoccupation with social reforms and self- centered nationalism, as a rule, made the victims of Communist aggression themselves fully aware of their danger only when their turn came. Many reform- minded non- Communists were ready to believe that only reactionaries had to fear the Communists, who were clearing the way for radical social reforms. And those who suffered little from Soviet interference were not particularly impressed by the alarming progress Communist tyranny was making in their neighborhood. As previously in the era of Hitler's aggression, there was at the time of Stalin's aggression no move toward united action in opposition. One by one, and by stages, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were brought under the rule of Soviet tyranny. In fact, Czechoslovakia, the first among the victims of Hitler's aggression and the last among those of Stalin, was the most optimistic in believing that she would succeed, although those around her failed, in cooperating with Russia. And for that matter the West became really aware of the Soviet menace only after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, when already the Western nations felt themselves directly exposed to the danger of Soviet aggression. Yet even at the time of the Yalta conference (February 1945), when the chances of cooperation with Russia were viewed with the greatest optimism, Communist aggressiveness was apparent in all the countries liberated by the Red Army. In addition to the chronically grave crisis in Poland, there was trouble in Romania, where the Russians were greatly dissatisfied with the government headed by General Radescu. The charges against the Radescu governmentas reactionary were not without foundation, nor was the complaint wholly unjustified that the government was unable to maintain order in the rear of the Red Army. For example, Soviet reports about Romanian nationalists massacring Hungarians in Transylvania might have been exaggerated, but it was true that order was restored only when the Soviet authorities took over the administration. In any case, the actions which the Russians took against the Radescu governmentwere neither democratic nor in line with the Yalta provisions.

Early in March 1945, Soviet troops disarmed the Romanian troops in Bucharest, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky, after an ultimatum, ordered King Michaelto appoint a new government headed by the pro- Communist Petru Groza. With the appointment of the Groza government on March 9, only a month after Yalta, a regime was already safely established in Romania which could efficiently carry out the bolshevization of the country, while ruthlessly exterminating the anti- Communist opposition. The Communist coup in Romania was cleverly accompanied by concessions granted to the new Romanian government in the administration of multinational Transylvania. The Russians did not lack the talent for exploiting ethnic rivalries in the Danube Valley according to the old devices of "divide and conquer."

At the time of Romania's defection from the Axis in the summer of 1944, the Russians, in agreement with the Western Powers, were already capitalizing on the rivalry between Romania and Hungaryby promising Transylvania, "or the greater part thereof," to the Romanians as a reward for their defection. After the Communist coup, Russia, without consulting the West, transferred the administration of the whole of Transylvania to the Groza government. The Romanians therefore felt confident that the peace conference too would award the whole of Transylvania to them. Thus Groza brought Transylvania as a dowry to the Romanians, and thereby he considerably strengthened the popularity of his regime.

In the meantime, Moscow's agents in the Hungarian provisional government intimated that Transylvania might not be lost yet, if only Hungarycould catch up with Romania's progress toward a people's democracy. Thus, old feuds between the Danubian nations and nationalist passions were harnessed to promote sympathy for Soviet Russia.

The Communists in Czechoslovakia were in a specially favorable position to appeal to nationalist passions. They could remind their compatriots that Russia, in addition to restoring Czechoslovak sovereignty over territories inhabited by alien populations, supported also the expulsion of alien peoples therefrom. This gain seemed so valuable that the Czechoslovaks even forgave Russia for taking away Ruthenia. Moreover the cession of Ruthenia to Russia, effected by the Czecho-slovak- Soviet treaty of June 29, 1945, was interpreted as a fulfillment of T. G. Masaryk's program; for in 1918, when the Czechs took Ruthenia from Hungary Masaryk had declared that Czechoslovakia would hold it only as a trustee for Russia. And for that matter, by ceding Ruthenia to the Russians, the Czechs and Slovaks did not surrender their own co- nationals. The population of the ceded territory, which had twice changed hands between Hungaryand Czechoslovakia since 1918, consisted of over half a million Ruthenes and over 100,000 Hungarians. To the Bulgarians, in the meantime, the Communists pointed out that Soviet justice and respect for the principle of ethnic freedom had enabled them to keep Southern Dobrudja, a territory which they had gained from Romania under Nazi auspices. This ostensible appeal to high principles cloaked a rapidly extended bolshevization of Bulgaria. There, the decisive moment in the Communists, taking over the government had already arrived before Yalta. In September 1944, the Muraviev government, which represented the democratic elements, was swept aside after one week in office. Although the new government was headed by a non- Communist, Kimon Georgiev, Communist power expanded rapidly. Communist aggressiveness against the democratic elements precipitated a major crisis in January 1945, when the Western-

oriented Dr. G. M. Dimitrov was forced to resign as General Secretary of the Agrarian Union. Thereafter it was only a question of time until the other Dimitrov, the famous Communist Georgi Dimitrov, former secretary of the Comintern, should take over as premier.

In Yugoslavia, the special Yalta agreement, envisaging a coalition between Communists and Western- oriented democrats, was carried out inasmuch as Tito became premier and Subasicforeign minister in the government formed on March 7, 1945. But those democrats, including Subasic who tried to cooperate with the Yugoslav Communists were soon either in jail or in exile. The democrats, who were anxious to equip Yugoslavia with free institutions on the Western model, were on the losing side, as well as the exiled King Peter 11 and his reactionary clique, who were dreaming of restoring the dynasty and Serbian hegemony. Tito, as leader of the Communist revolution in post- war Yugoslavia, showed no greater respect than Stalin for the democratic Yalta principles. However, the Western Powers, although critical of Tito's dictatorial practices, reluctantly recognized his regime; for, in Churchill's words, addressed to the disillusioned Peter 11, the West was "unable to prevent" the events which had disappointed their "best hopes."7 Tito won recognition by a political fait accompli which followed from his military victory in the war. So too did the Communist Enver Hoxha, who was in control of Albania when the war ended.

Disputes over recognition of post- war governments in Eastern Europe opened the chasm between East and West shortly after Yalta. The sole exception was Czechoslovakia, where Benes and his Czechs, after re- turning from London via Moscow, seemed to settle down to a happy marriage with the Communists. On the other hand, the great crisis was caused over Poland, where freedom remained in eclipse after Yalta as before, even though, as Churchill was wont to say, "it was for this that we had gone to war against Germany."

At Yalta it was agreed that the Polish government, which had been formed from the Lublin Committee of Soviet puppets, should be re- organized on a broader democratic basis, and that this new government should be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections. Averell Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr respectively the American and British ambassadors in Moscow, were to join with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in a commission to assist the Poles in forming a truly representative government. This commission, however, made no progress of any kind in implementing the Yalta agreement. The ambiguities of the Yalta text itself were exploited by the Russians to dispute the Western interpretation of the agreement. Whereas the Western negotiators wanted to replace the Soviet puppet government by a Polish government of all the democratic parties, the Russians "defended" Polish sovereignty against Western "interference"; meanwhile they tightened their octopus- like grip over the country.

Under the impact mainly of the Polish crisis, Churchill began to sound the alarm in inter- Allied communications early in March 1945. He was disturbed by Soviet actions elsewhere too, especially by what was going on in Romania and Bulgaria. However, since Stalin did not interfere with British actions in Greece, Churchill chose to respect the pre- Yalta agreements he had made with Stalin concerning Soviet "pre- dominance" in the two Balkan countries; moreover, he "did not want to do anything . . . which might harm the prospect of a Polish settlement." For Churchill felt that Poland was, in general, the "test case" between the Western Powers and the Russians, in relation to the meaning of such terms as "democracy, sovereignty, independence, representative government, and free and unfettered elections."[8]

On March 8, in a message to President Roosevelt Churchill expressed his deep concern about the Polish situation. He informed the President of his plan to send a personal message to Stalin, urging "an early settlement on the basis of the Yalta decision," and he also expressed his hope that the President would do his "utmost to bring this about."[9]

Thus Churchill began the series of messages, propositions and pleas which he made public in the last volume (Triumph and Tragedy) of his memoirs, and which proved conclusively that in the spring of 1945 he grew fully aware of the Soviet menace and was also ready to take action against it. Unfortunately the American government did not sense the danger as early as Churchill did. And Churchill noted sadly: "We could make no progress without American aid...."[10] For, even before the war had ended, it was evident that the future of Europe would depend upon two extra- European Great Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

Rooseveltagreed with Churchill's objectives, but fearing lest the Polish issue aggravate the East- West chasm, he disagreed with Churchill's tactics. As far as the objective of implementing the Yalta decisions on Poland was concerned, Churchill's tactical proposal was modest indeed: he wanted Mikolajczyk, ex- premier of the London Poles, to attend the negotiations on the reorganization of the Lublin government. But it was only after repeated urging that Roosevelt on March 29, agreed to address Stalin directly in support of Churchill's proposal. Stalin promised to use his influence with the Lublin Poles to make them withdraw their objections to inviting Mikolajczyk. Meanwhile, however, other incidents had intensified the strain: the Russians refused to let Foreign Minister Molotov attend the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco unless the Lublin Poles were admitted to represent Poland; fifteen leaders of the Polish anti- Nazi underground movement disappeared mysteriously after a meeting with Soviet representatives; and, most serious for the East- West alliance in the closing days of the war, Stalin accused the Western Powers, in the so- called Berne affair in early April, of negotiating secretly with the Germans in the Swiss capital.

The Western Powers rejected Stalin's accusation; President Roosevelt in his reply to Stalin, used especially strong language, expressing his "feeling of bitter resentment" over the "vile misrepresentations." The affair was closed with Stalin's explanation of the Soviet point of view which Churchill thought came "as near as they can get to an apology." On April 12, the day of his death, President Rooseveltsummed up his views of the Soviet problem. He cabled to Churchill: "These problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day, and most of them straighten out, as in the case of the Berne meeting. We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct."[11]

After Roosevelts death, President Truman without delay took up the still unsettled Polish question. Within two days, he proposed to Stalin that Mikolajczyk and two other Polish leaders from London should be invited to Moscow at once. Truman also rejected the Soviet contention that the position of the Lublin Poles was similar to that of Tito's Yugoslavs. Therefore the Western recognition of Tito's government was not a precedent which could be applied to Poland.

But the East- West deadlock over Poland continued, and toward the end of May Truman sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow. Hopkins spoke about America's concern for certain fundamental democratic rights, while Stalin assured him that "the Soviet system is not exportable."[12] Hopkins' mission was considered a success because Mikolajczyk and two of his emigre colleagues finally went to Moscow to join the discussions on the reorganization of the Polish government. Churchill himself persuaded Mikolajczyk to go, telling him in parting: "We are responsible for your journey. If something should happen to you we shall start fighting." Mikolajczyk decided to go in a last desperate attempt to save whatever he could of Poland's freedom. Gloom prevailed over the words of Tomasz Arciszewski, Socialist premier of the doomed Polish government in exile, when he said in his farewell to Mikolajczyk: "In your hands lies the future of Poland."13 The compromise reached at Moscow was hardly a guarantee of Poland's future as an independent nation. Mikolajczyk, as leader of the Peasant party, became Second Deputy Premier of the new so- called Provisional Government of National Unity, headed by one of the Lublin Poles, Osobka- Morawski, a pro- Soviet Socialist. The First Deputy Premier was the Communist Wladyslaw Gomulka. Fourteen of the twenty- one members of the government were Lublin Poles, while Moscow's trusted stooge, Bierut, continued to function as President of the Polish Republic.

The Polish government was recognized by both Britain and the United States on July 5, at Truman's request. The recognition was one of the first acts of the new American Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, who took office on July 3. As Churchill saw it, all the Polish parties, except Stalin's Communist puppets, were in a hopeless minority in the Polish coalition government which the Western Powers had recognized. However, he resigned himself to this act of appeasement, though only after all his efforts during the spring of 1945 had failed to create a partnership with the United States for what he called "an early and speedy showdown and settlement with Russia."14

In the spring of 1945 Churchill had reached the conclusion that Soviet Russia had become a "mortal danger." He saw "a great failure and an utter breakdown of what was settled at Yalta." He urged "dogged pressure and persistence," because otherwise "Eastern Europe will be shown to be excluded from the terms of the Declaration on Liberated Europe," and the West "shall be excluded from any jot of influence in that area." He spoke already of an "iron curtain" drawn upon the Soviet front. He was convinced that "a new front must be immediately created" against the Soviet onward sweep. He urged that the Western armies should meet the Russians "as far east as possible," that they should take Berlin and Prague, though Vienna, another of Churchill's objectives, had already been lost to the Russians. When because of American objections he was unable to change Allied strategy in the last days of the war, he wanted to maintain the Western armies, because he was convinced that above all "a settlement must be reached on all major issues between the West and the East in Europe before the armies of democracy melted, or the Western allies yielded any part of the German territories...."15 Almost ten years later, in November 1954, Churchill revealed in a speech to his constituents at Woodford that in the spring of 1945 he had ordered Field- Marshal Montgomery to stack the arms of surrendered German troops for possible reissue if the Russians advanced too far west. It is debatable whether the order, and especially its disclosure, was wise or unwise. In any case, the order itself was further evidence of Churchill's prompt reaction to the Soviet Union's treacherous behavior in the spring of 1945.

Following the German surrender on May 8, Churchill urged Truman several times not to withdraw the American armies from the western borderland of Czechoslovakia and from the areas in Germany which were assigned to the Soviet zone of occupation. The withdrawal, he argued, should be made only when accompanied by "the settlement of many great things which would be the true foundation of world peace." Truman and his advisers thought, however, this would harm relations with the Russians. All Western troops began withdrawing on June 21 from an area four hundred miles long and one hundred and twenty miles at its greatest depth.16 It was of course not only the size of the area abandoned to the Russians that mattered. Churchill opposed the withdrawal of troops because he saw that "the Soviet menace . . . had already replaced the Nazi foe." He realized that only the military might of the West, if anything, could force the Russians to respect the Yalta agreements. But he was unable to gain American support for his new policy. The American policy- makers seemed to regard the East- West conflict in Europe as a dispute mainly between Britain and Russia. They felt the United States could stand between Russia and Britain as a "friendly mediator, or even arbiter."17 They were anxious to concentrate American forces, and to engage Russia's help in the unfinished war against Japan. Under these circumstances, Churchill's last hope was that his meeting with President Truman and Generalissimo Stalin, the new Big Three conference which was scheduled to take place in Potsdam, might save the situation.

Churchill attended only the first half of the Potsdam conference, which began on July 17. On July 25, he returned to London to learn the result of the elections The Conservative party's defeat at the polls ended Churchill's premiership and his attendance at the Potsdam conference. In his memoirs, however, Churchill disclosed that he had planned a "showdown" with the Russians, or even a "public break," at the end of the conference. He pointed out especially that neither he nor Eden would ever have agreed to the Western Neisse as the frontier of Poland. 18 Even more weighty reasons, for that matter, than the problem of Poland's western frontiers called for a showdown. The entire East European situation was in fact grave enough to call for a drastic reappraisal of the West's policy toward Soviet Russia. But whatever the basis, it is hard to imagine how Churchill could have carried out his "showdown" plan, with Western public opinion so overwhelmingly friendly toward Soviet Russia. Nor would it seem that Roosevelts death contributed materially to the failure of the new policy which Churchill was advocating behind the scenes, although Churchill himself referred to the "deadly hiatus" and the "melancholy void" which existed "between the fading of President Roosevelts strength and the growth of President Truman's grip of the vast world problem."19 The real "deadly hiatus" which cost the West the fruits of victory resulted from the failure of the Western Powers to integrate the democracies into a socially progressive and spiritually dynamic international force. At the war's end, the Western democracies stood, with their atomic bomb which forced Japan into surrender (August 15), with their armies stronger than the world had ever seen, not knowing how to use their power effectively in the service of democracy and peace. There was no lack of willingness in the West to help the war- torn world. The United States, with its tremendous wealth and economy unscathed by war, stood ready to help needy peoples with food and supplies; for some time, American aid even continued to flow into countries which had developed strongly anti- Western attitudes under Communist governments. In 1945- 46, American- supported UNRRA shipped more than a billion dollars, worth of aid to the Central and Eastern European countries in the Soviet orbit; Poland received 481 millions, Yugoslavia 420, Czechoslovakia 270, Albania 24 millions; Hungary one of the worst devastated countries, as well as Romania and Bulgaria, also received some Western aid, although as former enemy states they were not eligible for UNRRA aid.

Unfortunately, Western willingness to aid the world economically was not matched with ability to act politically. The Western nations were very slow to comprehend the swiftly changing international situation. Individual domestic problems absorbed their attention as soon as the great struggle was over. They demobilized much too soon, hopeful that the world's peace would be assured by the United Nations. In Europe, the Western victors concentrated on what at that time were believed to be the basic provisions for peace, namely, punishing Germany and establishing friendly relations between Soviet Russiaand the Middle Zone nations. And although Russia's behavior was anything but cooperative, the Western democracies, as if gripped by a deadly inertia, kept repeating to themselves, and to those who were looking to them for guidance, the old wartime slogan, "Get along with Russia!," a slogan now shorn of its one- time realism and signifying nothing but appeasement of the new aggressor.

The New Central Europe