PAN- SLAVI SM

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Introduction

It is not by accident that the French Revolution is regarded as the introducer of a new epoch in the history of mankind. The effects of the French Revolution have immensely influenced the course of history. The pre-revolutionary era in Europe was characterized by extreme despotism of the rulers, which was felt in the whole spectrum of society. It affected the cultural, economic, social, and religious life alike. Some outstanding encyclopedists and writers of the French intellectual elite raised their voices first against the glaring injustices of the regime. In their writings they emphasized high humanistic ideals, which were summarized in these three famous words: “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!” They found ardent allies among the French intellectuals, and later in the entire nation.

The deteriorating economic and social conditions of the second half of the 18th century also helped the outbreak of the French Revolution. Those great revolutionary ideas did not stop at the borders of France, but soon spread all over Europe, causing a great stir among the nations. This wave of enlightenment and national awakening was most fervently propagated by writers, poets, scientists and scholars.

The Slavic groups were among the first ones affected by those revolutionary ideals. While French romantic literature, and idealistic German philosophy had strongly inspired early Pan-Slavic ideology, Pan-Slavism itself sprang from the desire of the Slavic groups to unite, and combine their forces.

The Pan-Slavic movement produced a highly developed literature. Many great scholars committed their lives to the movement. The most significant among them were: Pavel Joseph Safarik (1795-1861), Jan Kollar (1793-1852), Frantisek Palacky (1798-1876), Ludevit Stur (1815-1 856), among the Czechs and Sloyaks; Stanislav Statiscg (1773-1826), Bronislav Tretowski (1808-1869), Adam Mackiewich (1789-1866), among the Poles; Stanko Vras (1810-1851), Valentin Vodnik (1758-1819), Ljudant Gaj (1809-1872), from the Illyrian Slays; ivan Kotnyerevski (1769-1838), Taras Seuchenko (1814-1861), from the Ukrainians; PeterJ. Cadayev (1794-1856), Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin (1800-1875), Fyodor Ivanovich Tyuchev (1 803-1875), from the Russians.

All these spiritual leaders shared the opinion that glory and power
could be attained only through unification of the Slavic groups. However, realizing this goal was not an easy task.

during the Congress which had started at the end of May, Vladimir Ivanovich Lamansky pointed out that the invitation of the non-Russian Slays — which he called a great historic event — fitted nicely into the framework of the ethnographic exhibition, there by proving that Russia did not intend to deprive the various Slavic peoples of their different ethnographic characters, but magnanimously recognized the historical rights of the weaker Slavic brethren, thereby acquiring a strong position of moral leadership. In the same speech he demanded that Russian be the official language of all Slavs, and this proposal was greeted with thunderous applause by his Russian audience. The non-Russian guests gradually came to the conclusion that by Pan-Slavism their Russian hosts meant “Pan-Russianism,” which would include the general acceptance of the Russian language and the Orthodox faith by all other Slavs; in other words, a Russification of the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan Slavs, similar to that of the Poles and Ukrainians within the Russian borders.

The Ukrainian and the Polish questions were also discussed by the Congress. Some delegates suggested the establishment of a Pan-Slavic university in Warsaw. Others proposed the division of the Slavic world into three territories: one exclusively Russian part; that would include all territories east of the Vistula, a Western Slavic empire, with Prague as the capital; and a Southern Slav empire, with Belgrade as its center. The possible establishment of publishing houses, literary periodicals, and economic institutions was also discussed.

From the chosen topics of discussion it can be easily understood why the Moscow conference showed no practical results: for most of these topics themselves were sheer utopian intellectual dreams.

The Congress of Prague was held in June, 1848. Great hopes were raised by this first Pan-Slavic gathering, which the Czech leaders, Palacky and Safarik had initiated. Of the 341 delegates, the overwhelming majority were Austrian Slays, but a few of them came from Russia, Poland and even from Prussia. Mikhail Bakunin was one of them. This congress took place in an era when the whole of Europe was in a state of political fermentation, searching for new ways of self-expression.
Historic Development of Pan-Slavism

In the late 18th century, the Slavic peoples of the Carpathian basin and the Danube region looked upon czarist Russia as the only truly independent Slavic state, and major power. They expected her to back their nationalistic aspirations. As a result of Russian victories over Napoleon and the Turks, these Slavic peoples idealized czarist absolutism. They saw only its favorable aspects that were beneficial and useful to their movements, disregarded the drawbacks of despotic rule, such as the harsh oppression of non-Russian peoples of czarist Russia, including non-Russian Slavs. Their clarity of vision was clouded by the anti-Ottoman policy of the czarist empire, which somewhat eased the sufferings of Balkan Slavs under the Turkish oppression, thus blinding them towards the aggressive expansionist policy of the czars. This czarist political aid to Balkan Slavs strengthened the pro-czarist illusions among the Czechs and Slovaks, too. Whereas the overwhelming majority of contemporary Slavic leaders of the Austro-Hungarian empire remained loyal to the Habsburg monarchy. Their exclusive aim was to achieve some kind of independence from the Hungarian state and its constitution, in other words, a kind of political autonomy, still within the domain of the Austrian emperor. Those who leaned towards czarist Russia were called Pan-Slavists, and those who favoured the Austrian monarchy were named Austro-Slavs.

The differences of opinion between the Habsburgs and the Romanovs over the East-European question in the first half of the 19th century still did not lead to a serious rift between the Austro-Hungarian and the czarist empires. What is more, in 1833, these two great powers signed a treaty of mutual help, to protect the emperor and the czar against outside or inside attacks. Prussia also had joined this treaty. How seriously had Czar Nicholas I taken this agreement was proved later; in 1849, when the Russian army invaded Transylvania, to protect the Austrian ruler against rebelling Hungarian troops. The czar considered the Hungarians the chief opponents of the Habsburg empire.

The fear of the anti-monarchist Hungarian nobility from czarist
Russia and Pan-Slavism was expressed by Nicholas Wesselenyi in his book, “Opinions about the Hungarian and Slavic Nationalities,” published in Leipzig, in 1843. The fear of a possible union between the Slavic nationalities of Hungary and czarist Russia was not entirely baseless, for it was about that time that the political ideology of Pan-Slavism took shape.

Pan-Slavism, as a political movement, originated from the unsolved nationality question.

From the political events of the last century, and especially the events following World War I, it seems evident that we have a two-fold problem at the root of the modern nationality question:

1. How can a workable solution be found between the state and the various nationalities that together constitute the nation?
2. How can the problems of European minorities be resolved within the wider, continental political framework?

In the course of the 20th century, the nationality question has become a very real political problem, with well-defined aims demanding real and lasting solutions.

Nowadays it is beyond doubt that the concept of the nation, as a political entity includes, as a prerequisite, the power to govern the state. While the concept of nationality refers to a group of people with racial-national self-awareness, and a common language, and some degree of organized unity that considers itself as a legally and politically distinct entity from the governing group.

Hence this treatise is not aimed at clarifying the conceptions, nor at providing a historic survey for the development of these conceptions. It is intended to provide a sketchy picture of the historic development of the nationality question, during the last two centuries in East Europe, with the emphasis on Hungary, within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Therefore it puts the emphasis on these political events and happenings which illustrate and illuminate the historic development of the nationality question, which came from the political and cultural trends of Pan-Slavism. (My survey does not include the Romanians, and Saxons of Transylvania.)

The political history of the nationalities of Hungary began with the diet (legislative assembly) of 1790-91. Everything that happened before that date may be relegated to the realm of social and cultural history. It seems
obvious that the nationality problem existed long before 1790, but it was not recognized consciously as such. It surfaced in the form of certain settlement rights, such as the Diploma of Leopold, instead of political or language rights.

However, at the diet of 1790-91, the participants expressly requested the recognition of their political and language rights by the emperor. The 1790 decision of the Serbian Congress of Temesvar, and the first memorandum of the Romanians under the title “Supplex libellus Vlachorum” had arrived at the Transylvanian diet for the same reason. While the Hungarian diet of 1790-91 had received the Croat-Slavonian counties’ memorandum, the “Declaratio,” which demanded the preservation of Latin, as the language of public administration — in opposition to Hungarian language demands.

Thus 1790 is a remarkable turning point in the history of East European peoples. It marks the beginning of nationality-related politics. Culturally the question of Hungarian language use dates back to 1777, when George Bessenyei urged the establishment of an “entirely Hungarian academy.” The political roots of this question originated from a national reaction against the oppressive language decree of Emperor Joseph II, which was formally expressed at the 1790-91 diet. The literary interest merged with the political interest only a few decades later, after 1825. Until then the so-called class-nationalism of the nobility, and the revived national spirit — which was enjoying a rebirth through the language reforms — progressed mostly on a parallel course, with some diversions.

Starting from the rationalistic state principle, the initiators of the literary revival (writers and poets, like Kazinczy, Kolcsey, Kisfaludy,) misunderstood the so-called French-style state principle: however these writers, poets, and language reformers never showed impatience or antipathy towards the nationalities of their country. The representatives of the feudal state fought by nonliterary means, but quite vociferously, for the recognition of the national tongue as the official language of the state. In this political fight between the awakening Hungarian national consciousness and the Austrian state interests, the nationalities had no objections against the Hungarian aspirations, except the Croatian representatives. On the other hand, owing to the lack of diplomatic finesse, the feudal Hungarian noble classes were unable to take advantage of the opportunity until 1805. Act XVI, the first Hungarian language law, enacted in 1791, was skillfully formulated by Sandor Pasztory, the governor of Fiume. This was ac-
accomplished in spite of the machinations of Baron Joseph Izdenczy, the emperor’s adviser on Hungarian affairs. This act could have provided the basis for the enactment of the natural rights of the Hungarians, whereby the harmful consequences of subsequent fierce debates could have been prevented.

The aforementioned Act XVI, 1791, declares: “In order to avoid the use of a foreign language in the administration of public affairs, and preserve the Hungarian language, His Majesty assures the nobility that he shall not use any foreign language in official matters, and for the purpose of enhanced propagation and improvement of the Hungarian language, special teachers shall be employed at high schools, academies, and the university, so that those who want to learn this language, or become more proficient in it, be able to do so in any desired area or direction. However, for the time being, governmental affairs still shall be dealt with in Latin.”

The noble representatives misunderstood the meaning of the phrase, “for the time being,” and protested against it. Although it was through the inclusion of this very phrase that — by referring to the emperor’s promise, as stated in the Act Pasztory had intended to provide the next diet with a legal basis for enacting the use of Hungarian in education and public administration, in spite of all contrary intrigues.

Pasztory’s subtle tactics went unnoticed by the nobility, as the events of the diet of 1792 proved. At that occasion the Hungarian representatives requested nothing else other than the acceptance of Hungarian among the compulsory school subjects, and that Hungarian be the language of correspondence between the Regent Council and the Hungarian-speaking countries. Finally on the basis of a Croatian motion — they asked for the introduction of the Hungarian language, as a non-compulsory subject in Croat-Slavonian schools.

Vienna did not deign to sanction even these modest requests, and so proposed a compromise for the emperor, which stated that the administrative language of the Regent Council shall be decided through subsequent negotiations; however, bilingual petitions or representations may be submitted to Parliament. In turn, this very important proposal was rejected by the politically uneducated noble classes. They had reasoned that, since one of the bilingual texts would be written in Latin, a second text written in another language was redundant. Consequently, Act VII, 1792, became an incomplete and meaningless law. The Regent Council continued to correspond with the counties in Latin, and the representations also were written in Latin, as before. Even though the Act had mentioned the teaching
of Hungarian as a non-compulsory subject in the schools of the “attached territories,” nobody paid much attention to that sanction. So the use of

the Hungarian language remained unresolved. The only positive outcome of this law turned out to be a partial solution: At the University of Pest, in 1792, the first professor of the newly created Hungarian Department was not Nicholas Revay, the outstanding linguist and neologist, but the dilettante Andras Valyi, whose lectures about the cultivation of the language met with general disinterest.

The first significant nationalistic political objection on the Croatian nobility’s behalf, the so-called “Declaratio” was related to these early language acts. In the arguments of Baron Skerlecz, the author of the Declaratio, and its parliamentary advocate, Bedenkovich, the Croatian national ideal had received its first conscious formulation. This was not the first manifestation of Croatian nationalism. At the diet of 1681, the Croat-Slavonian nobility had raised its objection against the preferential treatment of Serbs by the Viennese royal court, at the Croatians’ expense. One hundred ten years later, to prevent the enactment of the official status of the Hungarian language, they would argue that the official language of Hungary was Latin, and so it would be anti-constitutional to press for a change.

They declared that the “central country” had no legal right to force its will upon the “attached countries,” obviously failing to recognize that by the rigid adherence to Latin, Croatia was actually trying to impose its will on the Hungarians, in a basically internal matter. The parliamentary dispute elicited by the “Declaratio” followed the “great Croatian” line of ideology. We have to recognize that this consciously nationalistic attitude represented a new, hitherto unexperienced mode of behavior among the nationalities of Hungary. It appeared as the protector of Latinity at the diet, but later it would become the flag bearer of racial ideas. For example, during the debate on the bilingual parliamentary journal, Bedenkovich had declared that the Hungarian language could not be introduced in the “companion countries,” even as a non-compulsory subject, because the Croatian nation is as distinct and genuine as the Hungarian, “and it would be a shame to lose its own language, for that would be the end of its distinct nationhood.”

A contemporary political treatise, “Dalmatiae, Croatae, Slavorum trium sororum etc., Posoniensis 1791,” which was written to Count John Erdodi, the Governor of Croatia, by an anonymous author states that the Hungarian language is so “primitive,” that it is insufficient even for domestic use.
Such intentional misrepresentations would show up again and again in the course of subsequent historic development of the nationality question. Well-conceived Hungarian intentions would be distorted beyond recognition, often to imply the opposite meaning, by the conceivers of Pan-Slavic ideology.

The political significance of the Croatian memorandum “Declaratio” is demonstrated by the fact that its author, Baron Nicholas Skerlecz, and the representatives of the Croat-Slavonian counties voiced their protest in the name of the “Croat nation,” as a political entity, whose interest they wanted to protect by retaining the status quo.

The idea of distinct political nationhood among the Serbs of Hungary first showed up in a definite form at the Serbo-Illyrian Congress of 1790, held in Temesvar. However its roots reach back to earlier times. During the anti-Turkish campaign, in 1690, 40,000 armed Serbs had arrived with the retreating imperial army in Southern Hungary, together with their families — some 200,000 souls — and occupied the southern counties. They were under the leadership of Chernovich, the patriarch of Ipek. The nationality rights of these immigrant (fugitive) Serbs had been protected by various charters. “The Diploma of Leopold,” which dates back to August 21st, 1690, granted them total religious freedom, and freedom from taxation within the Serb-occupied territories. It also gave them the right to have their own judicial system, religious self-government, and the right to elect a symbolic viceroy. These privileges had allowed them to create a “country within a country” situation. As the emperor’s patent of August 20th, 1691 reveals, the presence of this large group had originally been regarded as temporary, so that with a favorable change in the military situation the “Serb nation” would return to its ancestral homeland and the accustomed ways of life. Therefore their privileges were actually hospitality rights, which they had received as guests. However in the course of time this had been forgotten, and instead of returning home to their own country after things reverted to normal, they turned against their hosts.

The Temesvar Serb Congress of 1790, to which the Serb parish priests, smallholders, burghers, high clergy and military leaders received an invitation, regarded this ad hoc privileged position as final. Albeit the Turkish occupation ended. On the basis of the existing situation, Frontier General Secujac, backed by the Serb military leaders and the high clergy, demanded the establishment of a Serbo-Illyrian chancellery. They also demanded an official designation of the borders of Serb national territory,
that would include a portion of Southern Hungary; moreover the recognition of the independent authority of Serb national justice, and the continuous maintenance of the guarded frontier areas under the Imperial War Council’s supremacy.

The Hungarian noble classes lodged a protest against these constitution-violating demands. Nevertheless the Vienna Royal Court, following its self-serving divisive policy towards the nationalities of the Danube region, found the creation of an “Illyrian” chancellery practicable. It began its function in late 1791, under the leadership of Count Ferenc Balassa, a naturalized Austrian monarchist, with unmistakably anti-Hungarian aims. The sad truth is that during the Habsburg absolutism, some members of the Hungarian aristocracy could be used as servile agents of anti-Hungarian causes.

Even Vienna failed to recognize that the Serbian question of Southern Hungary had already outgrown the confines of Viennese existing politics, which tried to capitalize on fomenting dissent among the nationalities of the Danube valley.

The Serbian nationalistic ideal had already found its verbal and political formulator, seven years before the Temesvar congress, in the person of Dositei Obradovic, the forerunner of Serb linguistic and literary revival. In his book, “The Advices of Common Sense,” (1783) he precisely outlined his national conception, which later reappeared within the Pan-Slavic framework as the Southern Slav conception.

“Everybody knows,” says Obradovic, “that the peoples of Montenegro, Dalmatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Slavonia, Szerem, Bacska, Banat speak the same language. Therefore I shall translate the thoughts of wise men for the entire Serb nation...”

According to the above quotation, Obradovic’s “Serbian nation” included the Serbs of Croatia, Slavonia, Szerem, Bacska, Banat, regardless of religion. His clarity of vision was rooted in the enlightened spirit of the French Revolution. This, contrary to Kollar and Gaj, who adhered to Herder’s and Hegel’s romantic pro-Slavic theories. They believed in a Slavic renaissance. The Slovakian counterpart of Obradovic, Anton Bernolak, was the father of Slovakian language reform. The first Slovakian newspaper, Prespurske Noviny (Pressburg News), which appeared between 1783-87, reflected the spirit of enlightenment. Bernolak’s own Slavic Grammar (Grammatica Slavica) was based on the Western Slovak dialect.

Bernolak founded the first Slovakian Literary Association
(Tovaristvo litterného umenia). Juraj Fandli, the first Slovak culturist-politician was one of its members. From all this it becomes evident that prior to the conception of Pan-Slavic ideologies which were closely linked with German philosophy, there had been a French-style nationalistic cultural movement among the Danubian Slavs. But owing to the ill-fated anti-monarchist Martinovich plot, it could not develop fully. The advocates of the subsequently developed German-based, and decidedly anti-Hungarian mystical Slavic nationalist conception borrowed the style of its pamphlets from German political literature. This can be seen from the impassioned tone of Kollar’s first anonymous pamphlet, “Über die Magyarisierung der Slaben.”

It was not by accident that Kollar and Gaj found each other amid the fight for language rights. The initiator of this meeting had certainly been Gaj, who had known Kollar’s above mentioned pamphlet. To express his appreciation, he offered his Zagreb press to this great champion of Slavic culture, for printing similar pamphlets. Hence the most famous pamphlet of the language war, “Sollen wir Magyaren werden?” was printed in Gaj’s Zagreb shop. It caused a great stir at the Pressburg diet, where the Torontal delegate, Hertelendy, demanded the author’s punishment. His motion was rejected on the ground that the diet stood for freedom of the press.

Until Hungary was governed by absolutist rule, with Metternich at the helm, the Slavic peoples of the monarchy took an unfair advantage of the royal court’s anti-Hungarian disposition, through Pan-Slavic hate campaigns, with tacit German approval. Since Herder’s time it became fashionable to decry Hungarian language and culture. In the 1820’s a popular Leipzig periodical, Geschichte unser Zeit, under the editorship of Heinrich Schock directed a series of biting attacks against the alleged anti-Slavic trend in Hungary. Mr. Schock, the son of a German father and a Slovak mother had been born in Szepes county, that belonged to the Hungarian Highlands. When he finished university, he did not return to Hungary but went to Germany, where he became a writer. One of the main centers of anti-Hungarian Pan-Slavic propaganda literature was Leipzig. The Pan-Slavic movement received a spiritual lift from the literary revelation of Sandor Rudnay, the Archbishop of Esztergom, published in 1830, under the title “Slavus sum,” or “I am a Slav:” His mother’s side was Slovakian. This book especially moved the lesser Slovak priests. Its original text can be found in the Archbishopric Archives of Esztergom. (Acta Strigoniensis, 1830.)

It is not difficult to see that the linguistic movement of the Slavic nationalities of Hungary was merely a facade for anti-Hungarian Pan-Slavism. This linguistic movement surfaced again at the 1843-44 diet where
the Croatian delegates — probably at the request of the “Illyrists” who had won the Zagreb leadership contest of 1842 — made a futile attempt to object in Latin against the forthcoming language law. This parliament had enacted Act II, 1844, which laid down the rules for the introduction of an official administrative and educational language in Hungary.

In the decades of the language war more than one hundred political pamphlets had appeared in Hungary, in relation to the nationalities’ plight. This extensive pamphlet literature had begun in Zagreb, in 1814, with Chaplovich’s “Der Sprachkampf in Ungarn” (The Language War in Hungary), and ended in Prague, in the fall of 1848, with Michael Miloslav Hodza’s pamphlet, “Der Slovak,” which urged the practical realization of Pan-Slavism. Judging from their tone, these pamphlets were aimed at confrontation, rather than reconciliation. It is noteworthy that nearly 75 percent of the German-language pamphlets of Pan-Slavic origin were published in Leipzig, although Prague and Zagreb were the focal points of Pan-Slavism. This had nothing to do with escaping domestic censure. In the spirit of these German-language pamphlets one can recognize the influences of the universities of Halle, Jena, and Gottingen, and the anti-Hungarian sentiments of Herder, Hegel and Schlotzer — the effect of which was hard to resist, even for such a disciplined mind as Safarik.

From the 1790-91 diet and the “Supplex libellus Vlachorunz” half a century had elapsed until the first definite memorandum was submitted to Prince Metternich on the nationalities behalf. It was submitted by Paul Jozefy, the Lutheran priest of Tiszolc, and several eminent members of the Slovak nationality leadership. It requested the establishment of a Slovakian seat at the university, as well as the employment of Slovak censors, and the reinstitution of Latin in religious administration, and for registering births, marriages and deaths. This memorandum was submitted by the circumvention of the Pressburg diet. Through the intervention of Joseph, Palatine of Hungary, it was laid aside by the emperor.

We can safely conjecture that the Slovakian nationality question would have taken a much more favorable turn in 1848, if the requests of the Jozefy memorandum had been granted. But the nobility, which went to the other extreme from its Latinic cult, paid no attention to this. Count Szechenyi’s academic speech, in the fall of 1842, had fallen to deaf ears. Similarly, in the spring of 1843, a classically concise Slovak memorial that first pointed out to the peoples of Hungary the advantages of racial harmony, went unheeded. Paul Bekesy (Tomasek), the author of the pamphlet “Peace of Tongues in Hungary,” formulated the terms of peaceful coexistence like this:
“1.) The peoples of Hungary, regardless of their different languages and nationalities, regard one another as brethren.

2.) They mutually agree that Hungarian be the diplomatic language in public matters. However, brotherly esteem will take into consideration the plight of those who do not know, or under their given circumstances cannot know this language, and are afraid to lose their rights.

3.) Even though the Hungarian language, and thereby the Hungarian people would gain primacy over the other (constituent) peoples and their languages, they would not try to impose their (Hungarian) language upon the rest. So the other nationalities could retain the free, undisturbed use of their languages.

4.) The aim of our earthly existence is betterment, and people can better themselves only through improving their own languages without any hindrance, according to their destination.”

While Bekesy was inspired by the humanity of French enlightenment, the avant-guardists of the nationalist movements, of the 1840’s, the Croatians were more pragmatic in realizing their aims. During the Croatian parliamentary session of 1845; Gaj and his companions tried to end the dependency of their Church on the state, and thereby sever one of the most important ties between Hungary and Croatia. They formulated this in four points:

1.) Croat-Slavonia be set free from the supremacy of the Archbishop of Kalocsa. The Croatian Church be independent from the Hungarian Catholic Church.

2.) The bishopry of Zagreb be elevated to archbishopry.

3.) A croatian Regent Council be set up in Zagreb, as it had been in the 1767-79 period, during the reign of Empress Maria Theresa.

4.) A separate Croatian Department be set up within the Royal Hungarian Chancellery.

These proposals were rejected not by the Hungarian Parliament but by Vienna, even though it was in the interest of the royal court to exacerbate the Croatian question. Otherwise Gaj, who had initiated preliminary negotiations with Kossuth, in the autumn of 1845, later was unable to maintain his influence when the Croatian militarist party became the trend setter in Zagreb, under Jelacic’s leadership. Jelacic, who had made a pact with the ruling family, became the viceroy of Croatia. In June, 1848, he openly revealed his party’s stand to Louis Batthyany, the first Hungarian prime minister in this manner: “The differences between us arise not from particular offences, which could be atheridied, but from the fact that you want to make Hungary free arid independent from the monarchy, whereas I swore
allegiance to the political unity of the monarchy. Therefore our differences can only be solved by the sword.”

Evidently the Croatian nationalist movement had turned away from the Illyrian national concept of Gaj, after 1845, and gradually assumed a military character, owing to the influence of Jelacic, the soldier. He considered the affiance with the ruling family more important than the constitutional fights for nationality rights. Consequently, Zagreb had no concrete nationality program in 1848, only militaristic ideas.

The Congress of Zagreb, which convened on March 25th, 1848, put together a 30-point proposal that contained demands for the annexation of Slavonia and Dalmatia. It also included the military boundary area to Croatia, as well as an independent Croatian government, legislative Parliament, and the organization of a “National Guard.” Six months later this National Guard, prompted by Vienna, attacked the democratic Hungarian government, which had abolished the feudal system in Hungary.

A couple of months before that incident, in the spring of 1848, at the Lipotszentmiklos convention, the Slovaks had come up with a positive national program, at the instigations of Prague and St. Petersburg. This program had a decidedly aggressive character. The convention had been initiated by Stur, Hodza, and Hurban. On May 10th, 1848, the following demands were listed:

1.) Slovaks be allowed to use their mother tongue.
2.) Separate diets be held, and the ethnographic borders be determined.
3.) The representatives be obliged to truly represent their voters’ interest in Parliament.
4.) Slovak be the language of judicial trials and public meetings in the Slovak ethnic district (Okolia).
5.) A Slovak university as well as Slovak schools be established.
6.) The Slovak language be taught in other ethnic districts also.
7.) The use of the Slovak national flag be allowed, and Slovak be the language of command for the Slovak National Guard.
8.) Freedom of the press, and right of assembly be instituted.
9.) Statute labor be abolished, and the agrarian problem settled.

As it can be seen from the last two points, this program contained some demands that had already been met by the revolutionary 12-point declaration of Pest, in March, 1848. The rest of these demands could have been settled through direct negotiations. However, the creation of a separate ethnic district, with a separate National Guard, using a separate language of command could not have been reconciled with the prevailing Hungarian
view of the nationalities. The Pan-Slavic Congress of Prague, in June, 1848, and the West-Slovakian uprising during the September - November period of the same year substantially hindered the chances of reconciliation. They provide the reason as to why there were no definitive negotiations between the leaders of the Hungarian liberation movement and that of the Slovak nationalist movement in 1848. The recurring Slovakian demand for the establishment of separate ethnographic districts, at the Turocszentmarton convention of 1861, gave the Slovak nationalist movement a definite separatist character.

From the 1820’s onward, Pest was the spiritual center of the Serbs of Hungary. Their new literary works were printed there, by the University Press. The Serb intellectual elite rallied about the Matica of Pest, which had been founded in 1825. Until 1848, the interest of the Serb leadership had centered on the Serb Church, religious congresses, and the language reform, instead of the nationality question. The matter of language reform had been settled by 1848, when Vuk Karazic’s populistic language reform movement became victorious over the clergy-backed artificial Slavono-Serb language. Since the Serbs of Hungary, in the possession of their royally granted privileges enjoyed all the nationality rights of a modern multinational state, the neighboring feudal Serbian Principality did not especially attract them. Karadzic, their literary and cultural leader, and young Svetozar Miletic had disappointedly left the Principality, because of the prevailing constitutional troubles.

On March 17th, 1848, at the so-called Thomas’ Day assembly in Pest, the leaders of Hungarian Serbs proclaimed their stand on the nationality question. Their new demands could have been met through peaceful negotiations. On the first day of this meeting they held a sympathy demonstration in favor of the revolutionary 12-point declaration of the Hungarian citizens of Pest. How could it be then, that barely two months later the Serb Congress of Karloca showed open hostility toward the Hungarian government, and thereafter the enmity led to the 1848-49 uprising of the Serbs? Fact-finding historians have shown that in 1848 there was no real enmity between the Serb and Hungarian peoples. As the Croatians had been antagonized (toward the Hungarians) through an alliance between their ruling party and the Habsburg dynasty, so were the Serbs through their high-ranking priests. The Hungarians were influenced by their overzealous government and Kossuth’s hostility toward the Serbs.

Let us take the events in their proper time sequence: On March 23rd, 1848, Prime Minister Batthyany formed his government. Its members represented all parliamentary factions, but they themselves were mostly
moderates: Prince Paul Eszterhazy (Minister about the King’s Person), Stephen Szechenyi (Minister of Transport), Joseph Eotvos (Minister of Religious and Public Education), Gabor Klauzal (Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce). Besides them, only Louis Kossuth (Minister of Finance), and Bertalan Szemere (Minister for Home Affairs) represented the radical elements.

On March 27th, the Croatian provincial Parliament in Zagreb declared itself as a national Parliament, and at the behest of the military party, proclaimed the secession of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia from the Hungarian Kingdom, and their unification into a separate kingdom. On the same day, the Ujvidek Serb Convention repeatedly declared its demand for autonomy.

On March 29th, the Czech politicians demanded the formation of an independent Czech government.

On April 1st, the first Pan-Slavic paper, Narodny Noviny was published, under the editorship of Havlicek Borovsky.

On April 8th, the Austrian emperor promised the establishment of high offices for the Czechs.

On April 9th, a Serb delegation, led by Alexander Kostic, arrived at Pest, took part in the parliamentary events and negotiated with Louis Kossuth. A clash of opinions occurred between Kossuth and the Ujvidek delegation, in the question of Serb autonomy.

On April 10th, the Slovak Pan-Slavic political party, Sbvenska Lipa(Slovakian Linden) was formed.

On April 11th, Emperor Ferdinand V ratified the March legislations. However, a week later,

On April 18th, Jelacic, as newly appointed viceroy marched into Zagreb, declared a state of emergency, and broke off diplomatic relations with the Batthany government.

Without a doubt, the souring of Serbo-Hungarian relations started on April 9th, with that unfortunate argument between Kossuth and the Ujvidek delegates, namely Kostic and Stratimirovic, in the Parliament. This single incident — which Kossuth called a misunderstanding in his memoirs — could not in itself provide a reason for armed clashes. A subsequent Serb pamphlet, entitled “Serb Warnings to the Hungarian Nation,” (issued in Buda by Uros Ergovic, a Serb publicist of Pest) which contained the critique of the 17-point Thomas’ Day declaration and that of the May 10-14 Karloca Congress, did not exclude the chance for a peaceful solution of the Serbo-Hungarian dispute, in spite of its strongly critical tone. (This pamphlet and its critique was published in Joseph Thim’s book, “History of the 1848-49 Serb

The Karloca resolutions, however, must have arisen from weightier social and political considerations, which — according to Vasa Bogdanov, a Voivodina writer — put the Serbs of Hungary into a pioneer role. It required the transition from the former “privileged nationality” status into a new mold: that of the “Serb nation of Hungary,” whose aims were not related any more to the status quo. For this reason, the resolutions of the Karloca Congress were totally unacceptable to the Hungarian government.

The Karloca Congress brought the following resolutions:
1.) The Serb nation is free and independent under the Austrian monarch, and the common Hungarian crown.
2.) The Serb Voivodina consists of Szerem, the Frontier Area, and the counties of Bacs and Baranya, and the Bandom of Temes and its frontier zone.
3.) The Serb Voivodina forms a close connection with Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, on the basis of freedom and equality.
4.) In order to regulate their common relations, a Grand Committee (Odbor) will be elected on behalf of the Voivodina, which will have the power to convene the National Congress, if necessary.
5.) The king (emperor) will be asked to ensure national freedom for the Rumanians also.
6.) They will not take part in the religious convention convoked by the Hungarian government.
7.) The Grand Committee, in agreement with the Patriarch, will cover the costs of managing the state from the national treasury.
8.) The Grand Committee and the Patriarch will appoint a delegation, which will submit the resolutions to the king.
9.) The Grand Committee will send its envoys to the Croatian National Assembly, to represent the interests of the Serb nation.
(The above document was quoted from Milco’s book: “National Rights and National Politics,” Kolozsvár, 1944.)

From the above resolutions it becomes evident that Rajacic’s group — which wanted to use the already organized extremist Serb intellectual youth for its own purposes — deliberately tried to prevent a possible reconciliation with the Hungarian government, through a religious meeting. The close connection with Croatia was the direct outcome of the Vienna court’s policy line, and so was the reference to Rumania. The Voivodina, which constituted the only tangible gain of the 1848-49 Serb uprising, did not perform any autonomous activity during the decade of its nominal existence.
This is attributed to the fact that Frontier General Suplikac had filled his Voivodal post for only twelve days, and also because after the suppression of the 1848-49 War of Independence, every important administrative post was filled exclusively by Austrian, or royalist Czech officials. The Serbs of Hungary had objected to the autonomous Voivodina from the beginning, because most of them lived outside the boundaries of the Voivodina, in the military frontier area. Hence among the Voivodina’s population only 309,855 were Serbs, and they constituted merely thirty percent of the populace. Of the 1,214,329 non-Serbs, 414,947 were Rumanians, 396,156 Hungarians, 256,164 Germans, 73,642 Bunyevacs and Sokacs, 23,014 Croatians, 25,982 Slovaks, and 13,253 other nationalities. The minority position of Serbs rendered their leadership largely illusory within the Viovodina’s borders. (The post-1849 population data of the Voivodina and Temes Bandom were taken by the Temesvar Regent Council. They were published in Srbski Let, 1863.18).

In spite of the Karloca resolution, and the subsequent armed clashes (between Serbs and Hungarians), the Hungarian government favored a peaceful solution for the Serbian question. This becomes apparent from the peace terms of November 23rd, 1848, which the Hungarian Home Defense Committee had formulated from a superior military position. Albeit the Committee rejected the Serb territorial demands, it made substantial concessions:

1.) The Hungarian government grants an amnesty for the Serb rebels.
2.) They are entitled to all the individual rights of freedom and ownership, as provided by the April legislation.
3.) They are free to use their language in religious matters, education, and local administration.
4.) Serbs may communicate with the higher authorities and the central government in their own language, and shall be answered in the same language. The laws shall also be declared in Serbian.
5.) The Greek Orthodox Church shall receive the same rights as the other denominations. Its patriarch will sit next to the primate in the Parliament.
6.) The Serb national shall have a voivod.

(The authentic wording of this peace treaty is available in Joseph Thim’s aforementioned book, VoL I., PP. 246-47.)

These terms went unanswered by Karloca (Karlovci). Patriarch Rejacic simply sent the related document to Vienna, and used it later as a political weapon, to hasten the official recognition of the Voivodina by the emperor. Thus, at least on paper, the Voivodina came into existence in
December, 1848. But it soon was relegated to an administrative district status, and the Serb delegates tried in vain to beseech the emperor on March 27th, and June 1st of 1849. The young Franz Josef referred the matter to the Cabinet, which let it drop. The Kremiers Imperial Constitution of March 4th, 1849 did not even mention the Serb question. At the dissolution of the Kremiers Parliament Franz Josef declared in a royal patent the territorial unity and indivisibility of the Habsburg empire, and the countries therein.

When in June, 1849, Rajacic introduced Serb public administration without royal assent in the Bacska, he was soon relieved of his post as royal commissioner, by the emperor (on July 11th, in Vienna). Thereafter the patriarch almost totally withdrew from public matters, and confined himself to the improvement of the autonomous government of the Serb (Orthodox) Church.

After the Royal Patent of Kremiers (Kromeriz, a Moravian town), but still on the same day, the emperor issued his Olmutz Manifesto, which nullified the Hungarian constitution, and separated Croatia and Transylvania from Hungary, and set up a new voivodal territory in South Hungary.

After the capitulation of the Hungarian army at Vilagos (August 13th, 1849,) a great majority of the Serb leaders realized that through a fatal mistake they had been needlessly antagonized against the Hungarian government which would have given them more concessions than the self-serving Austrian royal court.

It is an historic fact that on July 21st, 1849, at Szeged, the Hungarian Parliament had discussed, and enacted a nationality law for the “lesser nationalities.” Owing to the subsequent surrender at Vilagos, the implementation of the first independent Hungarian nationality law could not begin. The collapse of the independent democratic Hungarian government wrecked the chances of a Danubian peace plan, as a final solution of the nationality question.

The defeat of the Hungarian freedom movement had an unfavorable effect on the nationalities. The one-time prediction had come true: The nationalities were “rewarded” by the same treatment they had given to Hungary. Austrian military barons took over public administration everywhere: Kellersberg in Zagreb, Wohlgemuth in Transylvania, Mayerhofer in the Voivodina. Of course, Wohlgemuth did not want to hear about special nationality rights. Meyerhofer instituted martial law on November 18th, 1849, to restrain the justly indignant populace.

The Pan-Slavic and pro-Vienna Slovak leaders also found themselves in a compromising situation. Stur suffered a nervous breakdown, and withdrew from public life. Hurban and Hodza were put under police
surveillance. The engineers of the anti-Hungarian campaign, like Jelacic, Gaj, Rajacic, Saguna, lancu, disappointedly turned away from public life. During the great oppression the horizon of the nationality question suddenly cleared up, and the peoples of various nationalities shook hands in their common depravity.

During the first weeks of victory, the Vienna government was willing to offer some personal rewards. Kollar and Kusmany received new professorships at the University of Vienna, as a reward for their Austro-Slav policy — through Schwarzenberg’s patronage. Moreover, Vienna provided financial assistance for the publication of two Slavic newspapers: the Slovenské Noviny (Slovakian News), which — under Kollar’s editorship — tried to please the imperial censure; and the Vistnik Rusinov Austrivskoy Derzavy (Paper for the Ruthenians of the Austrian Empire), which opportunistically served the Austrian interests.

On the basis of earlier reports by Doriantsky, a Ruthenian politician, Vienna had hoped to secure the trust and loyalty of the Austro-Slavs for the dynasty, through these harmless token favors. But the outcome was just the opposite of what it had expected.

After Kollar died (in 1852), the Pan-Slavic movement did not produce another pro-monarchist leader to succeed him. The Pan-Slavist Czechs refrained from collaborating with the royal court, even though Czech bureaucrats played a dominant role in vanquished Hungary’s public administration, and that of the Voivodma and the “companion countries.” Their publicity, the fiery Karel Havlicek Borovský was arrested and imprisoned for his anti-Austrian articles. He died in prison, in 1858.

The Slovak separatists of Northern Hungary also turned away from Vienna in disappointment, caused largely by the strongly biased pro-Czech school policy of the Minister of Education, Leo Thun, the only prestigious Austro-Slav. In the spring of 1852, the coeditors of the Vienna-based Ruthenian newspaper, Ivan Holovacky, and Bogdan Dedicky were removed from their office by armed “Bach hussars,” who personified the ruthless autocratic rule of the period.

All in all, the nationalities fell silent, and did not show a substantial initiative until the Austro-Hungarian reconciliation of 1867. After the reconciliation the revitalized Pan-Slavic movement asserted itself through parliamentary debates about minority problems. Then the leaders of modern Pan-Slavism, Gregor Thomas Masaryk, and Edward Benes started their Czecho-Slovakian movement which proved so fateful for Hungary, after the First World War.
Pan-Slavism and the Hungarians

After the defeat of the 1848 War of Independence, the forces of despotism turned a deaf ear to the nationality question. It remained in limbo for more than a decade. The royal diploma of October 20th, 1860, contained mere promises, instead of concrete directives. It made some rather illusory concessions. It restored the integrity of Hungary, and recognized its traditional pre-1848 institutions, while at the same time it established an Imperial Parliament for joint administration of common affairs. The royal patent of February, 1861, authoritatively determined the number of delegates that might be sent to the Imperial Parliament. Hungary was allowed to send 85, Transylvania only 26. The Hungarian and Transylvanian representatives uniformly rejected this patent. They ostentatiously stayed away from the Reichsrat, the common Parliament. The undying hatred of the Vienna court for the Hungarians became apparent from a distinctive measure of this royal patent, whereby it had abolished the Hungarian Parliament, while it had granted full political rights to the Czech Parliament.

On reviewing the events of the pre-Ausgleich years, one is likely to discover that the necessity of a reconciliation between Austria and Hungary began at Solferino.

The various nationalities within the empire had to be restrained by separate armies. Therefore the young Emperor Franz Josef could not afford to antagonize the rebellious Hungarians while trying to restore the former great power status of his empire, while maintaining his rule in Italy, and fighting for the leadership among the German-speaking countries.

Meanwhile he also had to appease the Pan-Slavic movement which flared up with renewed vigor in Hungary, shortly after the Ausgleich treaty of 1867.

In Lombardy, which Radetzky continued to defend, the volcanic forces of Italian nationalism had to be controlled by Draconic rule. The political safety of Lombardy was threatened not only from the inside, but also from the outside — by the Sardinian kingdom, through Cavour’s political genius. By then the Crimean War had alienated Russia from Franz Josef, and Prussia became a secret enemy. And when Sardinia succeeded in obtaining help from Napoleon III, Austria’s political isolation became complete. By the summer of 1858, Cavour had prepared for war, after he secured the backing of Napoleon III, and obtained Prussia’s sympathy. In 1859, the Emperor of France himself directed the joint Franco-Italian forces against the Austrian army, and defeated it soundly at Solferino, in June.
Franz Josef was forced to give up Lombardy by the Zurich peace treaty, and it became a part of the Italian kingdom, under the House of Savoy.

In the aftermath of Solferino the weaknesses and instability of absolutism seemed obvious. The Austrian army had not been properly fed, or armed, because of rampant corruption among its suppliers. It became evident that the aspirations for great power status, that had pushed the empire into a military fiasco, also undermined it financially. By 1861 the national deficit rose to 2,360,000,000 crowns from the 1,249,000,000 crown level of the pre-1848 years. The national budget rose by 84 per cent during the same period. It represented the highest budget figure among all the European countries. However only 1.9 per cent of the budget was spent on public education — less than what Russia spent for the same purpose. Aside from Spain, it was the lowest spending rate for education in the whole continent. The lion’s share of budget was swallowed by the army, and Bach’s administrative machine, which proved to be the most expensive of its kind in Europe. Hungary was swamped by Austrian centralists and Czech federalists. It is noteworthy that while the Czech political leaders had a Pan Slavic predilection, the ordinary Czechs seemed to “forget” about their national dream and tried to become good Austrian citizens. Bach’s staunchest helpers were the Czechs.

According to the general opinion, the October constitution of 1860 did not meet the Hungarian’s expectations. Even though the emperor had given up absolutism and centralism in this “permanent and irrevocable law,” (at least on paper, and in principle), restored the companion countries’ historic integrity, and revived the old constitution-based feudal diets, he still superimposed upon them a central parliament, or Reichsrat, which dealt with mutual matters.

The above mentioned authority and (document) elicited a mixed reaction among the nationalities. Among the Hungarians they stiffened the spirit of resistance, and started an era of active opposition. While the other peoples saw their significance in the preservation of the status quo. The Rumanian, Saxons, and Serbs hoped for a postponement in the scheduled dissolution of the Voivodina. The Croats had high hopes in these royal papers.

These hopes were articulated by Strossmayer, the Bishop of Zagreb. He expressed the Croatians’ wish to receive the same national status and enjoy the same political rights as the Hungarians. He also hoped for the establishment of a Croatian Chancellery, and the fulfillment of the promises of an earlier royal patent, (document) which had been issued on April 7th, 1850. The Slovaksians — whose Protestant leadership had been antagonized
by the royal patent of 1859, which had abolished the autonomy of Protestant Churches — were openly suspicious about the new royal declarations, while the Ruthenians remained noncommittal in this matter.

One can discover an obvious connection between the October Diploma, and the Karloca resolutions of March 21st, 1861, of the Serb National Congress, which requested the reinstitution of the Voivodina, according to the principles of the October patent of 1861) - as suggested by Rajacic, the chairman of the congress.

In Croatia the viceroyal conference of November 26th, 1860, demanded equality of rights for the Croatian nation, as well as ordinary language rights. Furthermore it urged the solution of the problem of the counties before the Hungarian-Croatian political negotiations would begin. It also asked the Vienna government to designate a separate royal committee to deal with the Croatian question.

The nationality question of Hungary was changed from its decade-long inertia. Thereby the friendly ties that had developed during the 1850s between the Hungarian and non-Hungarian peoples, on the basis of mutual interdependence, became relaxed. These improved relations had partly come about through negotiations between the emigrant leaders of the Hungarian War of Independence, and some politicians of the neighboring countries.

A study of nationality politics of the absolutist era would not be complete without mentioning Kossuth’s federalist ideas, and examining to some extent the social and cultural backgrounds of the era. Otherwise we could not avoid leaving unanswered some pertinent questions which had irrepressibly emerged in 1861, and also in 1868. I will mention here only the most revealing cultural events, and emigrant contacts, as well as a few direct references from Kossuth’s federative plans, which shed some light on the harmonious relations between the Hungarians and the nationalities during the era of post-1849 oppression.

It was not by accident that the Societa de Leptura, or the Reading Circle of Nagyvarad — which Alessandru Roman, the subsequent editor of Federatianea, a Pest-based Rumanian periodical had founded in 1852 — became the initiator of friendly Hungarian-Rumanian relations. This was accomplished through widening literary connections between the two peoples, and actively cultivating Rumanian literature.

The Hungarian-Serb cultural exchange also reached its peak during this period. I mention here only a couple of relevant data. (Some newly found data have been taken from “History of the Yugoslavian Peoples,” by Laszlo Csuka, Budapest, 1963.) The “Serbian Annals” (Srpski letopisi) in 1858 reminisced at length about Anastas Tomori-Teodorovic, a Magyarized Serb
patron of culture. He erected monuments for two Hungarian playwrights: Joseph Katona, and Charles Kisfaludy, and was an effective backer of Serb culture as well.

Between the surrender at Vilagos and the Ausgleich of 1867 Hungary lived without farsighted political leaders who could think in European dimensions. Still the country was eventually able to find itself. Kossuth in exile envisioned a different kind of Hungary. With rare historic farsightedness, he glimpsed the advantages of a possible confederation of the peoples of the Danube region. He devised a new central role for Hungary: the realistic preparation of such a Danubian confederation. (Oh, what an analogous situation we are in now, after the revolution of October, 1956!)

Kossuth himself started negotiations in this direction. He stayed admirably consistent in his views. What he proclaimed toward the Croatians in 1851, he basically reiterated in 1854, and subsequently in London, where he negotiated with the exiled Michail Obranovic. He repeated the same ideas during his talks with the Rumanian Cuza, which came about through the mediation of George Klapka. This was reiterated in the Turin memorandum of the Hungarian National Directorate of September 15th, 1860, as well as in the Hungarian-Rumanian military agreement of Iassy (of January, 1861), and finally in his comprehensive work, “Danubian Federation,” published in 1862.

The Hungarian nationality policy plans of the constitution-less period slowly passed from the realm of theories into the real world of daily politics. Passions flamed, and Pan-Slavism regained its vigor. New demands were posed by the nationalities, as direct derivatives of the nationality programs of 1848, and preparatory negotiations began for the epoch-making, reformminded “nationality law” (Act 44, 1868,) amid new ideological misunderstandings. Instead of a wide-ranging, thorough settlement, the nationality problem was remedied by a piecemeal approach, hence it gradually deteriorated from 1868 till the outbreak of World War I.

The Pan-Slavist movement had been underrated by Hungarian politicians and representatives, but the leaders of the nationalities had taken it very seriously.

At the beginning of the 19th century the Slovak-Southern Slav connections advanced toward a united political front. In a systematic study of Pan-Slavism one ought to observe that as early as 1801, Stratirnirovic, the Archbishop of Zagreb established a foundation at the Lutheran secondary school of Slovakian Pressburg. During the years that Safarik spent as a teacher in the town of Ujvidek (in southern Hungary), he found ample opportunity to meet with his Southern Slav brethren, and further the Pan-
Slavist cause. It is also known that the Serb Miletic had taken part in organizing the university students of Slovakian Pressburg during his student years. The Slovak memorial of 1841, which was handed to Metternich by a Slovak delegation, had been drawn up with Serb assistance, as it was readily acknowledged by Milan Hodza in his pamphlet (Der Slovak, 1848). It seems certain that the influence of doctrinaire Serb nationality politics on the Slovaks was still substantial in 1861, because both the Serbian and the Slovak nationality leaders steadfastly clung to the precondition of self-government, on 1848 terms. This attitude helped to arouse Hungarian opposition, on which Eotvos tried to capitalize later, during the 1867-68 parliamentary session.

The Pan-Slavist program of Turocszentmarton exceeded even the Karloca resolutions in the extent of its demands. It requested not only territorial autonomy and equal national rights, but also demanded the acceptance of their own language as the exclusive official administrative and educational language in its particular ethnographic locality. The Karloca Congress did not claim such an extensive language right, probably because of the multilingual character of the Voivodina.

The Pan-Slavist efforts and demands gradually became major opinion-forming factors not only among the Czech, Slovak and Serb intellectuals of Hungary, but more and more among the lower clergy as well as low-ranking municipal clerks, town clerks, and teachers of Slavic origin. Only the Hungarian upper class, or “the establishment” neglected the nationality question. Its members made joking remarks about the Slovaks and their staple food, the potato — as if that would settle the matter once and for all.

While the governmental departments paid only a perfunctory attention to the new nationality bill and tried to delay its enactment, a far-reaching event took place in May, 1867, in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Pan-Slavic Congress, in which some three-hundred Czech, Serb, Croat, and Slovak politicians, publishers, university professors, priests, three bishops (of which two were Catholics and one was Orthodox), one hundred school teachers who — be the nature of their profession — remained in close contact with their people — all met together. The czarist government acted merely as “host,” and “advisor” for the participants.

This Pan-Slavic Congress unintentionally prepared the way for the outbreak of World War I. The radicalism of the budding Slovak-nation concept also began to unfold during this congress. Stephen Moyses, Bishop of Besztercebanya, who was one of the participating bishops, had been the main patron of the Slovak nationality movements in the pre-Ausgleich years.
Owing to the effect of this Pan-Slavic Congress, and that of the Serb-Illyr movement, he admitted mainly Slovak theologians to his county seminary, and demanded a knowledge of the Slovak language from his Hungarian pupils.

In consequence of the Ausgleich of 1867, Hungary strayed from the road of social progress, and abandoned the populist spirit of 1848. Therefore it lacked the necessary democratization without which a reconciliation among the Danubian peoples could not be achieved. Thus, instead of being a positive solution, Act XII, 1867, turned out to be a tragic obstacle in retrospect, in the constitutional, social, and nationality crises of the pre-World War I period.

I want to review here the relevant events in a nutshell:

On May 29th, 1867, the Hungarian Parliament had ratified Act XII, which contained the terms of Austrian-Hungarian reconciliation. Section 59 of the Act declared the establishment of (x) customs and commercial union between the countries of Austria and that of the Hungarian Crown. The new Austrian constitution had also been proclaimed. It invalidated all previous royal orders. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was born. The Austrian emperor (still not king of Hungary) appointed Julius Andrassy for Prime Minister, Baron Joseph Eotvos for Minister of Religious and Public Education. Ferenc Deak did not take any ministerial portfolio.

Still in May, the Hungarian Parliament accepted (1) the creation of a common Ministry of Defense, and a common Ministry of Finances; (2) the obligation of paying 53 per cent of the empire’s debts; (3) the affiance between Austria and Hungary; (4) the Parliament also restored self-government for the counties.

On June 8th, Franz Josef I was crowned with the Hungarian Royal Crown, and thereby became king of Hungary. The exiled Kossuth protested against the Ausgleich.

Because of this so-called “dualism,” or harmonization of the administration of the two states, Hungary became a playground of Austrian centralism and German political influence.

Kossuth’s federation theory had a wide appeal among the more moderate nationality leaders and politicians. If the nationality negotiations of the 1860s had been directed according to Kossuth’s principles, they would have led to a timely and lasting reorganization of the Hungarian state. Thereby the extremist Pan-Slavist elements would have found less ground for fomenting dissent.

If the reconciliation between Austria and Hungary had not come about in 1867, perhaps Hungary could have avoided much of the subsequent
Germanization and its harmful consequences: the anti-Hungarian intrigues of the Vienna court (I mention here Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s hatred for the Hungarians, as an example) as well as the Austrian education of Hungarian aristocrats, diplomats, politicians, and high-ranking military officers; and last but not least, the prevention of Kossuth’s dream, the Danubian Federation, from becoming a reality. Perhaps within a framework of such federation Hungary could have spared the catastrophic consequences of World War I.

On November 24th, 1868, a general debate commenced on the nationality bill in the Hungarian Parliament, in a vibrant atmosphere, with a large number of participants. Francis Deak was the first speaker of the historic debate. On this occasion he introduced a separate bill, aimed at providing “equal rights for the nationalities.” He placed the “political nation” concept at the root of this bill, whereby he predestined its fate. He relied on the principles of constitutional law in substantiating his statements, in a declarative manner, precluding any contradiction in the final wording of this new law, as it can be observed from this quotation: “Time is short, so I will not waste it on a lengthy speech.

I will simply state my conviction in this matter. I am convinced of the existence of a political nation in Hungary: the united, indivisible Hungarian nation whose citizens are having equal rights regardless of what nationality they belong to. My other conviction is that this equality of rights may only be codified in regard to the official use of the various prevailing languages, inasmuch as it is necessary for the maintenance of the country’s unity, the practicality of government, and the correct administration of justice. There is nothing new in what I have just said — starting from these two principles — for according to the principles of our constitution, all the citizens of Hungary constitute one political nation, the citizens of which enjoy equal rights. Furthermore I declare that — owing to the aforesaid unity of the nation — the administration of the state cannot be done in several languages: it must be done in Hungarian, the language of the state...”

The “political nation” concept of this nationality law was akin to the French “nation-state” concept, with one essential historical difference: Public opinion in Hungary regarded the political state as the “assignee” of the Medieval feudal nobility; in other words, a closed, aristocratic corporation into which the individual had to elevate himself.

Deak’s nationality policy was aimed at reconciling the opposing factions. At the time he formulated his theories, he had not imagined that his political-nation concept would become the basis for the official nationality policy of the dualist era.

The Hungarian people strived for a real agreement with the
nationalities instead of ruling over them. They wanted to bring about a practicable nationality policy, instead of a rigid state policy.

The debate of the nationality bill lasted for five days. Impassioned speeches were heard on both sides. Some were almost spiteful. The leader of the Serb representatives, Misic, an Ujvidek lawyer, proposed a postponement for the enactment of this law, for he felt that time was not yet ripe for it. Had the members of Parliament heeded Misic’s advice, they could have spared a period of inertia in which the nationalities had plenty of time to brood over their real, or imagined grievances. This bitter passivity rekindled Pan-Slavism which became more aggressive and turned into a political conspiracy that resulted in Czecho-Slovakism at the end.

After the declaration of the nationality law, a new era began for the nationalities. Historians named this era “the age of passivity,” to designate the nationalities’ reaction against a centralist government’s action. Andrei Mraz, a well-known Slovak literary historian mentions in one of his studies that pre-World War I Slovak writers restricted themselves to merely recounting their grievances, and adding their own footnotes or arguments to the factual data they collected into their desk drawers for future use.

Post-Ausgleich Slovak nationality policy veiled its Pan-Slavist nature by a cultural veneer. Openly it dealt with political questions only in connection with Slovak public education. Although the Slovak writers and public figures (judges, teachers, priests) that gathered around the Matica Slovenska openly tried to protect their people’s interest in the political field as well. Bishop Moyses, a well-known and respected Pan-Slavist was the spiritual leader of this group. We have to recognize at least two Slovak political fronts: one that represented the Slovak nationality’s standpoints and precisely outlined the wishes of Slovak nationality leaders, according to the Turocszentmarton resolutions, and a parallel second front that was outwardly cultural and inwardly Pan-Slavist. It followed the path of language cultivation that Bernolak and Stur laid down. For the time being the Turocszentmarton Matica confined itself to the publication of grammar and reading books for parochial elementary schools, and the hitherto permitted three Slovak high schools: that of Nagyroce, Turocszentmarton, and Zniovaralja. Besides this activity, the Matica also published selected poems of Holy, and Sladkovic.

In post-Ausgleich years the passivity of the Slovak minority could be viewed optimistically as a temporary phenomenon, because the doors were open before the Slovak and Hungarian intelligentsia of the multilingual counties to get closer to one another.

This passivity turned into vigorous nationalist activity in the early
In early 1905, the Slovak Nationalist Party suffered a serious defeat at the election, during the first premiership of Stephen Tisza. Only Milan Hodza had been elected to the Parliament, as representative of the Kulpin district. But the outcome of this election did not harm the future of the Slovak nationality movement. At the 1906 election seven candidates of the Slovak Nationalist Party received seats. As a first step, these newly elected representatives joined the Nationalities Club — together with their Serb and Rumanian colleagues — and declared full solidarity with the other Slavic representatives toward the Pan Slavist ideal.

On October 10th, 1907, the Slovakian Nationalist Party — under the leadership of Hlinka, Parson of Rozsahegy — reached an agreement with the Sroban-led Slovak Social-Democratic Party. Meanwhile, Milan Hodza organized and led a language-oriented nationalist movement. The Czechs and Slovaks paid great attention to Franz Ferdinand’s trialist-federalist plans. On the Hungarian’s behalf Gabor Ugron, Louis Lang and Louis Csavolszky worked out a plan for a possible triple union: an Austrian - Hungarian - Czech monarchy. It was too late. On July 13th, 1907, a Pan-Slavist Congress convened in Prague. Father Hlinka was arrested, but he was temporarily released. He immediately started on a tour of political lectures across Bohemia and Moravia, aided by clerical circles such as Archbishop Stojan, Primate of Prague and Marion Blaha, Bishop of Brunn who fostered a Czecho-Slovakian union. During this tour Father Hlinka also collected donations for the church of Chernova, before its consecration. On October 27th, the day of consecration, the crowd that awaited the arrival of Hlinka acted threateningly against the assigned gendarmes who in turn fired at the crowd. Nine people died, and several lay wounded around the church... This incident permanently spoiled Hungarian-Slovakian relations.

In 1908 another Pan-Slavist congress was held in Prague, in the spirit of “Neo-Slavism.” Newer Pan-Slavist politicians appeared on the scene. One of them. Dr. Karel Kramarz, a university professor and one of the Czech representatives of the Reichsrat, published a pamphlet about the basic principles of Neo-Slavism on this occasion (Die Slaven Konferenz in Prag). Altogether 80 Slovak, 35 Serbo-Croat, and 160 Polish teachers took part in the conference. In 1908, Edward Benes received his doctorate at the Sorbonne of Paris. His doctoral thesis was titled: “The Austrian Problem and the Czech Question.”

After the Chernova incident a surge of protests was directed toward Hungary, including the well-known declarations of Bjornson and Tolstoi. Shortly afterward Seaton’s book, “Racial Problems in Hungary,” appeared. It
did much harm to Hungary. In the overheated political atmosphere, some minor attempts at reconciliation ended in failure. Julius Just’s peace program was rejected by Turocszentmarton, Csavolszky’s peace plan was not even discussed. The Czech medical doctors’ association boycotted the Budapest international medical congress “because of the harm done to the Slovaks.”

In the spring of 1912, the Turocszentmarton group asked once more for the restitution of the Slovenska Matica, and the return of its assets as well as the reopening of the Slovak high schools. These requests were not granted, the matter remained unsettled...Such grievances led to the strengthening influence of Hlinka and Srobar and their parties. Until the outbreak of World War I, numerous meetings, congresses, political demonstrations and youth meetings gradually forged a close affiance between Masaryk’s realists” and Srobar’s socialists as well as between the Catholic Czech and Slovak people’s parties.

Thus had the Slovak nationality movement arrived at the First World War and the “Czech Mafia,” which had several Slovak socialists, agrarians, and democrats among its members. It held political negotiations abroad and reached agreements. The more important ones were: the St. Petersburg talks, of 1914; the CzechoSlovak Declaration of Moscow, of May 16th, 1915; a tentative agreement of October 27th. 1915, of Cleveland, between the Czech National Council and the American Slovak League; the Kiev Memorandum of August 10th, 1916; the Pittsburg Agreement of May 30th, 1918; and the Turocszentmarton Declaration of October 30th, 1918, about the Czecho-Slovak union.

Finally Pan-Slavism reached its conclusion in the foundation of the Czecho-Slovak state. At this point I am quoting the views of the great Czech historian, Frantisek Palacky on Austria (of 1848): “If the Austrian empire had ceased to exist, we ought to revive it, in the interest of Europe.”

Bismarck’s opinion on Austria was expressed in his book, “Gedanken und Erinnerungen” (Thoughts and Recollections): “What other state could we set up in the area stretching from Tirol to Bucovina, that is presently occupied by Austria? Newly created states in this region would have a permanently revolutionary character.” In 1874, Bismarck said: “It is impossible to create little states in Europe. One can envision only historic states there.”

Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States had this to say in 1917, before the Congress: “We owe it to ourselves to declare that we do not intend to either weaken or alter the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. We do not want to meddle into her political or economic life. It is not our purpose to dictate anything to her. We merely want that her peoples themselves be
allowed to handle theft own affairs, be they big or small.”

On January 5th, 1918, Lloyd George stated that the destruction of Austria-Hungary was not wanted by the British.

Masaryk himself acknowledged in his work (Svetove Revoluce) that is was difficult to convince peoples — either in America or elsewhere — of the necessity of destroying Austria-Hungary. Austria was generally regarded as a countervailing power to Germany, and a necessary union of smaller nations, that protected them from “balkanization.” The pro-Austrian views which were held by official circles of the allied powers until the spring of 1918, were expressed most clearly by President Wilson.

The intent of this revelation by Masaryk was to emphasize the extent of his destructive work, whereby he had succeeded in confusing the already clarified view that some kind of union among the peoples of the Danube valley was politically necessary to maintain. In ten months Masaryk and his agents were able to distort and discredit the fundamental and historically sound principles that wise and cultured statesmen of past centuries had reasoned out through their lifetime. Hence in September, 1918, President Wilson informed King Charles IV that he had changed his mind as to what price Austria would have to pay for peace: giving full autonomy to the peoples of Austria-Hungary — which meant the disintegration of the empire.

How could Masaryk and Benes achieve this in ten short months? Perhaps the answer may be found in a letter that Oxenstierna, a Swedish statesman wrote to his son: “Don’t you see, my dear son, how little wisdom is being applied in the world’s government?”

Masaryk states these reasons for his success (in his book, Svetova Revoluce):

1.) His good connections with influential people. He was not fastidious in his methods to win people over to his side in various areas such as widespread secret organizations among public servants, approachable publicists, fanatic beaux esprits, demimondaines, valets and butlers, and people of hurt pride.

2.) His accurate information about what was going on behind the scenes. Through his built-in informers Masaryk and his colleagues were well informed about intimate affairs of influential men. They knew whose opinions mattered in decisive matters. They also knew what their weaknesses were, and how to take advantage of that sort of knowledge. They also received news of important events, such as secret agreements between the Serbs and the Rumanians, and took advantage of that, too.

3.) “Man’s value is equal to the sum of his abilities, minus his vanity,” said Bismarck, Masaryk was aware of this, and he was able to use
subtle psychology when needed. He frankly admitted that he won President Wilson over through constant feeding of his vanity. Others could be bribed by presents and promises.

4.) He and his men tried to win over the most important persons first. They did not waste too much time on lesser personages.

5.) Let’s not forget that Masaryk was a learned university professor by high European standards. On certain occasion President Wilson found Masaryk’s views questionable or unacceptable. But a couple of days later some newspaper articles appeared that seemed to justify Masaryk’s opinion. So the President had to respect his knowledge and foresight.

6.) Last but not least, Masaryk and his companions were masterly machinators. They often resorted to twisting the truth and propagating untruth.

It would be interesting to find out for certain whether Masaryk and Benes had some moral motives behind their machinations. Did they have a global Middle-European conception, or did they have the future of Europe in mind when shaping their policies?

Nobody has come up with a positive answer to these questions yet. On the contrary, as more data and documents are coming to light, they seem to strengthen the view that Masaryk and Benes — aside from some muddled Jacobinic nationalism — had only been motivated by personal ambitions to attain success. Both of them were atheists who did not think much of God’s laws.

From the 1918-1920 peace negotiations it becomes apparent that a feeling of uncertainty — or perhaps bad conscience — hovered over the responsible statesmen’s conferences. Many of them instinctively felt, others knew for certain that severe problems would arise from their blatant disregard for the time-honored unity of the Danubian monarchy. But they expressed their concern only in vague and timid arguments, as if some mysterious power prevented them from speaking out freely.

President Wilson had two main objections against the creation of Czecho-Slovakia: that the Czechs had not provided any convincing evidence that they were mature enough for self-government; and that the Czech population numbered only 6.5 million, which was not substantial enough to exert a decisive influence over the country’s German population of 3.5 million.

To dispel Wilson’s first objection, Masaryk invented the legend of a heroic Siberian Czech legion, which the President accepted at face value.

To resolve Wilson’s second doubt, Masaryk invented the fiction of “Czecho-Slovak people.” When it did not prove to be convincing enough in responsible U.S. quarters, Masaryk signed an agreement in Pittsburg, on June
30th, 1918, with the American Slovaks. This agreement provided full autonomy for the Slovaks in a federative Czecho-Slovak state. (As a matter of fact, the Czechs never fulfilled their Pittsburg promises to the Slovaks.)

Masaryk showed the agreement to Wilson who now felt convinced about the viability of a Czecho-Slovak state, and formally approved its creation. Had he known how Masaryk would talk about the Slovak question and the Pittsburg Agreement later, perhaps he would have changed his mind. In 1921, Masaryk declared: “There is no Slovak nation; it is only a Hungarian invention.” (Borsody: Magyar-Szlovák Kiegyezes, PubL in Budapest, in 1928.) And in 1925, he wrote in this manner about the Pittsburg Agreement which he himself had signed: “We had signed the agreement only to reassure a little Slovak group which heaven alone knows what sort of independence had dreamed up for Slovakia...”

During the peace negotiations several delegates had certain qualms about the plight of that populace minority whom Mr. Tardieu could not leave out of the newly created country, because the “interest of Czecho-Slovakia’s strategic safety” demanded otherwise. Edward Benes hurried to reassure these gentlemen. In his declaration of May 20th, 1919, he assured the delegates the Czecho-Slovakia will be a sort of Switzerland (“une sorte de Suisse”) where the various nationalities will live in complete autonomy and perfect peace. The same Edward Benes signed the Saint-Germain peace treaty, on September 10th, 1919, in which the Czecho-Slovak government promised to fully respect the minority rights of the non-Czecho-Slovak citizens.

The Holy Alliance

Until the documents of the secret archives of Vienna, Moscow, Leningrad (St. Petersburg) and Prague had been inaccessible to historians, they had misjudged even the initial motives of the affiance between the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. More over they had disregarded the private collections of documents of the Metternich, Windischgratz, and Paskievich families, which could have enabled them to see the political situation of the era in a proper light, and thus form a clearer judgment of Pan-Slavism as well. They also misjudged the causes and antecedents of the Russian intervention of 1849 in Hungary. Some of them maintained that the cause of the czarist military intervention had been the conspicuous participation of anti-czarist Polish rebels in the Hungarian War of Independence. Others believed that the dethronement of the Habsburgs by Kossuth had been the
main cause of the czarist intervention. The otherwise excellent Hungarian historian, Julius Szekfu writes: “...They (the Hungarians) declared the dethronement of the Rabsburgs. Kossuth was chosen as governor (to replace the king). A peaceful solution (of the differences between Austria and Hungary) became impossible. So Austria accepted the offered help from Czar Nicholas I.” (Szekfu, “History of the Hungarian State,” 2nd edition, Budapest, 1923, P. 183.) Szekfu mentions both, Polish participation and the dethronement of the Habsburgs as possible causes.

An objective evaluation of the 1848-49 Hungarian War of Independence could not be done until the end of World War II, when the relevant secret documents were finally disclosed to historians. Otherwise the historians of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had been obliged by their loyalty to the emperor and the Vienna court, so they had tried to show the emperor in a favorable light, regardless of the historic facts. Hence they were silent about the fact that it had been the czar who had saved the Austrian monarchy. They rather maintained that the victory over the rebellious Hungarians had been the outcome of a glorious “concerted effort.” Although in all likelihood, the monarchy would have disintegrated without the czar’s armed intervention. From the relevant historic documents it now becomes clear that the Habsburg emperor had to beseech the czar in a demeaning manner, in order to obtain his help.

Some of our historians have misjudged the character of PanSlavism. For instance Imre Lukinich, a university professor, wrote this: “Czar Alexander I, and Czar Nicholas I had realized that Russia had no role to play in Western Europe, and therefore they tried to lessen the area of contact (with the West).” (“RussianUkrainian History,” by Imre Lukinich, from his series, “Hungarians and the Slays,” Budapest, 1942.) We shall see later that the czars — contrary to Lukinich’s statement — were clearly aware of the great possibilities open to them through Western contacts. Our historians could not know the related Russian literature on this subject, nor the relevant secret diplomatic documents. They also closed their eyes to the pertinent historic data of English and French origin, whenever they were unflattering to the largely monarchist Hungarian aristocracy. Here I am quoting H. Fried Jung, the notable German historian: “Regarding the personal roles of the Habsburg monarchs in the historic events, we have relatively few data, since references to them had been cautiously avoided even in the most confidential documents.” (H. Fried Jung, “Fight for German Hegemony (1859-1866),” VoL I. Hungarian translation, Budapest, 1902, Pp. 257-59.)

In continental Europe the rulers followed the practice of feudal absolutism. They relied on the principle of ruling “by God’s grace,” which
meant that they did not have to justify their actions, nor could they be argued with. Their strong conservatism was rooted in this principle, and that is why they rejected any attempt for general freedom, and social progress.

After the defeat of Napoleon, the victorious European powers settled the territorial matters of Europe by the Congress of Vienna. (Sept. 1814 — Jan. 1815.) The Napoleon-occupied feudal monarchies were restored, and solidified. Prince Metternich presided at the Congress. France became totally isolated. The final document of the Congress, which was signed on January 9th, 1815, created a new territorial arrangement, and a new political situation in Europe. Through a total disregard for the nationality principle, the great powers’ territorial demands were satisfied, and the old dynasties retained their thrones. France was forced back to its old borders, while England further expanded its colonial empire. Russia could attain her long-time goal: She got a large part of Poland, besides Finnlund and Bessarabia. Prussia acquired the Rhineland provinces, as well as Posen, Danzig, and a portion of Saxony. Although Austria lost her Netherlands territories, she was compensated by a chunk of Poland, and a few Italian provinces. Germany remained divided into principalities and kingdoms, just like before. An independent Dutch kingdom was created in the Netherlands, with some Belgian territory attached to it. Switzerland’s eternal neutrality was declared. The Congress of Vienna also had laid down the foundations of the Holy Alliance, for the oppression of revolutionary, and national liberation movements in Europe, during the first half of the 19th century.

On September 25th, 1815, the three absolutist empires — Austria, Prussia, and Russia — formed a triple affiance, whose aim was a concerted oppression of future European revolutionary movements and the preservation of the status quo, as it had been laid down by the Congress of Vienna. The Holy Affiance held four congresses during its existence: The first one in Aachen (1818), the second in Troppau (Opava) in 1820, the third in Laibach (Ljubljana) in 1821, and the fourth in Verona (1822). Under the leading influences of Metternich (Austrian) chancellor, and Czar Alexander I, the Holy Alliance sanctioned the intervention of Austrian troops in Naples (1820-21), and Piemont (1821), to stifle the local revolts. It also ratified the intervention of French units in Spain (1823). Though the Holy Alliance became somewhat shaky at the turn of the 1830s, it still had enough momentum left for defeating the revolutions of 1848-49, particularly the Hungarian War of Independence.

The main backer of the Holy Alliance was Czar Alexander I. Metternich represented the interests of the Habsburg dynasty. Besides serving the interests of Emperor Franz I, and that of his feeble-minded
successor, he had also been a loyal agent and confidant of Alexander I. His influence upon the czar had been greater than that of the czar’s ministers. As Walter Tritch put it: “Metternich seems to be a minister of the czar as well as the Austrian emperor.” (W. Trittich, “Metternich und sein Monarch,” Darmstadt, 1952, P. 489.)

As I mentioned before, the ruling principle of the rulers of the Holy Alliance was their “divine origin theory.” Their absolutist and feudal system of government was operating under the more reputable name of “patriarchal rule.”

“(I) According to the words of the Holy Scriptures, which suggest that men regard each other as brothers, the three applied rulers united by the true and unbreakable bond of brotherhood, consider themselves as sons of the same country, and shall provide help to one another every time it is needed. They shall govern their subjects and armies in the same spirit of brotherhood they feel toward each other, in order to protect the faith, peace and justice.

(II) The governments mentioned herein, as well as their subjects regard each other as members of the same Christian community; and the three rulers shall see themselves as representatives of the same family, namely Austria, Prussia, and Russia. They hereby recognize that the Christian community to which they belong has no other ruler than God, the source of all power, love, knowledge and wisdom...

(III) All those who are willing to accept and abide by the holy guiding principles of this document, and recognize how important it is that they exert a proper influence upon suffering mankind, and especially those who are affected by this long period of upheavals, are welcome to join the Holy Alliance...”

What a hypocrisy!...

The congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona further elaborated the program of the Holy Affiance, and declared that the member states will act in solidarity against any manifestation of the revolutionary spirit in Europe.

During the 19th century the absolute monarchies became stronger everywhere in continental Europe, while at the same time the rulers aspired for territorial gain. Poland, Italy, the little Balkan states, and Turkey became the suffering victims of this excessive hunger for power, exhibited by the Habsburg and Romanov rulers — not to mention the other powers, since our interest is focused on these two ruling families, and their policies.

It is true that in the era of fierce international rivalries the necessity of maintaining a strongly centralized state had forced the rulers to curb the
land-grabbing appetite of rich landlords, to the detriment of the nationalities. England had played a leading role in this regard. And the British example provided a useful model for the other countries’ rulers (or their advisers) to introduce useful economic, social administrative, and cultural reforms in their countries. In that period even the majority of the rulers had accepted the principles of enlightenment. Only the Romanovs and the Habsburgs tried to obstruct progress. They were obstinate conservatives. But the storm of the times, and the forces of evolution swept them aside later.

As I mentioned, England and Prussia had been the first to recognize the signs of the changing times. They tried to activate the educated middle class in the service of progress. Prussia, even more so than England, needed the services and ideas of cultivated minds, in order to modernize the state. And in turn, the weak middle class also needed the ruler’s protection against those stubborn aristocrats who resisted progress.

But however modern, and reform-minded the absolute monarchy had become, it could not deprive the land-owning nobility from its primacy within the system, for it constituted the backbone of the system. Theoretically the absolute monarchy — as a form of government — could evolve in any direction it wanted, but in reality its options were limited. Enlightened thinkers referred to it by a new name: feudalism. (This name was later popularized by the French Revolution.) The absolute monarchy was willing to use every means to increase its power, enlarge its income through taxation, and extend its influence outside its borders.

Let us take an obvious example: Few rational thinkers, or even rational-minded rulers doubted that the abolishment of serfdom was necessary. It had been mentioned among the first points of enlightened social programs. From Madrid to St. Petersburg, and from Naples to Stockholm there had not been a ruler who would not have agreed to it in principle, two decades before the French Revolution. Yet such a reform had seldom been initiated from above, aside from a few little countries like Denmark, and Savoy. The feudal agrarian situation had been terminated largely through the influence of the French Revolution. And the liberation of peasants in Hungary was accomplished through the revolution of 1848-49.

The creation of the Holy Alliance prompted further unrest, such as the Naples and Piemont revolutions (1820-21), and the Spanish revolution (1820-23), and the number of military interventions also increased. The Italian revolutions were quelled by Austrian troops, and the Spanish revolution was stifled by French military units. The czar gave his approval to both interventions. When the Austrian army occupied Naples and Piemont (1821), czarist Russia marched an army of 130,000 soldiers along its western
borders, in case they were needed to quell any further rebellions in Austria, or Prussia. Since Czar Alexander I was a sworn enemy of any national uprising, he persuaded France to intervene in Spain. Foreign troops were used against the rising nationalist forces, in Rome, Sicily, Moldavia, Baden, Schleswig Holstein, and many other places throughout Europe. This was the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, which had protected the safety of any little monarchy against the national freedom-movements of the peoples, even if they numbered several millions, like the peoples of Hungary, or Poland.

Still new political storms were shaking the rulers’ thrones: the Paris revolt in 1830, and a general uprising in Poland, that began in November, 1830. The latter especially terrified the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. Hungary was closely affected by the Polish uprising. It had an influence on the Hungarian War of Independence of 1848-49, when Lieutenant Generals Henrik Dembinsky, and Joseph Bern offered their services to the Hungarian army. No doubt the Paris revolt of 1830 had an inspiring effect on the Poles. On November 29th, 1830, in Warsaw, Polish cadets of the local military academy attacked the palace of the czarist regent, Grand Duke Constantine. The regent escaped, and the rebels occupied the city. The event stirred the whole country. Still on the same night a royal Polish government was formed, in which all social classes were represented. On January 25th, 1831, the renewed Polish Parliament proclaimed the dethronement of Czar Nicholas I. On February 9th czarist troops entered Poland. After a period of heroic resistance the Polish rebel army — amongst those leaders was Dembinsky — suffered defeat at Ostrolenka. In the autumn of 1831 the Russian army occupied Warsaw. The czarist government placed public administration into the hands of the military, and in 1832, it abolished the Polish constitution, and formally annexed Poland to Russia.

The Polish uprising of 1830-31 was hailed in Hungary by such prominent poets and politicians as Francis KOlcsey, Nicholas Wesselenyi, and the young Kossuth.

Alliance between the Habsburg and Romanov Dynasties

The Paris revolt, and especially the Polish uprising impelled the Austrian and Russian rulers to form a new alliance. The fact that the Vienna court (besides
the Prussian government) had provided substantial help for the czarist government during the Polish uprising, served as the first impetus to forming this new alliance. A rapid concentration of Austrian troops along Austria’s eastern borders prevented foreign aid to Poland. Detectives of the Austrian Secret Police entered Poland occasionally, and handed over relevant information on Polish rebels to the czarist police. Some Polish rebel leaders were extradited by the Austrians to the Russians. Many of the Polish freedom fighters and high-ranking soldiers escaped through the Carpathians to Hungary, where they felt safe. (A similar situation occurred during the Second World War, when Hitler invaded Poland.) The clandestine activities of the Austrian secret police in Poland were criticized by the British and French governments, and some diplomatic retaliatory steps were taken by them. During the past centuries of Habsburg rule—and especially during the sway of the Camarilla—the Austrian governments often resorted to shady, clandestine activities, especially against the Polish and the Hungarian nations when they felt the emperor’s supremacy endangered by these nations. They found willing allies among the Czechs against the Hungarians, prior to the 1920s when the Austrians snapped off a chunk of the body of Hungary.

Bismarck noted that “The Prussian government had let the Russian troops pass through Prussian territory, even provided them with arms and ammunition used against the Polish rebels. (O. Bismarck, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 15, Berlin, 1932, P. 186).

The new affiance between Austria and Russia was initiated by the Austrians. The Habsburg throne became shaky, and badly needed protection. Order was disintegrating within the empire, the citizens were affected by revolutionary ideals, and owing to the language demands of the nationalities, the monarchy began to lose its great power status. Its existence was threatened by these nationalistic demands. If we pay careful attention to the history of the Habsburg empire, we shall see that it always needed some outside help to ensure its survival.


Palmerston, a British foreign minister, whose pro-Habsburg and anti-Hungarian sentiments were well-known at the time, wrote the following to Lord John Ponsonby, the then Vienna Ambassador of Great Britain: “The Habsburg emperor is able to retain his provinces through the benevolence and agreement of three outside powers, namely France, Russia, and Prussia. He may keep Hungary and Galicia only as long as Russia agrees to that. And
he is able to retain his position within the German alliance only until Prussia will tolerate that.” (E. Ashley, The Life and Correspondence of Palmerston,” London, 1879, Vol. 2., P. 106. The above quotation is not verbatim.)

Since the Habsburg monarchy consisted of many nationalities, it always needed some helpful allies. It always had to reckon with a possible insurrection from within, or an attack from without. Therefore it could not have withstood a concerted attack by the northern and southern Slavic states. This was the situation in the era of enlightenment of the 18th and 19th centuries, when the national revolutions began to undermine the foundations of the absolutist state. The gradual expansion of democratic views among the citizenry broke through the confines of feudalism. It is therefore understandable that the governments of the Habsburg empire were actively seeking alliance with other monarchies — most of all, the czarist empire — on the grounds of similar military and political conceptions, and above all, their rigid conservatism.

The Metternich-initiated new Austro-Russian alliance was welcome in the czarist court. The czar saw in Austria a staunch ally against the nationalist movements. There were other strong related motives for the alliance, such as protecting the cause of the aristocrats in the midst of ever increasing democratization —liberation of the serfs, taxation of the mobility, land distribution to landless peasants, extension of voting rights to the general populace, all threatened the pillars of feudal aristocracy.

In Hungary the prevalent traditional legal views, as expressed by the tripartite book of Werboczi, had been the main barriers of social progress. Well-informed law students, lawyers of middle-class origin, and publicists who travelled abroad often criticized the outmoded law book of Werboczi. But the Austrian governments that had often curtailed the Hungarian constitution, still adhered to the Werboczi regulations.

The chief organizer of the Habsburg-Romanov alliance was Metternich. This highly knowledgeable, shrewd politician, soldier and diplomat was an ardent admirer and servant of the czar, besides being an overly proud aristocrat who despised the “plebs.” As Krassinsky, a Russian general observed, “Metternich is the leader, and the model of European aristocracy.” German, Austrian and Russian historians unanimously regard Metternich as the restorer of the Austro-Russian alliance. “Metternich needed the czar’s help...He wanted to secure the backing of the Russian army ...With this aim in mind, he tolerated Russia’s eastern expansion. Because of his unswerving loyalty and servility to both monarchs, Metternich is hated by all rebel leaders of Europe. He accepted his role in order to save the sons of nobility from becoming lackeys to ordinary tailors and cobblers.”
(Krassinsky’s report to Czar Nicholas I. June 1829, Dipi. Archives.)

In Austrian political circles the possibility of creating a nominally independent Poland under Austrian control, as a buffer state against an aggressively expansionist Russia, had also been discussed. But Metternich strongly opposed the idea, and clung to his aim of uniting the anti-revolutionary conservative powers, because he recognized that this was the only means whereby the rising nationalist aspirations within the Austrian domain could be controlled.

“Metternich laid all his hopes in Russia. For him the only effective policy was servility toward Russia and the czar.” (Gentz: Aus den Tagebuchers des Grafen Prokesch. Osten Wien, 1909, P. 109)

For Emperor Franz I it was paramount to forge a close alliance with the Russian czar. He was very much afraid of a possible concerted anti-monarchist revolt within his domain. Preoccupied by this notion, he paid little attention to Russia’s Balkan aspirations. A revolution would threaten the very existence of the monarchy, whereas Russia’s strengthening influence in the Balkan was of local significance, from the viewpoints of the dynasty. There had been very few European dynasties that could surpass, or even match the Habsburgs in protecting their interests, and expanding their sphere of influence.

Through the initiation of Franz I, a meeting took place between the Habsburg and the Romanov monarchs in September, 1833, in the Czech town of Munchengratz. Russian help was vital for Austria at this time, since Franz I intended to secure the future rule of his feeble-minded son, Ferdinand, for whom he asked the czar’s protection. Czar Nicholas I, who liked to think of himself as the father of the peoples, felt flattered by the emperor’s request, which went beyond the scope of ordinary political and military aid. He solemnly swore to help the Habsburgs solve their family problems. It was displeasing to observe Metternich’s obsequiousness and flattery towards the czar. He proudly boasted that he regarded himself as a minister of both Emperor Franz I and Czar Nicholas I. The emperor himself went one step further: He announced to the czar that he had requested in his will that his sons maintain friendship with the czars, and let them know about every important decision of theirs. This guardianship role somewhat surprised the czar.
The Habsburg-Romanov meeting caught the Prussian king unawares. At the October, 1833 encounter of the three rulers in Berlin, he joined the alliance only after grave deliberation. It is interesting to note here Palmerston’s observations: “Austria is hanging onto Russia like a bad swimmer onto a good one.” (Palmerston-Russel correspondence, July 7th, 1849, Diplomatic Archives. The quotation is not verbatim.)

The three monarchs reached an agreement on mutual military aid in case of internal turmoil in any country of theirs, and they also agreed on extraditing the rebel leaders to one another if they were caught. The kept the agreement strictly confidential. They also decided to hold joint military exercises.

Metternich considered the Munchengratz agreement as his great personal triumph. He had succeeded in tying the fate of Austria inseparably to the fate of Russia. In this context Palmerston’s statement rings true: “Without Russia the Habsburg state would have ceased already.” (A.J.P. Taylor: The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918, History of the Austrian Empire, 1964., P. 37.)

The alliance looked solid. The three royal courts hoped to rule in relative peace. They decided to ask for the czar’s opinion in the major questions. In fact it meant that the czar had the final say in decisive matters.

Not long after the Munchengratz and Berlin meetings Metternich became the object of a general attack. Because of the Vienna revolt of 1848, and the subsequent Hungarian War of Independence, he left Austria and settled in London. While staying there he received an annuity of 50,000 ducats from Czar Nicholas I. During his stay in Britain he maintained steady correspondence with the czar, and continued his political intrigues against Italy, Germany, and above all, Hungary.

Here I am revealing a letter written by Metternich to Czar Nicholas I, on March 14th, 1848, shortly before leaving Vienna for London. (The original text is in the Diplomatic Archives of 1848. It was published in the series: Aus Metternichs Nachgelassenen Papieren,” Vol. 7., P. 605.)

In this letter he expressed his deep gratitude to the czar for the friendly sentiments he had shown toward him (Metternich), under his glorious reign. He mentioned that Europe was undergoing a serious crises, “which is rather social than political, and that he (Metternich) sensed the coming of this unfavorable situation, and had tried to prevent it during his ministership of nearly four decades. Furthermore he feels his efforts have been fruitless, so he will retire from active politics. Also that he wishes a lot of good luck to his emperor, and the same to the czar, whom he has always regarded as the truest friend and ally of the Austrian empire.

The czar became a self-appointed protector of
the peace of the whole Balkan peninsula. Schiemann notes that when Metternich informed the czar about the Hungarian situation, the czar replieth “I have always regarded Hungary with suspicion. I promise to keep my eyes on it.”

The main advocate of the reformist movement in Hungary was Stephen Széchenyi in this period, but he was soon eclipsed by the more radical Kossuth, whose ideas shaped the historic events of 1848. Between 1820 and 1848 the diets enacted several reform laws in Hungary, which caught the attention of czarist diplomats. Paskevich, the czarist vice-regent of Poland informed the Russian government that the reformist trend in Hungary might lead to a revolution...

When in early 1837, Laszlo Lovassy, a youth leader at the Pressburg diet had been taken to court, Kossuth had also been arrested. While Metternich had started negotiations with the czar about possible Russian “military assistance.” Metternich, the seasoned diplomat pointed out that if a revolution would break out in Hungary, it would have a kindling effect on Poland, because of the spiritual kinship between the Hungarians and the Poles. The Vienna court tried to arouse the czar’s suspicion towards the Hungarian reformative efforts by denigrating them as shady anti-monarchist machinations. “Austria may count on the czar in any case,” replied the czar.

The revolutions of the 1830s created a new situation which opened the way for social reforms, including partial (stiffl incomplete) language and civil rights. The socially awakening bourgeoisie and working class began to notice the difference between the oppressed and the oppressors.

The revolutions split Europe into two great regions. In the western region, west of the Rhine, the power of feudal absolutism was broken once and for all. In France, England and Belgium, moderate liberalism triumphed. In Switzerland and the Pyrenean peninsula where the liberal and conservative elements were equally strong, liberalism did not achieve a perfect victory, but the Holy Affiance could not force its will upon these regions any longer.

East of the Rhine the liberal reform movements began to expand further, despite the heavy oppression from above. Uprisings in Germany and Italy were quelled by Austria,
while the Polish revolution—the most significant among the revolutions of the 1830s—was crushed by Russia. In this second region of Europe the national question became the dominant issue. The majority of the population of this region belonged to multinational empires: the Habsburg, Russian, or Turkish empire. The rest belonged to divided smaller countries and principalities, or lacked the status of a centralized state (like the Germans, Italians, and the Poles).

The revolutionaries of the two main regions showed remarkable similarities in many respects, which is corroborated by the fact that the 1848 revolutions arose in both regions.

In the eastern half of Europe a sharp distinction was discernible between the actively revolutionary, and the passive, non-revolutionary peoples. The Italians, Poles, and Hungarians unquestionably belonged to the former group.

In the eastern region of Europe none of the revolutions achieved victory. Here the new radical elements were in a clash with the conservatives that believed in slow progress. The moderates hoped for a reasonable government, amenable to reformist suggestions through the active aid and helpful diplomatic suggestions of the liberal powers. But this did not happen, because the arch conservative Romanovs and Habsburgs effectively blocked and stifled all such efforts.

The Romanov and Habsburg alliance extended to the eastern and southern sections of Europe, including the Balkan peninsula and Italy. Russia protected Austria’s Italian interests against England through a diplomatic move in February, 1848, whereby Russia notified the British government that Russia would not recognize the recent revolutionary changes in Italy, and that it would regard any anti-Austrian foreign (British-French) intervention as a casus belli.

The year 1848 was marked by revolutions in Europe. The Paris revolution was recognized by the Great Powers. And the exiled freedom fighters of the stifled Polish revolution spread the revolutionary fire to other countries, especially to Hungary. Preparations for war increased throughout the continent. Czar Nicholas I informed the other European powers through his embassies that Russia was going to strengthen the Holy Affiance. If there was a revolution in Prussian, Russia would intervene militarily, to protect its own jeopardized interests.

The news of the victorious Paris revolt shook Vienna and St.Petersburg, and prompted military preparations in both Austria and Russia against France. Vienna invited the Prussian generals to a joint preparatory meeting; the czar exhorted the king of Prussia, Frederic William IV, to organize a military campaign against France. In his letter to the Prussian king
the czar urged a joint action by the German forces, and he gave concrete advice on how to do this. “Prussia, Hanover, Sazony, and Hessen on the north; Wurtenberg, Bavaria and the rest on the south. Within three months I am behind you with 350,000 troops.” (Czar Nicholas’ French-language letter of March 7th, 1848, to Frederic Wilhelm IV. Published by Schiemann, ibid., Vol IV.)

Secret correspondence and exchanges of messages encouraged the concerned rulers. They expected swift and favorable results. Vienna felt the prestige of the Habsburg dynasty enhanced. While the court rejoiced in festivities, the Vienna burghers prepared for a revolution.

The people’s uprising wrecked the military preparations of the three rulers. The rebels achieved victory in Vienna, on March 13th, and in Berlin, on March 18th, Austria received a new constitution. For a while it seemed that czarist Russia would remain alone in its anti-revolutionary fight. Czar Nicholas I branded every popular freedom effort as “mutiny” and “anarchy.” But eventually he grudgingly recognized (in March, 1848) that he was unable to start military action single-handedly against all the ongoing revolutions. He had to be content with issuing a belligerent proclamation to the rulers of Europe: “The ravages of revolutions have reached our allies’ countries: the Austrian Empire and Prussian Kingdom...We are prepared to meet the enemy wherever they appear...” Some governments – like that of France and England – interpreted the proclamation as a threat. It caused a shock in St. Petersburg that in feudal and absolutist Vienna the revolution had achieved victory in a matter of hours, and that the all-powerful Metternich had been forced into exile.

Paskevich was prepared for a possible souring of relations between the new leadership of Austria and the czarist government. On his advice the czar stopped providing loans for the emperor. Count Ficquelmont, the new Austrian Foreign Minister sent his newly appointed ambassador, Count Frederic Thun to St. Petersburg with a message of firm commitment to the czar, on the Habsburgs’ behalf. “The most tried and true allies of the House of Habsburgs are the Romanovs...Our aims remain the same.” That meant quelling the revolutions.

To his joy the czar noticed that the new, modified Austrian constitution had essentially left the emperor’s status unchanged, and the new cabinet consisted of Metternich’s former colleagues. The Kollowrat-Ficquelmont government earned the czar’s highest praise. The Vienna Camarilla observed with satisfaction the Russian military preparations along the Austrian border. The two ruling houses substantially strengthened their ties. In official Vienna and St. Petersburg circles the Hungarians were blamed for the successful Vienna revolution. The Vienna court informed the czar that “hotheaded
Hungarian rebels and cantankerous reformists” had precipitated the (Vienna) rebellion, so they deserve immediate disciplinary sanctions.

Nicholas I had been biased against the Hungarians since the beginning of his rule, and thus he could be easily convinced of their guilt. It sounded like a plausible explanation that the youthful Hungarian reformists of the Pressburg diet had made frequent excursions to nearby Vienna — either on horseback or by coach — to foment a rebellion.

At the proposal of Kossuth’s March 3rd petition, the Parliament passed the new laws that codified the recent revolutionary changes in Hungary, and, with the help of the revolutionary forces, obtained Vienna’s approval to these laws. What irked the czar the most was that Kossuth demanded “a complete revision of the existing system.” By this time it was well known in Hungary that Pan-Slavist ideals played a major role in the czar’s policies, and that the czar was prejudiced against Hungary. Through an indiscretion, the anti-Hungarian character of the Holy Alliance also became known.

The general view in St. Petersburg about Hungary’s position was that if Hungary had seceded from Austria, that would cause a grave crisis. The lower nobility and the city folk who were on Kossuth’s side, demanded secession. While the moderate high nobility (like Prince Paul Eszterhazy) suggested that the imperial court temporarily allow the setting-up of an independent Hungarian government until things would get normalized. They intended to take part in the new government, in order to exert a moderating influence on the more radical ministers. Their proposal caused consternation in Vienna. Consequently the number of diplomatic errands with secret messages from Vienna to St. Petersburg significantly increased. The reason of this was to obtain the czar’s help. The Austrian government, the camarilla, and the emperor himself adjusted their decisions to the czar’s policies.

At last Kossuth and his party received an official approval for the formation of an independent (responsible) Hungarian government, and the new government immediately began to eliminate the glaring social inequalities. It abolished forced labor, and introduced general taxation.

Meanwhile secret agents and nationality instigators were sent to the border regions by the Vienna government, to create anti-Hungarian dissent. Kossuth was concerned about the Havasalfold and Moldavian freedom movements. He was worried that the rebellions would extend to the Lower Danube region as well as the Hungarian Highlands. His anxiety was not baseless, for the Pan-Slavist forces derived new courage from the Hungarians’ political successes. Anti-Hungarian rebellions among the nationalities would pose a new danger. Those secret instigators acted on Austrian and Russian suggestions. In the Highlands they referred to Czecho-
Slovak brotherhood; in Croatia they emphasized linguistic and religious kinship, to obtain the people’s trust.

The Hungarian government also feared a possible Russian invasion, in case of a general national uprising. This fear proved justified. At the end of July, 1848, Russian troops occupied both principalities, and put down the local rebellions there. This was meant by the czar as a warning for Hungary.

The Nationalities Act

The preparation of The Nationalities Act received an impetus from a strongly worded speech on the minorities’ behalf. At the critical stage of the Hungaro-Croatian constitutional negotiations, on October 28, 1868, Andrew Medan, a representative of the Rumanian minority requested that the Parliament accept the Bill of February 11, 1867 — which had been brought in by the Serbian and Rumanian representatives — as the basis of negotiations, since the Bill of the Nationalities Committee itself was not satisfactory to the minorities, and even the liberal papers of Vienna “had made joking references to it.”

The governing party had been anticipating Medan’s speech for weeks, for it had been on the agenda of the Serbo-Rumanian representatives since the end of September. The government was prepared for an answer. Immediately after Medan’s speech, Francis Deak put forward the Bill of the Nationalities Committee, that had been prepared for thirty months, and it was sent to the Central Codification Committee for its final formulation.

The Committee had emphasized that it had prepared the Bill in the spirit of the early 1868 representation.

We are going to present both the Serbo-Rumanian Bill, or the so-called Minority Bill, and that of the Hungarian Nationalities Committee. From their comparison it becomes evident that the latter is not more, and not less than a modern language act, which includes the whole range of human rights; while the Serbo-Rumanian Minority Bill may be regarded as a constitutional and historical, as well as political and economical declaration of a close political unity of the non-Hungarian minorities, and that of their nationalistic character. The Minority Bill designates federation as the basis of a new deal among the peoples of Hungary, instead of civil liberties and equal individual rights. This hypothetic “federation of nationalities” would require the division of the counties into so-called minority districts, on the basis of legal equality, for better administration. According to the originators of this bill, the minority question could not be solved without the emancipation of the various minorities, and the aforementioned division of the counties. They
would require – as a prerequisite for any further negotiations – the recognition of nationalities as distinct nations within the country. If this were done, practical steps could be taken towards the division of the counties, and the “rounding up” of the electoral districts on the basis of nationality. This could be the task of a joint committee, in which each of the founding nations would be represented. This joint committee would determine in detail the functional rights of the Hungarian language, as the official language of the state. The Minority Bill agrees that Hungarian be the “diplomatic language” of the legislation, and that of the central authorities. On the other hand, it stipulates the free perusal of minority languages in the Parliament, and what is even more important, the right to submit petitions and representations in the predominant language of each district, and moreover the right of free organization for each of the constituent minorities.

The bill of the Nationalities Committee, and that of the Central Committee, as well as the finalized version brought in by Francis Deak assured complete freedom of choice for the language of education in the private, the municipal, and the parochial schools. The Minority Bill made no distinction between public, and non-public schools, and it selected the majority language of each district for the language of education. In its political aim and character, the Minority Bill was based on the principle of cultural autonomy, which was akin to political autonomy. During the debate of Act 44 of 1868, Miletic maintained the view that the so-called “rounding-up principle” that was to be applied in the division of the counties into minority districts, would be a strengthening factor for unity within the common homeland. In fact, however, this was a questionable view, since nowhere in 19th-century Europe had cultural autonomy been realized on such terms. The differences between the two bills were irreconcilable, and mutually exclusive to one another. One of them was rooted in the civil liberty principles of mid-19th century, while the other was founded on the hitherto unrealized “minority nation” principle.

Among the representatives of 1861, there is one in which Francis Deak refers to “the nations of the homeland.” It shows that in 1861 it still had seemed possible to find a compromise between the views of the Nationalities Committee and the opposing views of the minorities themselves. However, in the autumn of 1868 the difference between the Committee and the minority representatives were no longer reconcilable.

Bill of Equal Rights of the Nationalities
The citizens of various nationalities of the country are declared equal in the use of their mother tongues. In the interest of the country’s unity and the practical requirements of government and public administration, as well as the necessities of prompt and exact administration of justice, their equality of rights are stated as follows:

1.) Every citizen of the country may submit petitions in his mother tongue to his own town, or other towns, as well as to his Church and municipal authorities, and to the government of the state.

When writing petitions to municipal authorities other than his own, he shall use the language pertaining to the particular authority involved.

In the area of law and justice, Articles 14 – 21 regulate the use of languages.

2.) Those who have the right of speech at community, parish, and municipal meetings, may freely use their own mother tongue.

3.) Any citizen, regardless of his nationality, as well as any town, Church or parish has the right to establish schools at the elementary and secondary school levels, as well as other institutions of learning in the fields of the fine arts, the sciences, industry, commerce, and agriculture, with or without financial assistance. For this purpose, the involved citizens may form companies or associations with well-defined rules, approved by the government of the state. They may collect funds, and manage these funds under the central government’s supervision, according to their nationality rights and needs.

Such institutions shall be regarded as equivalent to the similar state-owned institutions of the same level or grade; schools, however, must be aligned with the curricula of state-owned schools.

The language of teaching of private institutions is determined by the founders. The associations and the institutions founded by them, may communicate with one another in their own mother tongue, whereas in their communications with other institutions, Article 1. shall be followed.

4.) The parishes are free to choose their languages of education and record keeping — within the limits of the National Education Act — as long as they do not offend their superior Church authorities by their choice of language.

5.) The higher Church authorities have the right to choose their own preferred language for discussions, record keeping, management, and communication with their parishes. If their chosen language is other than the official language of the state, their written records shall also be translated to that language.

In communications between different Churches and Church authorities
the official language of the state shall be used.

6.) Parishes, as well as supreme Church authorities shall use both, their own language and the official language of the state in their petitions to the government of the state, and to the governing boards. If they have more than one language for official record keeping, they may use any one of those.

7.) The language of community meetings and that of their minutes may be chosen freely by the participants; in addition to that, minutes of such meetings should also be kept in any other language, if at least one fifth of the voting members find it necessary.

8.) Officials and clerks to town councils shall communicate with their citizens in the citizens’ own language.

9.) Town councils shall use either their own language of management, or the official language of the state in their petitions to their superior authorities, and to the central government. When submitting petitions to other municipal authorities or their various departments, they may use either the official language of the state, or the language of the minutes of the addressee.

10.) Minutes of the municipal authorities shall be kept in the official language of the state, but they may also be kept simultaneously in any additional languages if desired by at least one fifth of the voting members. Where there is any discrepancy in the wording, the text written in the official language of the state shall be accepted as interpretative.

11.) In the administration of internal matters, officials of municipal authorities shall use the official language of the state, except when this would pose an insuperable difficulty to some of these officials. In such instances any one of the languages used for keeping the minutes may be resorted to; but whenever it is desirable in the interest of public administration, and governmental supervision, their reports shall also be presented simultaneously in the official language of the state.

12.) Officials of municipal authorities within their jurisdiction may use the language of the particular towns, associations, Churches, Church authorities, institutions, and individuals they are dealing with, in official matters.

13.) The different municipal authorities may use the official language of the state when writing to one another, or to the government of the state; but besides that language, they may also use jointly, any one of those languages in which their own minutes are written.

14.) When a citizen of the country becomes a plaintiff, or a defendant, or an applicant or petitioner, and he is represented either by himself or a trusted person, without the mediation of a lawyer, in such cases may use
(a) his own mother tongue, before the court of his town;
(b) when standing before the court of another town, he may use any one of the languages in which the minutes of that town are written.
(c) before the court of his own district, he may use the official administrative language of his town’s council;
(d) before other courts pertaining either to his locality, or other localities, he may use the language of that municipal authority, to which the particular court belongs.

15.) In judicial matters which may or may not involve a lawsuit, the judge shall conduct the hearing of witnesses, or other judicial procedures in the witnesses’, or employed persons’ own language. The court records, however, shall be written in the official language of the state. But if the interested parties cannot understand that language, an interpreter may be employed when the need arises.

The judge is also obliged to explain to the involved parties directly, or through an interpreter, the most important documents of the lawsuit in question, whenever one or some of the documents are written in a language that is not understood by one of the parties.

Summonses shall be written in the summoned person’s mother tongue when it is evident, or easy to ascertain. Otherwise the language of his town’s councibl, or the official language of the state shall be used.

Other judicial papers, writs, decisions, or judgments shall be written in the official language of the state, but the judge is obliged to issue such papers in the involved person’s own preferred language when asked, provided that it is one of the languages in which the judicial records are taken.

16.) If the affected parties want to appeal a court’s decision, the judge is obliged to have translated to Hungarian, by official translators of the central court of the area, all the related documents written in any other language, and forward the translated copies to the court of appeal, together with the originals.

All writs, decisions and judgments issued by the higher courts shall be written in the official language of the state. The presiding judge of a particular lawsuit is obliged to observe the rules of the last paragraph of Article 15, when issuing such papers.

17.) In all lawsuits where the parties are represented by lawyers, the language of the trial, the writs, decisions and judgments shall be the official language of the state.

The only exception is the language of the summons, to which Article 15 shall be applicable.

Each of the parties is required to submit jointly with the original, a Hungarian translation of each of his pertinent documents whose language is other than Hungarian.
The translated copies are regarded as valid when the representatives of the opponent parties of the lawsuit sign them jointly. If the exactness of the Hungarian translation is doubted by the opposing party, then the translation shall be verified by the official translators of the municipality.

For this purpose official translators shall be employed, according to necessity, at the expense of the state, in the administrative center of the area, or the municipal seat.

18.) In the interest of public credit, in lawsuits related to bills of exchange, the official language of the state shall be used.

19) The administrative language for the elected secular courts is, the official language of the state; the church authorities may freely select their own languages for managing their own affairs.

20.) The official language of the state shall be used by all land registration offices of the country; but writs and abstracts may be issued in one of the languages of the minutes of the particular municipal authority, to which the land registration office belongs.

21.) The language of state-appointed courts is exclusively the official language of the state.

22.) When private citizens, Churches, private institutions, and towns without municipal status submit their petitions to the government in a non-Hungarian language, the writs related to such petitions should be written in both Hungarian and the language of the petition.

23.) The educational language in all public schools, or government-maintained schools is determined by the Minister of Public Education; but in the interest of public education, and that of the common good, the state is obliged to ensure that wherever minority groups live in a close community, their members have access to education in their own mother tongue, up to the level at which academic education begins.

24.) In bilingual or multilingual areas, each of the prevailing languages shall be taught, including literature, at the existing state-owned schools of primary, middle- and high-school levels.

25.) In high schools built in the future in bilingual or multilingual areas, each of the prevailing languages shall be taught.

26.) At the state-owned university the language of education is Hungarian however, each of the prevalent languages of the country, as well as their literature shall have a department on the campus.

27.) Official positions shall be filled, just as they have been filled, on the basis of individual abilities, and a person’s nationality shall not be a hindrance in taking a high position. The state will endeavor to have bilingual and multilingual administrative officials, judges,
28.) All earlier laws that are in conflict with the above decisions, have been abolished. Paul Somsich m.p., Chairman of the Committee; Louis Horvath mp., Official in Charge.

In Article 1., the bill of the Central Committee states: “For petitions written to other towns either the official language of the state, or the language of the minutes of the particular town may be used.” Therefore it substantially differs from the wording of Article 1. of the Nationalities Committee’s bill which declares: “Every citizen of the country may submit petitions in his mother tongue to his own town, and to other towns as well, inasmuch as it is spoken and understood there.”

In turn, Article 5 of the Central Committee’s bill is more permissive than that of the Nationalities Committee, since it allows the different Churches to use their own languages when communicating with one another, “even if none of those languages is the official language of the state.” This is a significant concession compared to Article 5 of the bill of the Nationalities Committee, which declares: “In communications between different Churches and higher Church authorities, the official language of the state shall be used.”

In Article 10, the bill of the Nationalities Committee proposes that minutes that must be written in the official language of the state may also be written and kept simultaneously in another language when at least one fifth of the voting members of the municipality so desires. Contrary to this, the bill of the Central Committee says that if one fifth of the representative body of the municipality so wishes, the minutes may also be kept in another language. The voting ability, as a prerequisite, is omitted here in principle, while in practice it would seldom happen.

In Article 11, again the bill of the Central Committee has the greater concessions, insofar as it states that in exceptional cases the minutes of a municipality must also be kept in one or more additional languages, besides the official language of the state, even if “it poses practical difficulties to the municipal authority, and the officials themselves.”

Finally, in Article 23, the bill of the Central Committee mentions that in state-owned educational institutions the language of education is decided by the Minister of Public Education in such cases “where official legislation is lacking.” The importance of this statement becomes even greater if we consider that shortly before the bill of the Nationalities Committee was brought in, on June 23rd, 1868, Mr. Eotvos, the Minister of Education had
submitted to the House his Bill of Public Education, which was enacted on December 5th, by Act XXXVIII. Two articles of this Act expressly dealt with matters of minority education. Article 57 stated that in parochial elementary schools, religious teaching is managed independently from the state by the various denominations. Article 58 clearly stated the necessity of education in the pupils’ mother tongue: “Every pupil will be educated in his/her mother tongue insofar as it is one of the prevailing languages in his/her community. For this reason, in multifingual towns, multilingual teachers are to be employed.”

**Act XLIV, 1868, to Provide Equal Rights to the Nationalities**

Since all the citizens of Hungary together constitute one nation in the political sense, namely, the indivisibly united Hungarian nation, according to the principles of the Constitution, and thus all the citizens have equal rights, regardless of their nationality; and since this equality of rights in the official use of the various prevailing languages can only be regulated by specific rules, insofar as that is necessary to the maintenance of the country’s unity, the practice of good government, and exact administration of justice; with the retention of the citizens’ equal rights in all other matters, the following rules shall be applied regarding the use of the various languages:

1.) For preservation of the nation’s political unity, the official language of the Hungarian state is Hungarian; it is the exclusive language of parliamentary debates, negotiations and administration; the laws are brought in this language, but they are also revealed in official translations in this country; Hungarian remains the official language of the country’s government and its various departments.

2.) The official records of the municipalities are written or kept in the official language of the state; besides that, they maybe kept simultaneously in every other language that is considered desirable by at least one fifth of the officials or members of the municipal authority.

   In cases of discrepancies in the different texts, the Hungarian wording takes priority.

3.) At municipal meetings, everyone who has the right of speech may speak either Hungarian, or his mother tongue when it is non-Hungarian.

4.) When corresponding with the government, municipal authorities may use the official language of the state, but besides that, they may use jointly any one of the languages in which their minutes are kept. When corresponding with one another, they may use either the language of the
5.) Officials of municipal authorities use the official language of the state for managing their internal affairs; but if this poses difficulties either to the authority or some of its officials, in such exceptional cases they may also use any one of those languages in which their minutes are written. But whenever the interest of governmental supervision and administration requires, their reports and documents must also be forwarded in the official language of the state.

6.) Officials of municipal authorities, when dealing with town, parishes, associations, institutions, and individual persons within their own area, should use the language of the addressee, as much as possible.

7.) In judicial matters in which a citizen is involved without a lawyer’s assistance, either as a plaintiff, or a defendant, or an applicant, either in person or by a representative, that citizen may ask for the protection of the law, and the judge’s help,

(a) before the court of his town, in his own mother tongue,
(b) before the court of another town, the language of that town’s management, or official record keeping,
(c) before his own court, the language of his town’s management, or official record keeping,
(d) before other courts pertaining either to his locality, or other localities, he may use the language of the minutes of that municipal authority, to which the particular court belongs.

8.) The judge conducts the procedures related to Article 7, in the language of the plaintiff, or that of the applicant; hearings, questionings of witnesses, inspections and other judicial activities are to be conducted in the language, or languages of the involved persons, witnesses, applicants, and opponent parties in cases of criminal procedures, lawsuits, and other matters. The language of the minutes of a trial is chosen jointly by the opponent parties. If no agreement can be reached on this point, the judge may choose the language of the minutes of the trial from those languages in which the official records of the municipal authority are written; however, the judge is obliged to explain through an interpreter, if necessary, the contents of the minutes.

The judge is also obliged to explain the most important documents of the lawsuit, either directly or through an interpreter, if one of the opponent parties does not understand the language of the documents.

Summonses are to be written in the summoned person’s mother tongue, if it can be readily established. Otherwise the language of his town’s council, or the official language of the state may be used.
The judge’s decision shall be revealed in the language of the minutes of the particular trial, but he is obliged to reveal his decision verbally, or in writing, in another language, if one of the parties requests, provided that it is one of the languages in which the official records of the municipal authority to which the judge belongs, are kept.

9.) In such civil and criminal legal procedures where legal counsel is provided by a lawyer, or lawyers, the prevailing practice remains in effect at the primary courts, regarding the use of language in which the trial is to be conducted, and the sentence revealed, as long as the legislation has not come up with new regulations in these matters.

10.) Clerical (religious) courts are free to determine their own administrative languages.

11.) At the land registration offices, in matters that involve judicial supervision, the language of the judicial authority to which the land registration office belongs shall be used; but if the parties so require, decisions, writs, and abstracts may be issued in the official language of the state, or in one of the languages of the minutes of the municipal authority by which the relevant records are kept.

12.) If an appealed lawsuit was conducted in a non-Hungarian language, or if non-Hungarian documents were used in it, the Court of Appeals shall have these documents, as well as the official minutes of the trial translated into Hungarian by official translators who get paid by the state for their work, and will examine the trial through the translated text and documents.

Writs, decisions and sentences of the Court of Appeals are always expressed in the official language of the state.

The primary or initial lower court is obliged to express verbally and in writing the writs, decisions, and sentences to each or any one of the interested parties in a preferred language, in addition to Hungarian, provided that the preferred second language is one of the procedural languages applied by the primary court, or one of the languages used for record keeping by the municipal authority involved.

13.) The exclusive official language of the state-appointed courts is Hungarian.

14.) Parishes are free to determine the languages of their birth, marriage and death registers, management of their religious affairs, as well as their languages of education, within the confines of the National Education Act, insofar as they do not offend their higher religious authorities by their choice.

15.) Higher religious bodies and authorities may freely determine their languages for discussions, record keeping, administration, and communication with their parishes. If their chosen language is other than the official language of the state, their minutes shall also be translated by official translators to that language, in order to facilitate central supervision by the
Higher and supreme religious authorities may use either their language of administration, record keeping, or the official language of the state in their petitions to the government of the state; when sending petitions to municipal authorities and their various departments, they may use either the official language of the state, or any one of the languages they use for official record keeping. Parishes may use in their correspondence with their own municipal authorities, and the state, either the official language of the state, or their own administrative language; and when communicating with other municipal authorities, one of the languages used for keeping the minutes of the addressed authority may be applied.

In state-owned schools of the present and future, the language of education is determined by the Minister of Public Education, wherever official legislation is lacking. But in the interest of successful public education, and the common good, the state is obliged to ensure that, as far as possible, members of the various nationalities of the country, wherever they live in a closegroup, be able to educate themselves in their own mother tongue, at the state-owned schools, up to the level at which academic education begins.

In bilingual and multilingual areas, each of the prevailing languages, including literature, shall be taught at the state-owned primary, middle, and high schools.

At the state-owned university the language of education is Hungarian; however, each of the prevailing languages, including literature, shall have a department on the premises.

Community meetings are free to choose the language of their minutes, and administration. Minutes should be kept simultaneously in any other language that is deemed necessary by at least one fifth of the voting members.

Town clerks shall use their citizens’ own language when communicating with them.

When a town sends petitions to its own municipal authority and its various branches, and to the government of the state, either the official language of the state, or that of the town’s management may be used; when sending petitions to other municipal authorities and their various branches, either the official language of the state, or one of the languages of the minutes of the addressed authority may be used.

Every citizen of the country may send petitions to his own town, parish, Church and municipal authority or their various branches, in his own mother tongue.

When sending petitions to other towns, municipal authorities and their
various branches, either the official language of the state, or one of the languages of the minutes of the addressed authority may be used.

24.) At community meetings and parish meetings, those who have the right to speak, may freely use their mother tongues.

25.) If individuals, Churches, private associations, private institutions, and towns without municipal status send their petitions in a non-Hungarian language to the central government, then the writs related to such petitions shall be issued in both Hungarian and the language of the petition.

26.) Private citizens, as well as towns, Churches and parishes have the right, regardless of their nationality, to establish primary, middle, and high schools. To the improvement and advancement of the arts, sciences, languages, as well as agriculture, industry, and commerce, they may also establish other institutions of learning, under governmental supervision, as prescribed by the law; they may form associations, with well-defined rules, approved by the government of the state. They may collect funds, and manage these funds under the central government’s supervision, according to their nationality rights and needs.

Such institutions of learning shall be regarded as equivalent to the state-owned institutions of the same purpose, level or grade; schools, however, must comply with the regulations of the National Education Act.

The language of teaching of the private institutions is determined by the founders.

The associations and the institutions founded by them may communicate with one another in their own tongue, whereas in communications with other institutions Article 23 shall apply.

27.) Official positions shall be filled, just as they have been been filled until now, on the basis of individual abilities, and a person’s nationality shall not be a hindrance in taking a high position. The state shall endeavor to employ bilingual and multilingual officials, judges, and especially Lord Lieutenants whose mother tongue is non-Hungarian.

28.) All earlier laws and regulations that contradict the above rules are declared null and void.

29.) The rules of this law do not apply to Croatia, Slovenia, and Dalmatia, which together constitute a separate nation. In the matter of language rights they are bound by the agreement between Hungarian Parliament on the one hand, and the Croat-Slavonian Parliament on the other hand, whereby their representatives may use their own mother tongues in joint Hungaro-Croatian parliamentary sessions.

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Act LXIV, 1868, was built upon three basic principles. From the thesis of a political nation, as primary principle, comes the second one: equality
rights for every citizen, in the areas of public administration, law and justice, religion, association, and general policy of culture. The third principle also originates from the first, and it determines the spirit of this law. Since Act LXIV recognizes only one political nation, its foundation stone, in accord with the spirit of time, and contrary to the principle of collective unity (advocated and urged by the nationalities) is the protection of individual human rights, on the basis of ethics, and natural laws.

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**Russian Invasion of Hungary in 1849**

The successful Hungarian spring offensive of 1849 prompted Franz Josef I to take a decisive step. On May 1st he sent a personal letter to Czar Nicholas I from Olmutz. It was written in French. (This letter was saved by the St. Petersburg Archives. Today it is at the Moscow Archives. The Österreichisches Statsarchiv of Vienna has a copy of it.)

The essence of this letter is a request for the czar’s help against Hungary.

**Excerpt** (of the letter): Since his childhood, Franz Josef has regarded Czar Nicholas I as the most solid protector of the monarchic principle, and the most faithful friend of his family. Since his accession to the throne he has found assurance in the knowledge that the czar’s fatherly suggestions will help him at his tender age to solve his problems of ruling the empire. The situation of his empire is forcing him to appeal to the czar’s friendly sentiments which he has proved countless times to Franz Josef and his family. His government asks for military aid, or a joint offensive to crush the Hungarian uprising. There are many Polish as well as other insurgents fighting under Kossuth’s flag. Revolutionaries of all the other countries lay theft hopes in the Hungarian rebels’ successes and expect a final victory of their horrendous cause. The czar’s arms are fearsome for the enemies of society. The alliance of the Russian and Austrian rulers had once saved Europe from the revolters. Franz Josef hopes that the czar’s armies will again save modern society from certain destruction which is threatened by those who are preparing a terrible barbarism in the name of progress. (Signature: Your Royal Highness’ faithful ally and brother, Franz Josef)

On May 1st the emperor was still unaware of his dethronement by the Hungarians on April 14. Therefore it would not be the original cause of the above letter. The dethronement was announced at the May 2nd cabinet meeting by Chancellor Schwarzenberg. The Österreichischer Korrespondent
of Vienna published the news on May 3rd, in a special edition.

The victorious advance of the Hungarian armies had threatened the Habsburg empire with a sudden collapse. Emperor Franz Josef was worried that Vienna would fall to the rebels’ armies. That was the primary cause of his request for the czar’s help. His Debrecen dethronement merely hastened the czar’s intervention. By the time the czar was informed that some 5,000 former Polish freedom fighters, including high-ranking Polish rebel officers were taking part in the Hungarian revolution, he had already made up his mind. In the reactivation of the Habsburg-Romanov alliance, the decisive factor was not the emperor’s dethronement by the rebels but the obligations the czar had assumed through the Munichgratz and Berlin Treaties.

On May 10th, 1849, Czar Nicholas I replied to Franz Josef that he was willing to lend armed help. And what is more, his troops had already crossed the Hungarian borders. The invasion had commenced. On June 14th, at Dukla, the czar oversaw his troops before they would march toward Hungary, with religious blessings. On June 17th, Count Rudiger, a czarist cavalry general already reached the town of Lublo, with his Third Corps. Marshal Paskevich, the chief of the invading forces had his supper at Bartfa on June 19th.

Meticulous historians have taken a careful account of the opposing troops, down to the last horse-driving artilleryman. According to the available data, the Hungarian forces consisted of 172,440 men and 472 cannons; while the czarist army numbered 192,902 heads and 584 cannons. Besides this, the Austrian army — under Baron Haynau’s leadership — had 164,573 men, and 770 cannons. So the czarist and imperial forces together were twice as numerous as the Hungarian army. And in the number of heavy guns the ratio was even worse: 472 against 1354, or roughly one to three. In addition to this, a harmful discord among the Hungarian military leaders culminated at the end of June. Consequently the czarist troops were able to advance rapidly immediately after their arrival. On June 24th, Paskevich already reached Kassa, and a couple of days later he advanced westward up to Goromboly, passing the city of Miskolc. From there he started a two-pronged attack. One prong marched south-east, toward Tokaj where Major Gubkin’s naked Cossacks swam the Tisza, each having a sword as their sole weapon, and occupied the east bank of the river. The other prong which was made up of Lieutenant General Chedaiev’s corps, started straight toward the city of Debrecen. In two weeks it reached the Hungarian Plain.

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In order to maintain his absolute rule, Czar Nicholas had to arrest every liberal or so-called democratic revolutionary movement. The czar simply had
no faith in democracy. He regarded it as a political heresy. We could say that he was obsessed by feudal absolutism. He viewed the people as a faceless mass of cannon fodder, or a group of humble muzhiks. Without doubt Poland was the most vulnerable part of his empire. He was afraid of another Polish uprising, therefore he urged Austria to act forcefully against the Polish nationalist movement in Galicia. St. Petersburg looked upon Austria as its protecting western bastion against revolutionist movements and ideas coming from the West, especially France. In turn the Romanov’s alliance was vital and indispensable to the Habsburg empire.

In the now revealed czarist secret archives many relevant papers have been found in regard to the Russian intervention in Hungary. For instance in the Shcherbatov collection (Shcherbatov, Lettres et papiers, VoL IX, PP. 225-228) there is an important reference as to the motivations of the czar’s decision: “The Polish revolutionaries played an important part in the European freedom movements not only in Hungary but also in France, Germany, and even in Italy.” The czarist government kept this fact in mind. Another diplomatic message reveals Czar Nicholas’ worries over the possibility of a united Germany. In his letter of April 1st, 1848, czarist Chancellor and Foreign Minister Nesselrode confided his observation on this point to Piotr Kazimirovich Meyendorf, the Russian Ambassador to Berlin: “For Nicholas I, one of the most fearsome thoughts is the formation of a strong, united Germany in the neighborhood of Russia. (The idea was just as vexatious to France and England.)

Last but not least the prevention of such an occurrence had been one of the czar’s motivations in helping Austria against Hungary in 1849. The Habsburg-Romanov alliance proved stronger than the Holy Affiance, with Prussia as the third partner.

Kossuth correctly pointed out that the participation of the Polish Legion in the Hungarian War of Independence had served as a good pretext for starting an anti-Hungarian propaganda campaign. (Kossuth’s letter of February 24th, 1859, to John Ludvig; published by Kossuth in his “Letters from Emigration,” Vol. I., Budapest, 1880.) The Polish Legion had amounted to not more than 5,000 men. This modest number provided a sufficient pretext for the czar to send an army of 200,000 troops in “selfdefense.”

After the Hungarians’ defeat, the czarist foreign ambassadors spread the unfounded rumor that if the Hungarian revolution had succeeded, the Hungarian army would have helped Poland to achieve independence from Russia. The Wiener Zeitung whose views were close to those of the Vienna government, similarly used the Polish argument in its May 12th, 1849 edition: “The Hungarian movement has completely changed its original character by handing over the leadership to the Polish emigrants. Other
The czar’s May 8th proclamation (of 1849) was sent to the European foreign embassies. It emphasized that, “In Hungary and Transylvania the rebellion has been strengthened by our rebellious Poles of the 1831 uprising as well as by soldiers of fortune, dissidents, and migrants from other nations. This kind of an expansion is most threatening to us...These foolhardy insurgents threaten the peace of our provinces as well...” (The czar’s proclamation is quoted in its entirety by Michael Horvath’s book, “The History of Fightings for Independence in Hungary in 1848-49,” Second edition, Budapest, 1872.)

The Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, the official paper of the czarist government mentioned two reasons for the armed intervention by Russia: the alliance with the Habsburgs, and the need for self-defense. “Everybody who takes the trouble to look at our geographical location, and weigh the situation of the populace of the Carpathian and Danube regions will recognize that Austria’s holdings and political power cannot be lessened in those regions without seriously troubling our neighborly relations and jeopardizing our main interests. The Hungarian uprising has developed frighteningly; it leaves no room for deluding ourselves any longer. It has quickly expanded from the banks of the Tisza to the Danube. At present it holds Upper Hungary and the whole Transylvania in its power. As the involved territories increase, so does the danger of spreading the revolution even farther...The movement is not entirely Hungarian now. It is half Polish. Thereby it has the potential of inciting a new rebellion in all parts of Poland, and thus repeating the horrors of 1831. Presently more than 20,000 Poles are fighting under the Hungarian flag. They form entire regiments and army corps. Mainly their leaders, namely Bem and Dembinsky determine the action plans and the direction of military operations. This is not a secret any more. They openly boast of this,” says the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg.

The czarist foreign ministry was in the forefront of propagating biased misinformation, in order to discredit the Hungarian revolution. Nesselrode, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs had this to say about the Russian invasion: “The Hungarian rebellion has become the basis for an openly prepared uprising in Poland. First they had hoped to start it in Galicia, and then in our own provinces...Starting out from Transylvania, and encouraged by unreliable elements of Moldava and Rumania to disturb the peace of our principalities (of this religion), in complicity with Turkey. They have created a state of permanent turbulence and instability along their lengthy borders. Such a situation cannot continue without letting our own most vital interest be jeopardized.” (Nesseirode’s circular of May 9th, 1849, to the czarist
It was not a “brotherly love” for the emperor that prompted the czar to invade Hungary. The document collection of Martens mentions two reasons: (1) Czar Nicholas’ mortal fear of any revolution. (2) Providing help for Austria actually promoted the interests of Russia. For instance the Austrian police could be asked to start a purge against revolutionary elements in Galicia. “If the Austrian authorities don’t do this, I myself will catch them,” said the czar to Prince Lobkovitz on May 9th, 1849, when he had received the emperor’s urgent letter of May 1st from the prince. This time the Austrian government meticulously fulfilled the czar’s demand. The czarist political police also operated within the invading Russian army. Detecting and capturing Polish patriots was one of their tasks. Indeed, it was not for love that Russia provided armed help for Austria.

It is interesting to note how the czar thought of Austria. He had said to Lamerciere, the French Ambassador: “Do not think that because I intervene in Hungary, I intend to justify the Austrian stand in this matter. Austria has committed plenty of mistakes, and it has let the rebellious ideas swamp the country. The government has slipped into the rebels’ hands. This can not be tolerated!”

Austria failed to pay back the Russian help in the Krimean War (1853-56). The emperor did not send troops to aid the czar. The Russian Chancellor and Foreign Minister Nesselrode, had stated in his memorandum to the czar’s foreign ambassadors on May 9th, 1849, that the Russian alliance with Austria had not come about by chance and it was based on strict necessity. This affiance constituted the backbone of the Romanov dynasty’s foreign policy since Paul I, and even Katherine IL. Nicholas I served Austria not by a whim but from self-interest: He helped out the neighbor’s fire lest his own house catch fire. Nicholas I hoped that the Habsburgs would forever be thankful to the Romanovs for his aid in 1849, whereby he had saved them from destruction. He was convinced that young Franz Josef would obediently follow his advice. However, after the defeat of the Hungarian War of Independence the Habsburgs did not need the Romanovs’ help any more. And thus the alliance broke up shortly thereafter.

The Balkan Question

At the end of the 19th century, and at the beginning of the 20th, the Balkan area was a constant explosive situation. The related problems have been gathered by the historians under the heading: “The Balkan Question.” This,
however, had been preceded by the “Eastern Question.”

One of the consequences of the revolutions of the 1830s was that the policing activity of the Holy Alliance ceased west of the Rhine. Meanwhile the “Eastern Question,” which centered about the problems of an imminent break-up of the Turkish empire, rendered the Balkan peninsula a new battleground of the great powers. England and Russia had clashed first on this battleground. Their rivalry upset the balance of powers. The circumstances, the topography, and the local Slavic population favored Russia, whose aim even then was to gain free access to the Mediterranean through the acquisition of the Bosporus and Dardanelles...This entailed inherent military, political and economic advantages. Britain felt its sea route to India threatened by the Russian ambitions. Therefore the British wanted to strengthen Turkey, or enable it to withstand the southward Russian pressure.

Russia had two choices for attaining its goal: either to defeat Turkey on the battlegrounds, and then invade Istanbul and the sea canals, or to render it, through diplomatic means, a virtual protectorate of Russia. The dangerousness of the situation arose from the fact that the liberation movements within the Turkish empire became extremely vigorous; and that other countries also got involved in the “Eastern Question.” Austria was interested only indirectly, since it was also a labile empire, and its rule was jeopardized by the same peoples which had undermined the Turkish empire: the Balkan Slays, especially the Serbs. By this time the Pan-Slavic spirit had penetrated the minds of the Balkan Slays, and they were already dreaming of the union of all Slavic peoples. This had come about through the work of Russian agitators. Later this Pan-Slavic dream became the direct cause of the First World War.

During this period Russian expansionist policy was favorably viewed by the Slavic peoples. The Serbs and Bulgarians looked upon the czar and Holy Russia with reverence. Westerners were awed by the deceptive “aura” about the czar. Russia was still a “white spot” in many respects. Albeit – as it later turned out – the czar had been able to occupy only the largely uninhabited Kirghiz steppes, east of the Ural, and only a few settlements in the Caucasus, from the fiercely independent mountain peoples. The Orthodox arid bigoted Slays saw in the czar their patron and liberator. Their spiritual and national “liberation” motivated the “Balkan Question,” which replaced the “Eastern Question.”

The Balkan story is not so well known to the average reader. In today’s world the killing of an heir to the throne could hardly be a casus belli. But during the reign of Emperor Franz Josef I, the unquestioning loyalty for the ruler and the dominance of the Camarilla made it very difficult for the historians of the day to have an access to the secret and confidential material
of the emperor’s archives, and the State’s Archives (Staats Archiv). From the
end-of-the-century they published few diplomatic documents. The most
important documents had been inaccessible to our historians until the end of
the First World War. The Balkan Question was revealed only after the partial
opening of the Russian-Austrian diplomatic archives.

The governments of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had often been put
into a difficult position by the intricacies of the so-called Balkan Question,
which in essence had meant the gradual liberation of the Balkan Slavs from
Turkish rule, and the ensuing rivalries between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
During the “dualist” era the Balkan was the only area for free maneuvering,
for Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. Its freedom of action was restricted
only by a self-imposed status quo. After the occupation of Bosnia-
Hercegovina (August 19th, 1879), it abhorred any territorial change. It is
known that the Balkan national movements could only be directed either
toward the Sultan’s or the Habsburg empire. Austria was traditionally pro-
Turk. From this it followed that Austria was willing to help protect Turkey’s
European holdings against Russia. But this attitude was dictated at least
partly by self-protection also. The creation of new sovereign Balkan states at
the end of the last century altered the monarchy’s Balkan policy. Vienna
endeavored to weaken the ties between Russian and the Balkan Slavs,
through diplomatic moves.

The San Stephano Peace Treaty of 1878, and the Berlin Congress had
secured independence for Serbia, Rumania and Bulgaria. The great powers
(Britain and France) had given Austria a free hand in Bosnia and
Hercegovina. Austria later took advantage of this diplomatic success by
annexing Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1908. Russia reluctantly recognized the
annexation. In turn Austria agreed to the unification of East Rumelia, and the
Bulgarian principality. The Bismarck-suggested idea of dividing the Balkan
into spheres of interests was rejected by both Vienna and St. Petersburg. The
rivalry continued. Vienna gradually strengthened its Balkan positions. Serbia
became dissatisfied with Russian foreign policy and therefore reigning prince
Milan made a secret agreement with the Austro-Hungarian government,
whereby Serbia became a virtual protectorate of the monarchy. Two years
later (1883) Charles I, King of Rumania became an ally of Austria-Hungary.

The alliance between Prince Milan and the Kaiser disturbed the Pan-
Slavist politicians and their agents. Consequently the antagonism worsened
between Russia and the monarchy as well as the monarchy and the Balkan
peoples. The situation was not helped by the Vienna government’s rigidity
toward the Serbs with whom it wanted to deal only through orders and
decrees, without making concessions.

In November, 1885, owing to a border incident, Serbia declared war on
Bulgaria. The war which lasted less than a month, ended with a resounding Bulgarian victory. Bulgarian politicians had become dissatisfied with Reigning Prince Alexander Battenberg, and forced him to resign. In the spring of 1887, the regent council offered the throne to Ferdinand Koburg-Kohary. This choice almost led to war between Austria and Russia. Czar Alexander III denied the recognition of Ferdinand till his death. By this diplomatic defeat czarist Russia was almost completely squeezed out of the Balkan. Then said Alexander III: “Only one friend has been left for me on the Balkan: Nikita, Reigning Prince of Montenegro.”

From the turn of the century the Russian influence gradually increased in the Russo-Austrian rivalry. The Serb question occupied the center of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan policy. The Balkan Alliance was forged in 1912, by Russian diplomacy. Its member states: Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro set out to free the still Turkish-occupied Balkan territories. The first Balkan war (October, 1912 - May, 1913) ended with Turkish defeat. According to the London Treaty of May, 1913, Turkey lost nearly all of its European territories. It was about this time that Albania was formed, and since then Russian policy dominated the Balkan.

The circumstances of the outbreak of the First World War are generally known.

Now, after Tito’s death a new Balkan crisis is developing. The execution of czarist political heritage is one of the most important tasks of Communist Russia. To gain access to the Mediterranean is one of its ambitions. The so-called socialist brotherly help is a mere sham. It cannot be taken seriously as long as one socialist state dictates to another “brotherly” (socialist) state. This is a matter of power and not that of sentiment.

**Outbreak of World War II**

On September 1st, 1939, at 5:45 a.m., a German cruiser, the “Schleswig Holstein” opened fire on an isthmus near Danzig. The area in question, which the Germans called Westerplatte, was under Polish military control at the time. Simultaneously the Wermacht (regular army) attacked Poland from four directions without a formal declaration of war. Two days later, on September 3rd, England and France declared war on Germany, according to their obligations to Poland.
Two decades before this world cataclysm, in 1919, President Wilson and other victorious statesmen of World War I solemnly declared: They fought this war through in order to prevent all wars. The leading politicians of Western democracies were convinced that through the new institutions they had created for the preservation of world peace, future wars could be effectively averted.

How did it happen then, that 20 years after the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty the peoples of Europe clashed again on the battlefields? And why could this “needless war” (as Churchill called it) not be avoided?

Shortcomings of the “European Order”

During the post-World War I peace negotiations, President Wilson, who lacked unanimous backing by an isolationist American public, was unable to realize his conceptions for the maintenance of order in the world. The leadership (of the world) shifted to the hands of Clemenceau, and other chauvinistic French politicians who were not really interested in a universal and lasting political arrangement in Europe. Their main goal was to prevent vanquished Germany from regaining full strength — through the creation of a strong anti-German alliance. Therefore France had forged an alliance with Poland (which had regained independence after a 150-year long Russian and Austrian rule), and subsequently with the three Little Entente states: Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

France and its allies had exerted a decisive influence in European political matters until the middle 1930’s. It happened because American and Bolshevist Russia withdrew from the arena of European politics. Russia still felt the harmful effects of the Bolshevik revolution. Italy was plagued by internal problems after the Fascists had risen to power. England was absorbed by problems of the British Empire.

The alliance system, however, lacked the needed stability right from the beginning. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy a vacuum appeared in Central Europe. The Little Entente states had only one common reason for keeping together, namely thwarting the Hungarian revisionist efforts. A possible union between the northern and southern Slavs, or at least an extension of their borders closer to one another was a logical aim that well suited the Pan-Slavist conception...The main bather to achieve this was the existence of Hungary, or rather its geographical location, wedged between Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia. Neither the newly created states, nor the now enlarged “successor states” of the defunct Habsburg empire were able to
solve their nationality problems. They rigidly rejected every effort aimed at revising the 1919 peace treaties, and thus contributed to the increasing tension in Central Europe. The main principle of French foreign policy was security, and its first aim was the maintenance of the status quo. Therefore France also rejected every revisionist proposal.

**Hitler Rises to Power**

It was foreseeable that the almost 70,000,000 strong Germany would take an active part again in European politics as soon as it recovered from its defeat. Therefore the British governments—contrary to their French counterparts—followed a policy of gradual reconciliation and appeasement toward Germany, since 1920. This attitude seemed justified by the fact that in 1920 Germany had become a democratic republic, and the country had shown a steady social and economic consolidation in the 1920s. This steady progress, however, was broken by the 1929 collapse of the New York Stock Exchange, and the ensuing economic depression, which severely affected Germany. Many factories became idle, and the number of jobless people rose to six million! This situation favored the extremists in politics. Government crises followed one another, and at the polls both the Communists and the Hitler-led radical rightist party, the National Socialists gained votes. Some influential ultra-conservatives—being unaware of Hitler’s true intentions—advised the very old and feeble Hindenburg to appoint Hitler for Reichskanzler (Chancellor of the Empire) Hindenburg agreed. On January 30th, 1930, Hitler became the leader of Germany. The first thing he did was to invalidate the democratic freedom rights. After that he began his dictatorial rule. Owing to this turn of events the number of non-constitutional major European powers increased to three, Germany the Soviet Union and Fascist Italy. All three were totalitarian states based on a one-party system.

After Hitler solidified his rule with brutal methods, akin to those of the Bolsheviks, he set about revising the Versailles Peace Treaty. His successes in this regard were impressive during the 1933-38 period. In 1935 Hitler unilaterally annulled the armament restrictions of the peace treaty. In March 1936, the Wermacht marched into the demilitarized area on the right bank of the Rhine.

In 1934, Germany had signed a non-aggression pact with Poland, which was considered a remarkable diplomatic success. Other positive diplomatic steps were the 1935 British-German naval pact and, since 1936 onward, various agreements with formerly unfriendly Italy. Within five years,
Germany became an important factor in European politics, partly because England chose to remain in the background. Although the British people condemned Hitler’s brutal actions in Germany, they were sympathetic to the idea of revising the Versailles Peace Treaty. Only Churchill, and a few other realistically thinking politicians realized that fulfilling Hitler’s seemingly valid and justified demands would merely strengthen Hitler’s power, and provide the basis for further territorial claims.

**Consequences of the Munich Agreement**

Hitler’s rapid successes only made him more audacious. In the spring of 1938, the German army occupied Austria without resistance. Subsequently Hitler demanded autonomy for the Sudentenland’s 3.5 million German population. Since CzechoSlovakia had signed a mutual help treaty with France, and the Soviet Union (in 1935), the situation became tense in Europe. To avert an imminent war, Chamberlain – Prime Minister of Britain – initiated negotiations with Hitler. Hitler’s inordinate demands rendered the talks futile. To bridge the gap between the opposing views, Mussolini suggested a four-power meeting at Munich, with the participation of France, Germany, and Italy. The Munich Conference satisfied Hitler’s demand. The Sudetenland was given to Germany. Then, somewhat later the Polish and Hungarian territorial claims were also met. According to the decision of the Vienna Conference of November 2nd, 1938, Hungary regained a portion of its pre-World War I territories, on the basis of ethnographic majority.

After the end of World War II, the opinion was widespread that Czecho-Slovakia had been sacrificed by its Western allies, in the aim of saving the peace at all costs, and only the Soviet Union was willing to fulfill its obligation to Czecho-Slovakia. It is difficult to find excuses for the naive Chamberlain who jubilantly stated before the receptive crowd at Croydon airport the “peace for our time” was secure. But an objective analysis of the historic facts leads to the following conclusions:

Czecho-Slovakia had been an artificial political entity, created by the peace treaties of the Paris area. In this new republic the ratio of the Czech population was less than 50 per cent. The centralist Masaryk, and especially Benes governments completely alienated the non-Czech nationalities: Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ruthenians and Poles. These peoples either wanted to return to their mother countries, or to obtain autonomy for themselves. With the sole exception of Rumania, Czecho-Slovakia’s relations with its neighbors — like Poland and Hungary —were
unfriendly and tense. CzechoSlovakia was not allied to England by treaties; only France and the Soviet Union were its military allies.

The Soviet Union could have provided help only through Poland or Rumania— as the Soviet foreign commissar, Litvinov had stated repeatedly, in 1938— but neither Russia nor Poland were receptive to the idea of allowing Soviet troops to pass through their territories. Under the given strategic circumstances France could have helped its distant ally only if England had been willing to back up France. The British politicians, however, had already stated (in the spring of 1938) that they would not go to war for a country which was denying the right of self-determination, and which could not likely be revived even if the Western powers would win the war. From this statement aside, the British people were against war in Europe in 1938. And the Commonwealth states— Australia, Rhodesia, Canada, New Zealand,— shared the same opinion. Perhaps the fear of German aerial attacks had also been a contributing factor in Britain’s anti-war attitude. The development of the R.A.F. started only in the fall of 1938. Under the given circumstances there were only two alternatives: either to let Hitler take the Sudetenland without armed clashes, or to deny Hitler’s demand and passively observe his troops occupy the whole Czecho-Slovakia...The first choice looked less costly.

The real frailty of the Munich Pact was that it was restricted exclusively to German-Czech relations. The four great powers failed to deal with the Hungarian and Polish demands. Owing to their disinterest, the initiative for further demands was left to Germany. And these new demands led to a world crisis.

After the Munich meeting the outlines of a decisive German influence began to appear in Central and Eastern Europe. Nobody saw this more clearly than the Polish Foreign Minister, Beck, who began a feverish diplomatic activity to countervail this strong German influence in advance. He supported the Hungarians demands for regaining Ruthenia. And in order to prevent Germany’s further expansion, he tried to forge an alliance between Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Italy— since that country also seemed to be wary of German expansion. He encouraged the Slovak independence movement and wanted to normalize Polish-Soviet relations. For this purpose he signed a Polish-Soviet trade agreement in November, 1938.

**Danzig, and the Occupation of Prague**
The anti-German Polish activities soured the hitherto friendly German-Polish relations. This became evident in the fall of 1938. Another contributing factor was Hitler’s demand for Danzig and the so-called corridor, which was discussed again during Beck’s last visit to Berlin, in January, 1939. Hitler’s demand did not seem to excessive, since the defunct Weimar Republic had once demanded a much larger territory from Poland. The complicated international status of Danzig had been one of the most unfortunate creations of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Danzig had been declared an autonomous free city, under the League of Nations’ supervision. But the Polish state also had a right for the town’s supervision. The so-called corridor—west of Danzig—had once belonged to Germany, but, in 1919, it was attached to the Polish Republic, to provide free access to the sea. But because the corridor had separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany, the Germans had viewed it with disdain, even in Weimar times.

Since 1935, the Berlin-centered National Socialist Party formed the government of Danzig. Therefore Hitler would have not gained much by Danzig. He did not claim the return of the corridor, he only wanted an autostrada. But because he also required that Poland form an alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union, Poland rejected the whole package. Beck was also afraid, quite rightly, that such a constellation would relegate Poland to a vassal of Germany. In January, 1939, Ribbentrop reiterated Hitler’s requests, again without success.

Hitler worried that a possible Polish-Slovak-Hungarian alliance would hinder his expansion eastward. So he resorted to a preventive move. At his instigation, on March 14th, 1939, the Pressburg provincial Parliament proclaimed the independent Slovak state. The next day Hitler marched into Prague. Thereafter he abolished the independence of Bohemia and Moravia and annexed these territories with provincial status into his empire. In the meantime Hungary occupied Ruthenia.

By the Prague march Hitler had committed an unpardonable blunder. By the abolishment of Bohemia, he had violated the Munich Agreement. This caused a great consternation in Britain. So the British politicians that so far tried to reach an agreement with Hitler, were forced to change tactics. Two days after Hitler’s Prague march, Chamberlain in his notable Birmingham speech struck a decisive tone, and declared:

The democracies will firmly resist all aspirations for world dominance. The tension was intensified by a German ultimatum to the Lithuanian government for the “return” of the Memel region to Germany. Besides that Hitler sent a new demanding note to Poland, requesting the return of Danzig. The
determined Poles rejected that too. On March 31st, 1939, England and France unconditionally guaranteed the borders and sovereignty of Poland. Within a couple of days Rumania and Greece also received the same guarantee.

In the early 1960s, eminent British historians — among them A. J. P. Tailor and Liddle Hart — found this diplomatic move of Chamberlain somewhat rash. It seems undeniably amateurish in hindsight, just like his euphoric post-Munich statement. It is also true that this sort of guarantee ran counter to the centuries old British diplomatic traditions. Never before had Britain committed itself on the continent in peace time. So these guarantees may be open to discussion. But one thing is undeniable: Chamberlain was convinced that by this move he would deter Hitler from further attacks, and thus save the peace of Europe. This would have been true only if the Soviet Union had also signed the guarantees.

The German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact

During the 1930s the Soviet Union had been hailed as the champion of anti-fascist resistance, and the guardian of collective security. But it is known today that even then Stalin had tried to maintain friendly ties with National Socialist Germany. Since the consolidation of Bolshevik power at home, the Soviet Union had two main goals: To prevent the outbreak of an anti-Soviet war, and to hasten the outbreak of war among the capitalist countries. The worsening of German-Polish, and German-British relations created a favorable atmosphere for this policy. Because a Soviet alliance with the West would have averted the danger of war, Soviet policy had deemed it wiser to join the Third Reich instead.

In the spring of 1939 it was not yet certain whether or not Hitler would be willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Stalin therefore had ostensibly started negotiations with the Western powers, in May, at Moscow. The dismissal of the pro-Western Litvinov seemed a bad omen. The newly appointed Foreign Commissar, Molotov, proved a tough, unpleasant negotiator. He posed new demand throughout the negotiations which lasted all summer. The aim of these demands was to establish Soviet hegemony over Finland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Parallel to the Moscow talks, secret German-Soviet negotiations were going on, the completion of which was urged by Hitler himself. The outcome of all this double dealing was that bombshell: a German-Soviet friendship and nonaggression pact. It was signed by Ribbentrop in Moscow, on August 25th,
1939.

The agreement suddenly upset the European balance of powers. Germany acquired a powerful eastern ally. A German attack on Poland now could commence without the fear of retaliation. Hitler was convinced that in the given situation Britain and France will not fulfill their obligations to Poland...

The German-Soviet nonaggression pact contained an auxiliary protocol, pertaining to the division of spheres of interest. The Soviet Union agreed that the greater western half of Poland belonged to the German sphere, and the Germans let the lesser part, east of the San-Narev-Vistula line go to the Soviets. Hitler also gave his approval to Soviet domination of the Baltic states, and Besarabia. The Soviet attack against Poland began on September 17th, 1939, while Poland was still fighting with Germany.

The Nazi-Soviet pact had been a great diplomatic success for the Germans, at least momentarily. It encouraged Hitler to discard any sensible reconciliatory attempts, and on September 1st, 1939, he attacked Poland. Thereby he had started one of the greatest cataclysms of the modern era: the Second World War.

Consequences of World War II

During the course of history the responsibility for starting a war could rarely be ascertained. For instance a great many books deal with the preliminaries of World War I, without being able to point out who was responsible for its outbreak. The leaders of National Socialist Germany, taking an unfair advantage of a favorable situation, brutally trampled a thousand-year-old, cultured European nation, Poland, with a whole plethora of modern weaponry. And the Soviet Union willingly joined the attack from behind. Therefore the responsibility for starting the war is divided between the Nazi and the Soviet leaders who had cynically masterminded the plot. Britain and France may be cleared of any blame. They declared war on Germany only after the German attack on Poland began.

It is another question whether the Western allies achieved their aims for joining in? Britain and France had a two-fold aim: to protect the sovereignty of Poland, and free the continent of a totalitarian power. Alas, they could achieve neither. Poland —with several other countries — became a satellite after the war, and the totalitarian threat is still strong in today’s Europe...

And we also must realize one of the greatest consequences of the war. The leading role of Europe in world politics has ceased. The continent’s eastern half lives under Soviet despotism, while its still free western half is
dependent upon the United States’ foreign policy. We have to agree with John Lukacs, Hungarian-born American historian, who conjectures that World War II has been the last continental war in Europe for all times to come.

Hungarian Minority Policy
During the Interwar Period;
Circumstances of the First Vienna Award

After the defeat at Mohacs, Trianon was the greatest catastrophe of Hungarian history. The country’s original territory of 325,000 square kilometers was reduced to 92,000 square kilometers, and its former population of 21 million dwindled to 7 millions.

Bled by the First World War, demoralized by the Communist terror of Bela Kun, and sacked by the Rumanian occupation, the country was at the brink of collapse. Nearly a million refugees left the detached territories and lived in cattle cars in truncated little Hungary. Inflation skyrocketed, there was a shortage of sugar, meat, coffee, tea, the majority of the country’s population was close to starvation. The economic and financial situation was catastrophic.

Under such circumstances the country’s populace expected from its leadership to keep alive the hope for a brighter future, a better era in which downtrodden Hungary would enjoy a respectful position again in the world. The first consolidated post-war government – led by Stephen Bethlen – kindled this kind of hope with it popularized the “No, No, Never!” slogan against the unjust Trianon Peace Treaty. Its reassuring effect was felt not only in Hungary but also the Hungarians of the detached territories, living under foreign rule.

After the Second World War both the Communists, and the Social Democrats belatedly blamed the interwar Hungarian regime of exacerbating the Central European situation, through their revisionist demands, which pushed Hungary into an alliance with the Germans, who had lost the war. This of course was a false assumption, because, as I have already pointed out, the revisionist movement had arisen from a vital need during the 1920s. Neither is it true that the (partial) return of the detached territories was the main cause of Hungary’s alliance to Axis.

The revisionist principle became the basic motivation of Hungarian nationality policy. As soon as the government officially accepted as its final aim the revision of the Trianon Peace Treaty, the same policy had to be
applied toward those Hungarians who lived in the detached territories. From this it followed that Hungary could not normalize, its relations with Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (or the Little Entente states) as long as they rejected the idea of a territorial revision. However, Hungary’s relations with Austria were less strained, even though Hungary was not willing to give up the Austrian-held territories of Burgenland which had formerly belonged to Hungary. Nevertheless, under the given conditions the country could have not isolated itself from all its neighbors. At least its western gateways had to remain open. Therefore after the Sopron plebiscite (which had returned Sopron to Hungary) further Hungarian revisionist demands against Austria were dropped. And the ensuing friendly Austrian-Hungarian relations became the cornerstone of Hungarian foreign policy.

However, Hungary never gave up its revisionist policy toward the Little Entente states. The crux of the matter was the extent of territorial demands; whether they should be settled on the basis of geography, or ethnography. Those who favored the geographic basis, demanded the restoration of King Stephen’s borders, and swore by the well-known slogan: “We Want Everything Back!” They argued that the marvelous geographic and economic unity of the Carpathian-Danubian basis should not be upset, and that Hungary needed the Carpathian Mountains for strategic reasons. Moreover it also needed to retain Fiume (Rijeka) as its only seaport, as well as the natural resources of Transylvania and the Highlands, for economic reasons.

While the advocates of a demographic solution held the opinion that as long as Hungary was encircled by unfriendly Little Entente states, it was a vain hope to expect the restitution of King St. Stephen’s borders. They argued that even the big Western powers began to recognize that it had been a mistake to award so much (predominantly) Hungarian-populated land to the successor states. So, in case of a new European territorial rearrangement, Hungary could also expect the return of the chiefly Hungarian populated areas from the Little Entente states. But if the demands were too excessive, even this much could not be achieved.

The differences between these two opposing camps led to a sharp division of opinions within Hungarian government circles, especially during the 1920s. The differences had surfaced most of all in revisionist tactics. They were solved through the passing of time, and changing circumstances, in the second half of the 30s.

This division of opinions adversely affected Hungarian foreign policy. The foreign ministry worked out its plans and tactics on the basis of a possible demographic solution. On the other hand, the Second Division of the Premier’s office dealt with the plight of the oppressed compatriots in the unfriendly neighbor states during the better part of the interwar period. This Second Division based its activities on the geographic solution principle,
according to the suggestions of Under-Secretary of the State, Pataky. This duality of purposes led to difficult situations within the country’s political leadership, especially at the beginning.

The Foreign Ministry’s revisionist policy was directed mainly toward the Western Powers. It is a well-known sad fact that in monarchic days Hungary had totally neglected to build good foreign connections. The opportunities for doing this were limited by the fact that foreign policy had been a common (Austro-Hungarian) matter, and as such it had been directed by the Austrian Foreign Ministry. Due to this neglect, while Benes was scheming in Paris, and Masaryk in the United States against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Hungarian cause had no advocates in the Western world.

Hungarian revisionist propaganda was most active in England and France where it gradually produced some positive results. This was a difficult task, because in the 1920s there was a strong anti-Hungarian trend in the West. Even in 1934, some Parisians referred to the Hungarians as “bosh de deuxieme class” (second-class Germans). In England the Rothermere campaign brought good results for Hungarian revisionist propaganda. And in France, a teacher of modern diplomatic history was the first to declare (at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, in 1933) that the near-Paris peace treaties had been unjust. But he hastily added that the status quo should not be disturbed, even by the amelioration of injustices.

The only weak point of the Hungarian revisionist propaganda was that it neglected the United States. For at that time the United States adopted an isolationist foreign policy line, and it was difficult to foresee that within 15 years the United States would be the leading world power, while the voices of France and England would barely be audible...

Revisionist foreign policy was much less complicated a matter than revisionist internal policy, that involved both the citizens of Hungary and the Hungarians of the detached territories. As I have already mentioned, this policy was directed by UnderSecretary of State Pataky. Because of its dual character this policy also had external as well as internal ramifications. During the interwar period, the lot of the Hungarian minority in the neighboring Little Entente states was much better than it is today — excepting Yugoslavia. First of all, the near-Paris peace treaties officially declared the protection of the nationalities. This was included in the peace treaties as well as the Charter of the League of Nations. The League of Nations also had a complaint bureau for the minorities, so there was a basis for legal fights. Moreover (excepting Yugoslavia again) there were democratic, or quasi-democratic regimes in the neighboring states: Austria,
CzechoSlovakia, and Rumania, Besides this, in Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania, Hungarian parties were allowed to exist. The Hungarian representative in the Parliaments of Prague and Bucharest had a right to speak in Hungarian. For example, Joseph SzentIvanyi, the leader of the Highlands’ Hungarians could state on September 24th, 1920, in the Czech Parliament that the Hungarian Parliament alone was entitled to sign the Trianon Peace Treaty, and that the Highlands’ Hungarians will never relinquish the right to decide their own fate...Of course such bold statements usually don’t go unnoticed, their reaction would come sooner or later...Among the Hungarian minority leaders none escaped some form of intimidation during the interwar period. Many were put in jail. But still there was a chance to voice the injustices, and talk freely to foreign correspondents...How far we are from this today!”

Needless to say, the successor states oppressed their minorities whenever and however they could. There was a saying in those days at the Hungarian Premier’s Office: “The Hungarian minority in Czecho-Slovakia may do anything, but can actually do very little. In Rumania they may not do anything – without greasing some palms. However, in Yugoslavia they neither may nor can do anything.”

During the interwar period the Hungarian minority was most opposed in Yugoslavia. Its lot was relatively easier in CzechoSlovakia, while in Rumania there were a few tolerable periods in between the bad ones.

The Hungarian governments of the interwar period had appreciably strengthened the resistance and conscience of the oppressed Hungarian minorities in the neighboring states. If the Kadar government of today would do only a tenth of what its interwar counterparts had done, the future of Hungary would seem much less gloomy.

Hungarian foreign policy toward CzechoSlovakia and Yugoslavia was based on the assumption that these countries were artificial creations, with little inward cohesion. Therefore it tried to capitalize on the historic antagonism between the Czechs and Slovaks, and between the Serbs and Croats. Budapest held the opinion that both Czecho-Slovakia and Yugoslavia would disintegrate under the political pressures of Hitlerist expansion. But there was no chance for the disintegration of Rumania. Therefore Hungarian foreign policy toward Rumania endeavored only to sell the idea of an independent Transylvania to the bettereducated Rumanians of Translyvania. The desire for an independent Transylvania is stifi strong among Transylvanian Hungarians.

The Ruthenians were favorably regarded by Budapest, since most of them had proved their allegiance to Hungary. There was no Russian instigation among them in the interwar era. The good Ruthenians still yearn
for the old times when they harvested wheat on the Great Hungarian Plain, and thus secured their bread for the winter.

In the interwar period, CzechoSlovakia had been regarded as the spiritual leader among the Little Entente countries, and the key to the future of Central Europe. In 1937, two years before the outbreak of World War II, the German pressure was put on Czecho-Slovakia. Everyone felt a crisis imminent. At the time the Hungarian population in Czecho-Slovakia numbered about one million. Their political organization was strong. Originally there had been two Hungarian parties: the Hungarian Christian Socialist Party (under the leadership of Geza Szullo. and subsequently John Eszterhazy), and the Hungarian Nationalist Party. In 1936, at Ersekujvar, these two parties merged under a new name: the Hungarian Party. It was popular among the Hungarians, and its membership was well-organized.

Feeling the threat of the gathering storm clouds, Prague resorted to various preventive measures. Her Danubian plans received some support in France, but almost none in Central Europe. Prime Minister Hodza tried to approach Hungary through a Hungarian speech he delivered in Slovakian Komarom. Budapest, however, remained unimpressed, because by that time the political winds turned for Hungary’s favor. Besides this, there was the problem as to whether the Czechs or the Slovaks should be the negotiating partners.

The Foreign Ministry and its older, more seasoned politicians wanted to negotiate with the Czechs on the basis that the Czech leaders would hold the reins of power, and they would be less reluctant to give up some Slovakian territories than the Slovak leaders. Foreign Minister Kálman Kánya favored such an opinion, and thus he tried to prepare the way to such negotiations. For this reason, Kánya was criticized by the Germans.

Contrary to Kánya, Under-Secretary of State Pataky favored the Slovaks as negotiating partners, since they had lived within the Hungarian kingdom for a thousand years. Following this principle, the Second Division of the Premier’s Office maintained close connections with the anti-Czech Slovakian and Ruthenian elements, and backed them politically as well as financially. I mention only one example: When the Czechs incarcerated Bela Tuka – the leader of the Hlinka Party – for his openly anti-Czech stand, his wife secretly received a regular allowance from the Hungarian government, through its Pressburg (Bratislava) consulate. Later Bela Tuka became the first Premier of the independent Slovakian state.

Under Hitlerist political pressure the European situation became extremely tense in 1938. The 3.5 million Germans of the Sudetenland openly
rebelled, and the mood was equally rebellious among the Hungarian, Polish, and Slovakian nationalities. Obviously Bene’s Czecho-Slovakia was at the brink of disintegration. The leadership slipped from Prague’s hands. Finally, through increasing Axis pressure the four-power Munich Conference of September, 1938 sealed the fate of CzechoSlovakia.

Hungarian foreign policy did not want a one-sided German solution for the Hungarian question, therefore Hungary asked the representatives of the Munich Conference to deal with the Czecho-Slovakian Hungarians’ problem too. John Eszterhazy also went to Munich to express this wish. Chamberlain and Daladier, however, wanted to deal only with the most pressing Sudetenland problem. And so it happened that the Munich treaty mentioned only in its Appendix that “Insofar as the problems of the Polish Hungarian minorities of CzechoSlovakia shall not be interested governments, then the four powers shall deal with these problems at their next conference.”

The Munich Treaty toppled the Benes government. The Sudetenland was annexed by Germany, and Slovakia received a free hand to manage its internal matters, and also to settle the question of the Slovakian Hungarian minority. Thus in October, 1938, the Hungarian-Slovakian negotiations began at Komarom, in a not too optimistic atmosphere. The Hungarian delegation – led by Kálmán Kánya, and Paul Teleky – resided aboard the Zsófia steamer at Hungarian Komarom, from where it reached the place of negotiations at Slovakian Komarom, day by day. Monsignor Tiso and Ferdinand Durchansky led the Slovak delegation. The negotiations were conducted in Hungarian, because every member of the Slovak delegation spoke fluent Hungarian.

At the first stage of the discussions, Tiso proposed a customs union between Hungary and Slovakia, instead of a territorial revision. Mr. Kánya rejected this proposal and wanted the return of some Slovakian territories to Hungary, according to the provisions of the Munich Treaty. Then the Slovak delegation offered the Csállókoz, and somewhat later it was willing to give up a territory of 5400 square kilometers, with 350,000 Hungarian inhabitants. But the Hungarian delegation was still unsatisfied, and demanded twice as large a territory, which Monsignor Tiso refused. Thereby the negotiations broke off after four days.

On Hungary’s behalf the Komárom meeting was only a tactical move of which the Hungarian delegation had not expected a final solution. The Hungarians expected a more favorable solution from the next four-power decision. Paul Teleky, however, was an exception, perhaps because of his clarity of vision. He thought about the future with foreboding.

After the Komárom negotiations the Hungarian delegation demanded a
plebistice on the Hungarian-populated areas of Slovakia. But the Slovak government was afraid of such a solution. Because the Slovak leaders had succeeded in building good connections with Berlin, instead of a plebistice they asked for a German-Italian arbitration. The Hungarian government attempted to involve the British and French governments in the decision, but they politely declined. Thus came about the First Vienna Award, in the Belvedere Palace, on November 2nd, 1938. The new common border of Slovakia and Hungary was decided by Ribbentrop and Ciano, the German and Italian foreign ministers. They adhered to the demographic principle as closely as possible.

According to the 1938 Hungarian census, the total population of the territory awarded to Hungary was 1,032,356. Only 11.9 per cent of this population were Slovaks (120,000); and about the same number of Hungarians remained in Slovakia—mainly around the Pressburg and Nyitra area. All in all, the Hungarians were satisfied with the new boundaries, while the Slovaks were not.

When in 1961, Oxford professor MacArtney—the authority on Central European history—held a lecture in Toronto, and the local Slovak leaders asked his opinion on the fairness of this 1938 boundary, his answer was that on an ethnographic basis it may be regarded as eminently fair.

It is doubtless that among the three territorial rearrangements in Hungary’s favor between 1938 and 1942, the Slovakian-Hungarian rearrangement was the best, both on legal and ethnographic grounds.

As we know, on March 15th, 1939, Slovakia became an independent state, while the Czech-occupied territories (Bohemia and Moravia) were annexed by Germany. Hungary was the first to recognize the independent Slovakia. Monsignor Tiso became president of the new republic, Bela Tuka became prime minister, Ferdinand Durchansky foreign minister, and Sanyo Mach the minister for home affairs. Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum was the Secretary General of the Hlinka Party.

From among the Slovakian-Hungarian leaders John Eszterházy and Michael Csáky (the leader of East-Slovakian Hungarians) had remained in Slovakia, while Andor Jaross had become first a member of the Hungarian Parliament, and later received a ministerial post as Minister for Home Affairs of the Sztojai government. From the leaders of the Slovakian-Hungarian Party László Sirchich, Stephen Révay, Marcell Szilárd, Julius Arkauer, and many others remained in Slovakia. Senator Charles Hokky returned to Hungary during the occupation of Ruthenia.

After the end of the war only László Sirchich, Marcell Szilárd and Stephen Révay could escape to the West. John Eszterházy and the other Pressburg-area leaders (seven altogether) had been taken away by the Russians. Only John Eszterházy was allowed to return to CzechoSlovakia,
but only because the Czechs wanted to try him there as a war criminal. He was suffering from consumption when he was taken to the prison of Pozsony (Pressburg; Bratislava) and soon after he died at the Mirovo prison. Michael Csaky had also been taken to Russia; first to Lubianka prison, and then to the Vorkuta death camp. After Stalin’s death he was taken to West Germany where he lived for 13 years, under constant medical supervision. For all his suffering he remained an indomitable Hungarian patriot until his death. As we know, Andor Jaross had been handed over by the Americans to the Hungarian government, together with the other members of the Sztojai government, and all were executed by firing squad.

The Slovak leaders received a similar fate. President Tiso was hanged by a Czech tribunal. Because he had been a very popular figure in the whole Slovakia, his trial and execution were done in secret. The announcement of his execution was delayed by months. The other members of his government who could not escape in time were punished likewise. Only Foreign Minister Durchansky, and party leader Kirschbaum were able to escape to the West. Dr. Kirschbaum is still active in Toronto.

Thus the historic drama, which started in 1918, and culminated in 1938, ended tragically in 1947 for the leaders of the losing side. But even so, much spilled blood failed to bring a real solution to the nationality problem. Today the situation is much worse, and the solution seems to be further away than ever.

Under a Double Oppression

Act 100, 1960, the constitutional act of the Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic was amended by Act 143, 1968, in regard to the Czecho-Slovak federation, and by Act 144, 1968, regarding the nationalities. This latter amendment did not meet the nationalities’ expectations for the following reasons:

1.) It did not assure their social, economic and cultural development as to bridge the gap between the nationalities on the one hand, and the two favored nations on the other hand.

2.) It did not assure the nationalities’ collective participation in the political life of the state.

3.) It did not assure a uniform development of their schools at the various levels.

4.) It did not guarantee the cessation of their forced assimilation.

The National Assembly and the Slovak National Council has failed to introduce a law that would correct the above-mentioned shortcomings of the
existing amendments.

The harmful consequences of these shortcomings have most adversely affected the Hungarian nationality, gradually eroding its constitutionally sanctioned rights.

The anti-constitutional discrimination is evident in the following areas:

14 EDUCATION

(a) The lack of newly built Hungarian babies nurseries.
(b) The decreasing number of Hungarian elementary and secondary schools.
(c) A reduction in the number of classes.
(d) A reduction in the number of pupils per school in the Hungarian elementary schools by 30 per cent relative to the number of schoolable Hungarian children.
(e) Attempt at changing the language of education from Hungarian to Slovak.
(f) An insufficiency in the quality of Hungarian-language education at middle-level trade schools.
(g) The direction of the Hungarian Department at the Teachers’ College of Nyitra, which is synonymous with the cessation of Hungarian elementary teachers’ education.
(h) The low proportion in the number of Hungarian students at the universities and colleges of the Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic.
(i) Hindering the students of Hungarian nationality in obtaining scientific education and university diplomas at the universities of the Hungarian People’s Republic.
(j) Widening the gap between the cultural level of the Hungarian minority and Slovak majority.

2.) CULTURE

(a) Depriving the cultural needs of the citizens of Hungarian origin to literary circles and amateur theater groups;
(b) Scanty financial backing of the Hungarian cultural institutions;
(c) Hindering the publication of Hungarian books within the republic;
(d) Reducing the number of copies of Hungarian newspapers and periodicals;
(e) Reducing the number of imported Hungarian books; completely disallowing the import of Hungarian books published in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and other countries of the world; individual ordering of books from the West is hindered by the customs office. This is contrary to the spirit of the Helsinki Accord.
(f) Increasing the price of imported books from Hungary by about 53
per cent;
  (g) Restricting Hungarian popular education;
  (h) Postponing the creation of an independent Hungarian scientific institution of the social sciences in the republic.

3.) ECONOMY
  (a) Uneven developing of the predominantly Hungarian areas;
  (b) Badly organized industrialization of these areas to increase the assimilation of Hungarians;
  (c) Insufficient training for Hungarian skilled tradesmen in these areas;
  (d) Hard circumstances forcing the citizens of Hungarian origin to seek work outside their districts;
  (e) Unfavorable social composition of the Hungarian inhabitants;

4.) POLITICAL LIFE
  (a) Non-recognition of the Hungarian minority’s collective political rights;
  (b) Exclusion of the Czecho-Slovakian Hungarian workers’ Cultural Association (CSEMADOK) from the Slovak National Front;
  (c) Improper social composition of the Hungarian minority delegates in the various elected bodies;
  (d) Discontinuation of the ministerial function for the observation of nationality affairs;
  (e) Failing to set up those organs within the state machinery, which could ensure the assertion of nationality rights.

The above-listed grievances were taken from a 1979 memorial which the oppressed Slovakian intelligentsia had sent to the West through secret channels.

The police started hunting for other copies of the memorial, and arrested many Hungarians while searching their homes.

The second part of the memorial gave concrete suggestions (meant for President Husak) as to how the existing grievances could be remedied.

1.) INEDUCATION
  (a) Slovakian Hungarian youth should be given the opportunity to educate themselves in their mother tongue, from babies nurseries and nursery schools upward to secondary schools and trade schools, especially in those trades which are predominant in the Hungarian areas.
  (b) Students of Hungarian nationality should be admitted in greater numbers to college and university faculties (by 250 per cent), and especially medicine (300 per cent), law (400 per cent), economy (500 per cent) so that their number be in proportion with the total Hungarian population of the republic (relative to the other nationalities).
(c) Hungarian-language education at the Agricultural College of Nyitra, and at the Veterinarian Medicine School of Kassa (Kosice) should be assured. The number of Hungarian students of these faculties should be increased by about 300 per cent.

(d) Hungarian-language trade practice should be assured as well as the right to take the examinations in the Hungarian language at the Komensky University of Bratislava, and the chemical and technological faculty of the P. J. Safarik University of Kosice (Kassa); the architectural, mechanical, chemical, electrical engineering faculties of the Slovak Polytechnical School; and the mechanical engineering faculty of the Polytechnical School of Kassa.

(e) A Hungarian Teachers College should be set up at Bratislava, for training primary and secondary school teachers.

(f) A guarantee should be given that further attempts will not be made to change the language of education to Slovak in the Hungarian-language schools.

(g) Citizens of Hungarian nationality be allowed to educate themselves at any colleges and universities of the Hungarian People’s Republic, especially in social sciences and various branches of technology that are directly related to the industries of the predominantly Hungarian areas.

2.) IN CULTURE

(a) For the citizens of Hungarian nationality the cultural outlet should not be restricted to literature and amateur ensembles, but should be expanded along professional lines as well.

(b) A permanent Hungarian theater should be founded in Bratislava for the improvement of Hungarian dramatic art.

(c) Popular Hungarian-language education for the masses should be improved and expanded, to ensure variety, and allow the cultural life of the Hungarian minority to become manifold. The Central Nationality Department in Bratislava should be enlarged, and it should have a branch office in each district.

(d) A Hungarian Cultural Center should be established for the cultivation of the fine arts, and music at the professional level. Local as well as larger-scale cultural activities should be given better publicity and financial assistance; the variety and number of newly published books should be increased. The number of special editors at the Madach Book Publisher should be enlarged.

(f) Besides a Hungarian literary periodical, other independently edited culture and social sciences-related periodicals should also be published, for the propagation of scientific and technical knowledge.
(g) An independent Hungarian weekly should be published.
(h) Instead of the low educational quality and infrequently published district papers, there should be regularly published semi-monthly papers: Two such papers for the Western Slovakian district; one for the Central Slovakian district; and one for the Eastern Slovakian district.
(i) The Bratislava television station should telecast some Hungarian programs.
(j) An independent scientific institution containing a Social Sciences Department should be set up for the examination of Hungarian minority life. The staff members of this institution should be mostly Hungarians.

3.) **POLITICAL LIFE**
(a) Let the CSEMADOK belong to the national Front again.
(b) Let some of the secretaries of state, and deputy ministers be chosen from among the rows of the nationalities, especially in the fields of education, culture, health care, agriculture and food production, industry, and architecture.
(c) Appeals of the nationality representatives should not be viewed as an anti-state act.
(d) Nationality Councils should be set up at the district level also, and most of its staff members should originate from the nationalities.
(e) In the mixed nationality districts and towns, and the Nationality Committees of the districts separate nationality departments should be opened mainly in the area of education, culture and health care.
(f) The citizens of non-Czech and non-Slovak nationality (especially Hungarians and Ruthenians) be allowed to use their own languages in official matters, in spoken as well as written form, in the mixed-nationality districts as well as at the offices of the state and the party centers.
(g) In the villages and towns, bilinguality should be obligatory at the areas of mixed nationality.

This memorial was formulated by the Committee for Protecting the Rights of the Hungarian Nationality within the Czecho-Slovak Federated Republic.

**Hungary and the World**

The following study of István Bibó, State Minister in Imre Nagy’s Revolutionary Government, was published on September 8, 1957, in the
Viennese newspaper, Die Presse. In an introduction to the article, the Editor-in-Chief stated that Bibó had written the essay after he was arrested and the manuscript had been brought out of Hungary by an Asian diplomat. Die Presse also added that Bibó had asked to have the article published even if publication endangered him personally. In Hungarian it was published in the Irodalmi Ujság (Literary Gazette), official organ of the Hungarian Writers’ Association Abroad, London, on November 15, 1957.

The Situation in Hungary has become an International Scandal

The situation of Hungary is a scandal for the Western world. For almost ten years the Western world has maintained that the East-European countries object to the single-party governments imposed on them by the Soviet Union, governments they did not choose or desire. Further, for almost ten years, these countries themselves have been fed with the hope that, sooner or later, they would arrive at some sort of a different self-determined form of government. The Western world did not promise to start an atomic war in their interest, nor did it call on them foolishly to take up arms. Their encouragements, however, did say that if ever the international political situation and the attitude of these peoples justify it, the Western world will use all its economic, political and moral weight to bring these issues up for consideration and a satisfactory solution. The Hungarian Revolution brought about all the requisite conditions and legal claims.

Post festa, it has become fashionable both from the left and the right to be sorry that the Hungarian Revolution followed its foolhardy impetus, and impetus by which it surpassed, for example, the Polish actions. There is not much point in being sorry, especially so because the Polish and Hungarian issues are related and reciprocal. Precisely because of the consternation of the Hungarian issued cause, the Poles could make a stand and go no further. In addition, the impetus of the Hungarian Revolution was not caused by foolhardiness, but ignited by the opposition of the State bureaucracy, the bloodthirsty stubbornness of the Security Police. And yet, this Revolution, despite its having been unorganized and unprepared, and an answer to senseless bloodshed, remained astonishingly sober, humane and temperate. If, at a later date, it was declared hopeless, it certainly did not become so by foolhardiness, but by having been abandoned.

A bigger uprising than this one, better armed, with more warriors and more victims, might break out in Eastern Europe. However, there is very little possibility there will be another country that will produce such perfect legal, political and moral cause, erasing hatred,
oppression, bureaucratic dictatorship, putting into power an out-and-
out Communist who, by taking into account the Communist Party’s
loss of moral and political prestige in Hungary, accepted a
parliamentary democracy based on multi-party system, and who stated
that his country wished to remain outside of any military blocs.

What else is needed, if all this was not enough to forcibly call a great
power conference which, by giving sufficient guarantees to the Soviet Union,
could bargain for the freedom and independence of Hungary?

The most important feature of the last 150, or rather 50 years of political
evolution is the realization, slowly but steadily gaining ground in the
progressive world and enriched by blunders and relapses but nonetheless
hardened in the fire of two world wars, that in a period of democratic public
opinion the only possible policy is a moral and principled one, which is, in
addition, the only fruitful and realistic policy. The gravest consequences the
Western world must face as a result of the defeat of the Hungarian
Revolution are that a ten-year-long policy and propaganda referring to
principles and morals can now be contested not only in terms of its
effectiveness and true meaning, but in terms of its honesty as well.

The Hungarian issue, however, is also a scandal for the Communist bloc. Ever since 1953 the leaders of the Soviet Union and Communist philosophers
have striven, and not without some success, to wind up the problems of so-
called Stalinism. Actually, it is more correct to speak of Stalinist political
practice since there is no question of a new ideology which we can dig up
from Stalin’s theoretical or economic works, nor of simple tactical or
technical errors. Only a coherent system of cruel and merciless practice,
remorselessly and indiscriminately used for the purpose of establishing a
Communist society, exists.

Lenin and Marx already had stated there were no absolute values for
human deeds, yet both supposed that correctly- i.e. objectively-assessed
relations of interest indicated a direction. Stalin and his disciples, however,
narrowed this down to the interests of the working class and the aim of
achieving a Communist society, and the latter attributable to the sheer will of
the leaders, or the leader, of the struggle. Thus, those tactical viewpoints
subject to changes based on mood or mistakes or changes of opinion, became
a directive and assumed legality. As a result, the proletarian dictatorship
which Marx meant to be brief and transitory and Lenin thought to make last
longer, instead of gradually yielding ground to more democratic methods,
became a permanent form of government simply by declaring itself to be the
supreme form of democracy, and for a long time to come.

According to the eternal rules of absolute power, however, this fact
disturbed the normal functioning of precisely those spheres of interest which
were meant to set an example for proper communal and individual behavior.
The huge and terrifying apparatus set up to break the “enemy” has, by following its own rules, not diminished the number of the enemy. On the contrary, it has made more enemies and by the use of terror and hatred has shortly turned the entire population into an enemy. Later, the same apparatus was used, most conveniently, to subdue opposition within the Party, and also to eliminate all popular rivals, thus succeeding in undermining intra-Party democracy and Communist morality.

When, after Stalin’s death, his successors began to liberalize Stalinist political practices, and later frustrated any further attempts at establishing personal power, and the 20th Congress broke with a few characteristically Stalinist theses and began to criticize Stalin personally, some Communists cherished the hope that there were forces in the Soviet Union, and primarily in the Communist Party there, that were able to turn back to a more correct road building Socialism.

This hope, however, was mortally wounded by the events of November 4, and afterwards, in Hungary. What the real reason for the Soviet action was — a realistic assessment of the situation caused by the attack on Suez, or the consternation caused by the Hungarian situation itself — we do not know. One thing is sure: the realistic assessment proved to be false and the consternation was exaggerated, because free development of the Hungarian situation would quickly have shown that not only was it harmless to the cause of Socialism, but that, in fact, it could have served as an example for it. At the time of the Soviet intervention, the situation had already begun to clear. Mob rule ceased, serious and authoritative voices were heard in defense of Socialist achievements, and a national coalition government was formed which had no reason whatever for following rightist zeal or weakness. Anyone who witnessed, or came in touch with the resistance after the defeat of the Revolution, even in the slightest degree, must admit willy nilly, at least to himself, that what had been destroyed by Soviet tanks, had been the beginning of one of the most exciting Socialist experiments of this century. And destroy it they did, and helped to enforce something that resembles something else, but surely not a society building the future.

The present Hungarian regime leans on a bureaucracy filled with inferiority complexes, frustrated, and by hook or by crook, defending itself against its enemies, the very same youth, workers and intellectuals. There have fought writers, workers, and students. These, however, never achieved any results, but what is more important, they didn’t call themselves revolutionaries or Socialists either. All this is the new Hungarian Communist Party, a Communist Party unparalleled in history.

So far, the basic structure of each Communist Party has been as follows.
It had an intermost core of passionate, dedicated, absolutely self-sacrificing men of iron will. These were surrounded by less intelligent but extremely well-disciplined group of people who were masters in the ways and means of ruthlessly taking and maintaining power. Then there came the enthusiastic mass of believers, mostly workers, who diligently participated in propaganda and administrative work, and finally, after assuming power, there came the outermost layer, the opportunists and bureaucrats who used the Party primarily for their own purposes.

The center of gravity of the Hungarian Party has been shifted to this strata. The General Staff has shrunk to a small group who either state their intentions in a round-about way, or cynically and openly avow them. Around them the technicians of power cavort and try to navigate between the equally dangerous and equally ineffective methods of brutality or slackness. For them, the working masses have ceased to exist. Only the outermost circle exists, that of Party officials afraid for their jobs and positions. There has not been any Communist Party in the world with such a low proportion of workers in it — a Party composed chiefly of bureaucrats and armed militia confronting a united block of workers.

The country itself, thus far feeling helpless against organized power, is now able to realize that this power is completely isolated and is supported by nothing more than foreign aid. This is all a constant source of irritation to everyone who takes Communism seriously, or at least to whom Communism means more than arbitrary power, to people who profess a certain creed. All the Communist Parties in the world make the greatest efforts to seek their own particular roads to Socialism, in a way that permits them nonetheless to remain within Marxist-Leninist ideology, which they believe uneasily doled-out concessions and rigid Stalinist orthodoxy, while the maintenance of the Hungarian regime at all costs is at least as bad an example as letting Hungary out of the bloc would have been, which the Soviet Union tried to avoid precisely because of the other bloc countries.

In the non-Communist world, on the other hand, the organization of sympathizers, into which much work has been put, shows the scars and signs of decay. The peace, women and youth movements, embodiments of great quantities of idealistic enthusiasm, have joined such forces as the intellectuals, workers and youth, upon whom Communism has primarily relied. In a single word, the Soviet action in Hungary, meant to avoid surrendering a position, has since become a constant danger to every situation the Communists have to face.

Hungary’s present situation deals a body-blow to all proponents of the ‘Third Road’ policy.* Those countries, groups and individuals — India and
other political responsible Asian nations, all Socialist and Social-Democratic Parties and many other political groups — believe that a world divided between capitalist and Communist ideologies is a world fighting phantoms and creating artificial problems. Amidst these phantoms stands the prejudice shared by orthodox capitalists and Communists alike: that socialism, i.e., a society free of exploitation, cannot be achieved without first discarding Western concepts of freedom for a long period of time.

Opposing this view are all those third-rolloers (taking what is actually the only possible road) who believe that Socialism’s aim — the elimination of exploitation — is but one stage in mankind’s evolution toward other freedoms, and thus, that the fight against exploitation cannot mean or even tolerate repudiation of the political and social freedoms previously discussed. The entire structure of freedom, which makes the Western world so humane and preferable despite its shortcoming-separation of powers, free election in a multi-party system, human rights, particularly freedom of the press and public opinion, judiciary independence and a constitutional State — is not merely a ‘bourgeois’ superstructure. It is simply an objective technique, the most highly-developed and superior technique, of freedom, and its superiority must be acknowledged sooner or later and can be without endangering the cause of Socialism.

It was during the Hungarian Revolution, if anywhere and ever, that a constructive third road policy was about to be born. The Revolution’s prime movers had no intentions of destroying Socialism’s real achievements, and they had the strength to prevent such attempts. They simply could no longer tolerate the techniques and results of oppression, the violence and lies that warped every facet of life, and turned toward those social techniques which give institutional guarantees against such practices.

* Under the term ‘Third Road’ Mr. Bibo means that camp of neutral states which are between the two opposite parties, i.e. the Soviets and the Western powers but sometimes he applied it to the ‘middle-of-the-road’ policy too.

During the early days of the Revolution the question of how to achieve this goal was not clarified, but the fact that this was the aim was perfectly clear. In fact, shortly after the Revolution’s defeat, the nation’s almost homogeneous public opinion crystallized its position with regard to the method by which Socialism could be maintained, yet combined with Western techniques of freedom: by means of multi-party system limited to those parties accepting a common platform of Socialism.

If with such sacrifice, effort and determination the Hungarian experiment
failed, if the Soviet Union found it worth using military force to return a country to the abandoned road of a one party system maintained by outside force, and in view of the fact that the Indian mediation attempt proved a fiasco, one is faced with a frightful conclusion that a middle-of-the-road policy is impossible in practice and, therefore, that the world’s division into two camps, its complete polarization both in terms of power and moral consciousness, is necessary and inevitable.

The above statement leads to a discussion of the gravest danger, the danger to world peace, for Hungary’s present situation leaves the possibility of world peace open to serious question. The Hungarian crisis creates a horrifying parallel between the present and the period just before World War II, and makes it possible that the crushing of the Hungarian Revolt will be the last act preceding the outbreak of the third World War, just as the abandonment of Czechoslovakia preceded the outbreak of the second. This possibility is the result of the facts. First, that a significant part of the Western world drew one major conclusion from the Hungarian issue: it proved that Stalinism not only had been revived, but never had ceased to exist, and that, after all, it is Communism’s natural and only possible form. Second, that a significant part of the Communist world reached the same conclusion (that Stalinism is Communism’s natural and only possible form) but for the opposite reason: that Stalin was basically right, and that only his methods can hold the Communist camp together. The peaceful co-existence of the most diverse political, social and economic systems is possible, but not among partners who do not share a belief in certain basic moral principles. It is true that Stalin – as opposed to Hitler – does not seem to have wanted to become entangled in a World War. However, his policy made it impossible, for either himself or his opponents to realistically estimate the motives and intentions of the others. In such a situation, one side sometimes takes the other’s lies at face value, and at other times does not believe the truth. Since the other side is not believed to have any ethical motives, it sometimes appears to be a craven coward while at other times it appears wantonly aggressive. Thus, sooner or later a specific situation develops in which both sides’ mutual and complete misunderstanding of the other’s intentions degenerates into a war – in this a world, atomic war – no matter how much both fear it.

This is the explanation and intended interpretation of the somewhat daring statement made above, asserting that the present state of the Hungarian issue involves the danger of the Hungarian issue (although the East European countries have had the privilege of sparking world wars). Rather, it is meant that if it is true that the Hungarian situation has become irremediable, then, there are indeed organic obstacles which prevent the world powers from
speaking the same language and understanding each other. If this is so, the realization that an atomic war is lunacy and means suicide is not enough to provide adequate protection against it.

Is the situation really this grave, and is there really no solution for the Hungarian problem and no way out of world politic’s dead-end street? The balance sheet of the present world situation certainly seems to indicate that. Yet, at each historical moment, the balance sheet is based not only on the factual circumstances, but also on the realistic possibilities inherent in the situation, possibilities whose exploration is not assured but is dependent on the extent of effort and goodwill. If we tally these possibilities, the outlook for the Hungarian issue and for the international political situation appears more promising than at any time during the last ten years.

The Tragic Fate of Hungary

American Hungarian Federation Newsletter, June, 1980.

On the 60th Anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon

Trianon and its Consequences

The Treaty of Trianon, which was forced upon Hungary sixty years ago in June, 1920, was by far the most drastic of all the peace treaties concluding the First World War. The shortsightedness of the peacemakers not only resulted in tragedy for the Hungarian state, which had existed for a thousand years and served as Western Europe’s outpost defending it against the onslaught of invaders from the East, but also had grave consequences for all of Europe which eventually affected the United States. Because of the historical significance of the Treaty of Trianon for Americans and Hungarians alike, the American Hungarian Federation takes this opportunity to recall the Treaty’s devastating impact on its sixtieth Anniversary.

At the end of World War I the victorious Allied and Associated Powers dismembered the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by creating a number of so-called “successor states.” The idea was to replace the multi-national monarchy with smaller national states, who would jealously guard their newly won independence and thereby prevent a possible future expansion of Germany into East-Central Europe. History was to prove twenty years later that the planners had deluded themselves. Instead of ensuring peace for generations to come, they created a settlement that carried within itself the
seed of two future wars—the Second World War and the Cold War. The very pillars of the new system, the “successor states”, were the least capable of checking Nazi aggression. Unwilling to satisfy the aspirations of their inordinately large percentage of national minorities, and concerned with preserving their territorial gains, they fell an easy prey to Hitler’s divide and conquer strategy without offering any significant resistance. Together with the greatly weakened and separated Austria and Hungary, the “successor states” became pawns on the chessboard of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

The dismemberment of Hungary

Beyond doubt the Treaty of Trianon was the most severe of all post-War treaties. Before the war Hungary had a territory of 125,600 square miles. By the terms of the treaty she lost 89,700 square miles, or 71.4 per cent of her former territory. Of her population of almost 21 million, 63.6 per cent was detached, including 3.5 million Hungarians (Magyars). The inhabitants of dismembered Hungary numbered only 7.6 million on a territory of 35,900 square miles. Rumania alone received 39,800 square miles, or more than what was left to Hungary. Czechoslovakia was presented with 23,800 square miles, and Yugoslavia with a similar slice, including Croatia, which for 800 years stood in a federal relation with Hungary. Even Austria was allotted 1,500 square miles of Western Hungary.

By comparison, the Treaty of Versailles detached from Germany no more than 13 per cent of its territory and 9.5 per cent of its population. (The Peace of Frankfurt ending the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 had cost France a mere 2.6 per cent of her territory and 4.1 per cent of her population.) Having decreed—at the instigation of a few power-Hungary nationalists—that a multinational state such as Austria-Hungary was not worthy of having a life of its own, the victors of World War I set up states such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, which were as many reproductions of the old Empire, containing as many mixed nationalities.

British historian Alfred Cobban observed astutely in his book National Self-Determination (1945): “It was ironic that a settlement supposed to have been largely determined by the principle of nationality should have produced a state like Czechoslovakia, with minorities amounting to 34.7 per cent of its population, quite apart from the question of the doubtful identity of nationality between Czechs and Slovaks. Poland was not much better off, with minorities amounting to 30.4 per cent, or Rumania, with 25 per cent.”

Altogether the “successor states” found themselves with 16 million persons belonging to national minorities, out of a total population of 42 million, while Hungary’s new borders were far more restricted than the reach of her nationality. According to Charles Seymour, American delegate to the
Peace Conference, the boundaries of the successor states did not even “roughly” correspond with the ethnic or linguistic line. In short, national self determination was granted to all, but denied to the Hungarians.

A great deal was alleged about the treatment of the national minorities in Hungary. However, compared to the situation prevalent in the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the lot of the new national minorities was (and continues to be) miserable. “Is it not scandalous — exclaimed Sir Robert Gower, member of the House of Commons in Britain some 15 years after the peace settlement — that a European reconstruction, loudly hailed as one that was going to liberate the national minorities, should have resulted in their persecution, the severity of which is such that there is no parallel to it to be found in the ancient Kingdom of Hungary, where the nationalities had been treated with infinitely more benevolence.”

Why Hungary was dismembered at Trianon

Although Hungary was labeled as one of the culprits of war and oppressor of nationalities, it is beyond dispute that the Prime Minister of Hungary, Count Stephen Tisza, strived hard to prevent the outbreak of war. In fact, he was the only member of the Austro-Hungarian Joint Ministerial Council for Common Affairs who from the first day of the crisis had consistently opposed the war. Yet, in the end it was Hungary which was most severely punished. Furthermore, none of the inhabitants of Hungary — not even the allegedly oppressed nationalities — were given the right to decide their fate. When the Hungarian Peace Delegation was handed the dictated terms of the treaty for signature, the chief of the delegation suggested that in accordance with the principle of self-determination the population affected by the treaty ought to be consulted through plebiscites. “Ask the peoples themselves”, exclaimed Count Albert Apponyi to the assembled delegates of the victors, “we will accept their verdict.” This indeed, would have been entirely consistent with the Wilsonian idea of self-determination. Why was it then not employed? The reason was revealed bluntly in the La Paix (Peace) by Andre Tradieu — who was to become Prime Minister of France twice between the wars — in the following term: “We had to choose between organizing plebiscites or creating Czechoslovakia.”

Perhaps the most important reason was that by the time the peacemakers turned to the treaty with Hungary they were bored with the entire process. In the word of one of the participants: “I am reliably informed that the delegates, and particularly the representatives of the
Western Powers, are frightfully bored with the whole Peace Conference...E specially since we presented our notes and memoranda they have begun to realize that the Hungarian question should be examined from many angles for which they have neither time nor patience.” And so, despite the pleas of the Hungarians, the treaty had to be signed, even though it had been drafted, down to its most minute details, long before the opening of the Peace Conference, and of course with the full complicity of its future beneficiaries.

It is all the more important, to acknowledge the attitude of the Chief Delegate of the Union of South Africa, General Smuts (later Prime Minister), who demanded that in connection with the proposed dismemberment of Hungary plebiscites be held in Transylvania, Slovakia, Ruthenia, and Croatia, Slavonia, on the strength of the argument that Germany had been accorded the same right with regard to Schleswig-Holstein, Silesia, East-Prussia, and Saarland. At first a lone voice, he was later supported by the other British Dominions, as well as by Japan, Poland and Italy. The fear of the plebiscite, however, prevailed against them and the plebiscites were denied. An ominous denial, because some years later the Swiss historian and expert on minority affairs, Aldo Dami, produced a brilliant formulation of the truth by saying: “A plebiscite refused is a plebiscite taken in fact.”

The Treaty of Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920. One year later, on June 7, 1921, the Reverend Father Weterle (for many years the protesting voice of Alsace in the German Imperial Parliament) declared in the French National Assembly: “I am profoundly convinced that had plebiscites been held, neither the Serbs nor the Rumanians would have received more than one-third of the vote cast...People had been pushed against their wifi. There can be no doubt about that.” Father Weterle spoke from experience; after all, the Alsatians, although of Germanic origin and language, desired to be French. The sentiment was similar to that of the Wends and Slovenes of Hungary’s Murakoz region. Despite being Slays by origin and language, these two ethnic groups requested – without success – to be allowed to remain with Hungary in 1919. As events proved later, it would have been advantageous also for the Croats and Slovaks to be consulted before they were made to merge in one state with the Serbs and Czechs, respectively. That they were unhappy with the new arrangement became evident when the opportunity presented itself during the course of World War II; both nationalities were quick to declare their independence from the artificially created “successor state.”
**The Injustice continues**

The Paris Peace Conference confused the concept of a people’s right to self-determination with the principle of defining nationality on a linguistic basis. The two are by no means identical; an ethnic group may well decide to prefer belonging to a national sovereignty whose majority is linguistically different than its own. The Treaty of Trianon did in fact flout both principles by cutting off large blocs of purely Magyar-inhabited territories and awarding them to Hungary’s neighbors for economic or strategic considerations. “The borders drawn at Trianon”, asserts Aldo Dami, “excluded from Hungary a first zone of Hungarian territories, plus a second zone inhabited by non-Magyars whose interests were, however, so closely entwined with those of Hungary that there could have been no doubt of their decision, had they been consulted. Hence, the Peace of Trianon is based neither on ethnography nor on popular sentiment, nor even on the interests of the populations—which the latter are sure to know best.”

Why was all this done? Why did the Treaty of Trianon endorse and legalize occupations by conquest, achieved after the cessation of general hostilities, by the armed forces of the “successor states” in stark violation of the armistice agreements concluded with the Allied and Associated Powers? Why was all this injustice sanctioned for the benefit of three countries whose leaders, in order to better divide among themselves the prospective spoils of Austria-Hungary, had in 1917 formed a conspiracy of intrigues to achieve their goal?

The answer may lie in the French Premier Clemenceau’s ten cynical words: “(The) peace treaties are yet another means to continue the war.”

Significantly the United States Congress refused to recognize and sign the Treaty of Trianon. In fact, America, in order to signify its disapproval more markedly, concluded a separate peace with Hungary on August 29, 1920.

Yet, even now, 60 years later, justice has not been done to Hungary. Attempts to revise the borders drawn at Trianon, by establishing them on a more equitable basis, have been in vain. The only frontier revisions, performed by the Axis Powers during World War II, were later annulled by the new peace treaties. And unlike those in 1919-1920, the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 did not even stipulate the protection of national minorities. Hundreds of thousands of Hungarians have been expelled already from the land where they were born and where they lived. Millions of others are suffering the fate of oppressed minorities. Their case has been presented repeatedly to the

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Sándor A. Kostya was born in Kassa, Hungary on February 26, 1910. After the Trianon Peace Agreement, Kassa became part of the newly created political entity of Czechoslovakia. His early schooling was partly done under the new Czecho slovakian educational system, and partly in Hungary at the Highschool of St. Stephen at Kalocsa, where he graduated. Advanced academic education was received at universities in Budapest and Szeged. Majoring in Hungarian Literature and Latin, he received his Diploma of Education in 1934 from the Pázmány Peter University. In 1936, the Doctorate of Scholastic Philosophy was conferred on him by the University of Szeged. After 1936 until the Second World War he taught Hungarian and Latin Language and literature at Kalocsa and Pécs. During the war, he served as a noncommissioned officer in the reserves. After the war in 1947, the new Hungarian Communist Government revoked the licenses of Catholic Separate School teachers and prevented them from teaching. From 1947 until the Hungarian Revolution he had to find menial employment to support himself and his family. The 1956 Revolution brought him back into public view, when he was elected as President of the Revolutionary Council of Jozsefvaros district in
Budapest. The Soviet intervention and subsequent defeat of the Revolution forced him and his family to leave Hungary and immigrate to Canada. After the initial difficulties of searching out a living and learning a new language, he went on to study at the University de Montreal Faculte des lettres. There he received his MA. for his thesis “L’Importance Litteraire et Politique du Panslavism” in 1964. Afterwards he taught latin in Canadian high schools. During this time he established the Association of Hungarian Teachers in Canada. He successfully formulated and taught from 1965 on a Hungarian Language and Literature course which was accepted as a credit program by universities. The Arpád Academy of Cleveland in 1980 awarded him a gold medal for his literary work titled “Pan-Slavism”. Presently he serves on the Board of Directors of the Toronto Hungarian Cultural Centre, where he is also the Editor of the “Kronika”, a monthly literary magazine. He is a member of the Arpad Acaderny, Cleveland, the International P.E.N. Club, and the Canadian Hungarian Authors Association, Toronto

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Thim, József, historian
Tisza, István(1861-1918)
Tiso, Jozef(1887-1947) Slovak president

Sz
Széchenyi, István (1791-1860)
Szekfű, Gyula(1883-1955) historian
Szemere, Bertalan (18 12-1869)

U
Ugron, Gábor(1847-1911) M.P. writer, publicist

V
Valyi, András, University prof. of Budapest
Versailles Peace Treaty
Világos - capitulation
Vienna Conference (1938.XI.2.)

W
Werbőczy, István (?-1541)
Wesselényi, Miklós (1796-1850)
Wilson, Wroodrow (1856-1924)
Map showing the location of the Hungarians within the Kingdom at the time of the Treaty of Trianon was drawn up.