Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary

Document 1
(Excerpt)

Secret T Minutes 15

July 31, 1942

Present:
Mr. Isaiah Bowman, presiding
Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Mr. John V. A. MacMurray
Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick
Mr. Leo Pasvolsky
Mr. Philip Mosely
Mr. Easton Rothwell

(...) Slovak-Hungarian Frontier

Mr. Mosely introduced the discussion of the Slovak-Hungarian frontier by commenting upon the following documents made available to the committee:

1. Alternative Territorial Solutions. Secret

2. Historical Outline, 1918-1939.

3. The American Position on the Northern Boundary of Hungary in

1919.

4. The American Position on the Northern Boundary of Hungary in

1920. Secret

5. Hungarian Census of 1910

6. Analysis of Czechoslovak Census of 1930. 7. Tentative Maps: Population by Native Language, 1910; Population

by Nationality, 1930.*

(Mr. Bowman requested that a copy of these documents be made available to Mr. Berle, who was not present.)

Mr. Mosely referred to the map showing the disputed frontier area, and commented upon the boundary established by the Vienna Award of November 2, 1938, by which Hungary received approximately 12,000 square kilometers and a population of 1,027,000, including many non- Magyars. He also discussed the boundary established by the Hungari- an-Slovak Protocol of April 3,1939, under which Hungary annexed part of Eastern Slovakia, in addition to obtaining certain rectifications of the Vienna line and annexing Ruthenia. The ethnic line would, he said, run somewhere between the 1937 and 1939 boundaries. Beginning at the west, the Grosse Schuett was preponderantly Magyar, although a bridgehead was left to Slovakia. Farther to the east the Slovakia were to be found south of the 1939 frontier in relatively 1arge numbers. According to the figures of the 1930 Czech census, the cities of Losonc, Rimaszombat, Rozsnyó, Kassa, Ungvar, and Munkács would all return to Slovakia for ethnic reasons.

If the frontier were drawn on ethnic lines, leaving roughly equal numbers on either side of the frontier the result would be to improve slightly Hungarian transportation facilities, without seriously interfer- ing with those of Czechoslovakia. From the standpoint of security, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be deprived of any substantial advantages of terrain.

Mr. Bowman said that Mr. Mosely's summary had clearly outlined the problem and that the first item to be discussed was the general question of whether a substantial number of people could be transferred from one state to another. Mr. Armstrong believed that this question should be considered in the light of Point Two of the Atlantic Declara- tion, stating that, "They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."** He thought it was necessary to clarify how Point Two would affect changes of territory, either on the side of the allies or that of the enemy.

_____________________________

* All significant statements of the listed documents are contained in Part II, Chapter II, 1-2, and 4-5 of this volume.

** Dénes Halmosy, Nemzetközi szerzõdések 1918-1945 (Budapest, 1983), 526-527 . Did it mean a resort to plebiscites or some other means for express- ing self-determination?

Self-Determination

The discussion continued on the subject of self-determination. Mr. Pasvolsky said that it would be necessary to translate Point Two into machinery for its fulfillment, and this would constitute one of the real problems of the territorial subcommittee. Mr. Bowman said that if the implementation of Point Two were not subject to discussion in the territorial subcommittee, the committee had better disband. The Atlantic Declaration was described by Mr. Armstrong as, in a sense, a reply to territorial changes forced upon Europe by the Axis. Mr. Bowman agreed, adding that it was necessarily general in statement. Mr. Pasvolsky said that the specific meaning of the postulates set forth in the Atlantic Declaration were left to others, including this committee, to decide.

Commitments

Mr. Armstrong said that promises or commitments more specific than those of the Atlantic Charter had presumably been made by the United States and its allies to various peoples. These commitments should be analyzed, he thought, as a means of knowing what territorial adjustments would be compatible with promises already made. Mr. Pasvolsky explained that promises already made. Mr. Pasvolsky explained that a careful compilation of commitments had been made by the research staff, and that all those pertaining to each problem should be brought together when that area was being studied. He went on to say that the official position of the United States has been to make no commitments with respect to frontiers and to accept none made by other nations. Mr. Mosely commented that, in recognizing the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile, the American Government had specifically refrained from recognizing the pre-Munich frontiers of that state. (...)

x x x SLOVAK-HUNGARIAN FRONTIER

Preliminary discussion was invited upon the problem of the Slovak- Hungarian frontier. The boundaries established by the Vienna Award of November 2,1938 and by the subsequent Hungarian-Slovak protocol of April 3, 1939 were shown to have included within Hungary all of Ruthenia, a portion of eastern Slovakia, and extensive areas in south portion of eastern Slovakia, and extensive areas in southern S1ovakia, whose populations included many non-Magyars. The ethnic line would run somewhere between the 1937 and 1939 boundaries. If the frontier were drawn on an ethnic basis, Hungarian transportation facilities would be slightly improved, without seriously dislocating those of Czechoslovakia. From the standpoint of security, neither Czechoslova- kia nor Hungary would gain any substantial advantages of terrain.

A minimum of 600,000 Magyars was said to reside within the contested area, according to the 1930 census.

Nevertheless, the preponderantly Slovak areas could be served out without preventing the transfer to Hungary of approximately 400,000 Magyars.

Principles and Procedures of Territorial Adjustment

Point Two of the Atlantic Declaration, stating the right of territorial self-determination, was thought to impose broad restrictions upon extensive boundary adjustments, although the specific application of this and other policies of the Declaration was regarded as subject to inquiry and deliberation.

Commitments made to the various states were regarded as placing another possible limit upon boundary adjustment. It was explained, however, that the official policy of the United States has been to make no commitments with respect to boundaries and to recognize none made elsewhere.

Box 59

Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary