A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war

CHAPTER VI

KURUC WARFARE IN 1703-1711

Habsburg diplomacy did not exploit the great opportunities created by Montecuccoli's victory over the Turks at St. Gotthard. The Treaty of Vasvar (1664) allowed the Turks to keep possession of their new conquests, Nagyvarad (Grosswardein) and Ersekujvar (Neuhausel), and to retain suzerainty over Transylvania. Emperor Leopold ( 1657-1705) found justification for accepting the unfavorable terms of the treaty in the "unpredictable situation in the west, the unrest in Hungary and Transylvania, and the economic crisis in the empire."/1/

The "unpredictable situation" in the west was created by the diplomacy of Louis XIV ( 1643-1715) who sought to extend France's power at the expense of the Spanish Habsburgs in the Netherlands. Louis did not make a secret of this goal: he openly claimed the territory as his wife's dowry upon the death of her father, Philip IV of Spain./2/ The uncertain element in the situation lay in the vacillating Austrian Habsburg policy of watching Louis XlV's preparations without deciding whether to oppose him or to join in the Spanish spoils./3/

The "unrest" in Hungary and Transylvania was caused by Montecuccoli's strategy which was a result of his unfortunate campaign in Transylvania,/4/ as well as of his acceptance of the terms included in the Treaty of Vasvar.

Finally, the economic crisis in the empire represented an illogical argument in the eyes of the Hungarians. Why did the economic crisis preclude an aggressive policy against the declining Ottoman Empire, yet allow positive involvement in a war in western Europe?

Thus, the more important members of the Hungarian aristocracy, now conspiring against Habsburg rule and encouraged by the French ambassador to Vienna, Sieur Nicholas Bretel de Gremonville, sought financial and armed support in the court of Louis XIV. It was naive, however, to believe that the Sun King

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would really support an anti-absolutist conspiracy of Hungarian nobles, while at the same time repressing the French estates with his harsh absolutism. His interest in the conspiracy was limited to the hope that an uprising in Hungary would keep portions of the Habsburg army away from the French frontier. In 1669, the conspirators fell victim to their own lack of secrecy and were exposed by traitors to the Habsburg authorities; they were promptly arrested, tried and executed. The Hungarian Constitution was suspended. The emperor appointed Johann Amprigen grand master of the Teutonic knights, governor of his "Hungarian province."

Habsburg absolutism poured troops into Hungary, and Germans replaced the garrisons of Hungarian soldiers. Hungary would have to pay the expenses of the military occupation. Therefore the Habsburg administration levied heavy direct and indirect (sales) taxes on the country. Since 40 per cent of the imperial income was spent on the maintenance of a luxurious court,/5/ the occupational forces were not paid regularly. The soldiers made up for their lost pay by looting Hungarian villages and cities. The Habsburg counter-reformation disregarded the rights of Hungarian Protestants and confiscated their churches and schools. Habsburg mercantilist policy accorded exclusive buying rights to the Orientalische Compagnie. Their monopoly forced the flourishing Hungarian animal husbandry and cattle trade into complete bankruptcy./6/ Additional bitterness was created by the company s exports of animals to Turkey also, which still occupied the larger part of Hungary.

In 1672, this general bitterness erupted into action. Now not only the aristocrats rebelled; overtaxed serfs, discharged soldiers and unemployed hajdus (cowboys) attacked the local representatives of Habsburg absolutism. The populations of villages, cities, and even Catholic Hungarians joined the revolt, defeated the Habsburg occupational army, and took control of the Hungarian highlands up to the Austrian frontiers.

The timing of the unorganized revolt was fortunate. Louis XIV began his "Dutch War" during the spring of the same year./7/ His successes frightened Leopold, whose advisors foresaw in Louis' attack the first step in the establishment of a universal empire. Leopold signed a military alliance treaty with enemies of France: the United Netherlands, the kingdom of Spain, the duchy of Lorraine./8/ This alliance and Leopold's participation in their 1673-74 campaigns against Louis XIV prevented Leopold from dispatching large forces against the Hungarian rebels. Yet, the rebellion could not succeed. The main reason was the rebels, inability to organize a centralized leadership and to unify their forces

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in a well prepared campaign. Thus, a stalemate developed between the Habsburg army and the Kuruc troops of Hungary./9/

The Peace of Nymwegen (1679) relieved Leopold's forces in the West, but the Bohemian peasant revolt (1680) prevented him from sending his forces against Hungary./10/ The peace party in the Viennese imperial court advocated a compromise with Hungary. In 1681 Leopold called the Hungarian estates, recognized the traditional liberties of the kingdom, and restored the office of palatine (viceroy). At the same time he granted religious freedom to Protestants.

The compromise divided the Hungarians. While upper class moderates accepted the compromise, Thokoly and his radical followers wanted to restore Hungary's complete sovereignty. Recognizing their inability to continue the war alone and realize their goal, Thokoly's group turned for support to the Turkish sultan. For the time being, it seemed to be the right policy. Since 1676 the grand vizier of the Turkish forces had been Kara Mustafa, who had previously planned the destruction of the Habsburg power during Turkey's war against Russia./11/ In 1682 a Turkish army invaded Northern Hungary and placed Thokoly on the throne of Northern Hungary as a vassal of Kara Mustafa. But Turkish patronage alienated many Hungarians; when in 1683 the main Turkish army tried without success to besiege Vienna, Thokoly found himself alone. The Turks retreated from Vienna. Indeed, they seemed ready to relinquish control over the whole of Hungary. The Habsburg army, which by 1684 had become part of the international army of the Holy League organized by Pope Innocent Xl, inflicted defeat after defeat upon the Turks. In 1686, the city of Buda was recaptured. In the following campaigns of 1689-99 the entire territory of Hungary was liberated from Turkish rule. The Ottoman Empire recognized the loss of its Hungarian conquests in the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. Thokoly and his small group of followers were pushed out of Hungary, whereupon they sought and found refuge in the Turkish court.

Emperor Leopold now controlled Hungary unconditionally. Although the Viennese court and the victorious generals refused to share the spoils of the great war of liberation with the Hungarians, their victory would have been doubtful without Hungarian sacrifices. The maintenance of the army during the liberation war cost 8,400,000 florins yearly. Subsidies paid to imperial allies added another 4 million florins to the expenses. For the years 1683-90, expenses amounted to 96 million florins. Hungary had to pay one-third of this amount(12), or 30 million florins. But "Hungary" meant only a few countries in Pannonia and in northwestern Hungary.

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The Hungarian Lowlands and the major part of Transylvania were under direct or indirect Turkish control, while in the northeastern highlands, Thokoly collected the taxes. The result of this heavy taxation was mass starvation, emigration (to Turkish-occupied territories), and a uniquely high rate of suicide. Palatine Eszterhazy, an absolutely loyal aristocrat, bitterly asked Leopold, "What is good for you in the liberation of our country if you will rule over deserted forests and mountains?" /13/ According to other eyewitnesses, looting and stealing by foreign mercenary soldiers caused losses in an amount larger than that collected in taxes. Equally great sacrifices were paid in blood by the Hungarians. In 1682 Leopold restored the formerly dissolved Hungarian army. From this time on, Hungarians provided a yearly average of 12-15,000 soldiers for the Habsburg armed forces, in addition to the noble insurrection, which was called up again and again, year after year./14/ Thus, Hungary paid dearly for its own liberation, and even after the war there was no end to the exploitation of the country. The Austrian, German, and Bohemian aristocrats, who were awarded with the estates of the "disloyal" Hungarian magnates, collected their dues from the bankrupt peasantry with no regard for the living conditions of the population.

Leopold used the exhaustion of the country for his own benefit to reintroduce Habsburg absolutism in Hungary. In 1687 he forced the estates to renounce their right to elect the king and accept the hereditary right of the Habsburgs. They also had to give up the "ius resistendi", the right to resist in case the king should violate the constitution (Golden Bull of 1222). In the last decade of the 17th century, Hungary, placed under virtual military occupation, was degraded to the rank of a province./15/ The Magyar regiments of the Habsburg army were again dissolved and the soldiers dismissed. Depopulated territories were repopulated within the framework of an official Habsburg settlement program, whereby the land was first awarded to foreign settlers rather than to the surviving Hungarian peasants. The settlers, mostly German, also numbered many Serbs, Slovaks, and even Italians among them. Bitterness among the Hungarian peasants and serfs became more and more acrid and resulted, after 1690, in almost yearly local revolts./16/ The violence, interestingly enough, was directed only against the imperial troops and not against the estate owners and landlords. The peasant troops, led mostly by impoverished nobles, directed their hatred toward the Habsburgs, who had caused such misery by depriving the Hungarians of their rights of freedom. The Hungarian aristocracy and county nobility themselves remained neutral in this struggle, as they probably did not see any hope for

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success. In addition, they were victims of the fear created by the Habsburg troops, who after defeating the rebels usually took a terrible vengeance on those who had had anything to do with the uprising. Still, the peasants persisted in the seemingly hopeless struggle, and the movement produced two leaders: Tamas Esze and Albert Kis, who with their natural talents for organization transformed the local peasant unrest into a nationwide freedom movement. In 1703 the peasant representatives decided to appeal for help to the richest landlord of Hungary, Ferenc Rakoczi.

Rakoczi was the offspring of highly-regarded, patriotic, aristocratic families. On his father's side, his ancestors were princes of Transylvania. His mother was the daughter of Peter Zrinyi, his uncle Miklos Zrinyi./17/ His stepfather was Imre Thokoly. In 1691, after capturing the fortress of Munkacs, the Habsburg army also captured Thokoly's stepson and took him hostage to Vienna. The Jesuits gave the young Rakoczi an excellent education.

Seemingly they also succeeded in making him a pious Catholic and, first and most importantly, a loyal subject of the Habsburg monarch./18/ In 1694 the Habsburgs judged him trustworthy enough to declare him legally an adult, give him back his formerly confiscated land estates, and appoint him high sheriff of Saros county in Hungary. He was only eighteen years old. In 1698, he settled on his estates in Hungary where he became acquainted with the strongly nationalistic high sheriff of Ungvar, Count Miklos Bercsenyi. This friendship became the turning point in Rakoczi's life. He grew interested in world politics as well as in domestic policy.

In the broader field of European politics, Louis XIV was still making news. Upon the death of Charles II (of Habsburg), King of Spain, he not only put his grandson, Philippe, on the Spanish throne in 1700, but also invaded the Spanish Netherlands. The stage was set for a new war against the Habsburgs. Louis, as in the past, sought allies in Poland, Hungary, and Turkey./19/ His ambassador to Vienna, Claude Louis Hector Duc de Villars, approached Rakoczi and encouraged him to organize a general uprising in 1699. Rakoczi saw the advantages of what French financial help, arms shipments, and, most of all, a Bourbon-Habsburg war offered to a possible uprising. Instead of taking this opportunity to make direct contact with the French court, he refused to cooperate. But from now on he followed with interest the Habsburg's Hungarian policy and the peasants' desperate struggle against oppression and exploitation; his loyalty to the emperor now changed to hatred. He gave his sympathies to the peasant masses, but was hesitant to join them in action. Instead, he looked for allies among the aristocrats.

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In 1701 the changed international and domestic situation convinced Rakoczi that it was time to get in touch with Louis XIV. However, his messenger, Francois Joseph Longueval, a captain of the Imperial army but of French origin, proved to be a traitor who delivered Rakoczi's letter to Vienna. Rakoczi was arrested and imprisoned but soon escaped, whereupon he sought refuge in Warsaw. There he again met his friend, Count Bercsenyi. Rakoczi then realized that a conspiracy of aristocrats alone could not end Habsburg absolutism in Hungary. After making contact with Louis XIV through Ambassador Charles de Charade, Marquis du Heron, in Warsaw, Rakoczi submitted his proposals to the French court: Keep in stock a larger amount of money, officers, and armaments in order to supply Rakoczi s troops when he was ready to revolt; and encourage the Polish king to provide 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry soldiers for Rakoczi in order to invade Hungary. He also requested Louis to convince the Ottoman Porte to support Thokoly for an attack on the Habsburg fortresses in the South./20/ The negotiations took considerable time and the news from Hungary made Rakoczi more and more impatient. Although Louis sent him and Bercsenyi 12,000 and 8,000 French livres, respectively, for expenses,/21/ the amount was far less than was needed for the financing of a nationwide uprising. Rakoczi, receiving the request of the rebellious Hungarian peasants/22/ (commanded by Esze and Kis) to lead them against the Habsburgs, did not wait for the conclusion of the French negotiations and returned to Hungary. With that the Rakoczi rebellion, which later grew to a glorious freedom fight, began. The calendar read June 16, 1703.

TACTICIAN, GENERAL. STATESMAN. The uprising started with a series of events that boded ill for success. The peasants, while awaiting the arrival of Rakoczi, turned their hatred against the neutral, hesitant, sometimes outright pro-Habsburg nobility. They attacked the noble country houses, looted, got drunk, committed atrocities, and thus alienated the nobility, who hurriedly assembled their forces and in a battle at Tarpa routed the peasant army. Thus Rakoczi, arriving in Hungary, found no army and, instead of national unity, an ever-growing hostility between noblemen and peasants. Class antagonism and the erupting civil war grew to be almost uncontrollable under the existing religious conditions. The majority of Hungarian Catholic lower clergy were educated by Jesuits. In their view, the followers of Luther and Calvin were dangerous heretics who should be wiped out by forcing them to reconvert to Catholicism. Since the Habsburgs were the leading champions of Catholic counter-reformation, any attack on them was interpreted by the Jesuits and their followers as an at-

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tack on the Roman Church. In the formerly Turkish-occupied territories of Hungary, the majority of the population followed Protestant teachings./23/ Thus, after the liberation of these territories from Turkish rule, the returning Catholic priests had parishes and followers only on paper. Yet, they strictly collected the decima from the Protestant peasants, as well as other services due to the Church./24/ No wonder that in the eyes of the peasants Catholicism was the same, as Habsburg exploitation and oppression; Protestantism symbolized for them the Hungarian religion, patriotism and freedom. The peasant rebels attacked not only the noble estates, but also the Catholic clergy and Church properties. These anti-noble and anti-Catholic peasants elected Rakoczi to be their leader. He was a devout Catholic, yet he was regarded by the Jesuit-educated Hungarian clergy as an ipso facto excommunicated heretic for rebelling against the Habsburgs. His army was made up of 90 percent Protestant peasants "whose open disrespect for the Catholic priests was interpreted by my supporters among the magnates as a persecution and destruction of the Church. /26/ In that proclamation, calling the entire nation to arms in defense of their freedom, he gave assurances to the nobility concerning the preservation of their ancient privileges./27/ However, in September 1703, in his Patent Concerning Serfdom, he exempted soldiers and their families from all obligations (dues and services) that they were required to render to their noble landlords./28/ More effective than his proclamation was the first news concerning his victories over the Habsburg forces. Henceforth, entire noble counties supported him and obeyed his call for noble insurrection. The peasants likewise remained loyal to him.

The restoration of religious peace was a harder task. Rakoczi was able to gain the support of the non-Jesuit-educated higher clergy, but his attempts to reconcile Catholics and Protestants, his use of tolerance and patience and condemnation of the use of force in questions of conscience, brought forward accusations from both sides./29/ As his authority grew, he was able to keep the religious question under control. He had the support of the entire country

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with the exception of the higher aristocracy. However, since they had lost the respect of and the authority over the people and the nobility because of their pro-Habsburg policy, they could not cause much damage to Rakoczi./30/

The success of the uprising depended now, first of all, upon successful military operations. Military victories could secure allies, as well as financial and military support for Rakoczi, and could force the Habsburgs to start negotiations. Success or failure was in the hands of "General" Rakoczi.

Rakoczi was not a professional soldier, but he knew about modern warfare. In the Western armies, the flintlock musket was generally accepted. The pike had disappeared. The infantry used ring bayonets for hand-to-hand combat./31/ The new muskets needed more expensive parts, powder, and balls. More time was required to train the soldiers. Contemporary tacticians recommended 2-4 cannons, that is, artillery support, for every one thousand infantrymen./32/ Heavy cavalry was still regarded as the decisive branch of the army; light cavalry was used only for reconnaissance. Finally, the armies were led by professional soldiers. The sergeant corps maintained the greatest discipline in the armies. Behind the armies stood the supply corps, which was limited only by the financial capacity of the rulers. Still, tactics and strategy remained weak. The generals' goal remained the outmaneuvering of the enemy instead of the risking of expensive armies in decisive battles./33/ The armies increased in numbers. During the War of Spanish Succession, the French army numbered about 400,000 men; the enemies of Louis XIV commanded even larger numbers./34/

In light of the above conditions, the Hungarian cause seemed lost from the very beginning. Although Rakoczi's popularity attracted many volunteers, his army at the end of July numbered only about 8,000 men. Only about one-quarter of them were armed with old fuse-ignition type muskets. Most of them had only sabres - not of the best quality either./35/ They lacked military knowledge. Rakoczi had to teach them even the most elementary skills of military operations, such as marching in columns, deployment of battle formations, encampment, and pitching their tents./36/

The bulk of the army was made up of peasant infantrymen. They elected their own officers, who were no better trained than any of the infantrymen, and earned their rank only by recognition of their courage. The confusing political, social and religious conditions did not help them to find the clear goal that they were fighting for. They saw the roots of every evil in Habsburg absolutism, in the imperial army, in the Catholic Church, which sup-

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ported the Habsburgs, in the pro-Habsburg landlords. No wonder that a great number of them began to look for their own self-interest and rich returns. Their goal was to find rich booty wherever they could. Thus, they attacked cities, villages, and noble mansions - sometimes more often than the enemy./37/ With equal hatred, these peasant troops attacked and massacred the new settlers (Serbs, Germans), dishonoring with their actions not only themselves but also Rakoczi and the whole cause./38/ Rakoczi tried his best to discipline these troops, but even he had very little control over them. After every confrontation with the enemy troops, these peasant soldiers took off for home. In the case of victory, their excuse was to take home the booty; in the case of defeat, to comfort the family./39/

Rakoczi did not have any better luck with those officers and soldiers who had formerly fought in Thokoly's army. They were regarded as experienced soldiers, but their principles were useless: "Keep a long distance between yourselves and the enemy; hold long rests during which the soldiers should sleep, eat, drink as much as they wish, then start raids of a duration not longer than 3-4 days; surprise the enemy, pursue him if he takes flight, retreat if he should resist." /40/ In other words, they used guerilla tactics and could not understand why Rakoczi wanted to occupy and hold the occupied territories./41/ Yet, exactly these two goals - occupy and hold - made Rakoczi more than a simple rebel leader tactician. The aim of his grand strategy, as a statesman, was the liberation of Hungary from Habsburg absolutism. The military equivalent of this goal was the control of Hungarian territories and direct contact with the troops of Prince Maximilian of Bavaria, who in 1703 led a strong force over the Black Forest into Austria. Rakoczi hoped that an attack on Austria proper would force Leopold to start peace negotiations.

Since French assistance through Poland proved to be much less than Rakoczi had hoped for,/42/ he kept trying diplomatic channels to make a compromised peace with Leopold, especially when Maximilian turned southward to the Tyrol instead of attacking Vienna. But successful diplomacy in time of war is based on decisive military victories. Rakoczi's army in 1703-1704 could not provide a basis for his diplomacy. Thus, besides conducting a war with guerilla forces while at the same time pursuing diplomatic negotiations, Rakoczi tried to organize a regular army from the best soldiers, generally members of the nobility. In 1703-1705 his army numbered only two infantry regiments (1,200 soldiers each) and a cavalry regiment (1,000 cavalrymen),/43/ besides the volunteer troops (75,000) whom Rakoczi began to pay regularly to improve

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discipline. So the total freedom-fighting force numbered around 78,000 soldiers./44/

The Habsburg forces in 1703 were in excellent shape. Thanks to the influence of Eugen de Savoy, the Habsburg army was well-trained, modernized, well-directed, and experienced in combat. The maneuver as the most important instrument of victory had been replaced by the new strategy of seeking victory through the winning of great, decisive battles. However, the majority of the Habsburg army was employed against the French forces. In Hungary the strength of the army was restricted to garrisons of the fortifications - about 4,000 men - and a security force of 8,000 men in Transylvania under the command of General F. L. Rabutin./45/ No wonder that Rakoczi's forces, no matter how inexperienced and undisciplined. successfully gained control over the entire country and also raided Austrian territories. The Habsburg military leadership ordered the loyal Hungarian magnates to confront Rakoczi with recruits from among their own serfs. However, their hope was frustrated by lack of enthusiasm on the part of the forced recruits who, in pitched battles, deserted en masse to Rakoczi's side./46/

Under such conditions, Rakoczi needed time and, first of all, money to build and train an army which could confront the Habsburgs, not only in hit-and-run battles, but also in a major decisive battle. Time could have been secured for him by Louis XIV s victories. But the French armies were defeated at Hochstadt and Blenheim in 1704, and although the war continued, the Habsburgs kept invading Hungary. Even more damaging was the intervention of Pope Clement XI, "who warned Louis not to give any support to the mortal enemy of the church." i.e., to Rakoczi. Louis informed Rakoczi that because of that papal intervention he could not continue to support Rakoczi's forces./47/ Thus, time began to run out and the source of finances dried up. Rakoczi, if he wanted to continue to fight, had to rely only on his own resources. By that time his tolerant, conciliatory policy began to bear fruit. The Transylvanian estates elected him Prince of Transylvania. The "three nations" (Magyars, Secklers, Saxons) and "four Churches" (Catholic, Calvinist. Lutheran and Unitarian) assured him of their unconditional support. Nevertheless, this support was insufficient to influence the outcome of the decisive battle at Nagyszombat, which Rakoczi fought against the Habsburg troops in the Vag Valley on Christmas Day, 1704. The Hungarian peasant infantry, breaking through the enemy lines, reaching the supply train, immediately drew up and began to loot the wagons./48/ While the Habsburg heavy cavalry mounted a counterattack, an infantry

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regiment of Rakoczi's - made up of Germans - deserted him and changed sides: the battle was lost./49/ The Hungarian forces withdrew successfully only because the Austrians failed to pursue the fleeing Rakoczi forces.

The winter campaign of 1704-1705 revealed the greatest defects in the Rakoczi army, which were never eliminated throughout the freedom fight, i.e., up until 1711. The prince recognized these shortcomings: total lack of knowledge of military strategy and tactics (on the part of his generals); a shortage of professional officers who could train the troops, enforce discipline, enjoy the soldiers' confidence and lead them in combat; an insufficient number of trained soldiers who would have followed their superiors' orders under any circumstances; the fluctuation of the size of the army caused by the lack of law which would oblige the population to serve in the army; and, finally, lack of money.

Every army is the mirror of the society which supports it and mans it. Rakoczi's army was no exception. Hungarian society was divided against itself. The peasants had started the rebellion as a class-action against unbearable conditions, oppression, and exploitation. Nationalism was not influencing them. Hungarian, Slovak, Ruthen, and, in smaller numbers, Romanian peasants fought shoulder-to-shoulder, side-by-side, against the imperial army (which enforced the tax collection), as well as against their own noble landlords. Rakoczi's attempt to reconcile peasants and nobles/50/ was only partially successful: the peasants stopped raiding their own landlords, but remained suspicious and did not accept their military leadership. Although the freedom fight in 1701 left Rakoczi with a relatively well-trained noble officer corps, they could not alter continuous suspicion and distrust by the peasant soldiers. Thus, the army never became a real army. It remained a mass of peasant bands - called companies and regiments - very effective in hit-and-run actions, but useless in combat formations and orderly battles. All the good will, courage, devotion and self-sacrifice of some noble officers was in vain because of the selfishness of the nobility as a class. When the Transylvanian estates passed a law in 1707, according to which every landlord had the right to demand the return of serfs who volunteered for Rakoczi's army, the Transylvanian army melted away./51/ The protection of their privileges was more important to the nobles than a victory over Habsburg absolutism, remarked Rakoczi in his memoirs with justified bitterness./52/ Thus, it was a miracle in itself that Rakoczi was able to continue the war for eight years.

Unquestionably, the love and respect the Hungarians felt for Rakoczi, which was the only real cohesive force in Hungary at that

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time, was not enough. Rakoczi had to be a statesmen negotiating with foreign powers; a politician keeping class antagonism and religious struggle under control; a strategist organizing an army, working out military rules, caring for supplies, training, equipment, and armaments; a general planning campaigns, sieges, and battles; and a tactician setting a personal example for his troops while

leading them against the enemy. Just one of these tasks would have required full years from several hard-working men.

Without outside help, however, Hungary could not win a war against the manpower and material resources of the Habsburgs who, in control of the German Empire, could count on more support. Thus, as Louis XIV suffered defeat after defeat by allied armies, the fate of Hungary was also sealed. Rakoczi's armies, underequipped, inexperienced in military operations, and short of supplies, were still able to defeat the Habsburg professional army in skirmishes, battles and raids, often in front of the gates of Vienna.

Without outside help these victories could not secure the victorious end of the war. Rakoczi knew that! Yet, he did not desert the cause; he was invited to fight, accepted the challenge, and led the revolt to the bitter end. Maybe that is why even today Rakoczi is still the subject of the limitless love and admiration of Hungarians./53/

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A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war