A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war

CHAPTER VIII

NATION IN ARMS: 1848-1849

The period from the Peace of Utrecht and connected treaties (1713-1794) to the outbreak of the 1848 revolutions witnessed great changes in Europe in every area of life. The Enlightenment won over not only the rising bourgeoisie and intellectuals, but a1so many kings. The internal organization of the Western countries, as well as that of Russia, changed. The French Revolution followed by the Napoleonic Wars continued Western Europe's transformation to the modern 19th Century.

The international order of Europe was rearranged in 1815 by the Congress of Vienna on the 'balance of power,' principle. The Congress wanted to preserve that international order by authorizing the grand scale co-operation of monarchs against their rebellious subjects. The Habsburgs were compensated for their lost territories in the Netherlands with territories in Italy. The Habsburg Empire became unquestionably the greatest continental power because the "citizen King" of France, Louis Philippe, was more than anxious to prove his peaceful intentions to Europe. Russia, on the other hand, was preoccupied with domestic problems which, during the reign of Czar Nicholas I (1825-1855), culminated in the unsuccessful Decembrist Revolt, triggering a ruthless reaction on the part of the monarch. In the German Confederation, whose president was the Habsburg emperor, the Metternich system tried to stop progress - the spread of ideas of constitutionalism and nationalism - in order to preserve the vestiges of absolutism.

In the Habsburg Empire proper, the struggle still went on between the imperial court and Hungary. From 1780 to 1790, the Hungarian estates staged a bloodless revolt against the absolutism of Joseph II (1780-1790). Reconciled by Emperor Leopold (17901792) and Francis II (1792-1835) in 1809, the old noble insurrection was called and obeyed against the Napoleonic invasion

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- only to end their campaign in an inglorious flight from Napoleon's soldiers at Gyor. In 1815, the Hungarian estates approved the Metternich regime in principle, but when it was implemented they rejected it. To express their dissatisfaction, they retreated into passive resistance. Since the Habsburgs had to rely heavily on the taxes and recruit-contingents of the Hungarians, Emperor Francis called the National Diet in 1825 to reconcile the estates again. With that, a "powerful" power struggle began between Hungary and the imperial court in Vienna. The former wished to gain independence from the Austrian court by means of a mere personal union. The latter was trying to preserve the prerogatives of absolutism.

When Emperor Francis died in 1835, his eldest son, Ferdinand (I. as Emperor of Austria: V, as King of Hungary), followed him on the throne. The political strugles of the 1840's began to create better conditions for the Hungarians./2/ In early 1848, as the revolutionary fever spread over Europe, ther Habsburgs had to compromise. In April 1848, the King sanctioned the "April Laws" which actually gave a constitution to Hungary, recognising its independence from the Habsburg lands. At the same time, the Diet recognized the Pragmatic Sanction which secured the Hungarian throne for the Habsburgs. Transylvania became united again with Hungary. The Croatian, and in Transylvania the Saxon military frontiers were subordinated administratively to the Hungarian government. The Hungarian units of the Habsburg army began to return to their home garrisons. Besides consolidating the newly organized National Guard, the Hungarian government also gained control over the units of the Habsburg army which were stationed in Hungary./3/

The important political changes which occurred in Europe in the first half of the 19th century paralleled changes in the fields of technology, armament, military organization, strategy and tactics. Already the wars of Frederick the Great had proved the superiority of mobility, speed and rapidity of fire over the cautious, slow and never-ending maneuver tactics. The American Revolution had created an entirely new army which, supported by the citizenry, often involved the civilian population in actual fighting. The French Revolution now went even further. The August 23, 1793 Law of the National Convention, called "Levee en masse", initiated total mobilization, total war, and, actually, unlimited warfare. Napoleon's military genius and generalship, besides revolutionizing military strategy and tactics, spread ideas of democracy and nationalism throughout Europe. The Metternich system, which

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replaced Napoleon's Imperium, could not prevent the invasion of these ideas.

However, no matter what great changes occurred in political and military philosophies relative to strategy and tactics, the Habsburg armies always seemed to lag one step behind. This was natural, because Austrian policy aimed only at maintaining the status quo. Thus one of the army's main tasks, the safeguarding of internal security,/4/ proved to be a large enough task for the army in the years 1848-1849 .

The army had, on paper, 399,400 men divided into 58 infantry regiments, 18 border guard regiments, one Tyrolean ranger regiment, 20 independent grenadiers, 12 field rangers, and one amphibious battalion. The cavalry included 14 heavy cavalry regiments (8 cuirassier, 6 dragoon) and 23 light cavalry regiments (7 Chevauxlegere, 12 hussar, 4 uhlan). The artillery consisted of fort and field artillery. The bulk of flre power was represented by the 5 field artillery regiments and the rocket corps. Engineering and technical battalions, a small medical corps and supply troops were also parts of the field army. Besides these units, the army had garrison troops, fort and city commands, educational institutions, archives, etcetera./5/ Although all of these units of the army existed, their actual strength was well below the number required by the organisational tables. Even for field exercises a regiment usually had to combine the personnel of its three battalions in order to form a combat battalion./6/ The practical combat value of the troops was an open question because of the very 1imited training in sharpshooting and field exercises./7/

The spirit of the army was that of a professional army: unconditional loyalty to the emperor and esprit de corps. The term of service was lowered in l845 to eight years. The regiments, for the sake of easier communication, were conscripted from districts where men of rank and file spoke the same language. Nevertheless, the Habsburg High Command, well aware of the effect of nationalism, garrisoned troops of different nationalities outside their ethnic areas./8/

The general distribution of troops within the monarchy reflected the principles of Habsburg foreign policy. The bulk of the army was stationed in Italy. The next important assignment was the defense of the Rhine against France. Special attention was given to the Croatian borders because of the turbulent conditions in Bosnia. But the remaining frontiers were neglected, the military units undermanned.

Because of the changes created by the April Laws and the 1848 Summer Agreements, the units of the Habsburg army garrisoned in

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Hungary were subordinated to the Hungarian government. Those units which had rank and file personnel of other than Magyar ethnic origin were to be replaced with Hungarian units serving in Bohemia, Galicia and Italy. Thus, the Hungarian government had at its disposal the 2nd, 34th, 39th, 51st, 60th and 62nd infantry regiments; the I st and 2nd Seckler border guard regiments; and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 9th hussar regiments: altogether, 8 infantry and 5 hussar regiments./9/ One battalion (out of the four) of the 19th, 32nd, 33rd, 37th, 48th, 52nd and 61st regiments was also under Hungarian command, while three battalions of each of these regiments remained under Austrian leadership, already being employed outside of the country. The 31st and 53rd infantry regiments' rank and file were respectively of Saxon and Croatian ethnic origin. The 16th and 23rd infantry regiments and the 7th light cavalry regiment were Italian, while the 5th artillery regiment was Czech. The border companies in Croatia and Slavonia also remained under direct Austrian leadership.

The supporters of absolutism in the Viennese court naturally did not give up hope that the concessions given to Hungary would prove to be temporary. Already in March, the newly appointed ban (military governor) of Croatia, Colonel Josip Jelacic, refused to take the loyalty oath to the new Hungarian Constitution. On April 19th, he formally broke away from Hungary as the head of the Southern Slav Movement./10/ On May 15, the Transylvanian Saxons and Romanians protested by way of mass meetings against union with Hungary. The Serbs demanded complete national and territorial autonomy in a similar congress./11/

On September l1, Jelacic crossed the Drava River, thus invading Hungary proper, and proceeded toward Buda. However, his troops, some 50,000 strong, were more interested in looting and ravaging the countryside than in a possible confrontation with their own comrades-in-arms now serving in the Hungarian army. No more spirited were the soldiers of the former Habsburg army serving now in the Hungarian forces. Their number was far inferior anyway to Jelacic's numbers. So Jelacic, although slowly, approached Buda. Finally, at the end of September, the Hungarians offered battle at Pakozd and confronted with 15,000 men (mostly untrained volunteer peasants) the Croat forces numbering 40,000 /12/ After the first clashes, Jelacic sued for a three-day armistice and hurriedly withdrew his forces from the battlefield./13/ As he retreated to Vienna, the Hungarian forces cautiously followed him. The rest of the Croat forces, some 10,000 of them, surrendered in October, providing the Hungarians with much-needed weapons, guns and ammunition.

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Now, standing on the Austrian frontier, the Hungarian statesmen, as well as the military leaders, faced the first crucial decision: should they follow the Croats all the way to Vienna and there unite with the Viennese revolutionaries, or should they stop at the borders and be satisfied with the point they had made upon the invasion of Jelacic. In other words, should they remain on the side of legality, defending their country but not giving any help to other revolutionaries against the monarchy; or, should they follow the advice of the dreamers of world revolution and world freedom? The situation seemed all the more favorable to the second solution since, in the last days of September, the Lamberg affair had already closed the door to a possible reconciliation between King Ferdinand and Hungary./14/

On October 3, the king announced (in a manifesto) the dissolution of the National Assembly, and Hungary was placed under martia1 law. At the same time those who continued their rebellion were declared to be traitors. Thus, the Hungarian soldiers who followed Jelacic's retreating forces were considered traitors even before they reached the Austrian border (October 10th). The Hungarian National Assembly unanimously rejected the King's orders. This meant that Hungary had decided to leave the legal path and solve the problem with the use of arms. Such a situation made it advisable to enter Austria and help the Viennese revolutionaries./15/ There were enough arguments against this plan, however, to delay decision until the end of October. On October 30, the Hungarian forces - 25,000 strong - fought a major batt1e at Schwechat against the superior Austro-Croatian forces and - 1ost./16/ One day later, Alfred Prince Windisch Graetz's forces occupied Vienna and began their preparation for an all-out assault on Hungary. On November l, Louis Kossuth, President of the National Defense Committee, appointed Arthur Gorgey, a former first lieutenant of the K.u.K. Army, as commander in chief of the Hungarian Army with the rank of major general, to face Windisch Graetz. Now both sides made tremendous efforts to increase their forces. When, in the middle of December, Windisch Graetz decided to start his campaign, the strength of the Austrians was double that of the Hungarian forces. In Vienna, the Austrians had 45,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 220 cannons. With the other troops which stood ready to invade Hungary from the North, South and Southeast, the Austrian strength exceeded l69,000 soldiers. Confronting Windisch Graetz, Gorgey led 20,000 infantry 2,000 cavalry and 70 cannons. The strength of the Hungarian army defending the Hungarian frontiers totaled only 85,000 men./17/ In the meantime, dramatic changes occurred in the leadership of

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the Habsburg monarchy. On December 2, 1848, Emperor and King Ferdinand, under the pressure of the Habsburg family council's decision, resigned. The new emperor, Francis Joseph, newphew of Ferdinand, was only eighteen years old. He was determined to restore law and order, that is, the absolutistic authority of the Habsburg throne. He ordered his troops to invade Hungary. At the same time he cal1ed upon the "misled soldiers" to end their rebellion and join Windisch Graetz's forces. The National Defense Committee, led by Kossuth, rejected the imperial manifesto and refused to recognize Francis Joseph as the legal king of Hungary.

This imperial manifesto and its rejection split Hungarian public opinion and created a crisis of conscience for the soldiers who had previously served in the Habsburg army. The moderate revolutionaries tried to end the crisis by conducting negotiations with Vienna. They were unsuccessful. Windisch Graetz was not even willing to see them. The radicals, demanding a complete break with the Habsburgs, advocated the declaration of a Hungarian republic. The many aristocrats and the higher clergy recommended surrender./18/ What decided the crisis was the attitude of the army. Its great majority wished to compromise but, since Windisch Graetz rejected negotiations, they decided to fight for "honor and country."

Although the government considered the situation critical, Kossuth and the Nationa1 Defense Committee did their best to provide the army with the necessary weapons, guns and ammunition, and supplies (even with uniforms).

Windisch Graetz began the invasion alongside the Danube River on December 15th. General Schlick had already entered Hungary from Galicia and occupied Kassa, while General Puchner had gained control over Transylvania. Gorgey, whose forces against Windisch Graetz were outnumbered two to one, also began to withdraw toward Buda. Kossuth more and more impatiently demanded that Gorgey take a stand to defend the capital, but to no avail. Gorgey without further resistance withdrew his troops into the capital. The government fled to Debrecen. This meant that the military leaders were freed from direct political-civilian influence. On January 2, still in Buda, the generals in a council of war accepted a bold and seemingly dangerous plan for continuation of the war.

According to this plan, the Hungarian forces under Gorgey's command were to march to the Vag River Valley to release the besieged fortress of Lipotvar. The rest of the forces (about 10,000 new recruits) were to withdraw and evacuate the territory between the Danube and Tisza Rivers. After reinforcement by the troops

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returning from the Serbian frontier, they were to defend Decrecen at the Tisza River against Windisch Graetz's forces.

The government desperately objected to this plan since, seemingly, it left Hungary's remaining lands completely unprotected. The government would thus be exposed to the attacks of Schlick's army corps, which stood at Kassa, as well as to the forces of Windisch Graetz.

Ironic, cynical accusations were launched against Gorgey for marching north and thus almost disappearing from the main theatre of war. Lazar Meszaros, Minister of Defense, accused him of "secret, treacherous goals."/19/

Kossuth decided to strengthen his own control over the army and invited Henry Dembinski, the Polish freedom fighter, to become the Commander in Chief of the Hungarian Honvedseg, instead of appointing Gorgey, whom he regarded as a dangerous rival. Gorgey's manifesto, issued on January 5, 1849 at Vac, provoked Kossuth to remark: "Gorgey has come close to being a traitor - unless he is already a traitor."/20/

The debate over Gorgey's role and the plan to evacuate the capital and march the most effective fighting force, that is, Görgey's army corps, to Northern Hungary is far from settled even today. The pros and cons concerning Gorgey's judgments are apt to reflect the political convictions of the debaters. Judging the plan and his role strictly from the military point of view, however, we must first analyze the strategic plan.

Gorgey left only a sma1l group of inexperienced soldiers between Debrecen (the new headquarters of the government) and Windisch Graetz's forces./21/ This decision really gives the impression that Gorgey wanted to put the government, as well as the whole survival of the freedom fight, at the mercy of Windisch Graetz. However, there are several points which should be taken into consideration before one may accept this judgment. After all, Gorgey knew the strategic principles according to which Windisch Graetz operated.

WINDISCH GRAETZ'S SITUATION:

Although on January 15th Windisch Graetz occupied Buda, he had to dispatch several divisions to pacify Pannonia (the territory between the Austrian frontier and the Danube River). This necessary distribution of his forces decreased the number of his main forces to almost half of the original numbers./22/ The strong fortification at Komarom remained in Hungarian hands. Thus the Austrian lines of communication, already too long, were threatened even further as winter approached. Gorgey's army corps positioned at Vac could have launched an

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attack against the left flank of Windisch Graetz's forces if he were decided to continue his offensive in the direction of Debrecen.

Under such conditions, the Habsburg strategy, as well as good judgment, required smart maneuvers to avoid a decisive battle. To stay in Buda-Pest, follow Gorgey's maneuvers with a strong force, and wait for the arrival of additional forces (which Windisch Graetz had urgently requested from Vienna) was the right decision.

No significant Austrian forces stood north of the Danube River. Thus, Windisch Graetz had to consider the possibility that Gorgey might well attempt to march against Vienna while the Field Marshal was pursuing the weaker forces of General Perczel toward the Tisza River.

In light of the above evaluation, the condemnation of Windisch Graetz - in that he missed the opportunity to end the Hungarian campaign by remaining in Buda - is not justified. By not analyzing Windisch Graetz's precarious situation, some people concluded that he underestimated Hungarian strength and blindly expected that the revolution would collapse by itself after the occupation of Buda./23/ While it is true that Windisch Graetz, in his letter to the Emperor, expressed such expectations, it is also true that he urgently demanded fresh forces. Thus, the hopes expressed in his letter should not be taken at face value.

GÖRGEY'S SITUATION.

The defeats - those the Hungarian forces suffered from Windisch Graetz's troops up until the end of December - proved that the Hungarians were not able to fight a regular war against the Austrian forces. With the exception of the units formerly serving in the Habsburg army, they were not trained to co1d-b1oodedly face the enemy and withstand the attacks./24/ The generals needed time to make professional soldiers out of amateur volunteers, time to equip them, and to provide them with better weapons, ammunition, and so forth. Gorgey's move secured this time.

Besides time, the Hungarians needed money to buy the necessary equipment. North of Vac were the rich mining towns of Hungary which produced gold and silver. By moving into these towns, Gorgey secured the financial base for further operations.

Finally, the imperial manifesto ordering the end of the revolution had its effect, especially on the officer corps. Gorgey's forces decreased during the retreat from the frontier to Buda to only about half of the original strength./25/ Gorgey had to stop losing men. Since the officers, especial1y, deserted him because they saw the growing influence of radicals within the government, Gorgey issued a manifesto of his own at Vac on January 5th. He summarized the moderate revolutionary grievances, leaving the door

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open for a compromise with Vienna if it would guarantee "Hungary's constitution and the honor of the army."/26/ Although with this proclamation Gorgey prevented the further deterioration of his army (and thus secured a very important precondition for the upcoming glorious spring campaign), it created a break with Kossuth's policy and tended to reject the political leadership of the National Defense Committee. In conclusion, it can be said that no matter how much the political leaders condemned the plan of Gorgey and the War Council to move the bulk of the army to Northern Hungary, it was a sound strategic decision. As for the conduct of military operations from Vac, famous military historians have described them as representing an exemplary performance on the part of the commanders as well as troops./27/

Beginning in February, 1849, the reorganized Hungarian army launched an all-out attack on the Austrian forces. (Plan 5). By May 21 the Austrian forces, defeated in many battles, were forced back on the southern front to the general line of the Drava River (the Croat frontier). In the west, they held only a narrow strip of Hungarian territory just east of the Austrian border, while in the north only the upper parts of the Vag and Nyitra River valleys remained in Austrian hands. The Viennese court panicked. On May 21, 1849, Emperor Franz Joseph traveled to Warsaw to ask formally for the help of Czar Nicholas I (by kneeling in front of him and kissing his hand)./28/ In. Hungary, the National Assembly declared Hungary's independence and dethroned the Habsburgs (April 14th), but left the future form of government open./29/ Russian intervention decided the final outcome of the freedom fight. On August 13, 1849, at Vilagos, Gorgey unconditionally surrendered to the Russian forces, ending the hopeless struggle.

The 1848-49 Hungarian Revolution and fight for freedom taught some lessons from a military point of view, which we can divide into two categories: In the first belong those events which affirmed or denied the validity of old principles of grand strategy, military strategy, organization, logistics, and tactics; the second category contains those changes which were caused by the revolutionary character of the war, improvisation, necessities, and the recognition or misinterpretation of conditions which demanded innovations, reforms and experimentation.

The aim of grand strategy is always decided, according to classical principles, by the civilian leadership of a country, in close cooperation with military leaders. In the Habsburg Monarchy, civilian and military leadership were united in the emperor's hands.

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The "April Laws," which recognized Hungary's independence/30/ and ordered the common army's Hungarian units to return to Hungary, as well as the Hungarian Diet's recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, did not change this situation, at least not in theory. The appointment of a responsible Hungarian government by the emperor-king, and the subordination of the Hungarian units to the Hungarian minister of war, again, theoretically did not change the situation.

The confusion occurred when Jelacic invaded Hungary and thus forced a confrontation between the Hungarian and Croatian regiments of the Habsburg army. The Hungarians loyally obeyed their king's (Ferdinand) orders, whereas Jelacic acted on his own initiative against Emperor Ferdinand's order.

The question of who was the legal civi1ian and military 1eader of Hungary was created by the Habsburg family coup which dethroned Ferdinand and chose Francis Joseph as his successor. The new emperor-king's manifesto ordered the "rebellion" to cease, and sent Windisch Graetz's troops into Hungary.

Since Francis Joseph did not become king of Hungary by consent of the Hungarians (as was required by the paragraphs of the Pragmatic Sanction), he was regarded as a usurper of power and Ferdinand was still regarded as the lawful king. However, Ferdinand after his dethronement by his family was not available, even for consultation. Thus the Hungarian political leadership consisted of the Diet and government alone; the military leadership was vested in the Hungarian government's minister of war. Francis Joseph's manifesto, his decision to dissolve the Hungarian Diet, the rehabilitation of Jelacic, the murder of the Emperor's emmissary, Lamberg, and, finally, Francis Joseph's declaration calling the Hungarian units "rebels", were all regarded by Hungary as unlawful acts. Thus the supreme civilian leadership of Hungary fell into the hands of the "lawfully" elected National Defense Committee and its president, Kossuth. But the authority of Kossuth and the Committee was not uniformly recognized in the country nor in the army. Each individual made his own decision and chose the side to which he wanted to award his loyalty. Although Kossuth commanded the majority's confidence, his "moderate" political views were not shared by other moderates who sought a compromise with the Habsburgs. His views were also opposed by extreme conservatives, as well as by radicals. Thus, the political leadership was hesitant and sometimes powerless, and its decisions often contradictory.

What influenced the actions of citizens also influenced the actions of military men. Some willingly, and some hesitantly,

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accepted the orders of the war minister, while some flatly refused to obey his orders and gave their loyalty to the new emperor.

At the time of Jelacic's invasion, there were 28 infantry regiments and 12 hussar regiments designated as Hungarians./31/ Their rank and file was almost completely Hungarian; the officer corps was, as usual, of mixed nationality. Out of the twenty-eight infantry regimentss five were stationed in Italy. These five remained faithful to their beloved commander, Field Marshal Count Joseph Radetzky./32/ The remaining twenty-three regiments were evenly split, eleven fighting for Hungary and twelve for Austria. The rank and file of these regiments chose sides according to the influence of their best known and most respected officers. On the other hand, out of the twelve hussar regiments, the nine which were stationed in Hungary sided with Hungary; the two in Italy remained faithful to Radetzky; and the one in Bohemia experienced mass desertion by the rank and file. Still, we have to remember that even the regiment commanders who were 1oya1 to Hungary expressed different political convictions. Most of them preferred political compromise to an all-out war against Austria.

In conclusion, the Hungarian grand strategy and the civilian-military cooperation were far from ideal. Civilian leaders very often felt it necessary to interfere with military decisions. The military leadership was constantly involved in politics, and obeyed or disobeyed the orders of the war minister according to their political convictions.

Matters were further complicated by the existing rivalry of the high-ranking military officers who sought higher rank or position and often openly turned against the government's policy. It was clear to Kossuth and to the National Defense Committee that the army command should be centralized in the hands of one commander in chief. To avoid offending his generals by appointing one of them to this position, Kossuth invited the hero of the 1830 Polish uprising, Henry Dembibski, to head the Hungarian army. Kossuth intended to reach two goals with this appointment: to centralize the military leadership in one person, and to have a general who shared his political views as commander in chief. The appointment was a mistake: the acting and fighting troop commanders were suspicious of Dembinski's appointment. Many of them refused outright to recognize his authority or obey his orders. In a revolutionary army, where the majority of soldiers fight because of their loyalty to their commanders, the appointment of a foreigner is not feasible. Thus the civilian-military leaders' cooperation remained weak, troubled, and therefore often ineffective.

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Given the cirumstances, the military strategy of the Hungarian army was excellent. It ilhlstrated the fact that the Hungarian high commanders, especially in the case of Gorgey, were formerly professional soldiers who knew the strategic principles of their time. At the same time, they were young and flexible enough to recognize the disadvantages of the old strategy and exploit the opportunities which were created for them by the revolutionary spirit of the army. One can find similar examples of fast marches, bold maneuvers and surprise attacks in the military history of the time only in the strategy of Napoleon. The troops of the former Habsburg army infused by revolutionary nationalist spirit proved to be excellent instruments for the implementation of such courageous, bold new strategy.

Besides the former Habsburg army units, as a result of the efficient recruitment campaigns of Kossuth, the Hungarian army also had a great number of volunteers who became the target of complaints from the generals. They were untrained, inexperienced young men who had joined the army to fight for their own political convictions and to fulfill their patriotic duties. They were not in uniform. Their main weapon was often only a straightenedout scythe. Since they lacked training, they could hardly hold their lines under enemy fire and were easily routed by attacks by the professional infantry and cavalry units of the imperial regiments. Once panic grabbed them, they threw away their weapons and continued to run - usually all the way home. No wonder that the generals bitterly complained to the government. They demanded that these volunteers be put under their control so that they could train them to be professional soldiers and place them under strict military rule and discipline. The invasion of Windisch Graetz and the loss of the capital of Buda, as well as other pressing conditions, forced the civilian leadership to give in to the generals. During the winter of 1848-1849, they worked wonders with the volunteers. Maybe this was the most shocking surprise for Windisch Graetz during the spring campaign: The revolutionary "bands and hordes" were transformed into a well-disciplined, well-trained, professional army within months; into an army which retained the political convictions and patriotic elan of the revolutionary soldiers, and added to them military skill./33/ By accepting divisions and army corps as strategic units, and the battalion as a tactical unit, the Hungarian army became much more flexible and easy to maneuver. This provided opportunities for the battalion, company and platoon commanders to pass quick judgment on the developing situation. In this way, they could best lead their units to realize the higher commander's plan.

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The soldiers, under such flexible superiors, used their own initiative to promote victory in battles. Instead of the closed combat formations used by the Habsburg army, they broke up into groups of squads, thus lessening the effectiveness of the enemy artillery fire. They kept the same loose formations during attacks. Instead of wasting their time reloading their rifles, they accosted the enemy with bayonnets and engaged them in hand-to-hand combat. Many victorious battles testified to the superiority of the Honved forces, in strategy as wel1 as in tactics.

What, then, were the reasons for the final defeat and unconditional surrender? Certainly not the military shortcomings of the army. The two main reasons were: the failure of the Hungarian government to recognize international political developments, which grew progressively unfavorable to their cause, and to counteract these developments with smart diplomacy. To mention a few examples: Hungary expressed its willingness to compromise in December, 1848, while Windisch Graetz was approaching Buda and the Hungarians seemed to have lost the war. On the other hand, they pursued a hard-line policy after the victorious spring campaign when the Austrians were temporarily losing the war. Only temporarily, since it should have been clear to everybody that the manpower of Austria and the German Confederation, with their almost 41 million inhabitants,/34/ would sooner or later overcome Hungary's resistance. On August 13, 1849, that is, on the day of surrender, the Austro-Russian forces numbered 370,000 men and 1,200 guns; the Hungarian army numbered 152,000 men and 450 guns./35/

Kossuth naively believed that foreign powers would come to the aid of Hungary. However, the Western powers paid only lip service to Hungary's cause. When the Ottoman Empire mobilized its troops to prevent Russia from using Wallachia as a base of operations against Hungary (Wallachia be1onged to the Ottoman Empire), Lord Palmerston persona1ly warned the Turks not to provoke a war with Russia. Hence, internationa1 political developments prevented the already feeb1e Hungarian diplomacy from enlisting foreign aid. Considering such conditions, an ear1ier policy of compromise could have been more successful.

The second reason for the defeat can be found in the shortages of ammunition and weapons. Enthusiasm and sacrifices could not make up for the shortages of hard cash and the result thereof: not enough military hardware. Without having a trustworthy and continuous supplier of armaments and ammunition in a foreign country, the limited resources of Hungary could not match the material capabilities of the Habsburg lands.

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The Russian intervention provided only the final blow for the Hungarian freedom fight. The revolutions of 1848 failed in every European country; only Hungary fought alone for more than a year without outside help, providing excellent examples of military virtue and of the art of war. Thus, we may conclude that the Hungarian Revolution and freedom fight was a lost cause from its inception. This is true however only if we disregard the existing chances for compromise. Missing the opportunity for compromise, the Hungarian politicians created a situation from which neither the talent of the generals nor the enthusiasm and extraordinary courage of the simple soldiers could rescue Hungary.

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A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war