A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war

CHAPTER XV

DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND
AGAINST SOVIET INVASION, l 944

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

In 1943, the Allies "closed the ring" around the Axis Powers and prepared for the final defeat of Germany./1/ In the first days of February, the Hungarian Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Szombathelyi, visited the German High Command at the invitation of the German general staff. Szombathelyi explained to the Germans that because of heavy losses in the battle of the Don, Hungarian industry would be unab1e to manufacture arms and equipment to supply an additional second army. The industry's capacity would hardly be enough to replace the losses the 2nd Hungarian army had suffered at the Don. Szombathelyi therefore recommended to Hitler that no additional Hungarian troops be deployed to the eastern front. Hitler agreed, but reasoned that inasmuch as he expected an Allied invasion in the Balkans, he would need additional Hungarian forces to protect the communications zone at the rear of the German armies. Szombathelyi accepted this new occupational assignment for the Hungarian forces in principle. The strength of this new occupational force was to be three divisions, according to Hungary's plan./2/

While Regent Horthy agreed with Szombathelyi, Minister-President Miklos Kallay vehemently opposed deployment of Hungarian troops in the Balkans. He believed that the Hungarian occupation would create hosti1ity toward Hungary among the Serbians./3/ Furthermore, even the provision of three divisions wou1d represent great hardship for Hungary's industrial resources and manpower. The Council of the Ministers agreed with Kallay; thus, Hitler's demand was rejected.

The Germans, disappointed with the Hungarian reply, accused Kallay and his government of "defeatism," and suspected that he intended to "make contact with the enemy to secure Hungary's

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secession from the Axis." Horthy, while assuring Hitler of his loyalty, denied the German accusations./4/ But German diplomacy, still pressing Hungary for additional troops, by the middle of September resorted to open threats to secure Hungary's continuous participation in military operations./5/ At the end of December, 1943, Dietrich von Jagow, German ambassador to Hungary, concluded that "the Hungarians are flighty and untrustworthy, therefore, without permanent and strict control, we shall not be able to succeed . . ." (in securing their unconditional loyalty)./6/ Was Jagow right?

Historical interpretations differ greatly concerning Hungary's role in the war. Historians of the Western Powers and the United States, analyzing the Second World War from a global point of view, pay little attention to those developments in Hungary which awakened German suspicion. Hungarian historians who believe that Hungary's participation in the war was triggered by her fear of communism argue that German suspicions were unfounded. Communist writers see in the events of 1943 (in Hungary) a last, desperate attempt on the part of the ruling class to rescue the feudal-capitalist social system from the consequences of Soviet occupation of Hungary./7/ American college textbooks usually mention Hungary as Germany's most faithful ally./8/

To understand Hungary's situation and the performance of the Hungarian Army, as well as the well-founded German suspicions, it is necessary to review the general situation of the war and to examine Hungary's alternatives at that time.

The defeat and surrender at Stalingrad (on January 31, 1943) of Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus' 6th army sharpened the conflict between Hitler and his generals. Hitler was outraged because of Paulus' surrender. He had expected him to fight to the last man, and then to commit suicide./9/ On the other hand, the generals were horrified by the insane sacrifice of Paulus' army and further upset because of the unjustified, huge losses of war materials./10/ The already-existing conspiracy to assassinate Hitler was beginning to receive support from many field commanders in the German Army. However, the attempt to kill Hitler in March, 1943 did not succeed./11/ The Allied resolution at Casablanca to "accept only unconditional surrender" from Germany had by that time become known in the Axis camp. Ironically, it strengthened the fighting will of the German armed forces./12/

A lack of war materials forced Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, "The Desert Fox," to evacuate North Africa. On May 20, 1943, Dwight D. Eisenhower reviewed the Allied troops in a "victory parade" in Tunisia./13/

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On the Russian front the great battle of Orel-Kursk ended on August l7th. The Russians, now fighting the "Great Patriotic War in defense of the Fatherland" (instead of in defense of communism), not only stopped the German counteroffensive but turned it into a defeat comparable to Stalingrad./14/

On July 25 Mussolini was arrested and the British and American troops (after conquering Sicily in August) invaded Italy against the lukewarm resistance of the Italian troops. Italy's defenses further drained the strength of the German armed forces. What made Germany's position even more desperate was the likelihood of a second front in Western Europe, forcing the Germans once again into a two-front war. This possibility had been the nightmare of German generals since Fie1d Marshal Alfred Sch1ieffen's time. (1833 1913),/15/

Hitler issued his directive against a possible Allied invasion of Western Europe on November 3, 1943./16/ On November 27, Roosevelt and Churchill arrived at Teheran to discuss (with Stalin) "Operation Overlord" and the postwar reorganization of Europe.

Horthy, Minister-President Kallay, the Hungarian government and the general staff learned about these events as they occurred. What they did not know about was "Roosevelt's obsession that he was 'Beauty' and that Stalin was the 'Beast' who could be charmed into becoming a fairy prince with whom Europe could live happily ever after."/17/ Further, the Hungarians did not know Roosevelt's conclusions: "Russia's postwar position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military force... Therefore every effort must be made to obtain her friendship... Since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most "friendly relations with Russia."/18/ Additional1y, the Hungarians did not know that Churchill's plan to invade Europe from Italy via Trieste and the Balkans in the direction of Vienna and Budapest had been rejected at Stalin's demand. and that therefore "Operation Overlord" would be launched across the English Channel, thereby leaving the Danube Valley in the Russian sphere of interest. The Hungarian general staff could not believe that the Allies, instead of selecting the relatively easy advance through the Balkans and Hungary, had elected a landing site on the Atlantic coast or in the Channel, accepting all of the risks, dfficulties and sacrifice of human life, to say nothing of the inevitable loss of war material that such a landing would require. Churchill found himself alone in his plan for the postwar creation of a Danubian Confederation "in

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modern form what had been in general outline the Austro-Hungarian Empire."/19/

For the above reasons the Hungarian government and general staff were strongly divided on the issue of a separate peace and on the question of how to regain independence from German domination. Although the parliament was not in session, the Smallholders' Party the strongest opposition party passed a resolution demanding that "everything possible should be done to regain for Hungary her independence, freedom and neutrality in the war." To realize this goal, the resolution foresaw the possibility of Hungary having "to change sides and fight on the British side against Germany."/20/ The general staff judged this demand (without securing the participation of the Allied forces in the side-switching maneuver) to be too risky and unfeasible.

Yet the Smallholders, Party was not alone in demanding the termination of Hungary's role in the war: Nicholas Horthy, the younger son of the Regent, Istvan Antal, Minister without Portfolio and Chief of the Propaganda Bureau; Antal Ullein-Reviczky, Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Press Division; and Colonel Gyula Kadar, Chief of the General Staff's Press and Propaganda Department, all began to work actively toward that goal. Additionally, leaders of the Catholic, Reformed and Lutheran churches, diplomats, politicians, academicians, and generals offered their cooperation and support to help Hungary withdraw from the war./21/ Kallay and Szombathelyi made several cautious declarations which indicated that they agreed with the goal of this covert peace movement./22/

Ullein-Reviczky established communications with the United States embassy in Turkey; the government made regular radio contact with the Allied headquarters in Cairo; and General Szombathelyi selected one of his trustworthy officers to negotiate with the Americans in Ankara. Horthy authorized Tibor Eckhardt, former president of the Smallholders, Party, to open negotiations in Washington. Minister-President Kallay requested Otto Habsburg to represent Hungary officially at the White House./23/ Thus during the spring and summer of 1943, Hungary opened direct communications with Roosevelt and with Churchill./24/

The Times of London reported on June 1 and 2 the Hungarian attempt to reach a separate peace agreement with the Allies./25/ The Germans tightened their control but could not, for the time being, prevent Hungary's preliminary negotiations for a separate peace. Should the Allies agree to an armistice and separate peace, the price would be Hungary's active participation in the war against Germany. Hungary, frightened by the consequences of such a

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move prior to an Allied landing in the Balkans, shrank from this demand./26/ The Teheran Conference which decided on the direct invasion of Germany rather than the Balkans completely frustrated the Hungarians. The Allies, however, held firm to their demand: Hungary must act, even at the price of great sacrifice. Kallay continued negotiations and, with General Szombathelyi, worked out a cautious plan to comply with the Allies' demand./27/ They requested Hitler to release the Hungarian occupational divisions from front line duties,/28/ while planning the mobilization of Hungary's entire military force (in stages) to create favorable preconditions for the execution of the "switch." So as not to awaken German suspicion, only four army corps were mobilized (in January, 1944) for the first stage. The excuse was "to protect Hungary s national frontiers in the northeastern Carpathians."/29/ This excuse was acceptable since by that time Soviet troops had reached the oId eastern frontiers of Poland and had come within 60-80 miles of the Carpathians. The Hungarian occupational forces found themselves confronted by Soviet front-line troops.

OCCUPATIONAL FORCES IN COMBAT.

Hungarian occupational forces in the Ukraine in June, 1943 numbered 9 light divisions organized in 2 army corps./30/ In the 8th army corps were the 102nd, 105th, and 108th light divisions, which had been fighting the Soviet partisans since 1942. The 7th army corps, comprised of the 121 st and 124th light divisions serving as occupational forces since 1941, had no real partisan problems until April, 1943. In that month, the 1st and 201st light divisions, newly arrived from Hungary, increased the strength of the 8th army corps to five light divisions. During the summer of 1943 the 18th and 25th light divisions were sent from Hungary to enforce the 7th army corps, increasing its strength to four divisions.

These light divisions had two infantry regiments each, but had no heavy infantry weapons and only token artillery. Thus they were not prepared to fight against the regular army units of the Soviets. The Hungarian soldiers. so restrained and gallant in their behavior, gained the respect and cooperation of the native population and so were effective against small partisan groups. But senseless Nazi policy ordered the resett1ement of the Russian, Ukrainian and Polish popu1ations (away from the area of communications) by transporting the female population to Germany and forcing the male population into labor battalions. As a result, the partisan movement grew stronger day by day. In August of 1943, 12,717 explosions destroyed railroad lines, 74 locomotives and 214 wagons were put out of order, 120 miles of rail were sabotaged,

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and the number of unexploded and disarmed land mines reached 3,011/31/ Without expert performance on the part of Hungarian occupational divisions, these numbers would have been substantially higher.

Good equipment, arms and ammunition became more and more important for the occupational forces, for, as the partisan movement grew, their formations were regularly supp1ied with vital stocks of ammunition and food (via airdrops) and were skillfully led by Soviet parachutist officers. Yet even in September, l943, the Germans failed to provide heavy weapons (mortars, antitank cannons) as promised to the light divisions./32/

During the summer of 1943, as renewed Soviet attacks forced the German front lines further to the West, timely withdrawal of the occupational divisions was strongly urged by the Hungarian general staff. Short of regular German front line units, the German High Command intentionally delayed regrouping the Hungarian light divisions in order to use them against fast approaching Soviet troops. The poorly-equipped and poorly-armed light divisions were forced to defend themselves against the assault of Soviet front line troops and could withdraw only under constant pressure. The Hungarian general staff, seeing the plight of the light divisions, concentrated on convincing the German High Command to release the 7th and 8th army corps from front line duties and from occupational assignments. The argument was that these troops were also needed for defense of the Hungarian frontier. The Germans refused to comply. To stop the Soviet advance into Poland they needed the Hungarian troops. In January, 1944, Szombathelyi visited Hitler's headquarters and personally pled for release of the two army corps from the front line as well as from occupational duties. He again requested they be transported back to Hungary since they were needed there. His request was refused, causing German-Hungarian relations to cool even further toward the freezing point./33/

By February, 1944 Jagow, the German ambassador to Hungary, suggested very diplomatically (to the German Foreign Ministry) that if Hungarian troops were to be used for defense of the Carpathians, they should be mixed with German troops. "This would secure more support for the Hungarians in the demanding front line duties."/34/ Jagow's suggestion indicated that the Germans had lost all confidence in Hungary's trustworthiness as well as in her army. In any event, this suggestion was too late inasmuch as Hitler, by that time, had already decided to occupy Hungary with German troops. Thus Germany could unrestrictedly exploit Hungary's manpower and resources and, most of all, prevent Hungary's desertion of the Axis.

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GERMAN OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY.

On March l9, 1944 German troops entered Hungary from Austria and Croatia, quickly occupying the country as far as the Tisza River. Additiona1 Croat, Romanian and Slovak forces were standing by as reserves./35/ The German troops did not cross the Tisza where the troops of the Hungarian 1st army were already mobilized. Here the Germans were satisfied to blockade the 1st army.

The occupation did not trigger clashes between the German and Hungarian troops, and the passivity of Hungarian soldiers was interpreted as proof of Hungary's 1oyalty to Hitler./36/

This interpretation was (and is) wrong. It may serve only to excuse Anglo-American failure to keep East Central Europe from Soviet domination. Those statesmen, politicians and historians who condemn Hungary for not resisting the German occupation have passed judgment from a global (or provincial) point of view; they are unab1e or unwi1ling to view developments from the Hungarian point of view, specifica1ly how the Hungarians - the government and the people - saw their own situation in March of 1944 and how they analyzed the possible consequences of armed resistance against superior German forces.

The Hungarian forces at home, with the exception of the 1st army, were not mobilized. The only forces readily available against invading German troops were four divisions (on peacefooting) stationed in garrisons at Budapest, Komarom, Sopron and Kaposvar. Lack of transportation prevented the remaining four divisions from reinforcing the above-mentioned divisions on time. Lack of equipment, arms and ammunition, even for the a1ready mobilized forces, wou1d have made resistance possib1e on1y for a few days. Since neither the Western Allies nor the Soviet Union had contingency plans to aid the Hungarian Army, a few days of Hungarian resistance would not have measurably affected the overall strategic situation and the outcome of the war.

At the same time, resistance to German occupation would have provided the Croats, Romanians and Slovaks, who then stood firmly on Hitler's side, with an excuse to occupy Transylvania and other parts of Hungary./37/

Thus Hungary's critics condemn her for her unwillingness to commit suicide and for her refusal to see her people decimated and herded into concentration and forced-labor camps. This Hungarian argument is especially valid since Hungarian resistance would have caused only insignificant and indecisive military inconvenience for

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Germany, while perhaps providing a slight advantage to the Soviet Union./38/

Going further in our examination, we can say with certainty that Hungary could not tolerate the idea of Soviet troops on Hungarian soil. The government, army, and population, ready to lay down their arms in the face of an Ang1o-American mi1itary force, were determined to defend themselves against the invasion of Soviet troops. To risk an anti-German uprising only to exchange a German for a Soviet yoke was an alternative utterly unacceptable to Hungary./39/

Therefore. Hungary did not oppose the German military occupation. Regent Horthy was not removed by the Germans (leaving a slim chance for him to continue the armistice negotiations), but the Kallay government was dismissed. Horthy appointed Dome Sztojay, former ambassador to Berlin, as Minister-President. The German troops were soon replaced by SS formations, and Sztojay's government was anxious to comply with all German demands. The SS found willing collaborators in the Volksbund/40/ and in members of the Hungarian Nyilaskeresztes (Arrowcross) Party who zealously helped the Germans to "solve" the Hungarian Jewish question because Hungary provided the last asylum for East European Jewry up to April, 1944.

The greatest problem for the Germans was created by the "unfaithfulness of the Hungarian Army."/41/ But instead of disarming the Honvedseg as some overanxious German diplomats recommended, Hitler decided to use Hungarian soldiers against Soviet troops approaching the Carpathians since the front line was no further than 80 miles from the Hungarian frontier./42/ With the blockade along the Tisza River lifted, the last obstacle to deployment of the 1st Hungarian army on the Soviet front was removed./43/ Now the assignment was defense of the national frontiers.

A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war