A Case Study on Trianon

No country or nation in contemporary history has been struck by a calamity of such lasting impact as Hungary when, on June 4, 1920, as a consequence of the peace treaty of Trianon, she was deprived of her historical boundaries and about two thirds of her territory and population, including 3,400,000 Hungarians attached to the neighboring states. At the same time Germany lost but 13.5 percent of its former lands to her victorious neighbors, and Bulgaria a mere 8 percent. Thus, the greatest injustice in Paris was committed against Hungary, as if that country were mainly to blame for the war and its outbreak.

The attitude of British political circles and the changes in the Foreign Office are particularly instructive and even decisive with regard to Hungary from the turn of the century down to 1918. It should be pointed out right from the start that the British attitude towards Hungary was always a corollary of its attitude and policies towards the Habsburg Monarchy. Until 1918 these policies were basically shaped by the well-known view of Queen Victoria's Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, Henry J. T. Palmerston, that Hungary was only part of the Habsburg realm. Palmerston was the person who made practically a dogma of the thesis that British policy towards Central Europe relied on Austria as a great power.

This Palmerstonian thesis lost none of its validity for over 65 years. For this very reason, in the period 1860-67 official England and its press strived to find a solution to the Hungarian question, some kind of agreement between the dynasty and Hungary. There was general agreement in this regard between the conservative and liberal elements of the British establishment. Even in the 1850's, during the climax of Kossuth's popularity, the pro-Hungarian public opinion and the government never reached the point where they would accept Hungarian independence as a necessity, no matter how lasting an impression the leader of the struggle for independence may have made on the English people. After the Compromise of 1867,

however, it was the Deak line which got the upper hand in England, and the Tory cabinets disapproved of the Hungarian opposition that aimed at breaking up the Dualist foundations. At the same time British liberals hoped that liberal Hungary would become the focal point of a Monarchy that was in the process of turning into a Danubian empire; and that Hungary would act as the conveyor of civilization to the Balkans.¹

Although the name of Lajos Kossuth continued to enjoy high respect even after 1867 as a symbol of national liberation, and at the time of his death in 1894 his uncompromising personality was eulogized in lengthy articles, not a word was said about his principles regarding independence, or of his vision of a federation.

The nationalities problem began to assume ever greater importance in the statements of British politicians, diplomats, and journalists concerning the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy from the 1890's on. The opinion of the Foreign Office in this regard was influenced to a large extent by Sir Arthur Nicolson, Consul at Budapest, soon to be named Ambassador to St. Petersburg; in his elaborate dispatches from Budapest he gave an account of the dissatisfaction and complaints of the Croatians and Romanians. He also mentioned in his reports the oppressive measures of the Hungarian government and its attempts to assimilate the nationalities. Nicolson's evaluation found an echo among several of his diplomat colleagues. The Romanian question in particular was publicized in the press, well-known British journalists and scientists calling attention to the relationship between Hungary and Romania.²

At the turn of the century the official British estimate of Hungary cannot be said to be unfavorable. For instance, the Times wrote in connection with the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Budapest, that the political center of gravity of the Monarchy seems to have shifted to Budapest because, in spite of its many nationalities, Hungary "is a homogeneous political unit compared with Austria proper. The Magyars have always shown a remarkable instinct for constitutional politics and their leadership behind the Leitha, in a kingdom associated with great traditions, is practically unchallenged."³ The comments on Hungarian politics were likewise positive on the occasion of the Budapest visit of King Carol of Romania.

In general it can be said in this period from the fall of 1897 to the summer of 1898, that the most important British newspapers, the Times. the Economist, the Foreign Office Papers, several monthlies,

and the liberal Fortnightly Review all wrote favorably about domestic conditions in Hungary and the country's prospects. But it would be a mistake to attribute too much importance to this evidence, because it was only in relation to the deplorable conditions in Austria that the Hungarian political conditions seemed good.

The criticisms of Hungarian politics emanating from Nicolson soon found confirmation in the brutal and undemocratic methods of the Dezso Banffy regime. The Times and other dailies criticized Banffy not only because of his law on servants and his breaking up the harvest strikes, but also because in 1898 he issued an ordinance regarding the Magyarization of non-Hungarian placenames.⁴ (As we know, following his example the Czechoslovakian government changed the names of ancient Hungarian settlements in Slovakia after the Second World War!) One of the prestigious periodicals, the Quarterly Review, published an article in a similar vein. It claimed that in no other country is the ruling nationality as tyrannical and impatient as in Hungary, the country of liberalism and liberty.⁵

The first ominous signs of the unfavorable turn in British public opinion vis-a-vis Hungary appeared in its appraisal of the Hungarian political crisis of 1904-06. This was the period when the Times, sympathetic to the Hungarian cause ever since the 1850's, and its increasingly well-known correspondent in Vienna, H. W. Steed, struck a more and more critical tone regarding conditions in Hungary. Both the British press and the Foreign Office begin to distrust not only the foreign policy of the Monarchy, but also conditions inside Hungary. British politicians expressed growing disappointment in the political wisdom and common sense of the Hungarian nation, in contrast to their former views. The criticism of the coalition voted into power by the electorate, of the recalcitrance in military matters (commands to be given in Hungarian), of the exacerbation of the separatist mood which could lead to grave international consequences, of the tragicomedy of "national resistance," of the narrowness of Hungarian chauvinism in general, which was presumptuous enough to confront simultaneously Francis Joseph and his army, the government of Austria, and the nationalities-all of this criticism became markedly sharper. The voices critical of the Hungarian coalition soon embraced all things Hungarian.

To make the picture complete, we should add that the change in the British attitude was caused not simply by the Hungarian political crisis of 1904-06, but by other factors which played a prominent role

about this time (the rise of German power, the serious defeat the Russians suffered at the hands of Japan, etc.). Certain circles began to believe that the Monarchy could fulfill its role as a counterpoise to Germany only if its fate were in the hands of more reliably anti-German nationalities.

In the vanguard of those critical of Hungary we find prestigious, competent, respectable journalists such as Wickham Steed, the Vienna correspondent of the Times. His debate with the Hungarian press, with Jeno Rakosi, the chauvinist editor-in-chief of the Budapesti Hirlap, and with Albert Apponyi, in the columns of the Times⁶ only enhanced his objections to Hungarian policies. He traveled to Budapest in September 1906, for the new session of parliament, and what he experienced there quickened his disillusionment with political Hungary.

That year Steed had arrived to the rejection of dualism, to the notion of a federalized monarchy.⁷ Steed had arrived at the awareness that the ruling classes in Hungary were no longer able to fulfill their former function as the solid foundation on which the power of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was built.

Steed's view of the Hungarians underwent a profound change during the crisis. His knowledge became deeper, most of his illusions dissipated: although he saw Hungary through the prism of anti-German British imperialism, in some ways his views were progressive, hence Hungary appeared to him an increasingly backward, reactionary, and even internationally weak country. His subjective sentiments were undoubtedly affected by the attacks his comments elicited in the Hungarian press. It occurred to him well before the outbreak of the World War that the federalization of the Monarchy and Slav leadership would be the most effective antidote to the German peril. He had not yet arrived at a final opinion; he would come to it only as a result of the pace of events following the outbreak of the war.

In the days when R. W. Steed offered well-founded and almost scientific analyses of conditions in Hungary, and an alternative for its future, there were journalists who were wont to side with Hungary against Vienna. According to an article in the Scottish Review, Hungary was justified in struggling for an independent army, for an enhanced sovereignty; the article observed, furthermore, that Hungary had outgrown the framework of the Compromise. It expressed hopes that the Hungarians' effort will be

crowned with success. The author of the article was R. W. Seton-Watson .⁸

As we have included in this volume a noteworthy study by Hugh Seton-Watson, there is no reason for me to dwell on Seton-Watson's activities in connection with Trianon here. I will only mention a few essential elements for the sake of continuity.

Seton-Watson was the son of patriotic Scottish parents, and was among those British intellectuals who shared the "conventional admiration," even while young, of the majority towards Lajos Kossuth and his nation. The young Seton-Watson extended this feeling to the Hungarian Independence Party and arrived in Vienna, in November 1905, convinced of the just cause of the Hungarian coalition. Here the skeptical, superior smile of Steed did not change his views; as mentioned above, in the spring of 1906 he still believed in the glory of the "phoenix of nations." He began to have doubts when he reached Budapest in the spring of 1906 and met political leaders such as Apponyi, Ferenc Kossuth, Sandor Esterhazy, Lajos Lang, Jeno Rakosi, but also Saxon intellectuals from Transylvania, as well as Romanian politicians and journalists. In spite of this, the work he published in 1907 indicates that he still had faith in the future of the Monarchy.⁹ In it, however, he was calling for the federalization of the Monarchy. In a pessimistic vein he believed, though, that foolish Hungarian policy of forceful assimilation would never allow that to come about.¹⁰

Reporting on the experiences gathered during his travel in the Slovak area in the columns of the Spectator, the Times, and the Morning Post, he criticized the antinationalities aspect of the school laws attributed to Apponyi, as well as the obsolete electoral system, the autonomy of the Church, the coolie life of the servants on the estates, etc. Seton-Watson denounced the oppression of the Slovaks in particular-an oppression confirmed by the bloody incident at Csernova on October 27, 1907, which resulted in the tragic death of 15 victims. (The gendarmes fired into the crowd on the occasion of the consecration of the Catholic Church at Csernova, performed by Father Andrej Hlinka in spite of the objections of the authorities.)

Following the massacre at Csernova, and as a result of the antagonistic articles published by Seton-Watson and others in the British press, the public mood soon turned anti-Hungarian; along with the analyses of W. Steed in the Times, this mood was to constitute the basis of the anti-Monarchy propaganda that became

widespread among the politicians from the area of the future successor states following the outbreak of the war.

Steed and Seton-Watson, former friends of Austria-Hungary, played a leading role in the propaganda campaign launched against the enemy countries during the World War. They were no longer concerned with internal reform, but strived to sweep away the state which stood in the way of the nationalities within the Monarchy. Steed, as the foreign policy editor of the Times, and Seton-Watson as the editor of New Europe which he founded at his own expense in 1916, used the press as weapons, often arbitrarily and with biased arguments, on behalf of the imperialist objectives of the Entente: the maximum territorial claims of the Slavs and the Romanians.

When the War Cabinet directed by Lloyd George established, in February 1918, the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, he named Steed and Seton-Watson as the co-directors of the Austro-Hungarian section. The latter was also closely associated with the Austro-Hungarian experts in the Political Intelligence Section of the Foreign Office.¹² The articles and secret memoranda which flooded the British press mainly thanks to their efforts, succeeded, in late spring and summer of 1918, in convincing the British political leadership and public opinion to give up the foreign policy principle which it had held for centuries with regard to the Habsburg Monarchy. The exiled politicians from the Monarchy were given the green light to proceed with their plans for dissolving the Habsburg Empire. Steed, Seton-Watson, and the officials and specialists, including journalists, historians, and politicians brought up on their writings contributed a great deal to the process of dissolution, to the fermentation within the Monarchy. The new order in Central Europe, and the new boundaries can be regarded largely as the fruits of their work before and after 1914.

towards the dissolution of multinational Hungary, or its tendency to become part of a larger unit. After the defeat of the Revolution and War of Liberation of 1848-49, both Kossuth and Deak feared these tendencies and strived to avoid them in defining the situation of Hungary. Kossuth sought the guarantee of a more secure future in some kind of compromise solution to the parallel and often conflicting nationalism of the small nations of the Danube, whereas Deak sought compromise with the reality of great power, with the Habsburg Empire.¹³

Since the alternative realized was the one Deak had proposed, the Hungarians became stalwart supporters of the Habsburg dynasty and partners of the Austrians in the consolidation of the Monarchy. In the eyes of the future victorious Entente powers-not to mention the antagonistic propaganda of the representatives of the successor states-this attitude compromised Hungary, which became fatefully involved with the losing imperialist group through the Monarchy and its alliance with the German Kaiser. Since the European events were not conducive to the alternative proposed by Kossuth after the defeat of the War of Liberation, namely, some kind of confederation of the small nations of the Danube basin, the elite which came to political power in Hungary with the Compromise of 1867 had to renounce the traditional, millenary concept of sovereign statehood, and accept responsibility, along with the Austrian ruling class, for the consequences of the mistaken foreign policy and incorrect nationalities policy.

Although during the decade and a half preceding the First World War the outlines of the weakness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had become clearly visible, the oppressed nations and nationalities invariably sought the solution to their problems within the Monarchy. In his work The Austrian Concept of State, published in 1865,¹⁴ Frantisek Palacky advocated the conversion of the Monarchy into a federal state, on the basis of eight ethnic groups. He was the author of the oft-quoted statement: "If Austria did not exist, it would have to be invented." Only a few years before the outbreak of the World War, T. G. Masaryk, then a university professor in Prague, still professed the views of Palacky and in general espoused only moderately nationalist principles. As late as 1908 he felt the demand for an independent Czech nation-state was utopistic. The Romanian writer from Transylvania, Aurel Popovici, in a work published in Leipzig in 1906, stressed the need for the unification of the small

nations along the Danube in face of the great power ambitions of Germany and Russia. Much like Palacky, he described the concept of a "Greater Austrian United States."¹⁵

Oszkar Jaszi, the Hungarian specialist of the nationalities issue, nurtured on the principles of bourgeois radicalism, would have liked to transform Hungary into an "Eastern Switzerland."¹⁶

The outbreak of the World War radicalized the politicians of the nationalities as it had Steed and Seton-Watson. Already in 1915 Masaryk began to proclaim, in the Entente countries, that one of the major war aims was the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In 1916, his disciple, the young Eduard Benes, published in Paris his work titled Detruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie! Masaryk and his circle strived with success to win an ever greater number of French, British, and American journalists, politicians, and diplomats to their cause. The same goes for other exiled politicians of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. There was no Hungarian counter-propaganda to speak of.

Mihaly Karolyi, an opponent of the war and the leader of the Karolyi Independence Party, became a key participant in the events only at the end of the war, at the time of the collapse. When the National Council was formed at the end of October 1918, and the bourgeois democratic revolution triumphed, Hungary too regained its national independence in the process of the dissolution of the Monarchy. The task which awaited Karolyi, now President of the Republic and its most prestigious personality, was to create the conditions for an independent state and defend the country against the attacking Czech and Romanian conquerors. But he gave pacifist illusions a free rein, helplessly tolerated the disintegration of the Hungarian armed forces, and proved incapable of assuming the leadership of a defensive struggle.

The January 8, 1918, message of President Wilson to both houses of Congress, in which he summarized the war and post-war objectives of the United States, determined the pacifist attitude of Karolyi. Among Wilson's Fourteen points, number ten dealt with the Habsburg Monarchy: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."¹⁷

The Fourteen points, the notion of a peace without victory, the right of self-determination, etc., had a particularly deep influence on

the nations of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. But the leaders of the Entente and of their allies in Central Europe believed already at that time that these beautiful principles applied only to the minority nationalities, and not to the Austrians, let alone the Hungarians. By November 1918 a number of facts indicated that the victorious powers regarded Wilsonianism as a thing of the past.

The amendment of the basic principles and the "updating" of point 10 concerning the Monarchy brought about the following essential modification enunciated in Wilson's speech on Independence Day, followed by his statement on September 27, to the effect that Slovakia was part of the Czechoslovak state, and Transylvania would undoubtedly join Romania.¹⁸ The obsoleteness of the Wilsonian principles was demonstrated later by other episodes involving Hungary: the failure to recognize the armistice signed at Padua, the military convention with Karolyi at Belgrade and its repeated infractions, hence the occupation of substantial portions of historical Hungary.

The National Council under the presidency of Karolyi still harbored illusions, as indicated by its proclamation of October 26. Here we read, in part: "In the spirit of the Wilsonian principles, and imbued with the hope that these principles not only do not threaten the territorial integrity of Hungary, but actually place it on a more secure footing. ... The nationalities problem was expected to be solved through the means of "cultural and administrative autonomy."¹⁹

In vain did the Karolyi government strive to reach an agreement with the nationalities, primarily the Romanians and the Slovaks: their representatives rejected all proposals. At the same time Czech and Romanian troops continued to penetrate into Slovakia and Transylvania. Even the events abroad should have dispelled all hopes based on the Fourteen Points. In the elections of November 5, Wilson's Democratic Party lost its former majority both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, and the victorious Republicans did not even want to hear of the lofty principles. Yet Mihaly Karolyi still outlined his foreign policy at the meeting of Independence Party, on December 30, 1918, in the following terms: "I base our foreign policy on the Wilsonian principles. I am confident that Wilson will triumph not only in America, but in Europe as well. The task awaiting America is to knead over all of Europe, to exterminate all thought of revenge within it, and to bring about a peace which will

not leave a bitter taste in the mouth of any nation."²⁰ Thus Karolyi, typically enough, proclaimed Wilsonianism as the basic principle of his foreign policy at a time when it was completely depasse, anachronistic, when Wilson himself was regarded as a defeated politician; his principles could no longer play a role in the policies of the allies. What is more, as we have seen, Wilson himself had several times modified his points, depriving them of their original, attractive, democratic content.

While the Karolyi government attempted to strengthen its international standing through the Italian and Yugoslav connections, as well as in other ways, the invasion of the imperialist Czech and Romanian forces, and the seriousness of the economic and political situation made the bourgeois democratic regime face insoluble tasks. The Allied directive designating a neutral zone in Hungary implied decisive military measures. Accordingly the Paris Peace Conference authorized the Romanian units to advance to the eastern limit of the neutral zone. This decision-which signified a death sentence for the Karolyi government-was taken in Paris on February 26, but was conveyed only in a note dated March 19. The note itself was handed to Mihaly Karolyi on March 20 by Lt. Colonel Fernand Vix, the official representative of the Great Powers in Budapest, accompanied by US Navy Captain Nicholas Roosevelt.²¹ Karolyi told Vix on the spot that no government could accept these demands; hence he would be obliged to resign. The following day, on March 21, Vix was handed Karolyi's negative answer.

Thus on March 21 the bankruptcy of the bourgeois democratic regime on the international scene became complete-an inevitable consequence of the policy of the Great Powers. The so-called Vix memorandum was only the climax of the policy with which the victorious Western Entente, giving way to its imperialist greed, forced the pro-entente Karolyi government to resign. True enough, the Karolyi government had internal weaknesses and made diplomatic mistakes, but its blind faith in a no-longer-existent Wilsonian pacifism also contributed to the collapse, to the proclamation of the proletarian dictatorship, to the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

The news of the proclamation of the Soviet Republic surprised the Paris Peace Conference, which was now inclined to negotiate. The fiasco of the Vix policy line, the Hungarian revolution, and the insecurity of the surrounding states, made the victorious powers more

cautious. Accordingly, the Peace Conference sent General Jan Christian Smuts, member of the British war cabinet and delegate to the conference, to Budapest. At this time the Anglo-American attitude prevailed in Paris, whereas the French tendency was relegated to the background. Thus, Smuts left France on April 1 on a special train and reached Vienna, via Switzerland, on April 3. From there he continued on his journey to Budapest accompanied by Elek Bolgar, the Hungarian Consul in Vienna, and arrived at daybreak on April 4. The general and his escort did not leave the train, and did not accept the lodgings offered to them. Yet he reacted realistically to the conditions in Hungary during his negotiations with Bela Kun. For instance, he accepted Kun's proposal to hold a conference with the participation of the governments of central European states (Hungary, Austria, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Romania) and in the presence of the representatives of the Great Powers, especially for the sake of economic cooperation. His proposal regarding the establishment of a neutral zone was more favorable than the one contained in the Vix note, because it would have pushed the line of the Romanian troops about 25 kilometers further East. Furthermore, he made promises regarding the lifting of the economic blockade and the invitation of Hungarian representatives to the Peace Conference. He did not, however, offer a guarantee regarding any of this. In his reply, Bela Kun rejected the revised demands of the Great Powers, and insisted on Allied adherence to the Belgrade Convention. With this reply in his pocket, Smuts left Budapest 48 hours after his arrival.

It was not the counterproposal of Kun that played the decisive role in the interruption of the negotiations, because that note of the Hungarian government was conducive to further negotiations. The unfavorable turn took place in Paris where the aggressive Czechoslovakian and Romanian elements under French guidance busied themselves with projects of armed intervention.²² The American peace delegation, however, was not at all in agreement with military intervention, and felt that resorting to Czech and Romanian troops was a poor idea. General T. H. Bliss pointed out in no uncertain terms that contact should be maintained with the Council government. What's more, he added: in case the Hungarian government did not accept the line of the neutral zone, and resorted to arms to defend itself against the Romanian troops, the Entente

should withdraw its support from Romania because the lines of the neutral zone were absolutely unjust, therefore the Allies must not continue to carry out an unusually unjust decision.²³

While the Romanian and Czechoslovakian governments supported the most aggressive elements of the Entente (Marshal Foch and Winston Churchill) intent on the project of immediate military intervention, finally the Great Powers did not opt for open intervention. They were eager to maintain the appearance of not interfering in the affairs of the Republic of Councils. They intended to force the hand of Hungary by relatively "peaceful" means, such as the economic blockade.²⁴ Such a policy, however, gave the Council breathing space and the opportunity to organize its military forces and fight in order to repel the Romanian and Czech imperialist forces which had penetrated deep into its territory. It succeeded in averting danger along the northern front by throwing the Czech forces back a considerable distance.

As a consequence of the successful northern campaign the Peace Conference insisted by its note verbale of June 7 that the Hungarian Red Army halt its advance, and promised in return that the representatives of the Council would be received in Paris-which would have signified the de facto recognition of the Republic of Councils.²⁵ In reality it was a matter of substituting diplomatic war for military intervention, and the Czech bayonets which had failed, while preserving the same objectives. In the words of Harold Nicolson: "They have decided to get rid of Bela Kun ... "²⁶

Of course, the Council rejected this note, the plain purpose of which was to stop the Red Army. In Paris, on June 9 and 10, the Council of the Four debated the Hungarian reply amidst mutual reproaches. The British general, Wilson, pointed out that the attack was initiated by the Czechoslovak army, provoking the Hungarian counterattack. Lloyd George underlined the responsibility of the Romanian government and army, since their repeated infraction of the demarcation line, the army's attack and advance, brought about a situation which, as he stated, made even the officer class of the old army side with Kun.²⁷ The telegrams sent by the Council of Four on June 13 to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were not couched in the same terms. The telegrams demanded of Hungary that it withdraw its troops from Slovakia, and hinted at the possibility of withdrawing the Romanian forces from the Tisza in exchange. While the Council in Hungary received no guarantee to that effect, it

nevertheless accepted the ultimatum proposed by Clemenceau, acting as the chairman of the Peace Conference. The consequences are well known: the Hungarian Red Army evacuated Slovakia, whereas the Romanian troops did not retreat. What's more, a critical situation developed along the Tisza eventually leading to the defeat of the Red Army, its complete disintegration, and the fall of the Republic of Councils.

A Case Study on Trianon