A Case Study on Trianon

There were many precipitants of the turnabout that occurred in French Danubian policy. At all events those political changes that followed the January 1920 French presidential elections played a significant role in it. Deshanel and Millerand replaced Poincare and Clemenceau. The new president and prime minister, but mainly the permanent secretary for foreign affairs, Paleologue, began seriously to consider a plan whereby they would create on the territory of the Monarchy a trustworthy, economically unified Danubian power under French influence, which might be a prop for both its German and its Russian policy. That is to say, they felt that this power might thwart Germany's eastward expansion, and at the same time counterbalance the so-called Bolshevik danger coming from the east. Their goal, therefore-as we shall see-remained unchanged: their predecessors-Poincare and Clemenceau-had also struggled to achieve the same end, first with weapons and then through diplomacy; in taking military steps, as well as in imposing the peace terms, they kept this goal uppermost in their minds. The change manifested itself in the means through which the goal was implemented, for it should be noted that from the outset serious conflicts arose in French political circles concerning the "bows" of the process. Here-just as in international life in general-two tendencies contended with each other. One faction wanted to achieve its goal by imposing severe peace terms, by weakening the enemy to the greatest extent possible, and by strengthening their eastern allies. The devotees of the other tendency-the so-called reconciliationists-regarded as insufficient a security policy resting on the

victorious successor states and limited only to that. They did not regard an economically and politically dismembered, "Balkanized" Eastern Europe as a suitable counter-weight to the German and so-called Russian danger. The new leaders at the Quai d'Orsay wanted to unify the small successor states-regardless of whether they were victors or vanquished-either within the framework of a Danubian confederation, or with the aid of a Habsburg restoration. The two ideas were conceived at one time, and existed parallel with each other. In the beginning they experimented with the former; later-when it became evident that every Danubian state was turning against this French plan-with the latter.

Millerand started from the position that previous French policy, which relied only on the victorious successor states, was not suitable for securing East Europe for France. This previous policy pitted two states-Austria and Hungary, countries that were quite important from an economic, geographic, and strategic point of view-against France, which could have resulted in strengthening the influence of England and Italy on these territories, and in the long run driving them both into the arms of Germany. This latter possibility had an especially alarming effect on the leaders of French diplomacy.

Why did Hungary become the central link in French Danubian policy; why did Millerand and Paleologue wish to unite the Danubian states around Budapest-in brief, why did their choice fall on precisely that country with which until then they had the most antagonistic of relations?

The reasons are multi-faceted. From the viewpoint of the building up of a Danubian economic bloc, it seemed most practicable to make Vienna or Budapest the center, since they had at one time played a leading role. Geographic, economic, and transportation considerations argued in favor of this move. It is not accidental, therefore, that the English and Italian conceptions of economic federation also had the same starting point. Nor is it accidental that both, but chiefly the English, decided, as did the French, in favor of Hungary.

What advantage did Budapest have over Vienna?

Above all, while in Austria an uncertain, anarchic state of affairs prevailed, i.e., a left-wing government was in power that could not master the situation and a further shift to the left was to be feared, in Hungary a conservative counter-revolutionary system had come to power that seemed capable of "consolidating" its domestic politics. And from the standpoint of investment of Western capital, this was

extraordinarily important, for both England and Italy, as well as France, wished to implement their plans with the assistance of their private enterprises, and these, in the last analysis, were not willing to take risks.² Besides its domestic political situation, the geographic position of Hungary also represented an advantage over Austria.³

The choice also fell on Hungary because it was a secure point in the assistance to be extended to Poland⁴-this fact played a very important role with Millerand, the chief organizer of the third intervention-and further because France's ideas were received more sympathetically in Budapest than in Vienna, and the Hungarians were prepared for greater economic sacrifices. For Hungary, cooperation with the French was the sole way out of a catastrophic economic situation. For Austria-although at the beginning of 1920 it had already begun to orient itself towards France-Anschluss always figured as a realistic possibility, a possibility that might cure the economic ills of the country.

And last but not least, Millerand and Paleologue wanted to pacify Hungary, the most unsettled state in the Danube basin, which was not willing to acknowledge the changes that had occurred, and refused to sign the peace treaty, or rather, stalled the longest. This, naturally, was no accident. The peace terms were the most severe in the case of Hungary. The Hungarian government justified its refusal to sign the peace treaty not only by referring to the territorial losses, but also by bringing up the economic non-viability of the country within the given frontiers. The Millerand faction wished to disarm this opposition by the prospect of economic and political support.⁵ For it was obvious that without Hungary the economic and political consolidation of the Danube basin was inconceivable.

Who initiated the Franco-Hungarian negotiations? What did they involve and on what did the parties to the discussions agree?

In February of 1920-shortly after Millerand came to power-a turnabout occurred in the relations between France and Hungary. The new leaders at the Quai d'Orsay recognized Hungary's importance for their East European plans,⁶ while in Hungary a foreign policy conception that saw the happiness of the country in a French orientation gained the upper hand. This change naturally was not independent of the one that occurred in France. Already much earlier, before and after the peace negotiations, the Francophile faction was in touch with those French circles that were preparing to assume power. Behind the continual delay in sending the Hungarian peace

delegation,⁷ and the total rejection of the peace terms, there lay the desire to mark time until the January elections, to which they attached great hopes. And when after the French elections a changing of the guard took place, and it was obvious that the hopes were being vindicated, the leaders in Budapest were prepared for an unambiguous French orientation.⁸ They were all the more prepared for this because they had to acknowledge with disappointment that in the foreign policy of Great Britain the Foreign Office line had prevailed, which from the start had disapproved of the pro-Hungarian policy of Lloyd George and the House of Lords, and defended the interests of the victorious successor states.

Under the impact of the above-noted changes in France and Britain, more and more Hungarian politicians became pro-French. The main representatives of the French line were Pal Teleki, Imre Csaky, and Karoly Halmos. It was due to their activity that the English-oriented Miklos Horthy finally, if slowly, accepted their ideas, and supported a Franco-Hungarian rapprochement. Later the hitherto anti-French-minded Albert Apponyi also followed suit. This line was especially strengthened with Pal Teleki's assumption of the foreign minister's seat (April 1920). Following this the rapprochement of the two states also started on the governmental level. The Franco-Hungarian negotiations proceeded on a parallel course in Paris and Budapest.

The first Franco-Hungarian conversation took place on March 17, 1920, on the initiative of the Hungarian side. Karoly Halmos, on the instructions of his government sought out Paleologue, and submitted the following proposals to him: France should change its policy vis-a-vis Hungary; it should support the plan for Franco-Hungarian cooperation; it should foster negotiations between Hungary and the neighboring states and lend its support behind the settlement of economic and political questions.⁹ Paleologue received the Hungarian initiative sympathetically, for the proposals submitted to him fit in wonderfully with his idea concerning the Danube basin. Having discussed the proposals with Millerand, he made contact with the members of the Hungarian peace delegation who had remained in Paris, namely: Imre Csaky, Pal Teleki, and Boldizsar Lang. As is well known, Apponyi, the president of the peace delegation, refused to sign the peace terms and returned to Hungary, but numerous members of the delegation remained in Paris. At these initial exploratory conversations, the Hungarian side outlined the

economic and political situation of Hungary as well as a plan for its economic reconstruction, which they wished to carry out with external assistance. They did not fail to mention the interest of Great Britain and Italy in this undertaking and informed the French side of the Hungarian government's decision to give preference to France in its search for a solution to the problem. For his part, the French permanent foreign secretary acquainted them, in broad outline, with the plan concerning a unified Danubian bloc, and the intended role of Hungary in it. He sketched out the economic ideas of the French government, according to which French capitalist groups would extend assistance in the economic reconstruction of Hungary. The beneficiaries on the French side of the economic agreement, to be created with the assistance of the French government, would be the firm of Schneider-Creusot. The question of territorial revision was bruited already at these first discussions in Paris. Although he emphasized that this would be the most difficult question,¹⁰ Paleologue was ready to discuss the reannexation of purely Hungarian border territories.¹¹

Following this, the Hungarian delegation returned to Budapest to inform the government of the results of this first conversation, and to seek guidance for future ones. After their arrival home they met with Horthy. The regent was sympathetic to the plan concerning Franco-Hungarian cooperation.¹² He called a conference of the members of the government as well as the members of the peace delegation staying in Budapest, at which they debated the general situation, the possibility of the new orientation, and the economic and political plan of the French government. The participants at the conference decided in favor of accepting the French proposals. They decided to suspend the English economic negotiations then in progress, recalling at the last moment the Hungarian delegation that was to leave for London to conclude the Danube shipping agreement. They urged the earliest possible start of Franco-Hungarian economic negotiations, which was to deal, inter alia, with the construction of a commercial harbor in Budapest. They decided further on a halt to anti-French press attacks, the introduction of censorship aimed at this, as well as on the formation of a government capable of carrying out these grandiose plans.¹³

However, the turn to the new foreign policy orientation did not prove an easy task. Both in political circles and in public opinion a strong anti-French mood predominated; they attributed the hated

peace treaty to France, and the high commissioners of Great Britain and Italy in Budapest-Hohler and Cerrutti-also deliberately inflamed this mood.

In the reports he sent to the Quai d'Orsay, Fouchet, the French high commissioner in Budapest, gave a detailed account of the Franco-phobia existing in the country, of the role played in this by his English and Italian colleagues, of their efforts to draw Hungary under British and Italian influence, respectively. Already as a charge d'affaires, Fouchet was busily engaged in improving Franco-Hungarian relations. On the basis of instructions from the Quai d'Orsay he did his utmost to prepare the ground for the prospective agreement. He endeavored to quiet the Franco-phobia which manifested itself ever more openly and virulently in government circles, in the press, as well as in public opinion.¹⁴ He established close contacts with the Hungarian aristocracy, above all with Archduke Joseph, whom he wished at all costs to place on the Hungarian throne,¹⁵ as well as with Albert Apponyi, the president of the peace delegation, whom he had to win over for the French plans and for the peace treaty. He established close relations with several responsible politicians, among them Horthy himself. In the first week of April he met on two occasions with the Regent.¹⁶ He conferred with Prime Minister Simonyi-Semadam, Foreign Minister Teleki, and Permanent Foreign Secretary Kanya. The formerly noncommittal politicians all of a sudden became accommodating and friendly. All of them expressed their agreement with the French orientation of Hungary. During these discussions the question of territorial revision came up, naturally; Apponyi sought radical revision, while the prime minister sought a plebiscite in the northern counties, with the aim of bringing into existence a Hungarian-Polish border (which he regarded as a joint Franco-Hungarian interest), from which he anticipated the re-annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine and Eastern Slovakia.¹⁷

Simonyi-Semadam recommended to Millerand consideration of his position, cautioning the French Prime Minister, according to Fouchet's report, that "if France wants to acquire those unprecedented economic benefits that present themselves in Hungary, it has to make those not very significant political concessions. A gesture on the part of France would at this moment be quite useful."¹⁸ At this time the French representative in Budapest sent several reports to the Quai d'Orsay. He reported on the efforts of the

Hungarian government on behalf of the new political orientation, on the tangible results of the efforts, on the complete cessation of press attacks against France (articles and publications were, on the orders of the press chief, shown to him before they appeared) on the appearance in Pester Lloyd of a pro-French article written by Istvan Bethlen, who took an open stand in favor of the Franco-Hungarian rapprochement,¹⁹ and finally, on the serious preparations made for the formation of a pro-French government. Adherents of an English orientation would be excluded from the new government, Fouchet reported, above all Finance Minister Koranyi, who had already committed himself to the English with promises and agreements. The government would be headed by Apponyi or Teleki, the foreign ministry by Csaky.

In the following weeks Fouchet regarded support for the formation of a pro-French government as his first priority, because-in his words-"the implementation of great decisions depends on this."²⁰

Meanwhile in Paris, too, which was the second site of the Franco-Hungarian negotiations, an important advance occurred. On April 12 Halmos returned to the French capital with maps, plans, proposals, as well as a personal message from Horthy. The next day he called on Paleologue and conveyed the Regent's message to the French government. According to the message Horthy accepted and supported Hungary's pro-French policy, was ready to support with his full authority the political program that had been embarked upon and was prepared to use all his influence to help support this policy. He hoped that in a short time a 500,000-man unified army composed of courageous and loyal soldiers could be created within the framework of a Franco-Hungarian agreement.²¹ Halmos mentioned in addition that Horthy viewed the creation of a pro-French government as one of his top-priority tasks. For the office of prime minister they had picked Apponyi, who would accept it on the condition that France had confidence in him. Moreover, he also broached the question of territorial revision, raising the question in a peculiar way, indeed, departing from the instructions he received in Budapest. That is, he was not seeking border rectifications from France, only its support for a solution to the problem that would be arrived at by the interested parties themselves. Finally, he transmitted the Hungarian government's proposal concerning economic cooperation.²²

Paleologue received Horthy's message and the economic program sympathetically. Moreover, he didn't raise any objection to

Apponyi's appointment. He noted that he would be glad to see Teleki in the foreign minister's seat.²³ On April 15, at Paleologue's request, Halmos called on Count Saint-Sauveur, the director of the Schneider-Creusot firm, and discussed the economic program with him. They agreed in principle on every question.²⁴

On April 16 Millerand received Halmos. The conversation took place in a friendly atmosphere. They discussed the details of the planned economic agreement, the signing of which they set for the end of April. The French prime minister promised that they would postpone the transmittal of the final peace terms.²⁵

During his one-week sojourn in Paris, Halmos achieved significant results. He had in essence arrived at an agreement with the Schneider-Creusot firm, and succeeded in bridging differences of a political character and in gaining the support of the French side for definite frontier adjustments. The time for the signing of the preliminary agreement had arrived. Halmos requested that the people designated to attend be sent to Paris.²⁶ The signing that was planned for the end of April, however, did not take place. The Franco-Hungarian negotiations came to a sudden standstill. The French side began postponing the signing, pushing back the date. Because of "work pressures" Millerand did not receive Bethlen and Csaky, who meanwhile arrived in Paris. Paleologue-alluding to a series of questions that still needed to be clarified-kept delaying further negotiations.

Why did the Quai d'Orsay pull up short? What suddenly made Millerand so preoccupied, and what disturbed Paleologue's clearsightedness? Primarily the Hungarian government's memorandum of April 23. The memorandum and appended map, which the Hungarian government had delivered to the French foreign ministry through Bethlen, requested the reannexation of territories, in exchange for a French orientation, economic concessions, and an agreement or even a modus vivendi, with the neighboring states. The territories were as follows: Pozsony and environs, Eastern Slovakia, the Csallokoz, Carpathian Ukraine, the Hungarian Kisalfold, those parts of Nograd and Hont counties that were indispensible to the strategic security of Budapest, the northern part of the Bacska up to the Franz Joseph canal, the disputed corner of the Bacska, and the German part of the Banat. In addition, they sought territorial autonomy for the Transylvanian Hungarians and Saxons and the

right to a plebiscite for the population of Western Hungary and the Banat, to determine whether they wanted to become citizens of Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, or Romania. And, finally, they requested a modification of the military aspects of the peace terms.²⁷

The content of the memorandum clearly proves that the Hungarian government was not, even in the fall of 1920, capable of rational compromise, that Apponyi's unrealistic aspirations continued to determine the foreign policy of Hungary, the irrationality of which is also pointed out by Lloyd George in his memoirs. He states that the Hungarian delegation would have achieved much better results if, instead of totally rejecting the territorial changes that had in any case been already implemented in practice, it had concentrated its efforts on individual border questions, as did the other delegations, in which case it could have achieved definite border rectifications.²⁸

The demands laid down in the April 23 memorandum were unacceptable to the French government.

Another reason for the standstill in the Franco-Hungarian negotiations was the vacillation of the Schneider-Creusot firm. Although the firm's director, Count Saint-Sauveur, agreed in principle with Halmos, still he began to waver at the end of April. He studiously weighed the possibilities of the Hungarian ideas.²⁹ His vacillation was in all probability related to the April 23 memorandum of the Hungarian government and to the impact that that had on the Quai d'Orsay. The thing came full circle: the Hungarian-French negotiations reached a dead end. The French government did not accept the memorandum even as a basis for discussion.

Halmos, who did not agree with the content of the memorandum in question, sent new notes to Paleologue on April 23, without the approval of Budapest; in these he summarized the results of the negotiations to date and set forth the territorial demands. According to these he requested the reannexation of exclusively Hungarian-inhabited territories, and a plebiscite for the Carpathian Ukraine. Paleologue accepted the Halmos memorandum as a basis for discussion. Subsequently, however, the Hungarian government attempted on several occasions to supplement the memorandum.³⁰ Bethlen and Csaky, too, tried to do just this when they arrived in Paris on April 28 with the aim of concluding the negotiations on the basis of the April 23 memorandum and of signing the agreement. Their efforts,

however, were without result. The note prepared by them,³¹ which sought to correct, or rather, supplement, the Halmos note, was acknowledged by Paleologue only as a point of information.

The discussions were scheduled to continue on May 4. In the morning the members of the Hungarian delegation held a conversation with the director of the Schneider-Creusot firm, with whom they reached an agreement on the question of leasing the Hungarian railways, while in the afternoon they debated the political part of the agreement with Paleologue. The French permanent secretary for foreign affairs informed the members of the Hungarian delegation confidentially of the latest note of the French government, which was a response to the Halmos memorandum. According to this, France would support Hungary in correcting the economic or ethnic injustices inherent in the peace treaty, and in creating a treaty that would promote an agreement between Hungary and her neighbors. It was presumed that all this would be done without touching the basic structure of the peace. During the discussions Paleologue stressed on several occasions that France had firmly resolved to rely on Hungary in the execution of its East European policy. For a long time it had wavered between Austria and Hungary, but after serious consideration had decided in favor of the Hungarians. Accordingly it wished, within the given possibilities, to strengthen Hungary economically and politically. In exchange, the Hungarian government would commit itself to a pro-French policy, as well as to reaching an agreement with the neighboring states. This latter question received an especially great emphasis in succeeding discussions; it may be said that it comprised a decisive element. The permanent secretary for foreign affairs stressed that it was the conviction of the French government that peace in East Europe could only be consolidated if the interested nations came to a mutual agreement and reached an understanding on rational and reasonable border adjustments. Csaky and Bethlen, in accordance with instructions from Budapest, attempted to get clarification on how and by what means the French government wished to support the demands of the Hungarians vis-a-vis their neighbors. How could it force them to accept Hungarian claims? Paleologue, however, did his utmost to avoid giving a direct answer. He referred to certain economic means which they wished to employ to this end.³² The French permanent secretary for foreign affairs was therefore quite aware that they did not possess such means, nor did he himself trust in the efficacy of the

economic pressure he referred to. At the end of the discussions Paleologue informed Bethlen and Csaky that the final peace terms would be transmitted the next day to Praznovszky, Hungary's representative in Paris. In the attached covering letter there even appeared a reference to the possibility of a revision of the peace.³³ This letter was made to appear as the work of the French government. The letter was signed, in the name of the Council of Ambassadors, by Millerand, the then-president. For this reason, the Hungarian government, contemporaries, as well as historians have ascribed the document primarily to the French prime minister. Our research does not support this. Quite the contrary, it proves that in opposition to common belief, the letter with the disclosure of Paleologue was not the work of Millerand. At the Conference of Ambassadors the French did not at first agree with the English, American, and Italian proposal concerning the question referred to.³⁴

The question has come up: Why did the French government take a position opposed to the Entente proposal, which in essence embodied Millerand's aspirations as well. Probably because the French feared that their allies, who had already advocated milder peace terms at the peace negotiations, wished in this way to implement their ideas-that is, to bring the peace treaty into being on the basis of these conditions. The Millerand faction, however, was opposed to any more significant alteration of the peace terms, especially if it were to occur with the aid of England or Italy. They assented to certain modifications, but they wished to effectuate these themselves; they wanted them to be linked to their name alone, and for this reason-as we have seen-they demanded heavy reparations.

A Case Study on Trianon