A Case Study on Trianon

Until fairly recently most of the documentation available was Hungarian and obviously partisan.² Piotr S. Wandycz's authoritative France and Her Eastern Allies³ was written before the French archives were opened. These throw a great deal more light on the subject, but still leave certain gaps due to inadequacies of recording. It is the purpose of this article to explore French relations with Hungary in the context of central Europe as a whole. Whilst the nature of Paleologue's involvement remains rather obscure, it will be suggested that Hungarian expectations were much exaggerated, that the change of course in the autumn of 1920 was neither an about-turn nor due solely to Paleologue's resignation, and that French policy in east central Europe lacked coordination.

During the war French governing and official circles had not been anxious to break up the Habsburg Empire. In the end the French led the way in recognizing the Czechoslovak National Council, but they did not bring to the peace conference a plan for the settlement in

central Europe. French conservatives thought of a new Danubian union and criticized the settlement as it emerged from the conference; but the French delegation supported Czechoslovak claims against Hungary.⁴ As the Italians, who were strongly opposed to anything like a revival of the Empire, were suspicious of French talk of a confederation while the French were opposed to a union between the new Austrian republic and Germany, the possibility of a bargain arose: France would not support a Danubian union if Italy would oppose an Anschluss.⁵ It does not seem that there was ever an actual agreement to this effect, but there is evidence of a tacit understanding. Hungary seems to have been largely ignored by the French until after the fall of Bela Kun's communist regime, but in the winter of 1919 they began to think about it as a component in a barrier against Germany, a field of economic opportunity, and a source of trouble if not brought under French influence. French representatives in the region feared that Britain had got there first and was favoring the reactionaries. The author of a memorandum of early January 1920, advocating a French initiative, did so at least in part on the ground that French influence in Hungary would mean democracy.⁶

Britain was indeed at this time thought of as the special guardian of Hungary. The Allied flotilla on the Danube was commanded by a British admiral; an Englishman, Sir George Clerk, had been sent to Hungary by the Supreme Council in September 1919 to disentangle the political situation after the fall of Bela Kun; the Austrian section of the Reparation Commission (which at this time covered Hungary) was headed by another Englishman. Admiral Troubridge was accused of supporting the candidacy for the Hungarian throne of Archduke Joseph, head of a branch of the Habsburg family long settled in Hungary; and the British High Commissioner, T. B. Hohler, who arrived in Budapest early in 1920, was an old friend of Admiral Horthy, the Governor and alter Regent.⁷ British firms were among the many active in central Europe hoping to buy up assets cheaply and take over from German interests. For example a group which included the shipowner and Minister of Munitions, Lord Inverforth, was seeking a controlling interest in Danube shipping, and early in 1920 asked (in vain) for British government guarantees of fiscal privilege in Austria.⁸ All in all, although the Foreign Office did not pay much attention to Hungary, the French fears were not without color.

The new Hungarian frontiers were adopted by the Supreme Council

in the summer of 1919, but it was not until January 1920 that a Hungarian delegation arrived in Paris to be handed the peace terms. A group of businessmen arrived at about the same time: they had economic openings to offer and hoped that France would support improvements in the treaty. At this time, as was clear at the Allied conference in London in February and March, both the British and the Italians were more willing than the French to consider revising the territorial provisions: the suggestion eventually embodied in the Allied note of 6 May, that the commissions entrusted with frontier demarcation could suggest minor modifications, came from the British.⁹ About the middle of March, however, there began intensive negotiations for economic concessions to a group headed by Schneider-Creusot, in return for which, the Hungarians hoped, the French Government would take the lead in securing extensive territorial revisions. The initiative seems to have been taken by Dr. Charles Halmos, a lawyer and member of the Hungarian business group, who evidently fancied himself as a political intermediary. The Hungarian version of events is that Halmos obtained from Paleologue a promise to encourage negotiations with Hungary's neighbors and a forecast that if the economic concessions were granted, Hungary would be made the centre of a new combination in central Europe. After visiting Budapest Halmos gave Paleologue a list of the Hungarian desiderata: territory including the Grosse Schutt island, Bratislava and southern Slovakia, Ruthenia or at least a plebiscite there, parts of Transylvania, the Baczka and southern Baranya; also autonomy for minorities in Rumania, plebiscites in west Hungary and the Banat, and economic facilities. In reply Paleologue is said to have given Halmos a note, dated 15 April, setting out the bases for a Hungarian-Rumanian agreement meeting most of the wishes that concerned Rumania, stating that there would be a Franco-Hungarian military and economic convention, and promising that the French Government would declare willingness to intervene in favor of Hungary and would carry out the plan when the note had been ratified by the Hungarian National Assembly.¹⁰

This document, which Deak treats as genuine despite the fact that its authenticity was denied, in 1927, by Halmos as well as by Paleologue, reads much more like a Hungarian than a French note. Even according to the Hungarians, Paleologue on all other occasions gave only general assurances and said the rapprochement would be a long-term affair; and no explanation is offered as to why, if this

document is genuine, he should suddenly have committed himself so far. There is no copy of the note in the French archives, but they contain a letter from Halmos of 22 March with a memorandum on the bases for a Hungarian-Rumanian agreement which are identical with those of the supposed Paleologue note. In another letter Halmos summarized a conversation on 17 March in which Paleologue apparently offered help in bringing Hungary and her neighbors together but held out no hope of territorial changes. Paleologue gave Halmos an introduction to the French High Commissioner in Budapest, Maurice Fouchet, and told the Romanian Minister in Paris of the proposals. Fouchet reported that France was regarded as the chief author of the peace terms but the government was considering a rapprochement and he thought some gesture would be useful to secure the economic advantages.¹¹ Halmos, according to his own note, told Paleologue on 12 April that he could give complete satisfaction on economic matters and was charged by Horthy to convey approval of the orientation of Hungarian policy towards France and the political program outlined so far, and pointed out that the Hungarian army would be available as soon as agreement was reached. On 14 April Halmos sent the Comte de Saint-Sauveur, a director of Schneider-Creusot, a note on the openings available to French groups: they included the state railways, state factories, construction of a Danube-Theiss canal, port works at Budapest, and privately-owned utilities. At a luncheon next day Paleologue listed concessions in which French firms might be interested, and agreed that the Schneider group would examine them at once. As for the political side, Halmos on 23 April sent Paleologue a note of what he, describing himself as Horthy's representative, proposed: a secret agreement that France would facilitate conversations between Hungary and her neighbors on frontier modifications, autonomy for minorities in Romania, plebiscites in several border areas, and economic advantages; and Hungary would put her economic and military forces at France's disposal, would be prepared to make alliances with states designated by France, and would give guarantees that arms supplied to her would not be used against France or France's allies. The agreement would come into force as soon as the French group took up the options under negotiation.¹²

Thus far it is clear from the French evidence that Paleologue was promoting the economic negotiations and had held out a prospect of Hungary playing a part in the new central European order. But that

he had made specific offers or approved Hungarian territorial claims seems most unlikely, and this is indirectly confirmed by instructions given to Hungarian officials who were now sent to Paris. The Foreign Minister, Count Teleki, stated that the negotiations must be on the basis of reciprocal advantage, the concessions must all come into force together, and France must give some indication of how Hungary's neighbors were to be made to surrender territory. But the most important thing was to secure France's good will. The officials, Count Bethlen, Count Csaky and the director of the state railways, M. Tolnay, thought that Halmos had gone rather too far with Paleologue, especially in describing himself as Horthy's representative, and recommended that the options to be given to Schneider-Creusot should be made conditional on some definite political assurance from the French government. On 4 May agreement was reached on the French group taking over the Hungarian railways; but on the political side Csaky and Bethlen got no more from Paleologue than an assurance that the French government would express willingness to promote agreements between Hungary and her neighbours.¹³

The final peace terms, little altered from those of January, were handed to the Hungarian delegation on 6 May. They caused great agitation in Budapest, but the government attached much weight to the promise in the Allied covering letter, that the frontier demarcation commissions would be able to suggest minor adjustments. The fact that the letter was signed by Millerand enabled the Hungarians to regard it as evidence of French good will. More concretely, the French undertook that if the peace treaty was signed and the economic deals concluded, they would declare that France was ready to facilitate conversations between Hungary and her neighbours, and to lend her good offices to any agreements which, without affecting the general structure of the treaty, would correct minor injustices.¹⁴ Fouchet read the draft declaration to Horthy and his ministers on 18 May, with encouraging effect; and the peace treaty was signed on 4 June.

By this time the negotiations had become public knowledge and Teleki was subjected, according to Fouchet, to public anger and British efforts to discredit France. Rumours had begun to reach the British in Budapest in the middle of April but the ambassador in Paris, Lord Derby, whilst prepared to believe that French officials had used language that might have encouraged the Hungarians,

could see no sign of French efforts to alleviate the peace terms.¹⁵ The reports multiplied and became increasingly circumstantial, until finally the Hungarian Prime Minister confirmed to Hohler on 26 May that negotiations were taking place and said that he supposed the Allies had come to some arrangement. The Foreign Office did not take very seriously the alleged French offer to obtain territorial revisions, but Hohler was instructed to tell the Hungarians that there was no Anglo-French understanding and the reported offers were contrary to the terms of the peace treaty.¹⁶ As for the public, according to Teleki 'responsible circles' in Budapest were saying that even a guarantee of territorial integrity-in other words, restoration of the whole of the old kingdom of Hungary-would not compensate for loss of control over the railways. The Hungarian Government therefore redoubled its efforts to pin the French down to a precise commitment, while the French demanded written confirmation that Horthy approved the business deals. Eventually on 21 June options were handed over, for the lease of the state railways and locomotive works, for the construction of a port at Budapest, and for control of the General Credit Bank. Next day Fouchet conveyed the French declaration, which spoke in general terms of the government's conviction that prosperity and peace in central Europe depended on the collaboration of all the states concerned, of its readiness to facilitate conversations between Hungary and her neighbours and to lend its good offices to any friendly agreement to correct minor injustices in accordance with the Allied letter of 6 May, and especially its willingness to facilitate discussions about restoring communications. The declaration would come into force when the economic agreements had been ratified. Paleologue refused to make any more definite promises, but Fouchet thought it important to give the Hungarians something quickly. He reported their immediate wishes as permission to recruit the army by conscription, delay (at least) in handing over the western counties allotted to Austria, speedy Romanian and Yugoslav evacuation of occupied territory, early examination of minorities questions, and making Budapest the headquarters of the International Commission on the Danube.¹⁷

These requests, and one for a separate Hungarian section of the Reparation Commission, were repeated formally after the options were handed over. Paleologue approved the comment of Quai d'Orsay officials, that France was not responsible for imposing the system of voluntary recruitment for the armies of the defeated countries but

believed that the same system must apply to all of them. She must not take the initiative but could agree to examine the question provided a modification did not endanger any other country. No promise could be given on the western counties nor any initiative taken on the evacuation of occupied territory. France could not intervene on behalf of Magyar minorities as such but could try to rectify injustices both in occupied territory and, for Allied subjects, in Hungary itself. There was no objection to the International Commission having its seat at Budapest, and a separate section of the Reparation Commission could be welcomed. On 24 June Laroche, the assistant Political Director, tried to explain to Csaky and Halmos what could and could not be done. Eventually they accepted his assurance that Hungary would be treated impartially, but said that if the options were to be ratified Hungarian opinion must be given something to show that a pro-French orientation was worth-while. Laroche conceded this, but said that the French Government could not make statements that would be interpreted as a change of policy and abandonment of France's allies.¹⁸

Where, as in the case of this conversation, it is possible to compare Hungarian and French accounts directly, it becomes obvious that the Hungarians put the most favourable possible construction on French statements. A striking feature of the whole story is indeed the Hungarians' wishful thinking. Sir George Clerk had commented in the previous November on their delusion that the Allies needed peace more than they did.¹⁹ Now it was not just Halmos, politically inexperienced and self-important, who seems to have believed it possible to get the peace terms changed or ignored. Teleki evidently shared the illusion: his attempts to get a statement as to how the desired promises were to be carried out betray some doubt about French ability to control the countries concerned-doubt which was certainly justified in view of the difficulty the Supreme Council had had in controlling the Romanian advance in the autumn of 1919-but not enough doubt as to whether the promises were within the French Government's power to make. The explanation is presumably that the Hungarian political class was both desperate and ignorant. It had not yet met the new Europe; it was devoted to the unitary kingdom of St. Stephen; the economy was in a state of collapse; and so it overcame its hesitations about the concessions and clutched at any hope of outside aid. As for what the French promised, there is no reason to think that it was anything specific. That

general assurances of good will were given is not in question. From the French point of view there was no ground for lasting hostility to Hungary. Even if the idea of a confederation had been abandoned, including her in a new regional system made good sense, and geographically Budapest was a suitable centre. But if the Hungarians believed that meant French help in overturning the peace settlement, they were victims of their own desires more than of changes in French diplomacy. Their boasting of French support helped to create the coalition of their enemies; but Paleologue was far too experienced to make rash promises, and even before his departure, the support the Hungarians actually received was small.

On the economic side Schneider-Creusot and French banks were building an empire in central Europe. The Schneider group's most important undertakings, however, were in Czechoslovakia, and they were not able ultimately to exploit all the available openings.²⁰ Hungarian assets were on offer to the highest bidder. When in July British representatives tried to explain that France had no power to promise to alter the territorial provisions of the treaty, and alienation of state assets seemed incompatible with the reparation clauses, the Hungarians simply asked for British counter-offers.²¹

The French Government informed other countries in the region about the economic agreements and the declaration of 22 June. Csaky, who saw the instructions, told his government that they were extensive, which was hardly true; but the Polish Foreign Minister regarded the rapprochement as important. The Hungarians in Paris also reported that the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments were keen to negotiate under French auspices, and the Romanians willing.²² Although Benes, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, was ready to discuss restoring communications, his enthusiasm for negotiations may be doubted, as also his professed unconcern at the Franco-Hungarian agreements; for the declaration, although general, was benevolent, and the Czechs had reason to feel alarm at Hungarian attempts to profit from the Soviet-Polish war. The Hungarians had for some time thought of Poland as a possible ally. Early in May Halmos told the Polish Foreign Minister that Hungary could offer military help against the Bolsheviks, a share in the French business options, and support against Czechoslovakia, in return for Polish support in her negotiations and help in equipping the army. The Poles, although cautious, apparently promised to help with arms; and they extolled to the French Minister in Warsaw the advantages of a Polish-Romanian-Hungarian entente.²³

The Russian counter-offensive against Poland, which began in June, stimulated Hungarian offers of help. The French were well aware that the chief motive was a hope of recovering Ruthenia and at least part of Slovakia, but some, like Fouchet, thought that Hungary offered a better barrier against both Bolshevism and Germany than did Czechoslovakia. Whilst not taking up the Hungarian offers, the French Government used them to press Benes to ensure the defense of the Carpathians.²⁴ As the Russian advance continued, Czechoslovakia on 7 August declared neutrality and prevented the transport of arms to Poland. The Hungarian Government asked for arms and sent Halmos to Paris with the chief of Horthy's military cabinet, Baron Lang. Millerand and Paleologue were not anxious to see them but Lang was allowed to talk to General Desticker, Foch's chief of staff. He was at first encouraging and, according to Csaky, said that the Czechs would be dropped if necessary. But after the Polish victory outside Warsaw the tone changed, and at the end of August all that Desticker-mindful of French armament interests-would promise was help in equipping the Hungarian army to the extent allowed by the peace treaty.²⁵

Hungarian activity during the Polish crisis precipitated the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav alliance, the first stage of the Little Entente. The idea of close co-operation between the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was not new: Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia collaborated at the peace conference, and by May 1920 there was talk of an agreement between them. In the last week of July a Czechoslovak-Yugoslav alliance was said to be imminent. However Benes went first to Austria where the Chancellor, the Social Democrat Karl Renner, gave him copies of two purported Franco-Hungarian secret treaties, said to have been signed at Godollo on 23 July. One leased the Hungarian state railways and provided for military collaboration; the other gave France the oversight of Hungarian domestic affairs and abandoned sovereignty over the railways in return for French agreement to extensive frontier revision. Benes told the French Minister in Prague, Couget, that he knew enough about the real Franco-Hungarian agreements not to be worried; but Renner was very much alarmed, and despite an official French denial of the treaty's authenticity he allowed them to be published in his party's newspaper, justifying his action by the continual Hungarian threats and boasts of French support.²⁶

In Belgrade on 14 August Benes signed a defensive alliance naming

Hungary as a possible aggressor. But for the time being his Romanian opposite number, Take Ionesco, would agree only to a protocol on neutrality in the Russo-Polish war and an oral promise of mutual assistance in case of Hungarian attack. Even though Romania was not fully committed, and it was not certain that other countries would not join, the system that quickly became known as the Little Entente was effectively born; and it was almost immediately said to be directed against French patronage of Hungary.²⁷ Although Benes presented it as something constructive, the step was unwelcome in Paris and was thought to cut across French policy. The Ministers in Warsaw and Athens were instructed to advise the Polish and Greek Governments not to join, because the system isolated Hungary; the Minister in Vienna, Lefevre-Pontalis, assumed that it was fundamentally anti-French; and Fouchet considered that Benes had not served French interests. French representatives in Czechoslovakia, however, were surprised at the expressions of disapproval. General Pelle, the head of the military mission, wrote that he had explained Czech intentions when he had been in Paris in July, and Millerand had not only not objected but had suggested extending the agreement. Couget thought that its timing had given the agreement a pro-Bolshevik appearance which the authors never intended.²⁸

One of the objections voiced in France was that the Little Entente cut across efforts to build an anti-Bolshevik combination of Poland, Romania and Hungary in which Poland and Romania would collaborate with the last White forces in Russia (those of General Wrangel, whom France had just recognized), and even Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would join.²⁹ But such ideas were far-fetched. Millerand was indeed more interested in Russia than in Poland, but the Poles had no desire to co-operate with Wrangel and were now inclined to make peace with the Soviet Government; the Romanians had no desire to fight; Czechoslovakia was afraid of Polish adventurism; Poland was resentful of Czech behavior over the war with Russia and about Teschen. It cannot be said that it was the formation of the Little Entente that frustrated French aims. Another suggestion was that the Little Entente was a product of, or at least supported by, Italian intrigue. In their hostility to anything resembling a Danubian confederation the Italians were suspicious of all attempts to encourage co-operation in the region. By 1920 the French Government had realized that there was no chance of the successor states agreeing to a confederation, but it favored economic

co-operation and said so when occasion offered, while the Italians were accused of stirring up the Danubian states against each other. There was talk in Vienna and Budapest of Italy having been behind Benes's meeting with Renner: the Italian press expressed satisfaction at French disapproval of the Little Entente.³⁰

Partly for this reason some French representatives thought it a mistake to betray hostility and to overdo the Hungarian policy. The charge d'affaires in Rome, Charles-Roux, considered that friction with Italy in the Danubian area was inevitable, despite any tacit bargain over a confederation and Austrian independence, because Italy wanted a dominant position in the region and would be upset whenever she found France in the way.³¹ To the Foreign Office it seemed that the Little Entente might be an obstacle to both French and Italian intrigue, and they were prepared to approve it so long as it was purely defensive and was based on the maintenance of the peace treaties. Lloyd George, however, warned Take Ionesco against admitting Poland, which he regarded as a source of trouble. Having earlier in the summer not taken very seriously the reports of Franco-Hungarian agreements, the Foreign Office was prompted by the stories of a secret treaty to make an official inquiry in Paris. The French replied that there was no treaty, no political promises had been given to Hungary, and there was no intention of breaching the Treaty of Trianon.³²

On 25 September, following Millerand's election as President of the Republic, Paleologue resigned from the Quai d'Orsay. By this time Wrangel's forces were isolated in the Crimea, and shortly afterwards the Polish-Russian preliminaries of peace were signed. There were soon signs of a shift in French policy. The new Secretary-General, Philippe Berthelot, was regarded as pro-Czech. The press began to write more favorably of the Little Entente, and at the beginning of October the Polish Foreign Minister was startled to be told that France did not oppose Poland's making peace with Russia and joining the Little Entente. The obstacles to the latter were too great; but the French encouraged the Polish-Romanian agreement which Take Ionesco hoped would form part of a combination between all the victors in central and eastern Europe.³³ There was no French intention of dropping Hungary, but greater caution was shown over semi-official dealings. When Fouchet reported at the end of September that Halmos was coming to Paris again to talk about army recruitment, he was told that there could be no such discussions

when Hungary had not ratified the peace treaty. The Ambassadors' Conference had recently taken up this matter, but at first neither the French nor the Italians pressed the Hungarians very hard, and the latter made great efforts to secure prior concessions and assurances, especially over the army, the frontier commissions, and a separate section of the Reparation Commission. Athelstan-Johnson, the British charge d'affaires in Budapest, commented that in view of its earlier assertions that changes in the peace terms would be secured, the Hungarian Government badly needed something to show to public opinion. Fouchet thought that it would be very useful if any concessions could be seen to come from France; and the Hungarian representative in Paris pointed out that the economic Concessions depended on the political programme.³⁴ The Allies refused to allow changes in the army: Laroche told Halmos that while France was not responsible for imposing voluntary recruitment, it could not be changed now. He also said that the demarcation commissions could not be appointed until the treaty came into force; but the names of the French members might be announced when Hungary ratified. Baron Lang had to be content with a statement that France did not refuse to supply equipment within the treaty limits. Finally the Hungarians asked the Ambassadors' Conference for assurances that the successor states were being asked to treat former Hungarian subjects with moderation, and that steps were being taken to implement the promise in the Allied letter of 6 May. These assurances were given, and on 13 November the Hungarian National Assembly assented to ratification.³⁵

Although Fouchet still worked for French influence, the Schneider-Creusot options expired in the middle of November without being taken up: the affair which had caused so much excitement seemed to have vanished like smoke. The group's resources were not large enough for all the contemplated enterprises, and the Ministry of Finance refused to provide government money. ³⁶ When Briand took office in France in January 1921 French policy was clarified. The Quai d'Orsay admitted that a fear that France was helping Hungary had probably contributed to the formation of the Little Entente. This had been a misunderstanding, spread by the Hungarians themselves: the French Government had never admitted the exaggerated expectations which the Hungarians had nurtured about the declaration of 22 June. Earlier suspicions had now been dispelled: France was above all loyal to the treaties and favoured her allies; but she wished to help

Hungary and Austria in order to prevent economic collapse and establish general pacification. Briand expressed to Benes "special sympathy" for the Little Entente; and after Halmos had turned up again with proposals for French intervention in Hungarian affairs and financial help, Fouchet was sent instructions on the attitude he was to adopt. He must avoid any appearance of favouring the monarchists, for the Allies would not accept any Habsburg and understanding between them in central Europe, based on respect for the peace treaties, was improving. The ex-enemy states had to be convinced that the treaties must be carried out. There might one day be some agreed improvements to Hungary's frontiers but she must first earn the Allies' confidence by showing her intention to fulfill her obligations. France would encourage economic co-operation but would not be drawn into a policy of treaty revision, and Fouchet must be on his guard against attempts to misrepresent French intentions.³⁷

The Hungarians, however, did not give up lightly. At the time of the ex-Emperor Charles's attempt, in March, to return to Hungary, it was rumoured that he had been encouraged by Briand.³⁸ Afterwards the Hungarian Government sent first Halmos and then Teleki to Paris to ask for help in avoiding execution of the peace treaty. But Teleki was given no hope that France could do more than encourage conversations with Hungary's neighbours about practical matters; and Loucheur, the Minister for Liberated Territories who had connections in French heavy industry, was discouraged from seeing Halmos.³⁹ The story of the supposed secret treaty took some years to die.⁴⁰ Hungary fared no better with Poland. In the second half of 1921 Polish-Czechoslovak relations improved: as Panafieu commented, the idea of a Polish-Hungarian-Romanian bloc was now admitted to be a chimera; and although the rapprochement did not last, Poland's attitude was more favourable to the Little Entente than to Hungary during the crisis in October over the ex-Emperor's second return.⁴¹ The only remaining possible friend was Italy, and she seemed uncertain whether leadership in central Europe could best be achieved by blocking reconstruction, courting the Little Entente, or supporting Hungary in mediating over the frontier with Austria.⁴²

The handling of the ex-Emperor's second venture put some strain on relations between the major Allies and the Little Entente. It also confirmed that group's cohesion and its weight in the Danubian area. A couple of months later Benes remarked to Couget that he would like in future to concert on such

problems in advance. He hoped France would be disposed to support the Little Entente: sentiment apart, it was in her interest to consolidate the new order created by the peace treaties.⁴³ Having signed with Austria an agreement on recognition of territories and mutual support, Benes believed he had included that country in the Little Entente orbit. Hungary's isolation seemed complete, apart perhaps from Italy. French policy now settled into the pattern of the eastern alliances, although French representatives in Budapest continued to think that Italian patronage was not welcomed there, and that Hungary could, given some good will, be reconciled to her neighbours.⁴⁴

It is difficult to see much evidence of a French grand design in central Europe in 1919-20. Rhetoric about creating a United States of Eastern Europe under French aegis or 'the continental hegemony which victory ought to assure us'⁴⁵ was not lacking, but it had little foundation. Was this due to lack of planning or to lack of means? The answer would seem to be both. Between about March and September 1920, the effort put into gaining influence in Hungary was considerable, and greater than the country's own economic importance warranted. On the other hand the effort put into coordinating the region was small. If Millerand and Paleologue had a scheme, they did not develop it even within their own ministry: Hungary remained virtually a case apart. But if the French had tried to promote a new Danubian system centred on Budapest they would certainly have failed. The other countries concerned were in no mood to give up any of their new territory or independence, and none of the great powers had the means to compel them. Hungary was largely responsible for her own isolation: as long as the Hungarians intransigently rejected the Treaty of Trianon so long, as Benes warned Couget, would patronage of Hungary alienate the other successor states. France was never able to overcome the mutual distrust of her two eastern allies: she would have been no more able to impose a plan on central Europe.

Notes

1. My thanks are due to the British Academy and the University of Durham for grants which facilitated the research on which this article is based.

2. Hungary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Papers and Documents relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, Vol. 1, 1919-1920, eds. Francis Deak and Dezso Ujvary (Budapest 1939), henceforth cited as FRH; also Francis Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference (New York 1942).
3. Minneapolis 1962.
4. See Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 3-26, 62-74; and a recent study of British policy, Wilfried Fest, Peace or Partition (London 1978).
5. See France, Archives of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, series Europe 19194929, Autriche Vols. 3, 61-2; series Paix, Vols. 99-100; and Barrere (Rome) to Paris, 2 June 1919, series Europe, Italic Vol. 89, Hongrie Vol. 55; Paris to Barrere, 17 June, Hongrie Vol. 55. Documents in the series Europe 19194929 are henceforth identified as MAE, with country and volume number.
6. Reports from Vienna, Bucharest, Budapest and Prague, October-December 1919, in MAE, Hongrie Vol. 46, Autriche Vol. 62; memorandum, 5 January 1920, Hongrie Vol. 58.
7. See Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, eds. E. L. Woodward and R. D'O. Butler, and others (London 1947 ff.), Series I, henceforth cited as DBFP, Vol. VI, ch. 1; Vol. XII, No.120.
8. See Public Record Office, London, F0 371/3550, file 168474/3, 1920 (documents in the Public Record Office are henceforth identified by file number, class and volume number); DBFP, Vol. VI, Nos. 50, 166, 299; Vol. XII, Nos. 70, 109, 161, 185, 189.
9. Discussion on Hungary at the conference of London, DBFP, Vol. VII, Nos. 26, 46, 54, 63, 65.
10. FRH, Political diary of the peace delegation, and Nos. 218, 224, 226, 242.
11. Halmos to Paleologue, 18 and 22 March1920; minutes by Paleologue, 23 and 24 March; Paleologue to Fouchet (Budapest), 30 March; Fouchet to Paris, 5, 9, and 10 April, MAE, Hongrie Vol. 58.
12. Halmos to Paleologue, 13 April 1920; Halmos to Saint-Sauveur, 14 April; minute, 15 April; Halmos to Paleologue, 23 April, MAE, Hongrie Vol. 58; FRH, No.255 enclosure.
13. FRH, Nos. 240, 242, 245, 247, 255, 259.
14. Fouchet to Paris, 8 May 1920; Halmos to Paleologue, 12 May; Paris to Fouchet, 13 May; Fouchet to Paris, 19 May; Paris to Fouchet, 28 and 30 May, MAE, Hongrie Vol. 58; FRH, Nos. 265-301; Allied covering letter in Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, 551-54.
15. Fouchet to Paris, 30 May and 2 June 1920, MAE, Hongrie Vol. 58; 191329, 192091, 193530, 194177/7067/39, FO 371/4268.
16. Correspondence, 3 May-6 June 1920, file 196614/3, FO 371/3560; 197112, 198639/7067/39, FO 371/4269.

A Case Study on Trianon