A Case Study on Trianon

The Period of the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution

World War I found Hungary and Italy as enemy states, members of two opposite camps. Italy assumed a place among the victorious great powers and, when the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was forced to lay down its arms, the representatives of the general staff, common to both sides of the Monarchy, signed the armistice agreement proposed by the Italian generals at Padua.

In the Fall of 1918 the Italian government was transformed by way of a temporary solution to a rather chaotic entity; the political tendency which prevailed had as its objective the enhancement of Italy's diplomatic position, including the assumption of an anti-Slav posture, and the achievement of great power status for Italy. Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando and his Foreign Minister, Sydney Sonnino, found support for these goals among the military leaders.²

It seemed that the military defeat of the Monarchy and its dissolution could only facilitate such Italian ambitions. One of the specific Italian aims was to take possession of Fiume and, by the same token, to gain influence in the Adriatic and in Balkan affairs-an influence

which Italy would have liked to extend to the entire Danube Basin, including Hungary. Italian officials were convinced that Italy, rather than France, deserved those rights in this part of Europe.³

Its great power partners, however, not only did not support Italian ambitions, but came up with claims of their own in this area; whereas the Italian claim to Fiume became the source of serious conflicts, of crises, and of the eventual fall of the Italian cabinet. The rivalry between France and Italy affected a number of countries and became one of the heaviest burdens East-Central European nations had to bear.⁴

Italy was most in need of scoring diplomatic victories. The poorest among the great powers, it was here that one would expect, in the aftermath of the war, social tensions, radicalization, a drift towards the left. The Italian government would have liked diplomatic victories in order to channel its internal difficulties, to make its citizens forget the misery of the war with the "fruits of victory." The officials placed the blame for their lack of success on the Anglo-Americans and the French. Mussolini and his circle, who were in the lead in instigating the masses against the allies, as well as being responsible for the attacks against the government, were wont to refer to the great powers as wolves, foxes, jackals.⁵

Italy's weak position, both on the domestic and international fronts, as well as the international ambitions of the Orlando government, made it absolutely necessary to seek partners in the Danube basin. Since it was strictly a matter of achieving power aims, of Realpolitik. we need not be surprised that the tactical maneuvers were full of what appear at first sight as incomprehensible and contradictory measures and statements. The main line of policy, consistently anti-French, prevailed throughout.

With regard to Yugoslavia the Italian objective was to weaken the new state, and thereby to roll back French influence in that area. Italy sought not only to take Flume from Yugoslavia, but fomented its internal difficulties as well, exacerbating the Yugoslav-Romanian conflict (in the Banat), and preventing its cooperation with the neighboring states in general.⁶

Based on the relationship which evolved in the last years of the war, the Italian military mission in Czechoslovakia, under the command of General Piccione, and including Italian officers in the ranks of the Czechoslovak army, attempted to compete with the French for influence in that country.⁷ Its attitude towards the Czechs, however,

was not unambiguous. During the dispute over Tesin, for instance, Italy sided with the Poles rather than with the Czechs: Italy also took a clear stand against one of the pet projects of Benes and his entourage, as well as of the French, i.e., the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav corridor between Austria and Hungary. At the same time it claimed credit for objecting to the corridor with the Hungarians who would have lost further significant territories thereby.⁸ It is understandable, therefore, that Czech public opinion, already favorably disposed to the French, seeing the expected leadership of Czechoslovakia in the Danube basin jeopardized by the Italian attitude, did not spare the Italians its attacks. These attacks redoubled when it became clear that Italy was likewise striving to cooperate with Hungary.⁹ As a result of this many-faceted Italian diplomacy, the most unlikely combinations of nations seemed possible at the time.¹⁰

Hungary could not be left out of the Italian projects. In spite of the promises made by the allies, and the latest claims, at the end of 1918 Fiume still remained formally part of Hungary, and it was not possible to predict whether or not the Hungarian government would have a say regarding the fate of the port city. Furthermore, Hungary was important from the Italian point of view both as a sphere of economic and political influence, and as the neighbor of Yugoslavia.

The bourgeois democratic regime which found itself completely isolated, and treated as the regime of a defeated state, without international relations, attached great importance to any step which might lead to the establishment of contact with the allies, or perhaps even to concrete support from one of the great powers. But there were so many obstacles to such prospects that any development in this area seemed beyond the possible. Karolyi and his entourage were known at home during the war as partisans of democratic transformation and of a pro-Entente orientation; on the other hand, they lost their western contacts in the decisive period, during the last two years of the war. The great powers and their lesser allies gave absolutely no credence to Karolyi's pro-Entente politics and viewed the democratic transformation and its possible further evolution with the greatest concern. The oath to the Habsburg king and Jaszi's nationalities' policy made a deeper impression abroad than the Hungarian government expected. The fact that the government did not elaborate a foreign policy beyond its generally pro-Entente attitude and its faith in Wilsonian attitude which would have coped with the given realities-constituted a further difficulty.

Thus at the first signs of interest shown by Italy, the Hungarian government reacted favorably, and the settlement of the fate of Hungarian employees and institutions in Fiume provided the occasion for the establishment of legal relations. Hence in December 1918 Jaszi sent Lajos Fulep to Fiume as the representative of the Hungarian government.¹¹ Before his departure Fulep consulted not only with Jaszi but also with Denes Berinkey the under-secretary for internal affairs. Fulep's mission was not precisely defined, but he was given authorization for further, favorable negotiations on behalf of Hungary.¹²

At that time Fiume was occupied by allied troops; the commander of the Italian units and the most prestigious member of the Entente mission was General Francesco Saverio Grazioli who declared to Fulep, at their very first meeting, that the Italians were willing to engage in further negotiations with the Hungarian government, and that, in order to promote a rapprochement, "it might be advisable if Italian troops were dispatched to Budapest."¹³

The background of this proposal was that only French troops were stationed in Hungary (in Budapest and Szeged), whereas the Entente committee controlling the Danube was represented at Baja and Szabadka by English monitors; Italian participation also appeared advisable because of the model provided by the still promising military mission in Czechoslovakia.¹⁴

While Fulep was waiting for a reply and further instructions, he also negotiated with Prince Livio Borghese.¹⁵ The Prince confirmed the inclination of his government to establish direct contact; what is more, he proposed to travel to Budapest himself in the near future to meet with Karolyi personally.¹⁶

Fulep found a connection with Prime Minister Orlando through Riccardo Zanella, who played a leading role in the Fiume council. Orlando approved of the continuation of the negotiations in "appropriate mode and form." Zanella also discussed with Orlando the advisability of sending Italian troops to Budapest, although this was not done at Fulep's suggestion. "It was not because of Bolshevism that he [Orlando] thinks the presence of Italian troops important, but rather-and a company would suffice for the purpose-to establish direct contact between Budapest and Rome. He would think it appropriate, however,"-Fulep reports-"if the President, even if it be in but a private letter to Orlando, should express his desire to that effect." We would derive no disadvantage from this,

the Italians emphasized, because nobody would know about it apart from Orlando and Sonnino. In spite of this Fulep added: "On my part I would think it necessary-if indeed this project were to be realized-to combine it with the moves contemplated towards the British and the Americans, in order to avoid even the semblance of a special relationship with the Italians."¹⁷

Nevertheless, the negotiations broke off at this point. Fulep never received a reply to his reports; he repeatedly urged Karolyi to arrive at a decision, but in vain: "If no quick and meaningful step is taken," he warned, "[Italy] may well abandon any notion of rapprochement, which would be fatal, because so far the Italian government is the only one inclined to support the Hungarian cause at the peace conference. ..."¹⁸

But in January 1919 the government had difficulty arriving at unambiguous resolutions for a number of reasons. It had no definite plans for taking advantage of the disagreements among the great powers, and it did not want to permanently commit itself on the side of Italy. The Italian proposal itself (the dispatch of troops) seemed rather worrisome. More importantly, the foreign policy of Karolyi and of the government aimed at winning the United States, and it did not wish to jeopardize this aim by an unduly explicit Italian orientation. Especially not at this time, when two missions under the leadership of Americans happened to be visiting Budapest, and the Hungarian leaders still hoped to bring about in this way decisive changes in Hungary's situation.

Another very significant interfering factor was that the Yugoslav leaders were beginning to take an interest in Hungary at this time. Their none-too-urgent or determined initiative elicited great hopes among Hungarian leaders, and figured heavily when they considered further negotiations with the Italians.

In his last report from Italy, dated January 20, Lajos Fulep, seeing the hesitations of the government and appraising the relation of forces correctly, wrote to Karolyi: "The consequence of our continued hesitation between a Yugoslav and an Italian orientation might be that we shall miss out on both of those possibilities."¹⁹ Although he had received no instructions to that effect he traveled to Rome with the help of General Grazioli. Here, among old friends, he met first of all with Giovanni Amendola, and they attempted to formulate further negotiations with leading political figures together. When it appeared, however, that Budapest not only did not

authorize these steps, but regarded them as strictly an individual endeavor and was prepared to disavow them, Fulep decided to return to Budapest.²⁰

To drop Fulep, and to interrupt the talks at Fiume or in Rome (in consonance with the hesitating maneuvers of the government) did not imply the complete abandonment of Italian-Hungarian negotiations. On the contrary, these continued in January and February, this time in Vienna. The change of site was intended to avoid publicity. The discretion suited both parties because, as Zanella wrote to Budapest: "the men of the Entente, but especially the French, are watching closely. ..." Precisely for this reason, while he advocated that the Hungarian press desist from its antagonistic tone in reporting and commenting on news from Italy, he immediately added: "But of course. not in such a manner as to awaken enemy suspicions that some kind of an agreement has been reached between Budapest and Rome. ..."²¹

The negotiations could be conducted in Vienna for the Hungarian consulate could, without much ado, enter in touch with the Italian mission there under the command of General Roberto Segre. The mission was given ample propaganda material aimed at enhancing the popularity of the bourgeois democratic regime of Hungary abroad. Augusto Bianchieri Chiappori, Sonnino's secretary, was informed of the new Hungarian proposals.²²

The government requested that Sonnino make it possible to establish direct relations via personal Contact. The Hungarian consul in Vienna, Oszkar Charmant, reported to Karolyi on February 3, that "an answer has arrived from Sonnino. He cannot leave Paris now. But he wants to send a representative with whom, he says, we can discuss matters as if we were discussing them with him. The place of the meeting has not yet been determined. I believe Zurich may be the most appropriate place. From there it is possible to travel to Rome, if needed."²³

All this, however, did not imply an unambiguous preference for Italian friendship. On the contrary; it seems that the interruption of contacts built up by Fulep, and its reconstruction along different lines, was meant to gain time while the Hungarian government was making progress in its contacts with Yugoslavia. The notion that the Yugoslav orientation was not only realistic but more beneficial than the Italian orientation could ever be, became stronger and prevailed in Hungarian foreign policy. The Hungarian government believed

that since it had given up Croatia and other southern territories a priori, it may reach an agreement with Yugoslavia regarding certain debated areas even before the peace conference handed down its decision. And it saw the basis of further cooperation with Yugoslavia in the fact that the new state needed a "hinterland," whereas Hungary needed an outlet to the sea. Another significant factor was noted by Gyula Szillasy, the Hungarian consul in Bern, in his dispatches which analyzed the relations between the great powers lucidly and realistically: in the Danube basin, including Hungary, Szillasy declared, it was the word of France that counted, hence an agreement and cooperation with Yugoslavia, which enjoyed French support, may influence French policy favorable.²⁴ The arguments or Szillasy found confirmation in the territorial offerings of Yugoslavia, and the whole perspective of cooperation.²⁵ The modest Italian proposal could not compete with these prospects.

Szillasy, much like Lajos Fulep, warned the Hungarian government about ambiguous experiments which could only end in failure; but, unlike Fulep, he definitely advocated cooperation with Yugoslavia.²⁶ Karolyi himself accepted this interpretation, and this determined further Italian-Hungarian relations.²⁷ Accordingly, when Marquis Tacoli arrived in Budapest, apparently in accordance with Sonnino's message, his proposal was accorded a cool reception, even though the notion of sending Italian troops to Budapest had been dropped completely. Tacoli proposed that if Hungary should not be able to hold on to Fiume at the peace conference "it should explicitly advocate that Fiume be attached to Italy." In return the Italians offered to establish a port with separate facilities for the Hungarians, and perhaps the recognition of the Hungarian flag on the high seas. Count Csaky, however, pointed out to the Marquis, that Hungary would prefer to see the area as an international port, for the road leading to it would have to go through Yugoslavia. This road of approach could not be guaranteed by Italy, and thus the port in itself would not be very valuable. According to Csaky, further exchanges of view could be fruitful only if "we could count on the positive support of Italy at the peace conference in certain other matters."²⁸ Csaky's lukewarm rebuttal of Tacoli's objections to the progress of Yugoslav-Hungarian relations was an indication of the change in the importance attached to the Italian relations. At the beginning of March Tacoli returned to Rome to clarify further possibilities, and then to continue the talks in Budapest.

The increasingly demure attitude of the Hungarian government did not make a very good impression in Rome. Italian leaders expected to find clear approval and immediate results in Hungary. This did not prove to be the case; in fact, the whole affair simply hurt the prestige of Italy vis-a-vis its allies. The Italians blamed the Yugoslavs for the attitude of the Hungarian government and, in order to render the Yugoslav-Hungarian negotiations more problematic, they presented Italian-Hungarian relations as having reached a much more advanced stage.²⁹

The right-wing aristocratic opposition to the Hungarian regime wanted to strengthen Italian-Hungarian relations at any price, because it hoped for the dissolution of the regime as a result of the presence of Italian troops. Gyorgy Szmrecsanyi, the governor of the city and province of Pozsony (Bratislava), who had resigned as early as November 4, because he refused to cooperate with the Karolyi regime, asked the Italian mission in Vienna to support his trip to Rome. He argued that "the mutilated country" could have but one serious ally "in face of the Slavic bloc of nations," and that would be Italy. Therefore he proposed that Italy support Hungary in attaining peace terms as favorable as possible and, at the same time, occupy the country militarily to "restore order."³⁰ He continued his talks until the beginning of March by which time it seemed that Italian officials were even subsidizing his stay in Rome.³¹

His private proposals suited Italian purposes in every regard. Italian leaders had more than once appealed to the French to the effect that Latin nations should stick together in face of the Slavs, and had several times suggested the occupation of Hungary.³²

Revolution, however, wiped away the bourgeois democratic regime, and the various projects no longer applied.

The Republic of Councils (Soviet Republic)

While the bourgeois democratic regime hardly gained the attention of the Paris peace conference, the proclamation of the Republic of Councils all of a sudden placed Hungary as an important item on its agenda. The proletarian dictatorship in Hungary rendered "Asiatic Bolshevism" a concrete reality in Central Europe; the tide of revolution, so it seemed, was advancing menacingly towards Western Europe. The change in Hungary was an indication that the Hungarian government would refuse to carry out the resolutions of

the peace conference, including the establishment of a neutral zone (as per the Vix memorandum).

The mood and atmosphere in Paris seemed particularly favorable to the Italian plans with regard to Hungary. While official Italian policy did not sympathize with the worker state any more than that of the other Great Powers, its representatives understood well that the new situation was favorable to their own position.³³ The British and the Americans regarded the zealous and aggressive French attempts, and the activities of French military leaders as practically the sole cause of the establishment of the Council. The French were primarily blamed for the new situation affecting all of Central Europe.³⁴

The French and British representatives left Budapest after March 21, and the Italians strived to fill the vacuum. The Italian military mission remained in spite of the reports that they too would depart,³⁵ and Prince Borghese, along with his secretary, Prince Pignatelli di Cerchiara, joined the mission. Borghese would have liked to become the official representative of all the allies in Budapest. This plan did not work out, however, partly because of American objections. The Americans were aware that Borghese was guided solely by the special interests of Italy.³⁶ In spite of this the Prince remained as an unofficial member of the Italian mission for the time being, while informing Orlando that only his family relations detained him in the Hungarian capital.³⁷

Borghese and the members of the mission had already established contact with some of the would-be members of the Council even before the proclamation of the Republic of Councils (with Peter Agoston, Zsigmond Kunfi, etc.) and strived for even closer relations with them from the end of March on.³⁸ Lacking Italian primary sources, and because of the taciturnity of the memoirs, we know relatively little about the content of the negotiations, especially in the early period of the Republic of Councils. There is no doubt, however, that the Italians attempted to prevent the organization of the proletarian dictatorship through assistance to the centrist and right-wing elements of the administration. Agoston related somewhat later that the Italians would have liked to orient Hungarian foreign policy in a different direction, and to replace the Soviet alliance with an Italian orientation.³⁹

Until the beginning of foreign intervention, however, not many concrete measures were taken beyond the above. At the peace negotiations Orlando and the Italian delegation supported the more

moderate policies of the Anglo-Americans against the aggressivity of the French military leaders. At the same time, however, they attempted to use these aggressive plans for their own purposes; as in the debate on Marshal Foch's proposal for the military occupation of Vienna and Budapest for the purpose of stemming the revolutionary tide. At this time the Italian delegation, referring to reports received from their mission, insisted that the occupation troops be Italian rather than French.⁴⁰ After the Foch proposal had been rejected, the Italian delegation no longer advocated measures against Hungary. On the contrary, at the end of March, when the Council requested that the peace conference send a diplomatic mission to Budapest, the Italian delegation supported the request, in contrast to Clemenceau's negative attitude. The Hungarian request was relayed to the peace conference by Borghese and, because at the beginning it seemed that the Prince would be included among those accompanying General Smuts, the Italians felt it was important to honor it. At the same time they took advantage of the opportunity to point to the harmful consequences of the French policy.⁴¹ Finally, however, Borghese was left out of the mission; the reports of the visit make no mention of his presence, and are very brief in their account of the activities of the Italian members of the delegation.⁴²

Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to assume that Borghese's role as intermediary in Budapest contributed to the fact that Philip M. Brown, the member of the American mission in Vienna delegated to Budapest, who had remained pretty much in the background until then, strived to improve his contacts with members of the Council from the end of March on, and met several times with Bela Kun. From the end of March to the beginning of May, while Brown resided in Hungary, he assumed the leadership among the representatives of the Great Powers. Only the Italians could challenge his primacy.

Hungarian relations negatively, but rendered them more active, more productive for the Hungarian side.

The contradictory attitude of the Italian representatives in Budapest reflected the ambiguity of Italian politics: these representatives maintained relations not only with counter-revolutionary circles; they also initiated and organized those economic measures which were to prove so important to the Council during the blockade.

The catastrophic military situation in late April led both the Italians and the Americans to seek "solutions." At the beginning Borghese suggested to the Council that it negotiate with the Great Powers in return for rescinding or moderating certain measures.⁴³ This suggestion, however, could not compete with Brown's offers, and Italy's prestige and influence could not be compared with that enjoyed by the United States. Thus, the Council, striving to gain time, negotiated first of all with Brown, keeping Borghese's proposals "in reserve," as it were.

The Italians, however, did not give up, and came up with new sets of proposals. Brown expressed the greatest concern at the negotiations between Bela Kun and other members of the Council with Borghese, and was afraid lest the Italians be the first to find a "solution."⁴⁴ His worries were increased by the fact that the roster of the Italian mission to Budapest grew in size at the beginning of May; new officers and employees had arrived from Vienna.⁴⁵

The bolstering of the Italian mission was due, in part, to the expected resignation of the Council, but also to more far-reaching Italian plans. The Italian officers who came to Budapest on instructions from General Segre right away paid a call on Bela Kun and, somewhat belatedly, proposed that, should the Council be reconstituted with more moderate elements, they would guarantee that Budapest would be occupied not by the royal Romanian forces, but by Czechoslovak units under their own command (General Piccione). Of course, Kun's reply was negative, for by the beginning of May the Council had already weathered the crisis.⁴⁶

Lieutenant Colonel Guido Romanelli also arrived in Budapest on May 12 in order to take command of the Italian mission. From that moment its Concerns became significantly more active and varied.⁴⁷

The evolution of Italian-Hungarian negotiations was followed with lively interest in Paris and elsewhere. The Czechoslovaks were

at least as interested, since they were directly concerned. The press in Prague gave relatively accurate reports of the negotiations. and pointed to their essence in the very headlines ("Is Italy seeking to preserve its back in Hungary?" and "Bela Kun will defend Italian interests in Fiume.").⁴⁸

The Italians proved extraordinarily flexible, and no longer mentioned occupation, since the circumstances had changed. On the other hand, they were well aware that under the blockade the Council was much in need of arms, ammunition, and food, which could not be obtained in legal ways. The Italians offered therefore to fill the gap and to circumvent the blockade. Undoubtedly, the Italian concern was considerably influenced, among other factors, by the so-called Italian crisis which had come about at the end of April at the Peace Conference, and which revolved once more around Fiume and Wilson's rigid rejection of the Italian claim.

A Case Study on Trianon