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As can be seen from the telegram of Kun to Bohm, the Italian mission proposed the signing of commercial agreements and was prepared to place Fiume under the protection of the Council.49 Brown was convinced that the proposals were prompted by the Italian ambition to occupy Budapest.50

Such a military move, however, was never explicitly discussed; the Italians made no demand which might have proved unacceptable to the Council. The acceptance of the advantageous offers seemed natural, even necessary.

While the negotiations were proceeding in Budapest, in Paris Sonnino was insisting, even more forcefully than his French colleague, Pichon, on the strict application of the blockade resolution, and argued that the blockade could be lifted only if the Kun regime collapsed. He also proposed that the pertinent decisions be made widely public.51 Sonnino could never have reached the same "liberal" stand with regard to the Republic of Councils as Orlando had; differences of opinion frequently arose between the two; still, one is bound to suspect that the actual effect of the proposal changed essentially nothing, yet it appeared to an outsider as a measure to camouflage the shipments.

The mission in Vienna attached special importance to strengthening ties with Hungary. Segre advised Romanelli to study how it "might be possible to take advantage of the unique and advantageous position of our mission in Budapest. We are almost alone here, without competition. and can utilize our influence to build the

foundations of our economic penetration."52 According to their plan they would have shipped to the Council a portion of the goods accumulated in Vienna, in the words of Romanelli, "after the suspension of the blockade."53 On such a basis, however, precisely because of their awareness of the above-mentioned decision at the peace conference, the members of the Council would have signed no agreement, and would have made no payment. In mid-May, however, at the insistence of Marquis Tacoli, and after negotiations between Count Basselet de la Rosarie and the representatives of the Italian labor unions (Benedetti) on one hand and members of the Council on the other, the parties signed an agreement regarding shipments of goods worth 25 to 35 million crowns. Ostensibly the shipments were of foodstuff, but in actuality consisted of weapons, ammunition, and food. They were followed, in July, by another 20 million crowns worth of textiles and clothing.54

The payment of the orders and the shipment of the goods, especially in the case of weapons, was not at all simple, since Hungary was under blockade. The Italians had to overcome not only technical difficulties, but elude the watchful eyes of the allies. The Italian mission in Vienna as well as the Italian sections of the allied economic and aid organizations were quite resourceful in the matter.

The Council attempted to make payments through Vienna, but the Austrian government would not allow it. Thus, the money was taken to the Austrian border under the protection of the Italian mission; at Bruck the representatives of General Segre took over.55

According to our sources, the bulk of the shipments came from reserves accumulated along the Adriatic, and reached Bruck, at the Hungarian border, usually through Vienna. Italian soldiers assured the safety of the ammunition convoys, and they could easily circumvent the none too strict Austrian customs controls.56 One of the convoys for instance was hooked to the train of the allied relief organization transporting food, clothing, and medicine into Austria. The Italians prevented the American officers of the organization from checking the content of these wagons, and thus the goods reached Vienna safely. From there they were trans-shipped to Bruck.57

At other times the task was up to the Italian mission in Vienna which, in accordance with an agreement between Austria and Czechoslovakia reached with the help of the allies, was entrusted with the Austrian weapons which were supposed to be forwarded to

Czechoslovakia in exchange for shipments of coal. The Czechoslovakians repeatedly pressed for the remittance of arms, for they were in dire need of them during the counterattack of the Hungarian Red Army in Slovakia. The Austrian government did live up to its obligations, at the price of serious domestic difficulties, and handed the weapons over to the Italian mission. The Czechoslovak government unaware of all this, waited a while, then delivered a scathing attack against the Austrian government. The latter, knowing itself to be in the right, objected in the same tone. During these debates it became known that the weapons had disappeared at the hands of the Italian mission, and it was feared, in Paris, that the bulk of the weapons had reached Hungary. It was only at the beginning of August, long after the Slovakian campaign, that the Czechoslovak army received some of these weapons.58

Though we cannot determine statistically the importance of the Italian shipments of war materials and food, and cannot trace their fate once inside Hungary, their transfer is, nevertheless, an important episode in the relations between the two countries.

The commercial agreements and shipments soon became known, of course. The American mission in Vienna reported them to its own peace delegation, the British to the Supreme Economic Council, the Austrian Foreign Minister to the French mission in Vienna, that is to the council of the Great Powers. These reports were confirmed by the accounts of the British ambassadors to Bucharest and Rome, and were included in the news received by Herbert Hoover, the American head of the Supreme Economic Council, and in the aide memoire the Romanian government handed to the British ambassador to Bucharest.59

None of these objections, however, was as passionate as the reaction in Czechoslovakia. In June several reports claimed that Italians were effectively aiding the Hungarian Red Army; some gave an account of the role played by Italian solders and officers, published the itinerary of the convoys and, in some cases, signaled their arrival.60

The successful advance of the Red Army into Czechoslovakia almost caused panic; the papers reported daily on the events in Slovakia, seeking those responsible for the unexpected breakdown. The indignation was directed in part against all the Great Powers. One daily, quoting Klofac, wrote: "Had the Entente Powers not been so soft and merciful, the situation would be entirely different today. and we would not have to shed blood."61

The Czech papers did not content themselves with such generalities, but aimed specific attacks at the Italians. They blamed the military defeat largely on the Italian officers,62 and devoted a whole series of articles to the matter of the Italian shipments to Hungary. It was common knowledge that the Italians had negotiated a deal of several million with the Council, in the framework of which large quantities of rice, lard, etc., had been delivered to the Red Army.63 According to another daily, the deliveries consisted not of food, but of "weapons and ammunition for the Red Guard."64 Items appeared in the papers to the effect that an alliance, the object of which was the offensive against Czechoslovakia, had been signed by Italy and the Republic of Councils. The newspapers claimed this was no secret, and believed that the Great Powers were undoubtedly in the know.65

Of course, the Czechoslovakian government strongly protested against the measures taken by the Italians. Foreign Minister Benes sent an extensive memorandum to British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour giving details of the shipments.66

Our sources, while not sufficiently varied, and while neglecting Italian materials, nevertheless leave no doubt concerning the actual existence of the Italian-Hungarian link. Hence it is rather surprising that the historical literature makes practically no mention of the matter.67

Because of the protests and reports the peace conference placed the matter on its agenda several times in the course of June and July. The Italian representatives, however, emphasized that they had no knowledge of the charges and Sonnino ordered a full investigation. Subsequently the Italian general staff headquarters, including General Diaz, categorically denied that the army was involved. The headquarters did not think it impossible, however, that private enterprise had a hand in the shipments. Under the guise of further investigation the Italian delegation succeeded in avoiding the issue for a while.68 The Italians prepared their report by July 27, and the peace conference placed it on its agenda for August 1. By this time, however, the issue had lost its topicality; with regard to Hungary, the Great Powers were preoccupied with other matters.69

In the meantime the British ambassador in Rome brought to the attention of the Italian cabinet the harmful effect of the circulating "rumors"; whereas the head of the British mission in Vienna, Cuninghame, strived to convince Prince Borghese of the impossibility of

such endeavors. In both places the reply was a categorical denial, what is more, Borghese ascribed the entire rumor-mongering to the French, citing it as another example of their anti-Italian machinations.70 The French press indeed did take advantage of the opportunity to publish anti-Italian articles from the moment it received notices about the first shipments, openly implicating General Segre; and even Allize launched a campaign against the Italians.71 It is strange, however, that in the debates at the peace conference and in the press the names of Romanelli or Borghese, not to mention the other participants, were almost never brought up.

The Italian mission in Vienna, having become the focus of attention and the target of attacks, issued statements several times, and advised Romanelli "to deny the charge in the most categorical manner."72 Segre and his colleagues denied the charges several times, adding that if there was shipment of some kind, another Great Power must be responsible. At the same time they filed a protest to the effect that the persons who took part in the affair disguised themselves in Italian uniform. All this received extensive commentary in the press from Prague, which resorted to terms that were far from flattering. No one took the Italian denials seriously.73

Naturally, the Italians did not accept responsibility for the shipments, whereas the Hungarian government refrained from any declaration whatever. Later on, however, Italian leaders were wont to admit the relationship.74

The failure of foreign intervention (for the time being), and the Italian-Hungarian deals were the last straws that prompted the Czechoslovak government to adopt measures against the Italian mission there. Piccione and his officers were replaced by Frenchmen, and thus the Italian prospects in Czechoslovakia vanished. Of course the Italians were not indifferent, and attributed their failure to French interference; Italian papers deplored the end to the friendly relationship with Czechoslovakia. In Prague, however, no tears were shed.75

Thus, the relations established with the Republic of Councils did not bring about the desired results for Italy. Antonio Gramsci correctly observed about the venture: "the Italian government was merely following the dictates of 'sacred egoism,' " and Romanelli, "the 'friend' of the Communists, was a faithful servant of the foundry and shipyard capitalists in Milan and Genova who would like to lay their hands on every port on the Adriatic."76

Romanelli was dissatisfied with the developments; since there were no rivals, Italy "should have achieved greater success in terms of commercial penetration." But better results could only have come about, he continued, "if our superiors in Rome or Paris would have attributed greater importance to the matter ... if only they had dealt with it with dispatch and in good faith positively." He felt it was a grave mistake to let Italian primacy fade.77

In spite of this they felt that the counter-revolutionary circles were losing their satisfaction with the mission. This made it more difficult to promote their old plan for the forced resignation of the Governing Council.78

The Hungarian counter-revolutionaries preferred to seek the support of the Anglo-Americans or the French who enjoyed greater influence and prestige, rather than the Italians who were in touch with the Council and Bela Kun. True, Romanelli and his mission had extensive contacts with the Council's opposition information from them and gave them advice; still, the Italians were unable to compete with the Anglo-Americans.

In June and July when the Peace Conference resorted to diplomatic measures, and eventually to the preparation of decisive military intervention in order to overthrow the Council, the Italian diplomats and military leaders behaved rather passively, and took little part in the passionate debates. Their statements were moderate, but did not prevent the unfolding of the events. In June the attention of the Italian politicians was once again absorbed by domestic matters. Orlando and Sonnino, having fought tooth and nail for the enhancement of Italy's international position and the acquisition of Fiume, could not accept the compromise solution concerning the port, and the cabinet resigned. Its place was taken by Prime Minister Nitti, with Tittoni as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Nitti and his collaborators were bent on resolving the internal problems exacerbated by the economic and political situation; Nitti entrusted the handling of the Peace Conference almost entirely to Tittoni.80

The new administration was compelled to deal with internal matters because of the dissatisfaction fanned by nationalism, and also because of the strike movement of the working class and its demonstrations of sympathy on behalf of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Councils.81

Hence Hungary was temporarily relegated to the background in

Italian politics. The international position of the Republic worsened significantly by July, and the hegemony of the great powers and their politics made its overthrow inevitable. The fall of Orlando also implied an end to active relations with the Republic of Councils.82 The Italians now paid closer attention to counter-revolutionary groups.

At the Peace Conference Tittoni himself actively supported the general policy line of "reestablishing order" in Hungary, since he felt that the example provided by the Hungarian dictatorship of the proletariat was more dangerous than that of the Soviet Union.83 While sharing Clemenceau's unequivocal stand, he pointed out that because of its internal difficulties the Italian government could not contribute troops for the proposed intervention.84 The Italian workers protested so strongly that Nitti declared, in order to preempt the general strike in preparation: "We will not intervene against the Bolshevik government," what's more, "we will recall most of our troops stationed abroad." He emphasized that "we do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of any country. Therefore I do not think that there is justification for a general strike."85

In Paris, Tittoni proposed that the Council be overthrown not by open intervention, but by providing assistance to the counterrevolutionary government at Szeged; thus the action would become an internal Hungarian matter.86 Tittoni was prepared to send Italian officers to Szeged. There was no need for this, however, because neither the Great Powers, nor their lesser allies, were inclined to collaborate with the Szeged regime, and the French had no desire to see their carefully built relations toppled over by their Italian rivals.

In Vienna, however, the Segre mission and Borghese were actively negotiating with the Social-Democratic leaders. Vittorio Cerruti, who before the war was on the staff of the Italian embassy in Vienna, and became the secretary for political affairs of the Budapest mission from June on, tried to prepare the overthrow of the Council, with the help of Romanelli, in Budapest.87 Borghese would have liked to form a cabinet under the premiership of Sandor Wekerle, because he felt that the Szeged regime would then be willing to give up their claims, in spite of the fact that four Social-Democratic ministers were to be included in the cabinet.88

But the conduct of the negotiations was in the hands of Cuninghame, not in those of the Italians. It is true that Cuninghame felt the collaboration of Borghese was important, because he had good personal contacts, and because he felt that due regard must be

paid to "the significant Italian interests in Hungary."89 On the other hand, the French disagreed with the personal proposals of Cuninghame and Borghese, and were convinced that the Italians had no business in Central Europe or in Hungary.90

On June 18 Romanelli traveled to Vienna to keep the allied representatives informed of his personal experiences; he had the opportunity to sense Cuninghame's good intentions, as well as the anti-Italian attitude of Allize and the French mission.91

For a short while after the fall of the Republic of Councils the role of the Romanelli mission again became important, since it represented the allies until the arrival of the committee of generals. In the first days Romanelli acted as intermediary between Budapest and Paris. Borghese was instrumental in bringing about the collaboration of the Social-Democratic leaders and the Bethlen group in view of a coalition government. The Italian mission intervened several times on behalf of arrested politicians during the Romanian occupation, and their presence and experience proved useful at this time for other reasons as well.92 Italy would have been glad to participate along with Romania in "cleaning up" the Hungarian situation, in the hope of excluding the French.93

Later on the Hungarian and Italian governments, dissatisfied with the Paris peace system, found ample basis and reason for the elaboration of closer cooperation, and Hungary once again became a significant target for Italian penetration. But in the 30's the Italy of Mussolini once again clashed with a power greater than itself in this zone-the Germany of Hitler.

Notes

1. So far there are no monographs summarizing all aspects of Italian-Hungarian relations in either language. "Az olasz szocialista munkasmozgalom es az 1919-es magyar szocialista forradalom" [The Italian Socialist Workers' movement and the Hungarian socialist revolution of 1919] by Franco Fern in A Magyar Tanacskoztarsasag tortenelmi jelentosege [The historical significance of the Hungarian Republic of Councils], es nemzetkozi hatasa [and its international impact] (Budapest: MSzMP KB Parttorteneti Intezete, 1960), deals primarily with the impact of the Hungarian Republic of Council, without attempting to be exhaustive. Two articles by Antonio Gramsci published in 1919, and edited by Aladar Kiss (Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek, 1962, No. 3) also pertain to the workers' movement. The recollections of Guido Romanelli, Nell'Ungheria di Bela Kun e durante


l'occupazione militare romena. La mia missione, maggio-novembre 1919 (Udine: Doretti, 1964), contains useful observations about the activities of the Italian mission in Budapest; it also deals with Italian political objectives, the relations between the mission and the Council, but especially with the relations established with the Hungarian counter-revolution. It is an interesting supplement to other memoirs and contemporary documents dealing with the Romanian occupation. Giorgio Maria Sangiorgi's L'Ungheria dalla repubblica di Karolyi alla reggenza di Horthy (Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, 1927) deals with the same period. There is as yet no overall treatment of the relations between the Hungarian governments and the Italian leaders. Yet there are many references to our topic among the monographs, mainly western, dealing with the whole of the period in general terms. Contemporary sources also provide relatively ample information.
2. There remained, however, a significant opposition to this foreign policy. See, for instance, Dalle case di Giovanni Giolitti: Quarant anni di politica italiana, III. Dai prodromi della grande guerra al fascismo 1910-1928, ed. Claudio Pavone (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1962). See also, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: 1938), 70-71. This opposition soon became stronger, primarily thanks to Mussolini. Regarding the internal position of the Orlando government and the Fiume issue see Ennio di Nolfo, Mussolini e la politica estera italiana (1919-1933) (Padova, 1960). A general treatment of the political situation in Italy can be found in Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Memorie (1915-1919), ed. Rodolfo Mosca (Milano: Rizzoli, 1960) and in Silvio Crespi, Alla difesa d'ltalia in guerra e a Versailles (Diario 1917-1919) (Milano: Mondadori, 1937).
3. Albrecht-Carrie, 102-103.1. H. Edwards, David Lloyd George II (London, 1930), 564. Maxwell H. Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy's Foreign Policy 1914-1937 (London, 1938), 121,196,198, and 208-209. C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences, 1917-1937 (New York, 1937), fl6. The most detailed treatment of the Italian-Yugoslav conflict can be found in Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 77 ff., and in V. E. Orlando, Memorie. In 1915 the Entente promised the port to Serbia. At the end of the war, however, it was no longer Serbia, but the newly constituted Yugoslavia, that claimed the promised city, and its claim was strongly backed by France. Italy resorted to the argument, among others, that the Serbia to which the promise had been made, no longer existed, hence its own claim was valid.
4. One of the specialists of the period argues that "perhaps none of the contradictions in the aftermath of the war constituted as serious a danger to European peace as the rivalry between France and Italy." Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia 1918-1935 (New York: 1937), 100.

5. C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe (London: 1962), 197-198. Di Nolfo, 9,12.
6. See, among others, a number of documents in I documenti diplomatici italiani Sixth series, 1918-1922, I (Rome: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1956) (referred to subsequently as I documenti). Also Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference XII (Washington, 1967) XII, 475 (henceforth Papers PPC), report by A. C. Coolidge dated February 27, 1919. Also Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First Series (subsequently, Documents), VI (London, 1956) 63, report by Rattigan, the British ambassador to Romania, dated July 9, 1919, Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu, 1919-1920, eds. B. Brizman and B. Hrabak, series III (Grada, Belgrade: Institut drustvenih nauka, 1960), Also see Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia.
7. L'udovit Holotik, "Uloha talianskej a francuzskej vojanskei misie na Slovensku r. 1919," Historicky casopis (1953), no.4, and (1954), no.1.
8. The corridor would have provided Czechoslovakia with an outlet to the sea at the expense of Austria and Hungary. It is characteristic of the attitude of the Italians that while openly rejecting the plan, they advised Benes confidentially that if Fiume were awarded to Italy, they would support the project. Archiv Ministerstva zahranicnich veci. Parizsky archiv (Prague). Vol. 43, no.4710, undated situation report from the conference.
9. This mood is well reflected in the Prague press. The morning edition of Bohemia, Nov. 29, 1918, published an article titled "Schwere Genesatze zwischen den Jugoslaven und den Italienern," and in the Jan. 29, 1919, morning issue "Der tschechische Korridor zur Adria. Italienischer Widerstand gegen den franzosischen Plan." Some of the Italian officers objected to part of the territorial claims of the Prague government in Slovakia (Statni slovensky ustredni archiv, Bratislava, Minister ceskoslovenskej republiky s plnou mocou pre spravu Slovenska, report from March 2, 1919, ref. A-288-815) and expressed their sympathies towards Hungary in other ways as well. (See Archiv Ministerstva, Vol. 48, no.4873.)
10. "Italien fur einen Bund zwischen den Deutschen und Ungarn-gegen die Sudslaven." Morning issue of Bohemia, Feb. 8, 1919, P. 5. Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies 1919-1925 (Minneapolis, 1962), mentions a project for an Italian-Hungarian-Polish bloc (94). It is worth noting that at the same time the Hungarian government strove for a Yugoslav-Hungarian-Polish bloc. (Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1010), 996.)
11. Lajos Fulep, as a young teacher, spent many years in Italy before the war and had extensive contacts among progressive Italian intellectuals and politicians.
12. He started on his assignment in December 1918 and kept Mihaly Karoly informed by written and oral reports.

13. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 1132, report of Lajos Fulep.
14. From December 1918 on Italy strove to obtain through official channels, in Paris, that Italian troops be sent to Hungary, while Foch was promoting the French occupation of Vienna and Budapest. I documenti, 226, 231, 253, 264, 273, etc.
15. Prince Livio Borghese resided in Budapest; he eventually acted as the political representative of the Italian mission in Budapest. In June he left for Vienna to participate in negotiations with the Social Democratic leaders.
16. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 1131.
17. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 1015.
18. Ibid.
19. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 584 (from Count Imre Csaky to the consul in Vienna, Oszkar Charmant, February 6, 1919).
20.
21. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 1014.
22. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 584. Regarding the formation of the mission and its task see I documenti, 352-353.
23. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 584. Zanella invited Charmant to Fiume already in his letter of January 22, 1919, adding that from there he could proceed to Rome to negotiate with the head of the cabinet. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 1014.
24. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 996; (1919), 1133.
25. The Yugoslav government was disposed to hand over predominantly Hungarian communities along the Drava River and in the Banat. The Banat had not yet been adjudicated; Yugoslavia and Romania were at odds over the province. The Yugoslavs would have preferred to see the debated territories under the sovereignty of a cooperative Hungarian administration (Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 1133; (1919), 1601.) Romania, which claimed the entire Banat, resented having to share with Yugoslavia. A History of the Peace Conference of Paris III, ed. H.W.V. Temperley (London, 1920), 29.
26. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 996.
27. He wrote to Szilassy: "I particularly agree with Mr. Consul's opinion-and practically all serious politicians share this opinion-that the only purposeful political orientation for us at this time would be the South Slavs." Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 982. A. C. Coolidge also reported to Paris, that the Hungarians were seeking an understanding with Serbia (sic as against the Romanians. Papers PPC, XII, 475, report of February 27,1919.
28. PI Archivum, papers of the Karolyi trial. Container 2, File 5; strictly confidential report by Count Csaky on March 4, 1919. Marquis Tacoli was the "Hungarian political representative" of the Italian mission in Vienna, followed at this post by Borghese. G. Romanelli. 14.

30. Hungarian State Archives, KUM Res. pol. (1919), 1237. Ivo 3, Lederer, 1677-178.
31. I documenti, 471-472. Report by Augusto Biancheri Chiappori to Sonnino, dated January 17, 1919.
32. Archiv Ministerstva, Folder 7, Number 731, report to the Foreign Ministry of Czechoslovakia, undated.
33. The military leaders supported the proposal of Szmrecsanyi, I documenti, 471-472; see the already quoted report. Regarding the Latin bloc and its broader implications see Albrecht-Carrie, 67.
34. Emil Tersen, "Az entent (kulonoskeppen Franciaorszag) es a Magyar Tanacskoztarsasag [the Entente-especially France-and the Hungarian Republic of Councils]. 1917-1919," in A Magyar Tanacskoztarsasag. ... , 164. G. Romanelli, 62 ff.
35. Organization of American Relief in Europe 1918-1910, eds. Soda Lorena Bane and Ralph Haswell Lutz (Stanford University Press, 1943). 517, letter by E. Troubridge dated May 26, 1919. Papers PPC, I (Washington, 1045), 135, minutes of the session of the American peace delegation, March 27, 1019. H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London, 1934), 297, telegram from Chieherin to Bela Kun dated March 25, 1919, Mrs. Sandor Gabor, Dokumentomok Szovjetoroszorszag es a Magyar Tanacskoztarsasag kapcsolatairol" (Documents Regarding the Relations between the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Republic of Councils), Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek (1061), no.1, 211. Nepszava, March 26,1919.
36. According to Romanelli the members of the mission were Lt. Col. Murari, Captains Accame and Carbone, eight soldiers, a clerk, etc. Marquis Tacoli was included as the political representative. G. Romanelli, op. cit. Papers PPC, XII, 424, report by Ph. M. Brown dated March 25, 1910. Franco Fern, 289. A. Gramsci, 127.
37. G. Romanelli, 28. Papers PPC, XII, 418, report by N. Roosevelt dated March 26, 1919.
38. P. Mantoux, Les deliberations du Conseil des Quatre (March 24-June 28, 1919)I (Paris: CNRS, 1955), 80; record of March 29, 1919. G. Romanelli, 28, 56-57, 84.
39. P, Mantoux, I, 80, Testimony of Peter Agoston, PI Archivum, the trials of the People's Commissars, July 14, 1920, 1822-23.
40. Ibid., as well as July 16, 1920, 1907.
41. P. Mantoux, I, 52 ff. Regarding the session of March 27, 1919. Papers PPC, XII, 419; report by N. Roosevelt dated March 26, 1019,
42. P. Mantoux, I, 80-83, 98-104. Papers PPC, V, 16 ff.
43. H. Nicolson, a member of the mission, gives a detailed account of the journey, but does not even mention the names of the Italian members, 292.
44. Agoston collection, PI Archivum, Container II, Folder 12. Testimony of Peter Agoston dated November 19,1919.

45. Report of May 4, 1919, Papers PPC, XII, 460.
46. Report of May 7, 1919, ibid., 459.
47. Reports of May 4 and May 12, 1919, ibid., as well as 460. Regarding Segre's project for the resignation of the Council and the possible entering of Italian troops; also see G. Romanelli, 62-63.
48. G. Romanelli, 10 ff.
49. Prager Tagblatt, (evening edition) April 29, 1919, 1.
50. The manuscript collection of Bohm in the PI Archives, 2nd container, file 12 271/5; "Bela Kun soil Italiens Interessen in Fiume schutzen," Prager Tagblatt (evening edition) April 29, 1919, 1.
51. Report of May 12, 1919, Papers PPC, XII, p. 466.
52. Papers PPC, IV, p. 694.
53. G. Romanelli, 63.
54. Ibid., 64.
55. Minutes of the meeting of the revolutionary cabinet, dated May 17, 1019, PI Archives; Hungarian State Archives, KUM Gazd. pol. oszt., bundle 3, A/2, file 23917/1919; G. Romanelli, 63 ff.
56. Minutes of the meeting of the revolutionary council, May 17, 1919, PI Archives; G. Romanelli, 65-66. Romanelli blames Count Basselet de la Rosarie for allowing the Austrian authorities to find out.
57. Memorandum of Benes, dated June 18, 1919, Documents, VI, 69; the report of the Czechoslovak delegation in Zagreb, June 25, 1919, Archiv Ministerstva, bundle 48, no. 4886.
58. Papers PPC, X, 372-373.
59. Report by A. C. Goodyear, the head of the Coal Mission, dated September 10, 1919, Organization of American Relief, 700; Papers PPC, VI, 257; VII, 263-264 (the July 25, 1919, meeting of the Supreme Council of the Great Powers).
60. Papers PPC, X, 345, 372-373, 378; XII, 530; Documents, VI, 20, 63, 88.
61. Archiv Ministerstva, bundle 48, no. 4880; bundle 72, no. 69823.
62. "Die Ereignisse in der Slovakei," Der Demokrat (morning edition), June 4, 1919.
63. Ibid.
64. "Die italienisch-ungarische Freundschaft," Bohemia, June 29, 1919.
65. "Italien fur Sovjetungarn?", Prager Tagblatt (evening edition), May 30, 1919.
66. "Ein Gegeimbundnis Ungarns mit Italien?", Abendblatt (afternoon edition of Bohemia), June 14, 1919,
67. Documents, VI, 69-70.
68. Neither does L'Holotik mention in his cited work that this factor may have contributed to the deterioration of the relations between Czechoslovakia and Italy; in fact, he makes no mention of the contacts between Italy and Hungary. Thus the work of Vondracek, already quoted, constitutes an exception, for there is a brief reference to these contacts on page 36.

69. We have no sources pertaining to the control process itself. The Hungarian press, however, eventually did deal with the inspection of the import and export bureau of Trieste on the basis of reports published in the Italian press, as well as with the charges against and arrest of Segre and Romanelli. Az Ujsag, May 29, 1921, "Ujabb reszletek a Segre-Romanelli ugyben" [New details about the Segre-Romanelli affair] and "Segre olasz ezredest szabadon bocsatottak" [The latter title is inaccurate, for Segre had the rank of general.]
70. Papers PPC, VII, 478-479; X, 345, 372.
71. Documents, VI, 20, 94-95.
72. Ibid., 95 Franco Ferri, 285; A. Gramsci. 127; G. Romanelli, 66.
73. G. Romanelli, 96.
74. "Mobilisierung der Sokolschaft," Der Demokrat (evening edition), June 6, 1919; "Die angeblichen italienischen Waffenlieferungen nach Ungarn und Bohmen," Bohemia, July 1, 1919; G. Romanelli, 95-96.
75. Franco Fern, 289-290.
76. L' Holotik, op. cit.; "Das Ende der tschechisch-italienischen Freundschaft," Bohemia, June 7, 1919. The article quotes at length from the Corriere della Sera.
77. Franco Fern, 285. Quotes from the August 19, 1919, issue of the Ordine Nuovo, In 1922 Romanelli was given the red-carpet treatment in Budapest, primarily because of his activities on behalf of the Hungarian counter-revolution. The "grateful Hungarians" rewarded him with a ceremonial sword and his bust sculpted by Alajos Strobl.
78. G. Romanelli, 91.
79. Ibid., 93.
80. Declaration by Prince Livio Borghese in the case of Peter Agoston, August 27, 1920, PI Archives, A. II, 11/86; testimony by Peter Agoston, the trial of the commissars, July 16,1920, P1 Archives, p. 1948; Mrs. Sandor Gabor, "The Counter-Revolutionary Attempt of June 24, 1919," Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek (1962), no.2; G. Romanelli, op. cit., especially the chapter dealing with the counter-revolution. As is well known, Romanelli intervened on behalf of the participants of the counter-revolution of June 24. In this connection, and in general, he speaks favorably, and often with high regard, of Bela Kun. See 136-138, 163 ff.
81. Lloyd George, II, 891, 1282; Albrecht-Carrie, 189, 197-199, 233, 235; di Nolfo, 14; V. E. Orlando, 16 ff.
82. Regarding the internal situation in Italy see di Nolfo, chapter I.
83. The contemporaries had a similar view of the situation. See, for instance, "Die italienisch-ungarische Freundschaft," Bohemia, June 29, 1919.
84. Session of July 5,1919, Papers PPC, VII, 23.
85. Ibid., 25. At the same time he proposed that the Council be prevented from tracing the confiscated goods, especially hard currency, at all cost, The

Finance Committee was instructed to work out appropriate measures in accordance with this resolution. Ibid., 23,28.
86. Franco Fern, 283.
87. Session of July 17.1919, Papers PPC, VII, 177-178.
88. Letter by Cuninghame dated July 1, 1919, Documents, VI, 7 G. Romanelli. 175, 245. The Hungarian press later had much to say about Cerruti, because he married a Hungarian woman. See, for instance. the theater column in Az Ujsag. October 24, 1923.
89. Agoston collection, diary entry for July 16.1919, PI Archives.
90. Report by A. Halstead, July 18, 1919, Papers PPC. XII.
91. Iratok az ellenforradalom tortenetehez [Documents regarding the history of the counter-revolution] I (Budapest: 1956) (2nd edition), 108-109. Document HL MNHF reports on the conference of the French mission in Vienna, dated August 2, 1919.
92. G. Romanelli, 217 ff.
93. Agoston collection, diary entry for August 16,1919, as well as report by Vilmos Bohm from Vienna dated August 5 1919, P1 Archives. Regarding the attitude of the Rumanian occupation forces see the papers of the Bandholtz mission in Papers PPC. XII; the reports of the British representatives in Documents, VI; also, the last chapters in G. Romanelli, op. cit.
94. Memorandum by Troubridge, November 4. 1919, Documents, VI, 413-414. Report by Bandholtz, August 28,1919, Papers PPC, XII. 660.
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