A Case Study on Trianon

In the summer of 1914, from the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, President Wilson embraced the idea of peace and offered to mediate in the conflict. The vision of peace and his perceived role in bringing it about seemed to be the force that shaped Wilson's mode of conducting foreign policy before, as well as after, the United States entered the First World War in the spring of 1917. He worked to bring about an end to the war, which he believed, was to be followed by a permanent peace constructed by "new diplomacy" based on new international norms" and secured by a "League of Nations." The President's dispositions were influenced by the country's isolationist posture as well as by domestic conditions, and also by his close friend and associate, Colonel Edward M. House who, although a neutralist, leaned toward the Allied Powers and was convinced that "an understanding with Britain was an absolute prerequisite for an American peace mission. ..."¹

At first, President Wilson used every means at the disposal of a neutral power to offer his good offices to the belligerents. However, "his efforts met with no success. In fact, it increased bitterness, and brought about an extended use of propaganda upon both sides."² In 1915, American aloofness and neutrality were sorely tried both by Allied control of the sea lanes (which adversely affected foreign

trade), and by the sinking, in May, of the British passenger ship, the Lusitania, by a German submarine. Many Americans were among those who lost their lives. This incident, as well as submarine warfare in general, brought the United States close to breaking with the Central Powers. The crisis subsided when the Central Powers pledged in May 1916 to restrict submarine warfare. As American awareness of the war was growing in the Presidential election year of 1916, the President stepped up his peace efforts. On May 27, 1916, Wilson gave a speech in Washington at a rally held by the League to Enforce Peace. He expressed the hope that "peace was close at hand" and implied that the United States was ready to mediate and guarantee it.

The League's rally gave President Wilson the opportunity to state his views regarding the postwar settlement.³ One of the ideas he espoused was "the right of every people to choose its sovereign affiliation."⁴ Wilson also suggested that in order to assure the freedom of the seas and to prevent future wars, "universal association of nations" should be formed.⁵ The President hoped in vain that his initiative would be followed by a similar British move. Disappointed, he persuaded himself that the United States should chart an independent course in foreign affairs. Although he had to concentrate on his re-election campaign, he planned, against the advice of Colonel House and Secretary of State Robert Lansing, to launch an independent American peace drive after the election.⁶ President Wilson was re-elected in November of 1916, as the man "who kept us out of war, but the peace initiative was temporarily taken out of his hands by the Central Powers.

Emperor Charles, who succeeded to the Habsburg throne on November 21, 1916 (after the death of his uncle, Francis Joseph), inherited a peace plan. It called for a combined statement of war aims and an offer to negotiate. On December 12, 1916, the Central Powers issued separate but similar statements. They proclaimed themselves the victors and professed to be motivated by "the desire to stem the flood of blood and to bring the horrors of war to an end."⁷ The Central Alliance invited the Entente governments to enter into peace negotiations. At the same time, Emperor Charles began his long and unsuccessful "search for peace through secret negotiations."⁸ When the peace note was issued, President Wilson, as previously indicated, was preparing one of his own and was concerned that the Allied governments might interpret this as a move

supporting the initiative of the Central Powers. Nevertheless, on December 18, Secretary of State Lansing relayed President Wilson's appeal to all belligerents calling on them to state their aims. Lansing stressed that the President was not preparing peace, and was not even offering mediation. "He is merely proposing that a sounding be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be."⁹

On December 19, David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, "in full accord with our brave allies," reflected on both of the notes by recalling the words of Abraham Lincoln: "We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God, I hope it will never end until that time."¹⁰ Then he called for "complete restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantee," adding that, "without reparation, peace is impossible."¹¹

The German and the Austro-Hungarian reply to President Wilson, both dated December 26, 1916, stated that their respective governments "now have the honor to propose that representatives of the belligerent Powers convene at an early date at some place on neutral ground."¹²

Then, on January 10, 1917, the Entente governments sent a joint, and somewhat more detailed, note of their war aims to Washington. It called in part for "the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations, the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Romanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination."¹³ On January 12, the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, Count Ottokar Czernin, sent a note to Washington that denounced the Entente governments for intending "the annihilation and spoliation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy" and indirectly blamed them for the continuation of the war.¹⁴

Before the joint Allied note and Czernin's retort reached Washington, President Wilson, who wanted to end the war on fair terms, was already preparing his next peace move. On January 3, 1917, he met with House and discussed with him a plan that would spell out "the conditions under which the United States would be willing to join in guaranteeing a peace settlement."¹⁵ On January 22, 1917, the President revealed his plan in an address to the Senate, expressing his belief that the time was near when "a definite discussion of the peace ... shall end the present war." Wilson felt that the war should be followed not by a balance of power, but a "community of

power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace. And since statesmen on both sides of the "group of nations now arrayed against one another have said ... that it was not part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists," as a guarantee of future peace and justice, the ending of the war must be a "peace without victory." He then added:

Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last.¹⁶

The President's address was communicated to all belligerents, but the anticipated peace negotiations did not take place, for both groups of belligerents wanted peace with victory. The Entente governments wanted only American assistance in the war, and the government of Germany had already decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, beginning February 1, 1917.¹⁷

As a result of the German decision, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917. President Wilson then made repeated attempts to reach an understanding and conclude a separate peace with the Monarchy. On February 20, Wilson received a communique from Lloyd George concerning the British position regarding the Monarchy which stated that the British government was ready to receive a formal peace offer from Austria and that it "did not wish to separate Bohemia and Hungary from the Habsburg Empire."¹⁸ A reply to the President's overtures to Vienna was sent on March 13, 1917, in a secret communique. It states in part:

Count Czernin repeats that he is disposed to enter upon conversation to end the war on condition that it is a question of general peace and not a separate peace. It is absolutely out of the question to separate Austria-Hungary from her allies the Minister asserts with emphasis.¹⁹

Meanwhile, President Wilson made one more attempt to keep the United States out of war. On February 26, 1917, he requested that Congress pass a resolution of armed neutrality; the motion,

however, was blocked in Congress. In the face of mounting pressure, due especially to the unrestricted German submarine warfare, the President asked Congress to declare war on Germany on April 2, 1917. The Senate voted for war on April 4, the House of Representatives on April 6, and thus, the United States joined the Allies in the war as an Associated Power.

On April 8, diplomatic relations were broken between the United States and Austria-Hungary, but war was not declared on the Dual Monarchy. After some reflection, Wilson stated on June 14 that "the war had been undertaken by the military masters of Germany who happened to be the masters of Austria-Hungary."²⁰ Wilson believed that the German rulers were responsible for all miseries of the war including the Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia in 1914 and was still convinced that he could separate the Monarchy from Germany.

In April 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour led a delegation to Washington and conferred with President Wilson, Colonel House and Secretary of State Lansing, briefing them on Allied positions, secret treaties and British views on postwar settlement. During a meeting with House on April 28, Balfour suggested a possible territorial settlement for the Danube region. Accordingly, "Austria would cede Bosnia and Herzegovina to Serbia, which would in turn give part of Macedonia to Bulgaria. Rumania would get some Russian territory and part of Transylvania. Three states would be formed from the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Bohemia, Hungary and Austria."²¹

Many others with ideas concerning peace and postwar settlement traveled to Washington, for President Wilson was increasingly considered to be the driving force behind the peace initiatives. For the same reason, various ethnic groups in the United States were organizing and stepping up their efforts to promote the interests of their kindred peoples in Europe. Some of the more successful organizers advocating the break-up of Austria-Hungary were American citizens of Slavonic background who had been born in the Dual Monarchy.²²

On August 1, 1917, in the midst of persisting rumors that peace was imminent, Pope Benedict XV issued a peace proposal to the rulers of the belligerent peoples. The Pope offered a framework, which he hoped would be accepted as a basis for the termination of hostilities and the foundation of a just and lasting peace. He indicated that "the fundamental point must be that the material force

of arms give way to the moral force of right." Regarding territorial questions, the Pope expressed the hope that, "in consideration of the immense advantages of durable peace with disarmament," the belligerents would put "the general good of the great human society" above private interests.²³

President Wilson could not accept the Pope's peace proposal because he felt it implied that the rulers of Germany would stay in power and as a result the world would remain an armed camp. Before sending his reply, however, which Lansing transmitted to the Pope on August 27, 1917, Wilson consulted with the Allied governments. The final draft emphasized that the United States was not seeking material advantage; it made a distinction between the German people and their government and stated that the wrongs done in the war by the "Imperial German government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people." Furthermore, the note stated that "the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues are ... no proper basis ... for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and common rights of mankind."²⁴

The President's reply was received with satisfaction in England and France. Interestingly, the press' reaction in Hungary was also favorable. On September 4, it was reported from Budapest that the evening paper, Az Est, regarded Wilson's ideas to be conducive to world peace and acceptable to every friend of peace. For Hungary, the most important consideration was that "America had unconditionally put herself on the side of no annexation."²⁵

As peace efforts were intensified, it became obvious that a planning organization was needed in the United States to prepare for an eventual peace conference.²⁶ A number of individuals came up with the idea at the same time and it was eventually developed by Wilson, House and Lansing. The Secretary of State, although he did not think that the conflict would end soon, requested a concerted study of "the aims and desires of the present belligerents."²⁷ Unknown to Lansing, President Wilson was also formulating a similar but alternative plan. As a former historian, Wilson considered that "preparing for peace would properly fall within the province of academic scholarship, making use of men trained in the handling of factual evidence."²⁸ On September 12, 1917, the President asked House to bring together a group of experts which eventually became known as the Inquiry.²⁹

Shortly after assembling the core of the Inquiry, House left for Europe as an American representative to the Allied Supreme War Council. During his stay, he tried in vain to persuade the Allies to join the United States in a declaration of war aims, which the Americans hoped would unite the peoples against the Central Powers. The Allies resisted that idea and tried, also in vain, to engage House in "a discussion of the expected territorial spoils following the war."³⁰ By that time Wilson came to realize that the Allies continued to embrace their original war aims as embodied in the secret treaties.³¹ He concluded, therefore, that "America must pursue a definitely independent course. "³²

At that stage, the American peace efforts were faced with a new challenge. On November 8, the leaders of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution issued a declaration in favor of peace, based on the renunciation of conquest by all belligerents and respect for the legitimate desires of peoples to rule themselves. This was similar to Wilson's earlier idea of "peace without victory." But in the heat of war he had already changed his mind and wanted a "victorious peace"³³ which was to lead to a settlement based on his principles, as indicated in his address to Congress on November 4, 1917:

... justice alone at every point and to every nation that the final settlement must affect, our enemies as well as our friends. ... It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula, "No annexation, no contributions, no punitive indemnities."

Wilson also expressed the necessity to increase American war efforts and to declare a state of belligerency with Austria-Hungary. He was embarrassed by the fact that, although the United States was fighting Germany, it was not at war with Austria-Hungary. At the same time he stated:

We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. ... We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small.³⁴

On December 11, 1917, President Wilson proclaimed, on the basis of a joint resolution of Congress passed four days earlier, that a state of war existed between the United State and the Imperial and Royal

Austro-Hungarian Government.³⁵ Yet the President continued his efforts to separate the Monarchy from Germany.

Meanwhile, Colonel House returned from Europe in mid-December. After House briefed the President, Wilson asked him to have the Inquiry prepare a comprehensive report which would include propositions concerning various geographical regions. Colonel House presented the report to President Wilson on January 4, and together they began to formulate unilateral American peace objectives. It was hoped that these objectives would impress liberals and socialists in Europe and in the United States when they realized that America wanted to base the peace settlement "on justice rather than on conquest." Wilson and House also hoped to "persuade the Bolshevik leaders in Russia of America's interest in a just settlement, which might serve to prevent Russia's withdrawal from the war."³⁶

American war aims and peace terms, which were based to a considerable extent on the Inquiry report, were included in the Fourteen Points, a part of the President's speech delivered to Congress on January 8, 1918.³⁷ President Wilson considered the last of the Fourteen Points which called for the formation of a League of Nations to be most important. Point Ten which proposed autonomy for the national groups without breaking up the Dual Monarchy was vitally important to Austria-Hungary. It indicated that Wilson agreed with the Inquiry which recommended:

Towards Austria-Hungary the approach should consist of references to the subjection of the various nationalities, in order to keep that agitation alive, but coupled with it should go repeated assurances that no dismemberment of the Empire is intended.³⁸

The Fourteen Points embodied American foreign policy regarding the postwar settlement. Yet the State Department was by-passed in its preparation. As a result, Secretary of State Lansing was very critical of the Fourteen Points. Lansing could not see how the secret treaties of the Allies could be reconciled with the principles of justice declared by Wilson. In Lansing's opinion the intention to maintain Austria-Hungary "was most unwise."³⁹ Lansing spelled out his views regarding Austria-Hungary and wrote them in his notebook:

I think that the President will have to abandon this idea and favor the erection of new states out of the imperial territory and require the

separation of Austria and Hungary. This is the only means of ending German power in Europe. Convinced of this, I think we should encourage the erection of a Polish state, a Czech state, and possibly a Ruthenian state. Then would come the union of Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia under one sovereignty. There should also be considered the annexation of the Roumanians of Transylvania to Roumania and of the Italian provinces to Italy. Finally, to complete the dismemberment, the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary could be separated. These independent states would present an insuperable barrier to German ambitions ... I shall await an opportune time to lay this last question before the President.⁴⁰

The "opportune time" occurred a few months later.

On February 11, 1918, President Wilson supplemented the Fourteen Points with the following Four Principles, which he held essential to a permanent peace:

Principle 1. "Each part of the final settlement must be based on the essential justice of that particular case."

Principle 2. "Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited of the Balance of Power," but that

Principle 3. "Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the population concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states," and

Principle 4. "All well-defined national elements shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism."⁴¹

President Wilson's declarations, especially the Fourteen Points, received world-wide attention. Unfortunately they were accepted by the European belligerent powers as the basis for peace and postwar settlement only after immense additional sufferings, destruction and propaganda campaigns. The Allied Powers held out for victory, which, paradoxically, was possible only with massive American aid as well as increasing military participation. The original German reaction to the Fourteen Points was summed up by General Erich

von Ludendorff, on February 5, 1917, during a secret meeting with Count Ottokar Czernin and German Chancellor Georg von Hertling, in his remark: "If Germany makes peace without profit, then Germany has lost the war."⁴² Only when faced with imminent defeat in the fall of 1918 were the Central Powers ready to accept the Fourteen Points and the Four Principles without reservation.

On September 15, 1918, the Austro-Hungarian government invited all belligerents to send delegates to a confidential and nonbinding discussion of the basic principles for the conclusion of peace.⁴³ When that proposal was rejected in Washington, the German government sent President Wilson a note on October 4 concerning an armistice and peace. Three days later, Washington received a second Austro-Hungarian note which offered to conclude with the President of the United States and his Allies an armistice on every front and "to enter immediately upon negotiations for peace for which the Fourteen Points ... and the Four Principles ... should serve as a foundation."⁴⁴

Reporting on these notes, Secretary of State Lansing recommended to the President that Germany and Austria-Hungary not be treated alike. "In Germany the population could be convinced that if they adopted a democratic form of government they could escape invasion and total ruin. But Austria-Hungary must give way to new nations."⁴⁵ This was clearly at variance with President Wilson's earlier position, but by the fall of 1918, he accepted the idea of the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire. The fundamental change in the President's position was due to complex internal and external developments. It seems, however, that two separate but related diplomatic events in the spring of 1918 were especially influential.

During a speech given in Vienna on April 2, 1918, Czernin attempted a public debate with Wilson over peace aims. He rejected the idea of a separate peace, but restated his readiness for a general peace based on the President's Four Principles stated on February 11, and on the Emperor's proposals. Those proposals were included in a letter secretly communicated to the President on February 20, in which the Emperor adopted the Four Principles and suggested that a general peace could be negotiated if all belligerents would "renounce conquest and annexations."⁴⁶ During the speech. Czernin also revealed the secret negotiations with France, implying that they were initiated by Premier Georges Clemenceau. Czernin then blamed the failure to reach peace on the rebellious nationalities and their exile

representatives who "ever kindle the expiring war spirit in London, Rome and Paris."⁴⁷

Czernin's speech angered Clemenceau and to show that "Count Czernin lied," he made the so-called "Sixtus letter" public.⁴⁸ This letter, wherein the Emperor had expressed a willingness to support France's "just claims in Alsace-Lorraine" in exchange for peace, was sent by Emperor Charles on March 24, 1917 to French President Raymond Poincare.⁴⁹ Czernin apparently had no knowledge of the Sixtus letter and resigned on April 15, 1918. The affair greatly embarrassed Emperor Charles, who was forced to move even closer to Germany.⁵⁰ Wilson and Lansing were dismayed over the incident, which destroyed all hopes of separating Vienna from Berlin. "There was always a possibility of something resulting from the evident desire of the Austrian Emperor for peace almost at any price," lamented Lansing.⁵¹

Almost simultaneously with the Clemenceau-Czernin incident, the "Congress of Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary" met in Rome. The meeting was organized and orchestrated by Czech exile leader Tomas Masaryk, with the help of two British propagandists, Henry Wickham Steed, and Robert W. Seton-Watson. The idea for such a meeting originated at the time of the Italian defeat at Caporetto on October 24, 1917. It was to demonstrate the "anti-Austrian solidarity of the oppressed peoples of the Habsburg Empire." However, by the time the Rome Congress met, between April 9 and 11, 1918, it also wanted to "convert and firmly commit the Allies, particularly President Wilson, to a strong anti-Austrian policy."⁵² It seems that the Rome Congress contributed to a considerable extent to the reversal of American policy toward Austria-Hungary.⁵³

The new American policy that accepted the idea of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was initiated by an exchange of notes between Wilson and Lansing in May and June of 1918. In a memorandum dated May 29, Lansing wrote to Wilson that the United States should revise its policy related to the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which would mean in effect "the dismemberment of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire into its original elements, leaving these independent nationalities to form separate states."⁵⁴ Wilson concurred and wrote to Lansing on June 26:

I agree with you that we can no longer respect or regard the integrity of the artificial Austrian Empire. I doubt that even Hungary is any

more an integral part of it than Bohemia. I have made this judgment in part upon a very interesting and illuminating conversation I had a month or two ago with a group of Magyar Americans who spoke plainly to the point.⁵⁵

The fundamental change in the American position was clearly reflected four months later in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian note, which was received in Washington on October 7, 1918. The ominous letter was written, at the President's request, by Lansing and dated October 18, 1918. The letter intimated that since the President's principles were announced (on January 8 and February 11), "the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czechoslovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a de facto belligerent government ... It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Yugo-Slavs for freedom" Therefore the President was "no longer at liberty to accept mere 'autonomy' of these peoples as a basis of peace."⁵⁶

The end of hostilities between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary was signaled by the unconditional armistice concluded at Padua, Italy on November 3, 1918. It also marked the end of the Habsburg Monarchy and was a grave turning point for Hungary. It set in motion or accelerated events and developments which would lead to the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. During those two years, Hungary went through the throes of a revolution. Regaining its independence. it became a Republic and was invaded by Czech, Romanian, Serbian and French troops. The invasion led to the rise and fall of a Soviet type republic and then to a counterrevolution, which restored the kingdom under a regent.

A Case Study on Trianon