A Case Study on Trianon

delegation, the State Department was to be given a leading role and the Inquiry an important, subsidiary role. House was to oversee all political and economic aspects of the delegation's work in Paris, Lansing was in charge of the legal questions, with the President providing the supreme leadership.⁵⁸

The President and his party left for Europe aboard the George Washington on December 4, 1918. On December 10, during the crossing, Wilson revealed some of his thoughts about the peace settlement and the League of Nations to the Inquiry and told the members that they "should go only so far in backing the claims of a given power as justice required, and not an inch further." He added: "Tell me what's right and I'll fight for it; give me a guaranteed position."⁵⁹ Among the Inquiry members was Archibald C. Coolidge, Professor of East European History at Harvard University, who soon was to be sent to Vienna and Budapest to gather information in the former territories of Austria-Hungary.

President Wilson marshaled all his resources in a single-minded effort to carry out his mission, which started on a high note with his triumphant arrival in France on December 14, 1918. Before the Peace Conference opened in Paris in mid-January, 1919, the President, with his wife at his side, was greeted with enthusiastic popular acclaim not only in France and England, but also (and especially) in Italy. In Rome, he paid a visit to the Pope, whose peace proposal he had rejected earlier; by then he considered the Pope a possible supporter of the League of Nations.

At the time of Wilson's triumphal tour, the newly independent and disarmed Hungary was being invaded from three directions. In the desperate situation, Count Mihaly Karolyi, head of the government of the democratic Hungarian Peoples Republic, sought American help and hoped to find President Wilson willing to see to it that Hungary was treated fairly at the coming Peace Conference.⁶⁰ The President's attentions, however, were focused on other matters, primarily the prospects of the League of Nations. But Karolyi's hopes were encouraged somewhat when Professor Coolidge arrived in Budapest from Paris (via Vienna) on January 15, 1919.⁶¹

During his six days' stay, Coolidge sent several reports to the American Peace Commission in Paris evaluating how he perceived the country's predicament. He interviewed Karoly (by that time President of the Republic) as well as other officials. He found the Hungarians distressed and in near chaos, united only in their concern

for the fate of their country. Coolidge could observe in Budapest the effects of the long war and the unfolding consequences of the foreign invasion. The fact that the invasion and the continued Allied blockade deprived Hungary of most of its vital resources, especially coal, led Coolidge to conclude that "the continuation of these conditions would cripple industry and bring about unemployment, thus increasing the danger of a Bolshevik uprising."⁶²

In one of his reports, Coolidge dealt with the complex and sensitive question of the nationalities. He found the Hungarian government ready and willing to transform Hungary into a sort of Switzerland by granting wide autonomy to the various nationalities. The Hungarians expressed to Coolidge their confidence that the great majority of the peoples living in the historical Hungarian state would prefer to remain there rather than be absorbed by their neighbors. They felt, reported Coolidge, that in the name of justice and Wilsonian principles, "these peoples should be given a fair chance to express their wishes."⁶³

Coolidge reported to his colleagues in Paris that if the extent of foreign occupation indicated the future boundaries of Hungary, more than three and three quarter million Hungarian citizens would be subjected to alien rule. "To compel what has been since a thousand years a unified country to accept such an arrangement as permanent would be only to condemn it to a future of hatred and strife with every probability of violent outbreak before many years have elapsed."⁶⁴

At the time Professor Coolidge stayed in Budapest, Czech troops were in the midst of overrunning and cutting off northern Hungary. He wrote about the Hungarian bitterness towards the Czechs, who proceeded to incorporate the occupied territories without asking the population for their consent, whereas the Hungarian leaders expressed to Coolidge their readiness to "accept the decision of the Slovak people as to whether they wanted autonomy within Hungary or union with Bohemia." The Czechs decided for the Slovaks as they "claimed Bohemia on historical and geographical grounds, Slovakia on the basis of ethnographic, and Magyar-inhabited lands north of the Danube on the basis of economic considerations." The Hungarians, reported Coolidge, regarded the Czech actions as naked imperialism and could not believe that "the Allies and especially America could countenance such a violation of the principles of justice and self-determination."⁶⁵ A separate report indicated that

Professor Coolidge was himself convinced by the Hungarian position concerning the unique geographic unity of Hungary, which had assured the viability of the Hungarian state for over ten centuries.⁶⁶

In the complete absence of Hungarian representation at the Paris Peace Conference, the Coolidge reports amounted to a presentation of Hungary's case by an American expert.⁶⁷ The reports indicated a desirability of upholding the unity of the country, or at least the unity of the Hungarian nation-a nation on the loser's side and in desperate straits, but one with a long past, a nation that trusted its fate to be decided on the basis of the Wilsonian principles of self-determination and free plebiscites with historical, cultural, ethnic, geographic, economic and strategic considerations. But as it was, the Peace Conference took none of these considerations into account.

The Coolidge reports hardly affected the American recommendations; they were too late for that. All but one of Coolidge's reports were dated January 19, 1919, and sent by couriers to Paris where the first concrete and recorded plan for the postwar frontiers of Hungary was just being completed. The plan was part of a comprehensive outline of problems-territorial, political, economic and social-which the Peace Conference was likely to face. It was drafted by the Intelligence Section (composed, for the most part, of former members of the Inquiry) of the American Peace Delegation, in Paris and was dated January 21, 1919.⁶⁸

The frontiers recommended by the plan resembled the eventual territorial settlement of the Treaty of Trianon. Yet in some important details, the plan was not as detrimental to Hungary. One of the most important differences concerned the frontier shared with the new Czecho-Slovak state. The American plan left the island of Csallokoz of the Danube river, with its overwhelmingly Hungarian population, to Hungary. But as the plan pointed out, "(I)n Hungary the recommended frontier runs south of the linguistic border and includes more than 500,000 Magyars."⁶⁹ According to the pertinent map of the plan, Ruthenia, with the important Hungarian cities of Ungvar, Munkacs and Maramarossziget would have remained part of Hungary, but the text of the report stated: "It is undesirable that the Ruthenians of eastern Hungary should continue under Hungarian rule ... and a Hungarian wedge be thrust between the Romanians and the Czecho-Slovaks." The report also opposed the idea of uniting Ruthenia with Poland, Galicia or the Ukraine, "which might lead to incorporation within a future Russia ... it is certainly

undesirable that Russia should ever extend across the Carpathians, down the Hungarian plain."⁷⁰

Concerning the borders with Romania, the American plan intended to leave the cities of Arad, Nagyvarad, Nagykaroly and Szatmarnemeti within Hungary (see map no. 2). In that way, a broad homogeneously Hungarian populated area would have escaped foreign rule. Significantly, the report pointed out (in case the recommendations were accepted) the necessity to protect another homogeneous Hungarian group in Transylvania, the Szekelys. It was suggested that the frontier be carefully defined "so as to do full justice to delicate questions of commercial outlets that affect dense groups of both Romanian and Magyar population."⁷¹

The Hungarian-Yugoslav frontier proposed by the American report was considerably more favorable to Hungary than the one ultimately laid down by the Treaty of Trianon. The cities of Magyarkanizsa, Szabadka, Topolya and Zenta, together with compact masses of Hungarians, would have beer left under the sovereignty of the mother country.

The report pointed out that "the boundaries of proposed Hungary do not follow historic lines, and the new state would have but half the area and population that Hungary had before the war." The reductions were made mostly in order "to satisfy the vital economic needs of neighboring states. " The report stressed that:

Further reduction of Hungary along the lines of Czech and Rumanian claims seems eminently undesirable. It would be unwise to give Rumania the mouth of the Maros. Likewise undesirable is the existence of a corridor between Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia, since the region of the corridor is preeminently Magyar in character.⁷²

The report recommended that the frontier between Austria and Hungary be left intact. This section of the historical borders of Hungary was the only one not immediately contested by her neighbor upon the termination of the war.

The region's new territorial order was built, however, at Hungary's expense for the most part, and the Peace Conference, in contrast with the U.S. Intelligence section's proposal, accepted most, if not all, of the territorial claims against that country. Interestingly, the first such claim, heard by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on January 31, 1919, set two of the Claimants, Serbs and Romanians, against each other. Both had

claims to the Banat, Hungary's rich southern district. The Romanians based their claims to the whole of the Banat on the secret treaty of August 17, 1916, between the Allied Powers and Romania. The Serbs asserted that part of the Banat belonged to them by virtue of the "will of the people." On the second day of the hearing, Ionel Bratianu, the Romanian Prime Minister, stated that he considered the Banat an integral part of the whole of "Transylvania," which Romania demanded on historical as well as ethnic grounds.⁷³ Vittorio Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, supported the Romanian claims, by reason that the secret treaty was binding on the Allies. That notion, however, was opposed by Clemenceau, who stated that the Allies' agreement regarding the secret treaty was canceled by Romania's conclusion of a separate peace with the Central Powers (May 7, 1918). Furthermore, as Lloyd George pointed out, "Rumania was now claiming more than she was entitled to under the secret treaty." At his recommendation, the following resolution was proposed:

It is agreed that the questions raised in Mr. Bratianu's statement on Roumanian territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance by an expert committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy. It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a lust settlement. The Committee is authorized to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned.⁷⁴

Before the resolution was adopted, President Wilson stated: "The United States of America were not bound by any of the treaties in question; they were quite ready to approve a settlement on a basis of facts." And he observed that "the claimants did not always restrict themselves even to the limit set by the Treaties." The President added:

... he was seeking enlightenment, and this would no doubt be afforded by a convincing presentation by the experts. If the resolution proposed by Mr. Lloyd George did not receive acceptance, he would find himself compelled to fight the question merely on the views expressed by the American experts; but he would prefer that these conclusions should be corrected by views of the French, British and Italian experts.⁷⁵

The resolution was adopted and a Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Romania was created.

The Czecho-Slovak claims were then presented to the Supreme Council by Eduard Benes on February 5, 1919. He began by saying that "the Czechs must be prudent, reasonable, and just to their neighbors and they must avoid provoking jealousy and renewed struggles." Then he proceeded to claim for the newly born state the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia and Slovakia. Concerning the latter, which had been an integral part of Hungary since the tenth century, Benes asserted that "Slovakia had, before the tenth century, formed part of a 'Czecho-Slovak' state when it had been overrun by the Magyars." According to him "the population still considered itself Czech; it wished to belong to the new Czecho-Slovak state."⁷⁶ As for the frontier with Hungary, he claimed the river Danube on principle, as well as for economic reasons, so that the landlocked Czecho-Slovak state would have access to the Black Sea. In addition to these claims, Benes submitted two suggestions for consideration. He informed the Peace Conference that the Ruthenes, eastern neighbors of the Slovaks, who were living in the northeastern part of Hungary, proposed the formation of an autonomous state in close federation with Czecho-Slovakia. The reason for the proposed federation, offered by Benes, resembled that of the aforementioned recommendation, warning against uniting Ruthenia with the Ukraine or Galicia. He stated that:

If Eastern Galicia became Russian it would be dangerous to bring Russia south of the Carpathians. If Eastern Galicia became Polish, the Poles themselves would not wish to include this population. It follows, therefore, that this people must either be Hungarian or autonomous. If the latter, they wished to be federated to the Czecho-Slovak state. This would impose a burden on Czecho-Slovakia. but would afford them the advantage of a common frontier with the Roumanians.⁷⁷

The other suggestion, submitted by Benes, concerned an overland access to the Adriatic Sea by means of a "small corridor" through western Hungary.⁷⁸ The idea of the corridor was opposed by the American recommendation. Upon hearing Benes's presentation, the Supreme Council referred the matter, together with the same stipulations as in the case of the Romanian claims, to a special 'Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions.'

The Yugoslav territorial claims were presented to the Supreme Council on February 18, 1919. Milenko Vesnic, speaking for his delegation, declared that "his delegation regarded the right of self-determination as inviolable and any treaty disposing of the Yugoslav people without their consent as null and void." Concerning the frontiers that Yugoslavia shared with Romania to the east, he repeated the suggestion made on January 31 during the discussion of the fate of the Banat, that would "allow the population to choose their allegiance." To the north, the Serbs proposed a boundary with Hungary that would include all Croats, Slovenes and Serbs, and would "correspond not only to ethnic, but to geographical realities."⁷⁹

After their presentation, the Supreme Council referred the Yugoslav claims to the committee that was already examining the Romanian claims. With that, the Council heard and referred the three territorial claims against Hungary to special committees "to examine the claims advanced and to formulate recommendations for a just settlement."⁸⁰ The recommendations were to help the Principal Allied and Associated Powers make their final decisions regarding the problems; however, as it turned out, the recommendations were accepted as final judgments.

Although the recommendations of the special committees were to affect Hungary vitally, her interests were seldom considered and the Hungarians were never given so much as a hearing. The committees were biased against Hungary by the nature of their tasks, which were to inquire into claims advanced by Hungary's enemies. The committees had to make recommendations for the future frontiers of Czecho-Slovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, rather than of Hungary.

The Committee on Czecho-Slovak Questions, considering the future of Ruthenia, decided "to advocate in principle the formation of an autonomous state to include the Ruthenians of Hungary which should be under Czecho-Slovak protection, with guarantees, however, for the freedom of transit across Ruthenian territory between Hungary and Poland, as well as between Rumania and Czecho-Slovakia."⁸¹ The subcommittee of the above committee, which was considering the future boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia, held seven meetings in five weeks, and only the testimony of the Czech representative, Dr. Benes, was heard.⁸²

In drawing up the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, the American and Italian experts of the Committee on

Czecho-Slovak Questions regarded as "a vital consideration to include the smallest possible number of Magyars within Czecho-Slovakia." In the British and French opinion, however, that consideration was secondary to finding the best geographic frontiers for the Czecho-Slovak state. The British and French point of view ultimately prevailed, as it did generally throughout the Peace Conference.⁸³

American and French views were at times poles apart. At the first meeting of the Committee for the Study of Romanian Territorial Questions held on February 18, 1919, the members of the committee agreed that "the whole of Rumania's claim to Transylvania should not be allowed." The members proposed different lines for the possible boundaries. The line "proposed by the French was furthest west, giving the largest slice of Hungarian territory to the Rumanians, while the line suggested by the Americans was furthest east," leaving the broad zone of Hungarian-populated regions within Hungary."⁸⁴ The differences in the American and French approaches to basic related problems were also indicated by a discussion between Andre Tardieu, member of the French delegation, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State. The discussion took place on May 8, 1919, during the proceedings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was considering the results of the territorial committees' inquiry. The topic was the future Hungarian-Romanian frontier, and at one point the minutes reported that:

Mr. Lansing asked why a more accurate ethnic line could not be followed.

Mr. Tardieu explained that it would cut the railway line and suppress continuous communication.

Mr. Lansing asked if anywhere west of the line there could be found a predominantly Romanian population.

M. Tardieu said that this might occur in certain isolated places.

In reply to further questions, M. Tardieu said that some 600,000 Hungarians would remain under Romanian rule, while 25,000 Romanians would remain within Hungary.

Mr. Lansing expressed the view that this distribution did not appear very just; in every case, the decision seemed to have been against the Hungarians.

M. Tardieu said that any other adjustment would have been all in favor of the Hungarians and correspondingly to the detriment of the Romanians.⁸⁵

It should be noted, by that time the Romanians figured prominently in French designs, especially as far as the war against Bolshevism was concerned. In contrast, the Hungarians were considered not only former enemies but current ones as well, after the Karolyi regime gave way to the Communist dictatorship of Bela Kun on March 21, 1919.⁸⁶

The question of the frontier between Austria and Hungary was brought up for the first time on May 8 at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. During the proceedings, Italian Foreign Minister Baron Sonnino expressed the opinion that their discussion should result in a definition of Hungary's border with Austria. Balfour was of the opinion that the best method of defining the frontiers would be to adopt the results of the inquiry by the territorial committee. In Lansing's view:

The Council was dealing with a territory which in 1914 had been the domain of Austria and Hungary. It was recognized that this territory was to be dismembered, that Austria and Hungary were to be separate states and that their lands were to be limited by new states, whose frontiers were to be determined. No definition of Austria and Hungary, therefore, appeared necessary. The definition would arise automatically as a result of establishing the new states.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, after further discussion, the Council decided to appoint a commission to collect information regarding possible rectification of the border between Austria and Hungary. No action would have been planned, however, if the question were not raised by the two countries.

The question was raised again at the meeting of the Supreme Council held on May 12, 1919, brought up by President Wilson. He said that the border between Austria and Hungary would have to be defined in the treaty with Austria. Baron Sonnino asked "whether it would not be enough to require Austria to recognize the independence of Hungary, and Hungary that of Austria, without raising the frontier question at all." Reflecting on this, Wilson stated that, according to his information, the Austrians would raise the question. In concluding the discussion, it was decided that "Austria

would be required to recognize the frontier of 1867 between Austria and Hungary."⁸⁸ Following that decision the Supreme Council adopted the frontiers of postwar Hungary as recommended by the territorial committees. But the question of the frontier between Austria and Hungary was brought to the attention of the Peace Conference once again. In notes submitted between June 2 and 16, 1919, the Austrian Peace Delegation set forth Austria's claim to western Hungary based on geographic, national and economic considerations. They held those territories to be vital to Austria if it was to be a viable state; at the same time they asked that "the right be granted the inhabitants of these territories themselves to decide by a free plebiscite whether or not they wish to be joined German-Austria."⁸⁹ Interestingly, the first to protest the Austrian claim at the Peace Conference were the Czechs, who renewed their efforts to secure a corridor through western Hungary. On July 7, 1919, the Supreme Council decided "to ignore the Austrian request for a plebiscite, as well as the Czech protest,. and decided to assign western Hungary to Austria without a plebiscite."⁹⁰ Hungary protested the decision bitterly and requested that a plebiscite be held in that part of the country but, as in the case of the other contested territories, the request was in vain. The single exception was to be the city of Sopron in western Hungary where the overwhelming majority of the population voted in a plebiscite to remain under Hungarian sovereignty (December 14-16, 1921).

With the decision of July 7, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers completed the dismemberment of historic Hungary. The results did not reflect the Principles of President Wilson nor the American recommendations. Although Wilson expressed readiness to argue the question of territorial settlement on the basis of the recommendations of the American experts, he never actually did so. Decades later, it was observed by an "Inquiry veteran" that "there were considerations of international politics, strategy and common courtesy to our allies which in many, perhaps the majority of cases, prevented President Wilson from following his experts' advise."⁹¹

As for Wilson's principles, they were compromised at the Peace Conference mostly for the sake of the League of Nations. On May 1, 1919, Lansing noted this when he wrote:

The feeling is that the principles, which the President laid down in the "Fourteen Points" and in his speeches, have been destroyed by compromises

and concessions, that a victor's peace rather than a just peace is being sought, and cupidity backed by threats of refusal to sign the Convenant controls the situation.⁹²

As a result (and quite contrary to the design, wishes and expectations of President Wilson) the postwar settlement was built on quicksand, especially in the Danube region.

Hungary, the country most drastically affected by the decisions of the Peace Conference, was not invited to Paris until December 1, 1919, after its fate was already sealed. The settlement imposed on that country by the victorious powers on June 4, 1920, was devastating in its effects. As demonstrated by subsequent history, it caused incalculable damage to the Danube region, as well as to the rest of Europe.

Notes

1. Inga Floto, Colonel House In Paris, A Study of American Policy at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (Aarhus, 1973), 25.
2. Ray Stannard Baker, The Versailles Treaty and After, An Interpretation of Woodrow Wilson's Work at Paris (New York, 1914), 9.
3. Laurence Emerson Gelfand, The Inquiry; American Preparation for Peace, 1917-1919 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 2.
4. Ibid., 3-4.
5. Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918, A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda (Port Washington. New York/London: Kennikut Press, 1972, 1957), 41.
6. Floto, op. cit.
7. James Brown Scott, Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918 (Washington, 19fl), 3.
8. Mamatey, 45.
9. Scott, 15.
10. Ibid., 16.
11. Ibid., 17-18.
12. Ibid., 23.
13. Ibid., 37.
14. Ibid., 43.
15. 1Mamatey, 48.
16. For the full text, see Scott, 49-55,
17. Scott, 68.
18. Mamatey, 60.
19. Ibid., 62.
20. Quoted by, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, From Wilson to Roosevelt,

A Case Study on Trianon