A Case Study on Trianon

Oszkar Jaszi, as minister of nationalities, recognized that the government could do nothing if the nationalities decided to secede.⁴⁰ After the Alba Julia decision, he thought of other alternatives to confederation. He was prepared to consider that in the eventuality that Hungarian villages would come under Romanian control, the national rights of the Hungarian minority would be protected by the Hungarian government.⁴¹ This indicated the consideration of overlapping sovereignty as another compromise solution to the territorial dispute. Put into practice, this concept could have reconciled the self-determination of the Romanians with the needs and expectations of the Hungarians.

Jaszi's plan could be considered as the minimum program of the Hungarians. However, the maximum plan-a confederated Hungary-was not jettisoned. The government continued to press for the maximum, fully expecting this position to be challenged and chipped away at the Paris Peace Conference.⁴² The weakness of this reasoning was the government's failure to realize that the victors, disregarding traditions, did not intend to invite the defeated to present their case and bargain over details.

The Hungarian government rejected the Alba Iulia decision. According to Jaszi, the Romanian leaders could not speak in the name of the majority. The combined Hungarian and Saxon population represented a 57 percent majority in the contested area. Significantly, the Allies also questioned the legitimacy of the Romanian claim on the same basis.⁴³ The Royal Romanian government's response to the declaration of its co-nationals was guarded at first as it still intended to pursue territorial quests as outlined in the Bucharest Treaty of 1916.⁴⁴

To counterweight the Romanian National Council in Transylvania, the Hungarian government encouraged the Hungarian

National Council in Transylvania to organize an assembly and to call for continued Hungarian sovereignty over the 26 counties. This tactic was to bring to the attention of the Allies the multi-ethnic character of the region. As another alternative, Budapest reluctantly supported the position of the Szekely National Council. Spokesmen for this Hungarian-speaking group with their own distinct cultural traditions favored the formation of a Transylvanian Szekely republic.⁴⁵

In addition to these steps, preparations for military resistance were also undertaken. These were necessitated by the march of the Romanian army into Transylvania. The first Romanian troops crossed the Carpathians on November 13. Marosvasarhely (Tirgu Mures) was occupied on December 2, Beszterce (Bistrita) on December 4, and Brasso (Brasov) on December 7. By the middle of the month, the Romanians had reached the Transylvanian segment of the Belgrade demarcation line By December 24 they surpassed it and occupied Kolozsvar (Cluj-Napoca).⁴⁶ In contradiction to the Belgrade Convention, the administration of the occupied areas was taken over by the Romanians.⁴⁷

In northern Hungary, the French government approved the occupation of Slovakia in the name of the Allies. In Transylvania, on the other hand, the expansion of Romanian control was made without Allied sanction but with the support of General Henri Berthelot. Berthelot, as commander of the Allied forces in Romania and in southern Russia, disregarded the orders of his commander-in-chief, Franchet d'Esperey, and gave unqualified support to Romanian expansionist designs.⁴⁸

In response to the Romanian advances, the Hungarian Council of Ministers was forced to decide on appropriate measures. Consideration was given to the resignation of the government and a call was issued to the Entente to govern Hungary. As a result of the continued blockade and territorial losses, Hungary was on the brink of chaos. Passive or active resistance to the absorption of Hungarian lands by Romania was also discussed. Oszkar Jaszi proposed that government ministers take personal leadership over a Hungary divided into ten regions. The socialist Minister of Welfare, Zsigmond Kunfi, proposed that, instead of decentralizing, the government should map out a new frontier along solidly ethnic lines. He concluded that this was the price Hungary would have to pay for the lost war.

The cabinet finally decided to issue instructions to the commissioner

of the 26 counties, Istvan Apathy. He was advised to agree to the occupation of Transylvania by Romanian troops acting as Allied representatives. This occupation was already in effect. Apathy was to insist on Romanian acquiescence to the retention of Hungarian police forces in the occupied areas. These were to be the symbolic representatives of the Hungarian authorities, as sanctioned in the Belgrade convention.⁴⁹

Instead, on December 31, General Berthelot offered Apathy a new demarcation line. Following negotiations in Kolozsvar, Apathy accepted the terms on January 3, 1919. The new agreement allowed the Romanians to hold the Nagybanya (Baia Mara)-Kolozsvar-Des (Dej) line. They were to be separated from the Hungarian troops by a 15-kilometer-wide neutral zone. Budapest, however, disavowed the agreement, claiming that Apathy was not empowered to deal away the more favorable terms of the Belgrade Convention. The Romanians also disregarded the Apathy-Berthelot agreement as it would have curtailed further expansion.⁵⁰

General Franchet d'Esperey and even Prime Minister and Minister of War Georges Clemenceau were displeased with the unauthorized action of Berthelot. They did, however, accept the agreement post facto. Accordingly, Franchet d'Esperey expected that the new demarcation line would put an end to further Romanian expansion.⁵¹

On January 23, the government of Denes Berinkey and Mihaly Karolyi, who was now the President of the Republic, decided that it had no other choice but resort to armed resistance against Romanian expansion. To stop further Romanian advances, it was decided to dig in along the county lines of Bihar. An offensive was not planned-there were no reserves. The energy crisis caused by the blockade also precluded the transportation of supplies in large quantity.⁵²

The Peace Conference, which opened in Paris in mid-January refused to accept the Entente commitments made to Romania in 1916. It also objected to the ongoing Romanian expansion. On January 25, the day after the Alba Iulia decision was enacted in the Romanian parliament, the peacemakers adopted President Wilson's resolution against the use of force for territorial acquisitions.⁵³ Special committees were set up to resolve the territorial questions. These committees were without either central direction or declared focus other than a resolution of border issues. They did not go about recommending general principles of settlement. They were restricted

by the conflicting wishes of the great powers and the demands of the representatives of their small allies.⁵⁴ The committees were expected to write their reports in such a way that they could be incorporated directly into the treaty.⁵⁵ Since the reports of the committees were due by March 8, the territorial issues concerning Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania were decided during the tenure of the Karolyi regime.

Flouting Allied wishes to leave the territorial questions to the Peace Conference, Romanian troops continued to advance. By the end of January they held the Maramarossziget (Sighetul Mamatiei), Zilach (Zalau), Csucsa (Ciucea), Zam (Zam) line. The Romanian occupation of most of Transylvania was complete. Military flare-ups between the Hungarians and the Romanians became frequent and further conflict was imminent.⁵⁶

Franchet d'Esperey, therefore, requested that the peacemakers in Paris establish a neutral zone between the Romanians and the Hungarians. He expected that the Romanians would be told to withdraw to the Apathy-Berthelot line. Instead, on February 26, the Commission to Study the Territorial Questions Relating to Romania accepted a demarcation line that allowed Romania to occupy a line north of the outlines of historic Transylvania. A neutral zone was established to separate the Hungarian and Romanian troops.

The demarcation lines were drawn upon the advice of the French General Staff. It put strategic railway lines under Romanian control. These additional gains, sanctioned by Paris, intended to assure the success of Marshal Foch's projected grand alliance against Communist Russia. Romania, whose troops were already fighting the Bolsheviks, were natural allies. Hungarian territory was the price for continued Romanian intervention in Russia.⁵⁷ Although Foch's plan was soon rejected, the demarcation line assigned to the Romanians was not altered. Subsequently, the Hungarian-Romanian frontier of Trianon closely resembled the Romanian demarcation line as defined on February 26, 1919.

General Franchet d'Esperey was soon instructed to make military preparations for the execution of the decision. The Romanians were informed of the things to come, but the Hungarians were kept in the dark. The Hungarian government remained isolated. It was not recognized by the Allies who claimed that, without a territorial settlement, Budapest represented only a "local government."⁵⁸ Consequently,

the government also lacked diplomatic accreditation abroad.

As a result of its isolation, which was compounded by a lack of information about the peacemaking spirit in Paris, the Hungarian government could not really formulate policies that would fit the new realities. By February 1919, it was evident that self-determination was "demode," and that there was no aversion to assigning the Hungarian population in the periphery to the neighboring states.⁵⁹

Charles Seymour, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian division of the American peace commission, recognized this problem. He saw the need to invite the Hungarians to Paris, if not for participation, then for consultation. He expected that in this fashion the Hungarian government could weather the shock which was awaiting it.⁶⁰

The Hungarian government, however, was unable to learn the truth. To curtail further Romanian advances, it was preparing for military resistance. On March 2, Karolyi inspected the troops in Szatmarnemeti and in an address declared:

If Wilson's principles do not materialize and, instead of a peace based on mutual agreement, a dictated peace demanding territorial dismemberment is offered, I promise you, soldiers, I will never sign such peace terms!⁶¹

The Hungarians were not informed of the February 26 decision of the Peace Conference until the middle of March. Until then, there were only rumors about new demarcation lines.⁶² It was during the visit of Halsey E. Yates, the American military attache to Romania, that the truth was unofficially revealed.

Yates came to Budapest to learn about the position of the government on the border question and to demand 250 locomotives for the Romanians. It was claimed that these were needed for them to fight against the Bolsheviks. Yates, stationed in Bucharest, was influenced by the Romanian version of the conflict. He considered that some of the American peace commissioners who had visited Hungary and sent favorable reports to Paris were biased in favor of the Hungarians. He intended to get an objective picture for his superiors in Paris and in Washington.⁶³

On March 15, Yates met Karolyi. He learned that the Hungarians were reconciled to the loss of the Maros Valley, but intended to resist further Romanian demands by military force. Karolyi argued that

additional territorial losses would ruin the country economically. This would cause trouble and discontent and would eventually throw Hungary into the arms of Germany.⁶⁴

Yates told Karolyi that the Hungarians must accept the loss of Slovakia and Transylvania. With this he confirmed the rumors about the new demarcation lines. He warned that, even though the Allies did not have sufficient armies around Hungary to reply to Hungarian intransigence, there were other means at their disposal, such as food blockades and indemnities.⁶⁵

Before leaving Budapest, Yates wired Paris that he "strongly recommended" that the existing lines not be changed until some 100 British and American officers supplied with automobiles could arrive. He also expressed the view that Hungarians could successfully resist the Romanians who could not be resupplied before May 15.⁶⁶

Yates' proposal, however, was not considered. New developments in southern Russia pressed for the transmission of the terms for a neutral zone. By mid-March the French interventionist forces in the area of Odessa were facing the threat of defeat by the Bolsheviks. On March 13, Clemenceau ordered General Berthelot to use Romanian troops to defend the Tiraspol, Razdelnaya, Odessa railway line.⁶⁷

The crisis in Russia gave the Romanians an opportunity to press for the execution of the February 26 decision. On March 14, the Romanian representative in Paris, Victor Antonescu, transmitted to Clemenceau his government's memorandum. In it the Romanians claimed that while Franchet d'Esperey was looking for a suitable French officer to carry out the terms of the Peace Conference, the Hungarians were stripping Transylvania and spreading Bolshevik propaganda. Clemenceau's response came on the same day. Using almost the exact words of the Antonescu memorandum, Clemenceau referred to the alleged scorched-earth policy of the Hungarians. He ordered Franchet d'Esperey to avoid any further delay and carry out the decision of the Peace Conference.⁶⁸

It is unlikely that Clemenceau bought Antonescu's argument about Bolshevism in Transylvania. However, he was cognizant of the fact that Romanian help in the new crisis in Russia was needed, and that the new demarcation line was the price for continued Romanian participation.

Colonel Yates, following his return to Bucharest on March 17, also saw the need to satisfy the Romanians in order to resolve the Russian problem. He wired to Paris:

The Poles and Rumanians are willing to fight our battles for us but they must be given at once the necessary supplies; and the menaces on their other fronts must be removed by our establishing neutral zones.⁶⁹

Franchet d'Esperey, who would have preferred to blame Romania's military involvement in Transylvania for the fiasco in Russia, had no choice but to order the transmission of the Peace Conference edict to the Hungarians at once. This was done in spite of Franchet d'Esperey's fears that the Hungarian-Romanian clashes above the neutral zone would continue. Furthermore, because of the crisis in Russia, no Allied troops were available to enforce the order in case of resistance.⁷⁰

On March 20, Colonel Vix, in the presence of other Allied representatives, handed the Hungarians the order to withdraw to the new demarcation line. In his instructions, Vix was told to give the Hungarians 48 hours to reply. His directions further stated that in case the Hungarians turned down the ultimatum, no immediate war-like act would be instituted against them. Yet during his meeting with Karolyi and the other leaders, Vix threatened to pack his bags if the government did not acquiesce. This was tantamount to the threat of resumption of war.⁷¹

Following this meeting, the Council of Ministers and President Karolyi gathered to discuss the required response to the Vix Ultimatum. Karolyi informed the ministers that the demarche could not be accepted because it would make the Romanian demarcation line into a frontier, thus depriving Hungary of further territories. In the meantime, French troops in the neutral zone would prevent the Hungarians from using force against Romanian territorial expansion. Karolyi gathered that the territorial losses could not be reversed as the Entente intended to use the Serbs, Czechs and Romanians in a war against the Bolsheviks. Since the Peace Conference did not recognize the Wilsonian principles, Hungary needed new internal and external policies. He proposed the creation of a socialist government which could assure better productivity, hence increase the nation's economic strength. It could also gather the support of the international socialist movement. As the only mass party in Hungary, the Social Democratic party could mobilize the workers and, subsequently, the middle classes to resistance. He also proposed that the socialists reach an understanding with the small Communist party, so that Hungary would not be attacked by the Russian Bolsheviks.⁷²

The socialists, however, went further than was expected. They fused with the communists. On March 21, following the rejection of the Vix Ultimatum and the resignation of Karolyi and the cabinet, the socialists and the communists established a Soviet Republic. The new government was now dominated by the communist Bela Kun. In alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks, it aimed to undo the dictated frontiers in the north and the south by calling for a war against "Entente imperialism."⁷³

The unsuccessful attempts of Karolyi's democratic regime to arrive at some understanding with its adversaries led to its demise. Neither its minimal nor maximal territorial solutions were found to be acceptable by its Czechoslovak and Romanian neighbors. The demarcation lines to which it objected and which it refused to accept became the frontiers that the Allies forced on a right-wing, authoritarian government. For a quarter of a century, the Horthy regime unjustifiably blamed the high price of defeat in war on a government which had actually refused to acquiesce to dictated territorial losses.

Notes

I wish to thank Montclair State College for granting release time for the work on this article.

1. Maria Ormos, "Meg egyszer a Vix-jegyzekrol" ["Once More about the Vix Memorandum"], Szazadok, Vol. 113, no. 2 (1979), 314; Gyula Juhasz, Hungarian Foreign Policy 1919-1945 (Budapest, 1979), p. 39.

2. Zoltan Szende, "Count Michael Karolyi in Belgrade," Hungarian Quarterly. Vol. 5, no. 3 (1939); Ferenc Nyekhegyi, A Diaz-fele fegyverszuneti szerzodes (a paduai fegyverszunet) [The Diaz Armistice Treaty (The Armistice of Padua)] (Budapest, 1922); Jeno Horvath, A trianoni bekeszerzodes megalkotasa es a revizio utja [The Creation of the Peace Treaty of Trianon and the Course of the Revision] (Budapest, 1939); Jeno Laszlo, Erdely sorsa az uniotol Trianonig [The Fate of Transylvania from the Union to Trianon] (Budapest, 1940); a recent but similar view in Yves de Daruvar, The Tragic Fate of Hungary (Munich, 1974).

3. Gyorgy Litvan, Magyar gondolat, szabad gondolat [Hungarian Thought, Free Thought] (Budapest, 1978), pp. 144-143.

4. Francis Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1942, repr. 1972), p. 8; for recent and similar interpretations, see Bennett

Kovrig, Communism in Hungary (Stanford, 1979), p. 37; Sandor Szilassy, Revolutionary Hungary 1918-1921 (Astor Park, Fla., 1971), pp. 26-27.

5. Zsuzsa L Nagy, A parizsi bekekonferencia es Magyarorszag 1918-1919 [The Peace Conference and Hungary 1918-1919] (Budapest, 1963); Tibor Hajdu, Karolyi Mihaly (Budapest, 1978); Lajos Ardai, "Angol-Magyar viszony a polgari demokratikus forradalom idejen az angol leveltari forrasok tukreben (1918 oktober-1919 marcius)" [English-Hungarian Relations during the Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution in the Light of English Archival Sources] Tortenelmi Szemle, Vol. 18, nos. 2-3 (1975); Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: the Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 and the Big Three (New York, 1976); Maria Ormos, "A belgradi katonai konvenciorol" [About the Belgrade Military Convention], TSZ, Vol. 22, no.1 (1979).

6. Inga Floto, Colonel House in Paris (Copenhagen, 1973), p 252; Arno Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking (New York, 1965), p. 16.

7. Wilfried Fest, Peace or Partition, The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy 1914-1918 (New York, 1978), pp. 188-189.

8. Kenneth J. Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1976), p. 218.

9. Josef Kalvoda, Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy (Washington, 1978), p. 17, Fest, Peace or Partition, pp. 238-239.

10. Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1957), pp. 333-334.

11. Fest, Peace or Partition, p. 253; M. L. Dockrill and Zara Steiner, "The Foreign Office at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919," The International History Review, Vol. 2, no. 1, January 1980, 55.

12. Peter Pastor, "The Hungarian Revolution's Road from Wilsonianism to Leninism, 1918-1919," East Central Europe, Vol. 3, no. 2, 1976, 211-213.

13. Gabor Vermes, "The Agony of Federalism in Hungary under the Karolyi regime, 1918-1919," East European Quarterly, Vol. 6, no. 4, 1972, 496; Bela K. Kiraly, "The Danubian Problem in Oszkar Jaszi's Political Thought," The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. 5, 1965, 127-129.

14. Dockrill and Steiner, "The Foreign Office," p. 56; Zsuzsa L. Nagy, "Osszeomlas es kiutkereses 1918-1919-ben, Jaszi Oszkar es a forradalmak" (Collapse and Search for Extrication in 1918-1919, Oszkar Jaszi and the Revolutions), Kritika, no. 5, May 1978, 3; Charles L. Mee, Jr., The End of Order: Versailles 1919 (New York, 1980), pp. 103-105.

15. Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin, p. 104.

16. As quoted in, Fest, Peace or Partition, p. 58.

17. Charles Seymour, Letter from the Paris Peace Conference (New Haven, 1965), p. XXX; Walter A. McDougall, "Political Economy versus National Sovereignty: French Structures for Economic Integration after Versailles," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, no. 1 (March, 1979), p. 11.

18. Dockrill and Steiner, The Foreign Office, pp. 67-68.

19. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy, pp. 9-10.

20. Sherman D. Spector. Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I. C. Bratianu (New York, 1962), p. 37.

21. Josef Kalvoda, Czechoslovakia's Role, p. 15.

22. Zsuzsa L. Nagy, "Magyar hatarvitak a parizsi bekekonferencian" [Debates on the Hungarian Frontier Question at the Paris Peace Conference] TSZ, Vol. 21. no. 3-4 (1978), p. 443.

23. Bela Beller, "A Magyar Nepkoztarsasag es a Tanacskoztarsasag nemzetisegi kulturpolitikaja" [The Cultural Politics of the Hungarian People's Republic and of the Soviet Republic toward the Nationalities] TSZ, Vol. 11, no. 1 (1968), p. 3.

24. Maria Ormos, "A belgradi katonai konvenciorol," p. 26.

25. Budapest. Orszagos Leveltar [National Archives], Minisztertanacsi jegyzokonyvek [Minutes of the Council of Ministers] K 27 MT jkv. No. 40 (Nov. 4, 1918); no. 41 (Nov. 5, 1918).

26. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT jkv. No. 41 (Nov. 5, 1918).

27. Michael Karolyi, Memoirs of Michael Karolyi, Faith without Illusion (London, 1957), pp. 130-137.

28. Jean Bernachot, ed., Les armees alliees en Orient apres l'armistice de 1918, comptes rendus mensuels adresses par le commandant en chef des armees alliees en Orient, a l'etat major de l'armee a Paris, de decembre 1918 a octobre 1920 (Paris, 1972), p. 45.

29. Nagy. A parizsi bekekonferencia, pp. 11-12.

30. Ormos, "A belgradi katonai konvenciorol," p. 29.

31. Bernachot, Les armees alliees en Orient, 45.

32. Ormos, "A belgradi katonai konvenciorol," p. 29; Peter Pastor, "The Diplomatic Fiasco of the Modern World's First Woman Ambassador, Roza Bedy-Schwimmer." EEQ, Vol. 8, no. 3 (1974), 279.

33. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT 1kv. no. 59 (Nov. 29, 1918).

34. Ferenc Boros, Magyar-csehszlovak kapcsolatok 1918-1921-ben [Hungarian Czechoslovak Relations in 1918-1921] (Budapest. 1970). pp. 46-47; Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT jkv. no. 58 (Nov.28. 1918).

35. L. Nagy, "Magyar hatarvitak." p. 444.

36. Le Temps, Dec. 31, 1918.

37. Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin, pp. 72-73.

38. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT jkv. no. 58 (Nov.28, 1918).

39. Laszlo, Erdely sorsa, p. 117.

40. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT jkv. no. 59 (Nov.29, 1918).

41. Budapest. Orszagos Leveltar [National Archives]. A Magyarorszagon elo nemzetek onrendelkezesi joga elokeszitesevel megbizott miniszter [The Minister in Charge of the Preparation of the Right of Self-determination of the Nations Living in Hungary], K 40. Erdodi Nemzeti Tanacs to Jaszi and reply (Dec. 3, 1918).

42. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT jkv. no, 72 (Dec.28, 1918); no. 58 (Nov, 28, 1918).

43. Spector, Rumania, p. 93.

44. Maria Ormos, "Az ukrajnai katonai intervenciorol es hatasairol Kozep-Europaban, 1918 oktober-1919 Aprilis" [The Impact of the French Intervention in the Ukraine and in Central Europe] TSZ, Vol. 20, nos. 3-4 (1977), p. 423, n. 56.

45. Orszagos Leveltar, K 40, Bohm to Jaszi (Dec. 5, 1918); Minutes (Dec, 17, 1918).

46. Gyorgy Ranki, ed., Magyarorszag tortenete, 1918-1919, 1919-1945, Vol. 8 (The History of Hungary, 1918-1919, 1919-1945] (Budapest, 1976), pp. 113-117.

47. Ranki, Magyarorszag tortenete, p. 96.

48. Peter Pastor, "Franco-Rumanian Intervention in Russia and the Vix Ultimatum: Background to Hungary's loss of Transylvania," The Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies, Vol. 1, nos. 1-2 (1974), p. 14, This essay is based on unpublished archival sources from the French Military Archives and the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.

49. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT 1kv. no. 69 (Dec. 18 and 19, 1918); Orszagos Szechenyi Konyvtar kezirattara [Archives of the National Szechenyi Library), Apathy iratok [Apathy Papers], Quart. Hung. 2455, "Erdely az osszeomlas utan" [Transylvania after the Collapse].

50. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT jkv. no. 13 (Jan.27, 1919); Ormos, "Meg egyszer a Vix-jegyzekrol," p. 327.

51. Bernachot, Les armees alliees, p. 164.

52. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT 1kv. no. 11 (Jan, 21, 1919).

53. Spector, Rumania, p. 80.

54. Dockrill and Steiner, "The Foreign Office," p. 66.

55. Dockrill and Steiner, "The Foreign Office," p. 69.

56. Ormos, "Az ukrajnai francia intervenciorol," p. 427.

57. Pastor, "Franco-Rumanian Intervention," p. 20; Ormos, "Az ukrajnai katonai intervenciorol," pp. 429-430.

58. Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin, p. 83.

59. Sir James Headlam-Morley, A Memoir of the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (London, 1972), p. 27, 44.

60. Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin, p. 104,

61. Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin, p. 128,

62. Ormos, "Meg egyszer a Vix-jegyzekrol," p. 331.

63. Washington, National Archives, War Department General Staff Military Intelligence Division 1917-1941, MID 220 a 2266-V 174, Report of Yates (March 4, 1919).

64. National Archives, MID 239 2323-354, Yates to Brig. Gen. Churchill (March 15, 1919).

65. Paris, Archives historiques, Ministere de la Guerre. Etat-Major de

L'Armee, Campagne Contre Allemagne, Carton 106, dossier 3, Vix to de Lobit (March 16, 1919).

66. National Archives, MID 239 2323-354, Yates to Brig. Gen. Churchill (March 15, 1919).

67. Pastor, "Franco-Rumanian Intervention," p. 20; Ormos, "Az ukrajnai francia intervenciorol," pp. 433-436.

68. Pastor, "Franco-Rumanian Intervention," p. 21.

69. National Archives, MID 243 2069-98, Yates to Brig. Gen. Churchill (March 29, 1919).

70. Ormos, "Meg egyszer a Vix-jegyzekrol," p. 330.

71. Tibor Hajdu, Marcius huszonegyedike [The Twenty-First of March] (Budapest, 1979), pp. 54-57; for the French and Hungarian text of the Vix Ultimatum see Gyorgy Litvan, ed., Karolyi Mihaly levelezese I, 1905-1920 [The Correspondence of Mihaly Karolyi I. 1905-1920] (Budapest. 1978), pp. 445-448; for the English version see Peak, The Paris Peace Conference. pp. 407-409.

72. Orszagos Leveltar, K 27 MT jkv. no. 29 (March 20, 1919); part of the minutes in Hajdu, Marcius huszonegyedike. pp. 69-73.

73. Tibor Hajdu, The Hungarian Soviet Republic (Budapest, 1979), pp. 28, 34-35.

A Case Study on Trianon