A Case Study on Trianon

The Treaty of Trianon was of major importance for the development of the Czechoslovak Republic.¹ It defined the Republic's borders with Hungary and fixed the fate of several nations and nationalities. This essay will place the problems of borders and nationalities in historical perspective, and discuss their origin before the First World War, their formation during the years of 1918-1920, and their lasting impact.

The treaty merely rubberstamped a historical development. The new Czecho-Slovak state labored to establish facts long before the Hungarian delegation fixed its signature on the document.

According to Macartney, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Eduard Benes, in a message to Karel Kramar, the Czechoslovak Premier, stated the need "... to occupy Slovakia via facti and create fait accomplis; we must command the situation. ..."² The Slovak leader Vavro Srobar put it this way: "The one who first lays hands on Slovakia would have it for keeps. ..."³ The new government strove from the outset to establish itself on Slovakia's territory; the southern border confronted it with a problem. Hence Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak military clashes started immediately with the formation of the state. The Czech and Slovak military might was mostly inferior to the Hungarian, but it sufficed for the politicians to justify their territorial claims. In the last count, however, the decision of the Great Powers rather than the fragile fait accomplis brought about the final results. French adroitness and obstinacy was decisive, and therefore Paris was charged with the deliberate weakening of Hungary, with the purpose of curtailing its influence in East Central Europe.⁴

Whether the fate of Hungary is described as punishment, bad luck, the vindication of the victors, historical justice, or whatever else, for Czecho-Slovakia the treaty meant the fulfillment of a dream. At an important consultation of Czecho-Slovak (but for all practical purposes, only Czech) political leaders on 2 January 1919,

the attending parties learned that neither Germans nor Hungarians would be invited to participate in the treaty negotiations. "The conditions will be dictated to them, and it is only up to us to forward our demands."⁵ Consequently, Prague coveted large chunks of their hapless neighbour. The contested area contained coal mines, industrial plants, railroads lines and strategic rail terminals, rich agricultural land and vineyards, as well as several hundreds of thousands Hungarians. The politicians attending the consultation were well aware that their demands contradicted the ethnic principle; they relied on the Entente's wish to weaken Hungary. President Thomas G. Masaryk already warned against the creation of a sizable Hungarian minority within the Czecho-Slovak borders.⁶ He would have preferred a border reflecting ethnic realities, one that would have left a smaller number of Hungarians on the Czechoslovak side. In spite of his conviction, however, he approved, when the time came, the incorporation of large Hungarian-populated areas into the new state.

Prague politicians cautioned the Slovaks to be realistic in their demands. One may doubt, however, whether the Slovak public figures possessed a clear enough picture, indeed any picture, of the future southern borders of their country. Enthusiastic but mostly inexperienced, naive and partly ignorant, the Slovaks relied on the judgment of their Czech brethren.

The Czecho-Slovak delegation in Paris included the talented young Slovak lawyer Stefan Osusky and several lesser Slovak consultants. Nonetheless the guiding directives came from Kramar and Benes. The results of the skillfully managed campaign were quite impressive. To quote Macartney "... sympathy with the Magyars must blend with admiration for the skill of the Czechs in negotiating successfully so many finesses and finally making a contract which their cards never seemed to justify."⁷

Because of the obstacle of the ethnic principle, the Czechs were forced to give in several times. While yielding on their most extremist demands, they were able to secure several purely Hungarian districts of economic and strategic importance. The Czech delegates reasoned that a large proportion of Hungarians were distributed over all of Slovakia, and that while they were taking on a large number of Hungarian people, numerous Slovaks would remain in Hungary. Also, the requested space consisted of a compact geographic unit. Some strategic considerations look ludicrous to us

in view of contemporary military technology. In practical terms, the assigned regions granted Czechoslovakia a free and easy access to the Danube river, provided military advantages, enabled unhampered rail- and motor-transportation from the South West to the South East, and furnished the mountainous Slovakia with a rich agricultural hinterland. The competent use of proper arguments advanced the Czecho-Slovak cause. The reasoning of historical justice proved to be somehow less convincing.⁸

The politicians alleged-and have done so with scholarly help until today-that a large proportion of the ethnic Slovak population to the south of the Slovak mountains underwent a process of Magyarization.⁹ The previously solid Slovak regions lost their ancient homogenous character, and became Magyarized to varying degrees under the pressure of Hungarian national policies.¹⁰

Benes was the architect of Czecho-Slovak victory. He enjoyed the full confidence and support of Prague. Yet the Czechs, much more then the Slovaks, understood the pernicious consequences of creating a huge bloc of captive population, potentially hostile to the state of their stay. This internal opposition was different from the aggressive nationalism expressed in the slogan "nem, nem, soha" (no, no, never, i.e. never giving up the claim of a greater Hungary) types. Yet even urban, moderate, and sensible Hungarians, whether living in Czechoslovakia or abroad, could not acquiesce to an arbitrary decision which created a large minority and forced it to live under alien rule. The Czechoslovak-Hungarian border constituted, and still constitutes, a permanent danger, an apple of discord. External enemies of both nations deployed this apple as a convenient tool for winning influence and facilitating intervention. The French were conscious of the advantage which the mutual hostility within the Danubian basin gave their policy-makers and their sympathizers in local capitals.

In a similar fashion the contested borders made Slovak dependence on Prague inevitable, and provided the Czechs with a stick for taming a rebellious Bratislava. Not by mere chance did President Benes remind the Slovaks repeatedly during the last war of the fate of their southern territories, and of his activities to regain them. This, after the Germano-Italian "Arbitration of Vienna" of 2 November 1938, awarded to Hungary a larger part of the disputed Slovak regions,¹¹ with its predominantly Hungarian population.

Tensions in Slovakia's southern rim reoccurred periodically. (Let

us recall only a few of the more significant dates: 1928, 1938, 1939-1945, 1946-1948, 1956, and the most recent, 1980.) Those of the Czech politicians who understood the problem, and found the negative outweighting the positive, expressed a willingness to revise the borders.¹² The leading Czech Communist, Bohumir Smeral, called for a revision of frontiers as early as 14 June 1921.¹³ Naturally, it was easier for a Czech to agree to a revision of Slovak borders than to be challenged over the historic frontiers of his fatherland. It had to be rather entertaining to watch Slovaks, including rabid Czech-mongers and haters of Benes and his memory, as they piously subscribed to the results of Czech diplomatic dexterity in Paris. In the eyes of many Slovaks, every inch of land obtained in Paris was sacrosanct, a part of the patrimony of the Slovak people, a gift of Providence-a ground drenched by the blood and sweat of Slovakia's children. Such was, the attitude of Gustav Husak and his Communist friends recently, in 1945.¹⁴ While Hungarian nationalists lamented "the amputated, bleeding regions of the fatherland, " Slovak patriots sang odes of joy. Orgies of chauvinism are alike. It is not without interest that a few Slovak nationalists, particularly during the existence of the Slovak state, saw Slovakia's allotment not extensive enough, and claimed Hungarian villages with an allegedly ethnic Slovak population as far south as outskirts of Budapest. They resembled, once again, the Hungarian irrendentists who aspired to regain the Felvidek (Upper Hungary, i.e. Slovakia).

Slovakia profited in many ways from the territorial expansion. The narrow mountain strip between Carpathians and Pannonia could hardly provide enough space for economic and social prosperity. The extensive agriculture of the southern lowlands supplied the country with food and with an outlet for redundant labor in the hills.

At Trianon the Great Powers discriminated against Hungary in favor of Czecho-Slovakia. They awarded the Czechoslovak Republic with another prize at Hungary's expense: the Transcarpathian Rus' (Subcarpathian Ukraine). The St. Germain-en-Laye peace treaty with Austria of 10 September 1919 and its minority-rights paragraphs recorded this transfer. Czecho-Slovak personalities coveted this territory long before the end of the war. Masaryk started to negotiate with several Ruthene personalities in the United States early in 1918, and others held similar talks with Ruthene dignitaries in the old country on a later date. Overriding opposition

from various corners, Czechoslovaks succeeded in convincing their partners of the advantages of joining the new republic.¹¹

The benefits of holding Transcarpathian Rus' were multiple and varied. The country served as a bridge between Czecho-Slovakia and Romania, two states hostile to Hungary. By holding on to it, Czecho-Slovakia prevented territorial contact between Hungary and Poland, something regarded as dangerous to the new state. The annexation of Transcarpathia to Czecho-Slovakia was preceded by thoughts of attaching it to Poland,¹⁶ of making it independent under a United States governor,¹⁷ and by other, even more colorful plans. Some Ruthenes appealed to Prague to cross the Carpathian chain and absorb parts of Western Ukraine.¹⁸ The solution eventually chosen worked well, however. Since there existed prospects, or dangers, of Russia becoming master of Eastern Galicia, the Great Powers saw in attaching the region to Czecho-Slovakia a way of preventing Bolshevik penetration of East Central Europe.¹⁹

Schools of Russian and of Ukrainian nationalism claimed alternatively the Ruthene population for themselves. Bolshevik troops could easily follow the precedent of the short-lived "West Ukrainian Republic" and try to conquer the strategic region. France in particular dreaded such a possibility, and supported Czechoslovak aspirations.

In addition to political-strategic considerations, the Czech politicians cherished the prospect of economic-commercial benefits. They habitually spoke about "expansion to the East," presumably through Slovakia and Transcarpathian Rus'. Direct connections with Romania promised uninterrupted railway transportation to the Black Sea ports and perhaps to the planned Transcaucasian line to the Middle and Far East. Czech business interests anticipated a significant increase in trade with Russia, and again the Transcarpathia was regarded to be the natural gate to East Slavonic markets.²⁰ For Hungary, loss of the territory meant a material disadvantage, for it left her bereft of the area of flood control of most of its rivers and deprived the mother country of further tens of thousands of her people.

The Treaty of Trianon solidified Czecho-Slovakia's territorial growth at the expenses of Hungary. It had significant human-national ramifications, too.²¹

In some sense, Trianon could be regarded as a "nation building" instrument. This was true for Hungary, which for the first time in

her history became a genuine nation-state, free of the ballast of subservient minority-nationalities. In a lesser degree (and perhaps as an irony of history) one cannot say the same about the other successor states. Neither Czechoslovakia nor Yugoslavia were ever genuine nation-states. Only Romania could assert that distinction, yet even her situation was checkered by the existence of considerable minorities and by the varied and contradictory traditions of the hodge podge of regions composing the Balkanic kingdom.

Slovaks could enjoy the full benefit of the new conditions. Hungarians and Germans living in Slovakia felt a considerable deterioration of status in comparison with the past. Ruthenes were still torn between the multitude schools of national identity. Although the state recognized Jews and Gypsies as independent nationalities, their particular social conditions do not allow us to judge them by general criteria.

Before the war, the development of Slovak national consciousness was curtailed by Hungarian nationalism, and by the social environment in which Slovaks lived. These circumstances slowed down the process of self-determination and hampered the rise of indigenous nationalism. Certain regions of Western and Central Slovakia could boast a rather small, nationally awakened intelligentsia, ecclesiastic (Lutheran and Catholic) and secular; as well as a moderate attention in the broad masses. Eastern Slovakia could not display even such modest achievements.²² Impoverished and backward, speaking a dialect different from the rest of Slovakia, and worshipping in the Greek rite of Catholicism, the population stayed apart from the majority of the Slovak people. Hungarians utilized the East Slovakian distinctions for further deepening the chasm within the Slovak people. A slight corrective was offered by expatriate emigrants (the region suffered from extensive emigration) who formed their national consciousness in America, and injected the newly gained convictions into the home population.²³ All in all, on the eve of the First World War Slovak nationalism was still underdeveloped and primitive.

During the process of the formation of the republic, the involved parties were aware of Slovakia's condition. Hence Hungarians insisted on a plebiscite to decide the country's future before signing the treaty,²⁴ while Czechs and Slovak activists resisted the proposal.²⁵ The deeply religious Slovak people were said to be unable to separate the political angle of the cult of St. Stephen (the Staatsidee of the Hungarian state) from the spiritual one, and could be easily

influenced in a pro-Hungarian direction, all the more so, if Hungarians were to be in charge of the plebiscite. Also, the vote of many Magyarized Slovaks augured ill for the national cause. Little, wonder, then, that Czecho-Slovak authorities would have nothing to do with the plebiscite.²⁶ Aware of the realities,²⁷ and following the fait accompli strategy, they refused any sort of democratic decision-making. President Masaryk put it this way:²⁸

The Slovak nation was oppressed to such a degree that it never had an occasion for political thinking, and would not be able to decide its fate. Therefore it is only natural that the opinions of national leaders should be decisive.

The "national leaders" were of course self-appointed political figures without significant public influence and support. They gathered once only, on 30 October 1918 in the city of Turciansky Sv. Martin in central Slovakia, to vote on and to accept the so-called "Declaration of the Slovak Nation."²⁹ That document defined Slovaks as a branch of the unified Czechoslovak nation, and for this nation it demanded the right of self-determination. Several members of the gathering, which came to be known as the Slovak National Council, represented political groups and clusters, while others were unaffiliated. The groups were inactive during the war, and represented largely Western and Central Slovakia. The Declaration reached the population in form of leaflets. Local councils occasionally voiced their agreement with it; the populace expressed its approval, it was said, by manifestations of street violence,³⁰ hardly legal forms of self-determination.

Nevertheless, it would not be easy to argue against Slovakia's joining Bohemia and Moravia in a common state. In an age when self-determination and independence of nations was made into a sacred law, Slovakia's continued existence under Hungarian government made no sense. All the more so as the Hungarians acquired the dubious fame of being inconsiderate and oppressive toward minorities. On the other hand, the Slovaks were not ready for any sort of independent life, and by no means were able to manage their country's existence by themselves. In fact, it was argued that the ones who were interested in returning Slovakia to Hungary's bosom were also the ones who invented and propagated the slogans of Slovakia's autonomy.³¹

The proposals coming from various corners to attach Slovakia to

Poland remained barren. Poles had only limited contacts with Slovaks in the past, partly because of the natural barrier which separated the two nations. Moreover, Poland on the eve of an independent life had no resources to spare and share with Slovakia. Evidently, nobody but the Czechs could offer and advance Slovakia's separation from the Hungarians. But the country's entrance into the Republic did not come about because its national leaders desired it. It was a via fact strategy, as well as the Entente's fear of Hungarian Bolsheviks, that toppled the scales in the direction of Czecho-Slovakia. (At the same time, of course, we shouldn't underestimate the value of the wartime preparatory work carried out by Masaryk and his friends, or the importance of other diplomatic, military, and propagandistic activities abroad.)

Several local "republics" stood in the way of Slovakia's self-determination, and they were to be eliminated before further steps could be taken. The most dangerous was the Slovak Soviet Republic founded by Hungarian, Slovak, and Czech Communists in the city of Presov in 1919; a motley group of Hungarian and pro-Hungarian patriots formed others. Martial law enforced by Czecho-Slovak troops of occupation paved Slovakia's way into Czecho-Slovakia.

An accepted cliche had it that the Czechs and Czechoslovakia saved the Slovak people from national extinction. But this is a deterministic notion; it denies the existence of creative forces within a nation and predicts the future on the basis of narrowly subjective criteria. In an epoch of national awakening among small nations and stirring, even among very small ethnic groups (the Basques, Bretons, and Corsicans are cases in point), it would be presumptuous to presuppose the disappearance of an entire nation. The fable of "Slovak salvation" belongs to the realm of propaganda whose aim was to justify the break-up of Austria-Hungary, the Peace of Trianon, and their outcome.

There is, however, little doubt that Slovak national survival was indeed in serious danger, and that the Hungarian denationalization drive could boast undeniable achievements. Czech public figures, more experienced in public relations and international politics, guided the Slovak attempt to overthrow Hungarian domination. The Czechs based their activity on the thesis of a single "Czechoslovak" nation with a Czech and a Slovak branch. In the coming years this thesis proved to be a failure and a serious blunder because of the threat it posed to Czech-Slovak coexistence. Also the Czechs'

patronizing attitude toward the "poor tinkers" was not very helpful in developing a healthy relation between the two groups.

Slovak nationalists, especially the younger ones who did not know Hungarian supremacy, proved themselves to be ungrateful to the Czechs. The uninhibited and loose behavior of the followers of Hlinka's People Party and of the Communist Party, their blind hatred and hostility, called for resolute actions. The essentially derogatory attitude and firm administrative methods of the departed Hungarian aristocratic rulers were apparently more efficient in dealing with some Slovak hot-heads than the conciliatory policies of the democratic Czech petite-bourgeois. Neither was the Czech expansion to the East as altruistic as presented occasionally. Prague reaped political, economic, territorial and psychological benefits from the annexation of Slovakia. Nonetheless, a denial of Czech compassion for their oppressed relatives would be an affront to historical truth.

Slovakia needed Czech assistance and, in one way or the other, got it. Trianon contributed definitively to the nation-building of the Slovak people.

The Ruthenes were less close to Czech hearts than were the Slovaks. Abandoned and destitute, the Ruthenes suffered badly from Hungarian denationalization and dreaded continuous Hungarian domination.³² (Described as Natio Fidelissima, the Ruthenes were entitled to a better treatment in Hungarian hands.) The un-Magyarized intelligentsia split over the question of ethnic-national allegiance. Divided into "Russian," "Ukrainian," and "Rusin" factions, the Ruthenes failed to offer a unified action of self defense. The Hungarians exploited the split thoroughly by a "divide and rule" strategy. Later the Czech masters borrowed a few pages from the Hungarian book of recipes.³³ The Ruthene assumption that all Slavonic Greek Catholics of the regions were co-nationals troubled their relations with the Slovaks. These relations suffered even more from the Ruthene claim on a considerable part of the territory that was thought to be Slovak. The others did not sit idle either, and portrayed Ruthenes as renegade Slovaks-at least the ones living in counties claimed by the Slovaks as well.³⁴ When drawing the borders between Slovakia and Ruthenia, the Czechs favored the Slovak side. Prague also did not honor the promises given to Ruthene dignitaries, and codified in the treaty of St. Germain and in the Czechoslovak constitution, to grant the people of Ruthenia autonomy and self-rule.³⁵ To summarize, the Ruthenes benefited

less from the collapse of St. Stephen's kingdom. Part of the blame goes to the Czechs, the other part to the forever quarreling Ruthenes. The Tertium Gaudens was Moscow, which annexed the country in 1945, and with that finally penetrated into East Central Europe. But quarrels among the Ruthenes, and with the Slovaks, go on happily among immigrants on the American continent.

Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were not beneficiaries of Trianon. On the contrary; as liberal as the Czech leadership might have been toward minorities, liberalism was not prized too highly by Slovak authorities. Hungarians in the country remained a visible symbol of Slovakia's past. They could easily become the whipping boy, the object of Slovak revenge, and the target of their suspicions. The Hungarian leadership too often sailed along winds blowing from Budapest, and these were not exactly friendly winds. Moreover, as the political conditions changed in East Central Europe, the minority moved toward radicalism.

The Hungarians were living in a democratic republic. They had political representation, and social and cultural institutions to satisfy their spiritual-intellectual needs. The state's agencies respected their particularities, at least to a degree. Economically they were better off then many of their co-nationals in Hungary (although their living standards were somewhat below those of the Czech Slovak population). Did the forced separation stimulate an independent ethnic development, a different ethos, a new consciousness? The interwar period was too short a time to observe such changes. Some idiosyncrasies did develop, however. At least a portion of the inhabitants was willing to assimilate, and some Magyarized Slovaks did revert to their native culture. A fraction of the minority acquiesced in the given realities, and the various minority rights helped to soothe the pains of others. Again it was the President Masaryk who from the outset labored for a better understanding. Yet, as Istvan Borsody has observed, minority rights were never proved to be a satisfactory substitute for hoped for majority rights.³⁶

The intensive propaganda warfare carried on over the heads of the minority by official agencies and private institutions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, often had little to do with the actual frustration, worries, and joys of the people. Sometimes, though, the Czechoslovak Hungarians did produce ammunition for new battles, and other times intolerant Slovaks were the instigators. How convenient a tool was the ethnic minority itself in the hands of irredentist

propaganda. Budapest and Prague spent enormous amounts of money to castigate the other side, in order of course to win sympathy abroad.

This duel kept the atmosphere tense, and decreased the likelihood of a rapprochement. It aided the anti-democratic elements in Hungary, as well as Slovak nationalists and Communists, in their attacks on liberals and in their defense of totalitarian values. The conflict offered the outside Fascist powers opportunities which they did not fail to grasp. Unfortunately, the liberals on both sides were unable to find a common language and to cooperate.

The authorities plainly regarded the Hungarian minority as a hostage; their treatment of that minority depended on the well being of Slovaks in Hungary. The Slovak press started to discuss this inhuman principle as early as 1919.³⁷ Accordingly, minority rights could be granted or withdrawn on the basis of reciprocity. Hungary counted among her inhabitants Slovaks, who composed solid ethnic islands. However, the Slovaks in Hungary were a fraction of the mass of Hungarians who resided in Czechoslovakia. Their national life it is true, was not sheer pleasure, and complaints were frequent. A system of turning entire minorities into a football of high policies could not be appreciated easily. In the First Republic, the hostage principle was scarcely applied, if ever. But during the Second World War, when Slovakia turned into a Schutzstaat of Berlin, and when the Hungarian revisionism reached the pinnacle of achievement and power, there was no limit to the barbarities on either side.

As stated above, Czechoslovak politicians and diplomats alleged in Paris that many of the Hungarian residents of southern Slovakia-northern Hungary were in reality Slovaks, yet they became the victims of Budapest's Magyarization drive. Consequently, one may say, their incorporation into Slovakia would be an act of historical justice. Strangely enough, representatives of the Great Powers swallowed this phony bait, and its impact could occasionally be felt.³⁸

Europe is still crowded with denationalized population, and the process of denationalization is still going on. If each nation would demand for itself its lost brothers, international life would turn into perpetual anarchy. In any case, Czechoslovakia promised to honor the rights of minorities, to abstain from challenging their nationality, and to give them schools in their own language.³⁹ What would not be done by the bourgeois governments of the First Republic, was

accomplished by a Communist-led administration of Prague and Bratislava in 1947. The campaign of "Reslovakization" carried out under premiership of the Communist Klement Gottwald was not any tamer than the work of the notorious HAKATA and other denationalization enterprises in modern Europe. The story of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia is a serialized one. New chapters appear at irregular intervals, though their appearance is more or less inevitable.

The Germans of Slovakia identified themselves with the Hungarian cause. By 1918 they were on the verge of losing their ethnic identity and becoming loyal Hungarians. The Germans regretted Trianon, supported Hungary as long as they could, and once they could not, they defended zealously their own minority rights.⁴⁰ In order to decrease the numerical strength of the Hungarians the Republic backed German efforts to preserve a separate German ethnic identity. In the long run the official policies backfired: being nationally conscious yet short of having a faithful and qualified intelligentsia, Germans of Slovakia imported teachers, administrators, and other professionals from Bohemia and Moravia. The newcomers brought along the political and social convictions prevalent in their milieu and imbued their clients with these ideas. Thus, in the final analysis, the publicly encouraged and supported policies of de-Hungarization assisted in the Nazification of Slovak (and Transcarpathian) Germans, another unexpected and bizarre result of Trianon.

The Jews do not fit the regular definition of nationality in the terms discussed here (i.e. language, territorial concentration, and a mother country to look after them). They were, however, major beneficiaries of the change in the region after the First World War.

The Slovak population and its leaders accused Jews of pre-war Hungary of a close cooperation with Budapest authorities in the denationalization process. Frantisek Votruba, a Czech author familiar with Slovak affairs, understood the Jewish dilemma well:⁴¹ "All instincts of life preservation led the Slovak Jewry to secure the good will of those in power; above all it needed to liberate itself from conditions of illegality and dependence. ... There were few incentives to join the minute and powerless Slovak elite and the masses of ignorant population devoid of protection of law." What was comprehended by an objective Votruba could not be and would not be appreciated by the Slovak intelligentsia, and even less by the general

population. The hatred of Jews, a heritage of centuries of religious and social indoctrination, frequently sought rational explanation and found it in all sorts of alleged sins. In Slovakia the Jews pursued their traditional professions, innkeeping probably being the best-known among them. This profession, like the others forced on Jews during centuries of persecution was short on high ethic standards. Consequently the innate hatred of Jews got an objective boost. Also the acceptance of Hungarianhood by many Jews, as well as fanatical Magyarization activity of individuals, alienated the nationally conscious Slovak intelligentsia. Finally, Slovak spokesmen attacked Jews for allegedly serving as informers and stool pigeons to the wartime Hungarian authorities. This is another of the notorious defamations of Jews, used by all their adversaries (in our case by Slovaks and by Hungarians alike).

When in 1918 the whole of East Central Europe was hit by a wave of anti-Jewish riots, all regions of Czechoslovakia participated in the outrages. Often the wish to rob Jewish-and non-Jewish-property sparked the riots, and even pre-programmed looting was recorded.⁴² Czecho-Slovak officials and the press whitewashed the murder and the looting by describing it as a popular revenge for Jewish misconduct in the past and especially during the war. On the other hand, they omitted to mention the social and political unrest that gave impetus to the riots. Czechoslovak troops coming to secure Slovakia and Ruthenia for the new state made the Jews a special target of persecutions, including summary executions on flimsy pretexts. Nevertheless, the authorities were reluctant to extend protection and help.⁴³ Vavro Srobar, the Minister for Slovak Affairs in the government of Prague, justified violence and actually made the Jews responsible for it.⁴⁴ Even imprisoned Zionist leaders were found to be enemy agents.⁴⁵ Hungarian troops, occasionally commanded by Jewish officers and manned by Jewish soldiers, enforced law and order and assisted victims of the disturbances. During the Hungarian Bolshevik invasion Jews again drew the vindictiveness of Czecho-Slovak officials and troops. And again they were between hammer of the Bolsheviks and anvil of their foes. All in all, the new Czechoslovak regime did not augur well for the Jews in Slovakia and Ruthenia. If Jews did nonetheless abandon their pro-Hungarian sentiments and eventually turned into constructive and faithful citizens of the Czechoslovak state it was to a great extent because of the good

will shown by President Masaryk and his lieutenants.⁴⁶ Protests by Jewish and Zionist organizations from abroad, as well as local Jewish presentations, finally met with a favorable response.

The Republic introduced liberal policies toward the Jews, enabling them to assert their Jewish identity and choose their own representation. The recognition of Jewish nationality was designed also to reduce the number of citizens opting for the German and Hungarian nationality. (Similarly, the Gypsies were given the choice of their own nationality.) In certain municipalities, Jews opting for their own nationality sharply reduced the number of Hungarians (and Germans) and hence put them all outside the bracket required for execution of the minority right as stipulated by the Republic's constitution.

The condition of Jews in the Republic worsened as one moved toward the East. Slovak nationalists in particular refused to recognize the benefits of cooperation with the Jewish population, and made them a convenient scapegoat for the country's ills. In Ruthenia the Czech authorities joined the local Jew-baiters. They tampered with legally granted rights and benefits, and through intimidation pressed the Jews to serve the needs of Czech political parties and of the central government.⁴⁷

Jews of the eastern parts of Czechoslovakia however, reaped major rewards from Trianon. They grew nationally conscious, free of forced national identities. They learned to exercise the legal rights of independent citizens and ceased to be subservient petitioners. The liberal and humane policies accorded to the Jews by the central government made them into convinced believers of Czechoslovak democracy, although Jews were still subject to unfriendliness and discrimination by state agencies. Anti-Semitism did not disappear. In Slovakia Jewish interests paralleled those of the democratic pro-Czechoslovak elements, and Jews offered voluntarily to cooperate with governmental representatives and private institutions. The situation was less ideal in Transcarpathia, though nonetheless better than in the past. Many a Czechoslovak Jew did not regret the treaty of Trianon.

This essay reflected on the territorial and the national changes brought about in East Central Europe by the First World War and the Trianon Peace Treaty. The changes in the lives of millions of human beings who were the silent victims of developments beyond their comprehension, cannot be accurately recorded. It was they

who nevertheless tried to make a new life for themselves in a radically altered political, social and psychological environment,

Notes

1. Originally, the name of the state was hyphenated (Czecho-Slovakia), The new constitution, accepted in Summer 1920, stipulated the unhyphenated name (Czechoslovakia).

2. Carlyle A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London, Toronto, New York: Oxford University Press, 1937), p 106.

3. Quoted by Dagmar Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), p 78.

4. Stephen Borsody, "Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr., ed., Czechoslovakia Past and Present Vol. 1 (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), p. 666.

5. Prameny k ohlasu velke rijnove socialisticke revoluce a vzniku CSR, Boj o smer vyvoje ceskoslovenskeho statu Vol. I (Prague: Nakladatelstvi Ceskoslovenske Akademie Vied, 1965), p. 38; document no. 26.

6. Ibid. p. 41; document no, 26.

7. Macartney. p. 103.

8. Slovensko, L'ud Vol. I (Bratislava: Obzor, 1974), pp. 440-31.

9. Prameny: p. 103.

10. Harold W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris Vol. IV (London: Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1921) p. 271; Joseph Chmelar, National Minorities in Central Europe (Prague: Orbis, 1937), p. 18.

11. Examples, see at the Balch Institute for Ethnic Studies, Philadelphia. PA, Hurban Papers. box 74-60, Extraordinary meeting of the government, President Benes's report on his sojourn to the United States, London, June 17, 1943; President Benes's address: Victory, Before the return home, London, March 28, 1945.

12. U.S. National Archives (Washington, D. C.) 860F.00/1-746, summary no. 377, December 19-25, 1946; 860F.00/9-564, airgram no. A-1254, Jefferson Caffery to the Secretary of State, Paris, September 6, 1946.

13. Rude Pravo (Prague), June 14, 1921.

14. Marta Vartikova, "Ceskoslovenska pracovna konferencia KSS v Kosiciach ako prios pri tvorbe vladneho programu prvej vlady Narodneho Frontu Cechov a Slovakov." Historicky Casopis, XXIII, 2 (1975), pp. 170-200.

15. Prameny, p. 43; document no, 28; Narodne Noviny (Pittsburgh). January 23, March 13, and April 24, 1919,

16. New York Times, January 2, 1920.

17. Times, January 4, 1920.

18. Prameny, p. 79; document no. 54.

19. Prameny, p. 65; document no. 40; pp. 85-86; document no. 60.

20. Prameny, pp. 36-42; document no. 26.

21. In the 1821 census the following number of people reported their nationality as Slovak: 1 967870; Magyar: 744 621; Ruthene: 461 449; German: 139 880 (in Slovakia only); Jewish 70522 (in Slovakia only). (Juraj Purgat, Od Trianonu po Kosice (Bratislava: Epocha; 1970), p. 301.

22. Anton Stefanek et al., ed., Milan Hodza (Prague: Ceskomoravske podniky tiskarske, 1930), pp. 784-87; NN, February 20, 1919.

23. NN. January 2 and 25, 1919.

24. Times, April 14, 1920.

25. Czechoslovak statesmen traditionally disliked plebiscites, because of the inherent dangers in a territory that has national minorities.

26. According to Macartney (p. 103), Oscar Jaszi predicted the defeat of Hungarians in the proposed plebiscite. He also favored international supervision of the balloting.

27. Ferdis Juriga. Blahozvest' kriesenia Slovenskeho naroda a Slovenskej krajiny (Trnava: Urbanek a spol., 1937). p. 194; MN, August 28, 1919.

28. NN, February 20, 1919.

29. Juriga, pp. 81 82.

30. Stefanek, p. 236; Prameny, p. 21; document no. 11.

31. NN, April 3, and June 19, 1919.

32. Prameny, p. 136; document no. 120; NN, April 24, 1919.

33. Prameny, pp. 358, 359; document no. 28.

34. NN, July 17 and 27, 1919.

35. Prameny. p. 94; document no. 67; pp. 101, 102; document no.75; pp. 364, 365.

36. Borsody, 670.

37. NN, March 27, 1919.

38. Temperley, p. 271; NN, April 17, 1919.

39. NN. August 28, and September 20, 1919.

40. NN, June 5, 1919.

41. Stefanek. p. 25l.

42. NN, January 2, and 16, 1919. Parents of this writer often recalled the looting in their respective birthplaces. Zarnovica and Prievidza. and the preceding occurrences.

43. The Slovak paper in Pittsburgh Narodne Noviny (National Press), which regularly charged Jews with Magyarization and with exploitation of the Slovak people, did not hesitate to deny the occurrence of bloody pogroms in Poland and the Ukraine, and described them as Jewish falsehood and propaganda against the Slavonic people (June 5 and 12, 1919).

44. The Jews of Czechoslovakia Vol. I (New York: Society for History of

Czechoslovak Jews, 1968), pp. 225-27; Prameny, p. 192; document no. 167; NN, August 28, 1919.

45. The Jews, Vol. 1, pp. 223-25.

46. Jindrich Kohn, "Masaryk a slovenska otazka zidovska," in Jozef Rudinsky, ed., Slovensko Masarykovi (Prague: Nakladetel'stvo Vojtecha Tilkovskeho, 1930), pp. 213-18.

47. NN April 24, 1919; Times, March 7, 1920,

A Case Study on Trianon