A Case Study on Trianon

An even more menacing feature of Romanian educational policy has been the steady decrease in the training of minority-nationality teachers. While reliable data on this trend are available only up to about 1957, some later sources indicate that this process has since been accelerated, so that today the minority teachers' program has been reduced drastically.⁸¹ The appointment, in 1976, of a Romanian as Rector of the Hungarian Teacher's College has already had detrimental consequences. Since this appointment, existing courses in Hungarian language and literature, Hungarian music and Romanian-Hungarian literature have been eliminated from the program.⁸²

There is no doubt that through these methods the Romanian administration has reduced the opportunities of the nationalities to foster their respective cultures. In this way Romania has reverted to a policy similar to that of the inter-war Romanian bourgeois nationalists. Yet, it has done this under the pretext of eliminating national particularism and isolationism, two handmaidens of nationalist reaction. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu and others have deemed this struggle as a means to further proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism. But as the emphasis is placed increasingly on socialist patriotism rather than on proletarian internationalism, the pattern of nationalism emerges quite clearly.⁸³ The educational policies have in fact not only Romanized the national form of minority education; they have also, to a great degree, put a Romanian imprint on the socialist content.

One is made to wonder: what are the prospects for the Hungarians of Transylvania? Unlike the Saxons and the Jews, they do not have the option or the desire to emigrate from their homeland. Can they withstand the assimilationist pressures of both official and unofficial Romanian policy? Probably. Their historical sense of common destiny and their national solidarity is enhanced by the current discriminatory policies of the Romanian administration. At the same

time, their numerical strength, and their awareness of being East Central Europe's largest minority will enable them to survive, to maintain themselves and perhaps even to become stronger.

For a while after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, it looked almost as if the Ceausescu regime would come to some accommodation with the Transylvanian Hungarians and satisfy their basic concerns. The temporary reduction in assimilationist policies from 1968 to 1972 gave some indication that relations between minority and majority can be improved. However, the reversion to an aggressive assimilationist policy since then suggests that Ceausescu is more interested in playing on the nationalist sentiments of the majority, to draw attention away from the country's economic problems, than to improve relations with the Hungarians. If this pressure continues, it can only lead to a further deterioration in the relations between Romanians and Hungarians. This is not just a domestic affair, it also has important international ramifications. If the fate of the Transylvanian Hungarians again becomes a volatile international issue, the Romanian nationalists, with Ceausescu at their head, can blame only themselves and their intolerant assimilationist policies.

Notes

1. The fact that these nationalities are at odds now-a fact denied by most Communists-and were in the recent past does not mean that this has always been the case. On the contrary, before the rise of modern nationalism, harmony rather than discord characterized relations among the peoples of Transylvania and the Vojvodina. Indeed, both areas encourage harmony and cooperation because of the interdependent geography within the Carpathian Basin. For some consideration of this question see: Paul Teleki, "Transylvania's Situation in Hungary and in Europe," in Louis Craig Cornish, Transylvania. The Land Beyond the Forest appendix V (Philadelphia: Dorrance and Company. Inc., 1947), p. 244; C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 7-9.

2. The dates given here are not above dispute. However, they do provide a simplified chronology of the power shifts in the Carpathian Basin.

3. Stefan T. Possony, "Political and Military Geography of Central, Balkan, and Eastern Europe," The Annals no. 232 (March 1944), pp. 3-4. states that: "Differential birth rates have been of extreme importance during the whole course of central and eastern European history, as they are the fundamental cause of the incessant change in the power position of nations.

We know little about vital statistics of former times, but it is certain that some eastern European peoples, such as the Poles, the Czechs, and the Hungarians, once had a 'larger' population than today, comparatively speaking."

4. Nicholas Kallay, Hungarian Premier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 56; C. A. Macartney. Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 9-10; Francis S. Wagner, "Szechenyi and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Empire," Journal of Central European Affairs XX (Oct., 1960), p. 294; footnote 17. Peter F. Sugar, "The Rise of Nationalism in the Habsburg Empire," Austrian History Yearbook III, Part 1 (1967), p. 112, maintains that in 1787 the proportion of the Magyars was as low as 29 percent.

5. C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd.. 1962), p. 3; C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 89.

6. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 9-12, indicates these changes. On p. 9, he states: "The Turks not only made havoc of Hungary's civilization; but the brunt of their attack and subsequent occupation fell full upon the unprotected central plains which were the stronghold of the Magyar population, the German, Slavonic, and Roumanian areas of the periphery escaping far more lightly. They thus altered the balance of the population ... to the disadvantage of the Magyars."

7. The historic "nationalities" of Transylvania were the Magyars, Saxons, and Szekelys (a people akin to the Magyars who occupy the eastern corner of the area).

8. Macartney, National States and National Minorities, pp. 321-26; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 353-54.

9. Pro-Romanian writers blur this fact by using only absolute figures for entire regions. They almost never break down the statistics to the "plasa" level (interwar administrative equivalent of the "judet" or county). See for example Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems, pp. 186-97; Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania's Case, p. 19; Pavel Pavel, Transylvania at the Peace Conference of Paris (London: Love and Malcomson Ltd., 1945), pp. 5-6; Alfred Malaschofsky, Rumanien (Berlin: Junker and Dunnhaupt Verlag, 1943), pp. 35-39. Only in Roumania at the Peace Conference: Paris 1946 (Switzerland: Romanian Government Publication, 1946), pp. 76-78, are the statistics broken down to the "plasa" level. However, in this case two misleading factors are emphasized: (1) that the Magyars only have a relative majority (plurality) in the border strip. and (2) that the other nationality groups living there would not favor Magyar rule. The latter contention ignores the fact that many of these "nationalities" are Magyarized Swabians and Jews who consider themselves to be Magyars regardless of how the Romanians classify them.

10. Dragomir, The Ethnical Minorities of Transylvania, p. 40; Macartney, National States and National Minorities, pp. 521-26.

11. Regarding the classification of Jews in the census of 1910, 1930, and 1956, it must be noted that the latter two place them in an ethnic category. This was not the case in the census of 1910. According to this early census a Jew could designate-on the basis of preference-what nationality he belonged to; only on religious grounds was he differentiated in statistics. The Romanians have placed the Jews in a separate category in order to weaken the statistics of the Magyars, for in the past the Jews have on most occasions opted for that nationality.

12. G. D. Satmarescu, "The Changing Demographic Structure of the Population of Transylvania." East European Quarterly VIII (Jan., 1975), pp. 432-33.

13. Wagner, "Szechenyi and the Nationality Problem in the Habsburg Empire," p. 309.

14. Ibid., pp. 289, 307, 309.

15. Ibid., Rustem Vambery, "Nationalism in Hungary," The Annals, no. 232 (March, 1944), p. 78.

16. Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 76-?7; Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 90-99, 108-18.

17. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, pp. 18ff.

18. C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945 Vol. 1 (2nd ed.; Edinburgh: The Edinburgh University Press, 1961), p. 8.

19. For a description of this disintegration consult Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, part V and VI. pp. 271-429; Zeman, The Breakup of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918.

20. Macartney. October Fifteenth, I, 4, 5, 21, provides a brief but concise summary of the losses suffered by Hungary as a result of this treaty.

21. R. G. Waldeck, Athene Palace (New York: Robert M. McBride and Company. 1942), p. 135; Vambery, "Nationalism in Hungary." p. 81; Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 5.

22. Grigore Gafencu. Last Days of Europe, trans. E. Fletcher-Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 156, 163, 167-68; and John O. Crane. The Little Entente (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 6. describe this from a pro-Romanian perspective. Robert Gower, The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States (London: Richards, 1937). p. 21. defends the Hungarians. He maintains that the "... difference between the situation of the Hungarian minorities and that of other minorities is this: the Hungarian minorities are firmly convinced that their present situation is due to the errors of a misguided and ill-conducted Peace Conference, whereas the

other minorities owe their existence to circumstances such as neither human foresight can avoid nor human skill control."

23. Emil Ciurea, "The Background," Captive Rumania ed. Alexandre Cretzianu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 940; Roucek, Contemporary Roumainia and Her Problems, p. 214; Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe, pp. 265-71; Waldeck, Athene Palace, pp. 21-22.

24. Gower, The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States, p. 18; Crane, The Little Entente, pp. 6-7; Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were Drawn," p. 434.

25. Clark, Racial Aspects of Romania's Case, p. 1; Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 387-89, 318-24, 429-30.

26. Alexander Cretzianu, "The Soviet Ultimatum to Roumania (26 June 1940)," Journal of Central European Affairs, IX (Jan., 1950), 396-403.

27. Kallay, Hungarian Premier, pp. 58-61; Waldeck, Athene Palace, pp. 27, 37, 113, 124-25. Grigore Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, trans. F. Fletcher-Allen (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1945), pp. 52, 64.

28. Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 389; Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke, pp. 114, 124-25; Macartney, Independent Eastern Europe. pp. 419-20.

29. Ibid., pp. 421-22; Waldeck, Athene Palace, p. 131; Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 59.

30. A. C. Leiss and Raymond Dennett, eds., European Peace Treaties After World War II (Worcester, Mass.: The Commonwealth Press, 1954), p. 102; Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, p. 351.

31. As some have observed, the objective of the Second Vienna Award was not to divide and conquer, but to bring about peace in the rear of Hitler's armies. On the other hand, this does not mean that Transylvania did not remain a potential reward to the state which performed its wartime duties better. See Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, pp. 253, 319; Kallay. Hungarian Premier, p. 64. For a Communist Hungarian interpretation see Miklos Horvath, A. 2. Magyar Hadsereg Megsemmisulese A Donnal (Budapest: Zrinyi Kiado, 1959), pp. 9-10. For a Romanian view see Pavel, Transylvania at the Peace Conference of Paris, p. 37. That war achievements were considered important is also illuminated from another angle by Waldeck, Athene Palace, pp. 355-56. Compensation given on the eastern front (Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transnistria) is here regarded as partial payment from Hitler for losses sustained in the West (Northern Transylvania and Dobruja).

32. Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 58, footnote 27; Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, p. 405. However, Stalin did not forget the Romanians either. For his approaches in this direction, see Alexander Cretzianu, "The Rumanian Armistice Negotiations: Cairo, 1944," Journal of Central European Affairs, XI (Oct., 1951), p. 251.

33. Emil Ciurea. "The Background," Captive Rumania, ed. Alexandre Cretzianu (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 18-19; Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke, p. 173; Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, pp. 191-92, 204-05, 216.

34. Leiss, European Peace Treaties After World War II, pp. 101-102, 299.

35. Ibid., pp. 101-102.

36. Hugh Seton-Watson, "The Danubian Satellites," International Affairs. XXII (April, 1946), p. 250; Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania, III, p. 85.

37. Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev (Paperback Edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), pp. 256-57, gives a brief discussion of Czech versus Slovak animosities which were utilized by the Soviet Union and the local Communists. In a similar way, the Soviets also used Romanian-Hungarian discord in Transylvania.

38. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke, pp. 213-17, blames the Hungarians for the success of Communism in Romania. He fails to mention, however, that the Hungarians had acquiesced to Soviet pressures only because the bourgeois Romanian leaders (i.e., Iuliu Maniu, Ilie Lazar and their "democratic" followers) were bent on revenge against the "disloyal" national minorities who had turned toward Hungary during 1940-1944. The Hungarians had no alternative left but to support the Soviet-backed Petru Groza, who had promised tolerance and respect for the national minorities. See Seton-Watson, "The Danubian Satellites," p. 247; Schieder, The Expulsion of the German Population from Hungary and Rumania, III, pp. 84-85.

39. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke, pp. 230, 249.

40. The "nationalities theory" and "policy" which has been taken over from the practice and experience of the Soviet Union, has been variously designated. Recently, the designation "Marxist-Leninist" has become more and more popular. In Yugoslavia this is the most commonly used. In Romania, on the other hand, the designation is simply "Leninist." Prior to de-Stalinization, in Romania this policy was always referred to as "Leninist-Stalinist." In Yugoslavia this was also the designation until the Tito-Stalin split of 1948.

41. Boris Levitski, "Coexistence within the Bloc," Survey, no. 42 (June, 1962), pp. 28-29, 33-34. A good example of such mimickry is I. Nistor, "Example of the Soviet Union is a Guiding Light," under heading "Rumania," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, IV (Feb. 7, 1953), p. 18. The original article appeared in the December 27, 1953, issue of Izvestia, p. 3.

42. Ibid., p. 18, points out, however, that for Lenin (and Stalin, we may add) such "rights" were really secondary. Lenin was "... cool, indifferent, even hostile to the national state and to nationality. But, in general, the proletariat and the Party have the solemn obligation to support the national liberation movement because democracy and socialism demand it."

43. "Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic 1952," in Constitutions of Nations, ed. Amos I. Peaslee (2nd ed., Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956). art. 82, p. 250; "Draft Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Romania 11/A supplement to Documents, Articles and Information on Romania (Bucharest: "Agerpress," 1965), art. 22, p. 9.

44. Ibid., art. 17, p. 242; Randolph L. Braham, "The Rumanian Constitution of 1952."Journal of Central European Affairs, XVIII (July, 1958), p. 176.

45. "Constitution of 1952," in Peaslee. See, Preamble, p. 239; arts. 58, 82, pp. 247, 250. Later documents skirt the question of local "autonomy." In this they are reverting to the position of the earliest post-war Constitution. See Constitution of 1948, arts. 75-85, p. 20. For the territorial alterations of the Magyar Autonomous Region, see: Gyula Miklos, "A Roman Nepkoztarsasagban 1950 ota vegrehajtott kozigazgatasi-gazdasagi korzetbeosztasok nehany tapasztalata," Foldrajzi Kozlemenyek, IX [LXXXV] (1961), pp. 307-45; Ceausescu, "Exposition on the Improvement of the Administrative Organization of the Territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania," pp. 1-31.

46. Short Document on Rumania, p. 4; "Constitution of 1952," art. 81, p. 249; "Draft Constitution of 1965," arts. 17, 102, pp. 7, 30.

47. Ibid., art. 102, p, 30; "Constitution of 1952," art. 68, p. 248.

48. Ibid., "Draft Constitution of 1965," art. 102, p. 30.

59. Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., Romania (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1956), pp. 69-71; Ghita Ionescu, Communism in Rumania 1944-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 204-208.

50. This is verified by the fact that in December 1955, 79.2 percent of the members were ethnic Romanians in the CPR. By 1968, 88.43 percent were ethnic Romanians. Compare ibid., p. 243, with "Report by Nicolae Ceausescu on Organizational Measures for the Steady Strengthening of the Moral-Political Unity of the Working People," Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, no. 27 (Oct. 28,1968), p. 30.

51. Randolph L. Braham, "Rumania: Onto the Separate Path," Problems of Communism, XIII (May-June, 1964), pp. 16-17, footnote 5.

52. That Stalin was thinking along these lines is also indicated by his abortive plan to have Romania and Hungary "federated." See Milovan Djilas. Conversations with Stalin, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962), pp. 177-78.

53. In the area of education, however, the turn toward assimilationist policies was evident already in the 1956-57 academic year.

54. Robert R. King, Minorities under Communism (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1973).

55. Committee for Human Rights in Rumania, Witnesses to Cultural Genocide: Reports on Rumania's Minority Policies (New York: 1980).

56. Randolph Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic

(U.S. Dept. H.E.W.; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 78-79; George Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania." The Reporter (November 19, 1964), p. 26; Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania" in East Central Europe and the World, ed. Stephen D. Kertesz (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), pp. 158-166. Actually, even one year prior to the revolution there were some hints of a turn toward more nationalistic policies. Along this line see Laszlo Banyai, "Tizeves a Bolyai Tudomanyegyetem," in A Kolozsvari Bolyai Tudomanyegyetem (1945-1955) (Cluj: Allami Tanugyi es Pedagogiai Konyvkiado, 1956), pp. 5-13.

57. Ibid., Laszlo Banyai. "Forum: irodalomtanitas es hazafias neveles," Igaz Szo, VII (Feb., 1959), pp. 236-242.

58. "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p, 76; Skilling. "Two Orthodox Satellites," p. 388; Tamas Schreiber. "A Magyar Kisebbseg Helyzete Romaniaban," Irodalmi Ujsag (July 15,1961).

59. In contradiction to the above contention it is possible to show that the total number of minority students in 4-year schools increased to 131,773 in 1956-57 from 127,634 in 1955-56. Yet in this same space of time the number of minority schools decreased from 1,416 to 1,343 in these same 4-year schools. This pattern is also apparent on the higher levels of education. See Braham: Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, p. 65. table 13. While the decreases of the years prior to the above seem more natural, the decrease in later years certainly does not. Now the decrease of minority schools is followed by the decrease of minority students rather than the other way around.

60. These pressures are of various kinds, some direct and some indirect. See in this regard "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76; Schreiber, "A magyar kisebbseg helyzete Romaniaban." F. K., "Romania Szuntesse Meg az Erdelyi Magyarok Uldozeset," Katolikus Magyarok Vasarnapja, 71 (June 21, 1964). p. l.

61. Ibid., Schreiber, "A Magyar Kisebbseg Helyzete Romaniaban"; "Level Erdelybol." Irodalmi Ujsag (Aug. 1, 1964).

62. "Level Erdelybol," Irodalmi Ujsag; Schreiber, "A magyar kisebbseg helyzete Romaniaban"; F. K., "Romania Szuntesse Meg Az Erdelyi Magyarok Uldozeset!"

63. "Statement by the Committee for Human Rights in Rumania" before the Subcommittee on international Trade of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate. at hearings on continuing Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment of Imports from Rumania, July 19, 1979, p. 17.

64. Ibid., p. 16.

65. Higher education demonstrates this trend best because (1) it has been totally "Romanized," (2) it has affected the leading strata (i.e., intelligentsia) of the Transylvanian Hungarians, and (3) it has been least possible to camouflage or hide from world scrutiny the absorption of these important

institutions. In this regard see Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," pp. 26-27; David Binder, "Rumania's Minorities Pressed by Nationalist Drive," New York Times (July 14, 1964), p. 4; J. F. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania." The World Today, XIX (Nov., 1963), pp. 503-504.

66. Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951), p. 341, notes that this early policy was by no means whole-heartedly and enthusiastically supported. He maintains that: "This liberal nationality policy was not carried through without strong opposition, not only from the Rumanian nationalist followers of Maniu but also from a part of the Rumanian Party itself, led by the former Minister of Justice Lucretiu Patrascanu. The removal of Patrascanu from his office and his disgrace within the party were certainly to some extent due to his 'incorrect' attitude on the national question."

67. "Cluj Regiune" according to Faclia, Feb. 6, 1958, in "Comprehensive Regiune Summaries," Weekly Summary of the Rumanian Provincial Press 4-9 Feb. 1958 (JPRS/Washington, D.C.: April 22, 1958), p. 3.

68. Brown, "The Age-Old Question of Transylvania"; Braham, Education in the Rumanian People's Republic, pp. 78-79; Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," pp. 26-27. It was in connection with this "parallelization" that three Hungarian professors committed suicide. One of them, Szabedi Laszlo, was a famous Communist poet and intellectual of the Hungarian minority. See in this regard "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania," p. 76.

69. Ibid., Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," p. 27.

70. Besides this formal pattern of "integration" there is also an informal trend along similar lines which is stressed and fostered by the Romanian regime. The most recent example of this policy has been the sharing of rooms in student hostels and dormitories by Romanians and Hungarians. The pretext for this is that the Hungarian students will more easily learn Romanian if they share rooms with Romanian students. See "The Hungarian Minority Problem in Rumania." This policy received its inception soon after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. A. Rosca, "The Party Organizations and the Patriotic Education of the Youth," Lupta de Clasa (Nov., 1957), pp. 87-96 in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals and Papers (JPRS/Washington. D.C.: Feb. 28, 1958), p. 126.

71. Compare Buletinul: Universitatilor V. "Babes" Si "Bolyai, "Vol. I, Nr. 1-2 (1957), and V. Babes es Bolyai Egyetemek Kozlemenyei, I, ev., 1-2 sz. (1956).

72. Ibid., Buletinul: Universitatilor V. "Babes" Si "Bolyai, "Vol. I, Nr. 1-2 (1957).

73. In 1956-57 it was still possible to find scholarly works in Hungarian. In V, Babes es Bolyai Egyetemek Kozlemenyei, I 6v., 1-2 sz. (1956), there are

fourteen Hungarian language studies and five Romanian language studies followed by the Hungarian summaries of seven Romanian studies. By 1960 it is evident that Hungarian language studies decline in numbers. In Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai Series 1, Fasciculus 2, Anul 5 (1960), there are 26 items, articles and studies of which only one appears in Hungarian, while 21 of the contributors are Hungarian. By 1965 the situation is even worse. Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai (Series Philosophia et Oeconomica, Anul X, 1965), contains seventeen items, articles and studies of which none appear in Hungarian in spite of the fact that five of the contributors are Hungarian.

74. Ibid.

75. That such faculty and editorial pressure exists is hard to substantiate. This contention is based on the observations of two scholars, a Pole and an American, who spent extended periods of time doing research at the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj (Kolozsvar) during 1967 and 1968 respectively. Both maintained, in personal conversations with this student, that the pressure was evident in the language used by the Hungarian faculty members. They never speak to one another in Hungarian, if even one Romanian faculty member is present.

76. V Babes es Bolyai Egyetemek Kozlemenyei, I ev., 1-2 sr. (1956)

77. Compare ibid., and Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 1, Fasciculus 1, Anul 4 (1959).

78. Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 1, Fasciculus 1, Anul 5 (1960); Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 3, Fasciculus 1, Anul 4 (1959); Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series Psychologia Paedagogia, Anul 9 (1964).

79. A Kolozsvari Bolyai Tudomanyosegyetem (1945-1955) (Cluj, Transylvania: Allami Tanugyi es Pedagogiai Konyvkiado, 1956), contains some of these studies. Also representative are: Emil Petrovici, "A Roman oris, Oris, Orsia, Orasa, Orasani, Oraseni Magyar Varjas," pp. 223-26, Attila T. Szabo, "A Gyermeklo es rokonsaga," pp. 235-251, and Mozes Galffy and Gyula Marton, "A Bolyai-Egyetem Magyar Nyelveszeti Tanszekenek nyelvjaraskutato Tevekenysege a Magyar Autonom Tartomanyban," pp. 253-279, in V. Babes es Bolyai Egyetemek Kozlemenyei, I, ev., 1-2, sz. (1956).

80. Some examples are: A. Bodor, "Adalekok a helyi elem fennmaradasanak kerdesehez a romaikori Daciaban: A Liber es a Libera Kultusz," Studia: Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series 4, Fasciculus 1 (1960), pp. 25-58; Zoltan Farkas, "Allam, nemzet es szuverenitas a szocializmusban," Studia; Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Series Philosophia, Anul XI (1966), pp. 19-27.

81. Pal Nagy, "Huszonnyolc uj tanito," Igaz Szo, VIII (Aug., 1960), p. 243, mentions that 28 students graduated from the Jozsa Bela Pedagogic Institute in 1960. This is already indicative of significant cutbacks in the

area of teacher education only two years after the merger of the Bolyai and Babes universities.

82. "Statement by the Committee for Human Rights in Rumania," p. 23.

83. V. A. Varga, "The Fundamental Laws and Characteristics of the Great October Socialist Revolution," Probleme Economice (Oct., 1957), pp. 8-10, in Selected Translations from East European Political Journals and Newspapers (JPRS/Washington, D.C.: March 7, 1958), pp. 138-39; Banyai. "Forum: irodalomtanitas es hazafias neveles," pp. 236-242: Rosca, "The Party Organization and the Patriotic Education of the Youth," pp. 115-126.

A Case Study on Trianon