Toward a New Central Europe

3. Neutralization Of a Buffer Zone Between Germany and Russia

THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEUTRALIZED ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

EDWARD CHASZAR

NEUTRALITY, pronounced dead on many occasions by statesmen and jurists alike, and condemned from various sides now as "criminal," now as "immoral,', has shown a remarkable ability to survive in international relations. Despite the fact that during the initial phase of the Cold War the concept was frowned upon by both of the superpowers, neutrality in foreign politics experienced a sudden revival. Even "legal neutrality" gained ground instead of losing.

If the trend continues, the often proposed neutral zone in Central Europe may yet become a reality in the foreseeable future. With the establishment of a neutral belt in Central Europeso some of its advocates assertthis territory would cease to serve as a bone of contention between the East and the West; rather, it would become an area of reconciliation between the two.

What are the prospect of a "neutral zone in Central Europe" today? What would be its significance for the area concerned, for the contending forces of the East and West and for the world at large?

In order to answer these questions, at least tentatively, it will be well first to clear up the confusion surrounding the terms "neutrality" and "neutralism," and then proceed to a discussion of the proposals concerning Central Europe, usually connected with the problem of '.disengagement."

Neutrality, neutralization, and neutralism

Historically speaking, "neutrality" in international law refers to non-participation in war, coupled with impartial behavior toward the belligerents. It imposes certain rights and duties both on the neutral and on the warring states. The latter, in particular, are bound to

respect the territorial integrity of neutrals. Neutrality also assumes the legality of war as an instrument of national policy. When, with the establishment of the League of Nations, and later the United Nations, war began to be looked upon as "illegal," the place of neutrality in international law turned questionable. In theoryat leastthe concept of collective security and neutrality cannot coexist. In practice, however, both the League and the United Nations had left several loopholes for war and neutrality, consequently the rules governing the latter are still considered applicable in international law. l)

A distinction has to be made between "neutrality" and "neutralization ."

Neutrality is a policy adopted by a State unilaterally in face of a particular war and for no specified period. Thus, Ireland and Sweden during World War II had chosen to remain outside the conflict. In fact, because of her particular situation, Sweden has been able to stay out of war for 150 years and she is considered a "traditional neutral." She was a member of the League of Nations, and joined also the United Nations.

Neutralization is the outcome of international agreement. Belgium, for example, was neutralized by the Powers in 1831 on their own initiative and without her request. Her supposedly "permanent neutrality" lasted until World War I. Switzerland, "permanently neutral" by international agreement at her own request ever since the Congress of Vienna (1815), in a classic example. Once a member of the League of Nations, Switzerland now holds that her neutrality is incompatible with membership in the United Nations. Nevertheless, like Sweden, she is a member of many non-political and non-military international organizations .

More recent examples of neutralization are Austria ( 1955) and Laos (1962). Both are members of the United Nations. Austria also is a member of the European Free Trade Association and of the Council of Europe, in spite of strong criticism from the Communist side.2)

Neutralism, as distinct from neutrality, refers to a foreign policy of non-alignment in international relations. It is sometimes compared with the policy of "no entangling alliances," pursued by the USA until World War I. By adhering to this policy, and occasionally formalizing it in the legal sense through declarations of neutrality, the USA aimed at maintaining freedom of trade with all nations whether in peace or war, without renouncing the right to make war when that was in her interest.

"Neutralists" today claim that although they refuse to join military or political alliances sponsored by the Great Powers, they are in no sense isolationists. On the contrary, the profess to have an active interest in world affairs ("positive neutralism"), and

interpose themselves between the opposing sides in the Cold War in order to promote world peace which they need for their own national development.3)

Notwithstanding the fact that "neutralism" or "nonalignment" is now an accepted feature of international relations, a neutralist country does not enjoy a special status in international law, nor any corresponding special legal rights or duties. This is recognized even by Soviet legal writers who had sought during the last decade to confer some kind of legal respectability and protection on the "policy of neutralism."4)

Another difference between "neutrality" and "neutralism" is that while the first term always implies a foreign policy of nonalignment for the neutral country, the pursuit of neutralism in itself does not necessarily lead to legal neutrality, nor is it sufficient to establish a neutral status. Success to do so depends on a number of additional factors, such as geographic position, military significance, relation to the Great Powers, and most important, mutual interest of the latter in guaranteeing neutral status.

These factors it appears today, are in favor of a neutral zone in Central Europe, and render the reconsideration of its establishment timely.

Disengagement and Neutral Zone Between East and West

During the first decade of the Cold War, putting their faith in the principle of collective action against aggression, both the USA and the Soviet Union maintained a rather rigid, negative attitude toward neutrality and neutralism. The first one to reverse her position was the Soviet Union. As part of the "New Look" in foreign policy after Stalin's death, seeking diplomatic support to balance US nuclear superiority, Soviet diplomacy came to look upon neutrality as a "progressive', course of action under given circumstances, and finally recognized its positive value. International lawyers in the Soviet Union quickly adapted themselves to the new situation, restored the legitimacy of neutrality and accepted its compatibility with the UN Charter.5)

Starting at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers in early 1954, the Soviet government began to put forward periodic proposals for the neutralization of Germany and Austria as a solution of the problem of European security. Subsequently, in April 1955 a Memorandum was signed in Moscow by the representatives of Austria and the Soviet Union, and in May of the same year, after a declaration of Swiss-type neutrality stipulated in the Memorandum, Austria obtained neutral status guaranteed by the Four Powers. In exchange for restoring full independence to Austria, championed for long by the Western powers, these latter had to accept the fact of an extended

neutral wedge between the Northern and Southern members of NATO.

As the events of 1956 in Hungary proved, the Soviet Union was not ready as yet to let one of her satellites assume neutral status. Not even the compromise plan, elaborated by State Minister Istvan Bibo in the government of Imre Nagy, which envisaged Hungary's continued adherence to a socialist system, but stipulated the country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, was acceptable to Moscow. The Soviet attitude was expressed by the spokesman of the restored Sovietbacked Communist regime in Hungary, Foreign Minister Imre Horvath, who said: "We approve of the neutrality of certain capitalist countries since it... means standing apart from the conquerors and those ready to go to war, (while) the neutrality of a Socialist country represents an underhanded attack on the cause of peace and Socialism and its betrayal.6)

The heightened East West tension which resulted from the events in Hungary and from the Suez affair in 1956 lent urgency to the question of disengagement. Officially, US diplomacy, still ingrained with the fear of further Soviet expansion, was wary of such proposals. The best-known of these was the Rapacki Plan (named after the Foreign Minister of Poland), originally presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1957, and somewhat modified later. It proposed (I) The establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic, (2) The creation of an inspection system to keep the zone free of nuclear weapons .

The Rapacki Plan was offered in the conviction that the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe could lead to an improvement in East-West relations and facilitate further discussion of disarmament, as well as the solution of some outstanding problems. Unofficially there were more far-reaching suggestions from American and British sides both before and after the Rapacki Plan.

Writing in 1956, George Kennan, former top US diplomat and Soviet expert, suggested the acceptance of realities imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. At the same time he thought that the gradual evolution of the present regimes toward increased independence and greater responsibilities to domestic opinion was possible, provided that such evolution was not conceived by the West as a military or ideological issue. For this reason Kennan was of the opinion that the dividing line between American and Russian military power in Central Europe ought to be de-emphasized, and the neutral zone that stood between the two ought to be increased, preferably including a unified neutral Germany. In his own words:

"I think it... a good thing rather than a bad thing that Sweden has never joined the Atlantic Pact, that Switzerland has preserved in every respect her traditional neutrality, that Austria has been effectively

neutralized, and that Yugoslavia is not wholly committed either to West or to East. I would wish that this neutral zone might be widened, rather than narrowed. While I realize that the concept of neutrality can be, and has been, exploited for Communist purposes, I don't think that should deter us from recognizing the real advantages it may hold."7)

In 1958, Denis Healey, British Labor leader and spokesman for defense affairs, put forward a model plan for a neutral belt in the middle of Europe. In his thinking the neutralization of Germany alone, suggested by Winston Churchill, and later by Nikita Khrushchev, would be unwise. Healey also opposed the neutralization of Europe as a whole. For him the neutral belt would include the German Federal Republic on the Western side, and East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary on the Soviet side; and then, in addition, "as many other states as you could get in by bargaining. It might be, for example, that you could bring in Denmark against Rumania, and so on. But you would have to guarantee some physical foothold on the continent for the West as a base for military sanctions against a possible military violation of the neutral zone by the Soviet Union."8)

According to Healey's plan countries in the neutral belt would be permitted to maintain conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) armed forces subject to international inspectionto defend their borders against a possible attack. More than any other plan this one also goes into a discussion of the reasons why the Soviet Union might, indeed, go along with she creation of a neutral zone.

Neutralization reconsidered

Ten years had passed since the proposals traced above were made public. Since then a new balance, a "balance of terror," has been reached by the USA and the Soviet Union, which renders war between the two prohibitive. The Cold War, even though some of the conditions which caused it are still present, has since become history. Suspicion, nevertheless, still lingers on both sides. "Positive anti-Communists" hold that peaceful coexistence is a mere Soviet strategy to build up economic and military power and then to bury the West. Russia, repeatedly invaded and devastated in the course of history, entertains similar fears vis-Ö-vis the West, and tries to protect herself by a string of buffer-states stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

As of late, however, the maintenance of the Soviet protective system has been a costly operation both in tangible and intangible terms. Military and economically the East European countries are now less an asset than a liability for the Soviet Union. At the same time a new menace is rising for Russia from the direction of China. By creating a neutral zone liabilities could be written off, and

the Soviet Union could devote more attention to her internal and Far-Eastern problems. The unnatural trade barrier which divides Europe could be eliminated by permitting the countries of the neutral zone to trade freely with both sides. Their middle-man role would likely result in increased prosperity. The neutral status, while prohibiting diplomatic and military alignment with the Great Powers, would not exclude the possibility of forming a larger federation of some sort by the common agreement of the neutral states.

In fact, the neutral zone might serve as a logical first step toward the creation of a Central European community, which then could act as a balancer between Western and Eastern Europe, a role unfulfilled and missing since the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

A number of future problems regarding the neutral zone, such as its step by step establishment, the rights and duties of its components, their exact relations to the East and West, including economic relations, would have to be examined seriously and in detail.

It is commonly recognized that the European situation, most of all the question of Germany, has been in an impasse for too long a period. Another attempt by the Great Powers at the solution of the problem may not be far off.

The creation of a neutral belt in Central Europe, it is submitted here, should be seriously considered again in the light of the changed world situation. The merits of the old proposals should be re-evaluated and, if necessary, new plans should be drafted to serve as possible alternatives for the settlement of the European question. To the students of Central European affairs would fall the task of criticizing the old and elaborating the new plans for eventual use by the interested parties.

1) A good summary on Neutrality can be found in Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1965), Chapter 32. For a detailed treatment of present-day problems see Titus Komarnicki, The Place of Neutrality in the Modern System of International Law, and Charles M. Chaumont, Nations Unies et Neutralite, both published in Recueil des Cours of the Hague Academie de Droit International, vol. 80 and 89, respectively (Leyde: Sythoff, 1953 and 1957).

2) On this point see Gyula Hajdu, A semlegesseg (Budapest: Kozgazdasagi es Jogi Konyvkiado, 1958), pp. 261-262. The Austrian point of view regarding participation in the UN is presented by Alfred Verdross in "Die dauernde Neutralitaet Oesterreichs und die Organisation der Vereinten Nationen," Juristische Blaetter, July 5, 1955.

3) Examples are given and evaluated in Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The Elephants and the Grass: A Study of Nonalignment (New York: Praeger, 1955), pp. 79-91

. 38

4) See for example the statements made at the VIIth Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Sofia, 1960, in Legal Aspects of neutrality (Brussels: I.A.D.L., 1961), in particular the statement of the Soviet participant L. Modjoryan, pp. 111-112.

5) For a detailed discussion read George Ginsburg's "Neutrality and Neutralism and the Tactics of Soviet Diplomacy" in American Slavic and East European Review, December 1960, p. 539 ff. This penetrating article is based on Soviet sources.

6) East Europe, July 1957, p. 47. Quoted by Ginsburg, p. 559.

7) George F. Kennan, "The Future of Soviet Communism." The New Leader, June 18, 1956, p. 6.

8) Denis Healey, A Neutral Belt in Europe? (London: Fabian Society, 1958), p. 8 reprinted in part in Paul F. Power's Neutralism and Disengagement (New York, Scribner, 1964). This convenient research anthology also contains excerpts of the Kennan article, and one version of the Rapacki Plan. Good case studies on neutralism and neutrality may be found in Peter H. Lyon's Neutralism (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1963).

Toward a New Central Europe