Toward a New Central Europe

INITIATIVES TOWARD COOPERATION IN THE
DANUBIAN BASIN IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES

PAL AUER

FEDERATION in the Danubian Basin was first discussed during the revolutionary year of 1848. Frantisek Palacky, Czech statesman, in an open letter, suggested the reorganization of the Habsburg Monarchy in line with the principles of Federalization and noted that it would be the only efficient defensive move against German and Russian pressure. Being present at the assembly of Frankfurt, he emphasized his conviction that the Monarchy could not hope to survive unless a federative cooperation is found, and noted that if the Monarchy as a frame of reference would not have been in existence it should have been invented and realized for the benefit of Europe and mankind.

Palacky, by the way, was interested mainly in the fate of people living in Austria; the problems of nationalities in the Hungarian Kingdom were less attractive to him. In his first draft he wanted to federate the Poles, Czechs, Austrian Germans and Illyrians (Southern Slavs). In his second scheme he added the Ruthenians.

The Croatian Ostrozinski suggested in a similar way during the fall of 1848, a federative reorganization of the Monarchy. The same year, 1848, saw a recommendation from Poland, Count Waleryan Krasinski being responsible for the suggestion of a Western Slav Catholic Federation under the rule of the Habsburgs.

Some years afterwards Lajos Kossuth occupied himself, during his exile, with federative ideas. His plan was published in 1862, in the Italian periodical "Alleanzeî. According to this plan, common decision would have to be reached in matters of foreign relations, military, finances, customs and duties and commercial legislation. He recommended a Federative Parliament with an executive Federal Council. The capital would have rotated annually between Pest, Bucharest, Zagreb and Belgrade. The Presidency would have gone automatically to the Head of State of that country whose capital city was in the turn of events to become capital of the Federation.

Though he announced that the plan connected with his name was actually the work of Ferenc Pulszky, there is no question about

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Pulszky, who represented the emigration of Kossuth in London, having not formulated the views of the former Governor of Hungary and of General Klapka.

The Hungarians, Southern Slavs and Rumanians would have built up the federative state, since Kossuth would not have included the Czechs and Austrians. This restriction was partly the cause of the political failure of the scheme. On Kossuth's explanation of his suggestions, Napoleon III replied, that he would have liked best to have the Germans living in three different states and that he regretted their present division in only two, living as they are, in Austria and Germany. He feared that if Kossuth's plan could become a reality, Austria which was left out of it, would have been compelled to join Germany. It is of interest to note, that the specter of an "Anschluss" already haunted the mind of Napoleon III.

Kossuth addressed the following words to the nations who were to participate in the Federation: "In the name of God the Almighty I entreat my Hungarian, German and Slavonic Brethren, to forget past grievances, to grasp hands, to revolt like one soul, and to fight for the cause of liberty, all for one, and one for all."

The Rumanian Popovici also championed a Danubian Federation. In the 19th century another Rumanian writer, Emanuel Gojdu, wrote: "I can assure the Hungarian nation, that there is not one Rumanian thinker who is not deeply convinced that Divine Providence, the God of All Nations has decreed his will, that the Hungarian and Rumanian nations have to live in an eternal Alliance. Only then can they hope in a glorious future. A contest between them can only lead to the ruin of both."

Unfortunately, neither the entreaties of Kossuth, nor the allocution of Gojdu have sufficed to move the listeners. What would be the reaction of Gojdu, if confronted with the present genocidal policy of the Rumanian government against the Hungarian minority?

It is of interest to note the views of Istvan Turr, the soldier and diplomatist, a friend of Cavour and Kossuth and an intimate of Victor Emmanuel I and Napoleon III. In 1860, his opinions were published in the "Pester Lloyd" and the "Journal des Debats." After discussing a forthcoming congress on European Unity in France, he writes:

"Study Switzerland: The strength of this small country lies in the variety of its composition. The Italian, German and French Cantons know very well, that if they would part, everyone of them would fall victim in a very short time to the aggression of one of their mighty neighbors. Every unit respects the national autonomy and national peculiarities of the other federated nation. The same reasons should instinctively impel the different nationalities of the Austrian Empire to move towards a close Confederacy. In the Austrian Empire there are 16 million Slavs, 10 million Germans, 7 million Hungarians and 3 million Rumanians. If these nations could congregate into one

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political organization, a common state, they could assume the common name of a Danubian Federation."

Until the second decade of the 20th century only scarce mention was made of a possible federative solution of the problems of the Danubian Basin. Only during the First World War, in 1915, did the German Lutheran Pastor Friedrich Naumann, who later became a member of the parliament of Weimar, and a candidate for Presidency of the German Republic, but died before the elections, published in his book "Mitteleuropa" and did publicize in many addresses, his plan for a Central European Confederation. It would have worked through common institutions and was to include Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The author of present essay was asked by Naumann to work out the statutes of an elected Arbitration Court which would have dealt with all disputes arising between members of the Confederation. Naumann did not anticipate the outcome of the war nor the devastating peace treaties.

At the opening of the Austrian Parliament (Reichsrat) on the 30th May, 1917, the Czech delegates demanded a reorganization of the Monarchy into a Federation with a united Bohemia and Slovakia taking part.

It was Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the successor to the throne himself, who previously wanted a reorganization of the Monarchy on the lines of a threefold division instead of the existing dual solution in order to secure to the Slavonic element beside the German and Hungarian participants an equivalent representation. It was, however, exactly the gun of a Southern Slav which made the realization of his ambitious plans tragically impossible. King Charles in his celebrated manifesto of 1918 recommended to his subjects a federalistic solution, though he himself was fully aware that his recommendation was late by "fifty years."

After the end of the First World War, Oszkar Jaszi, Hungarian minister for minorities, would have liked to form in Hungary a "Switzerland of the East," a Danubian Federation in which all nationalities would have received equal rights and would have been secured equal opportunities of development. But the neighbors of Hungary, who already in the last year of the war had clear ideas of what to expect from the ordinances of the forthcoming peace treaty, turned a completely deaf ear to the suggestions of such a solution. It is well known that the Peace Treaty of Trianon engendered in Hungary an intense movement for redress, whereas in the neighboring states, which enriched themselves at the expense of Hungary, the treaty favored the development of extreme nationalism. Perhaps the only fortunate statute of the treaty was the one which pointed toward a Hungarian-Austrian-Czechoslovakian system of preferences. Unfortunately, all the other ordinances of the treaty led to the birth of such

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mutual hatred, that, the three nations did not live up to the possibilities offered. Instead the Danubian states have built up so many national autarchies, which, especially as the states were small, and not self-sufficient, led to untenable conditions.

In 1920, better to say in the following year, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania founded a League which became known as the "Little Entente." This League was put onto a permanent footing in 1933. They agreed on a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Secretaries of the three states, which was to take place, from time to time, as resolved. This "permanent council" on ministerial level, could only take unanimous resolutions, so that every one of the three representatives had a veto right. They established a permanent secretariat. The Little Entente occupied itself only with military, it is better to say with diplomatic matters, not with economic questions or any other matter of public interest. The sole purpose of its foundation was to furnish a defense mechanism against an eventual resurgence of territorial demands from the part of a mutilated Hungary. Thus the Little Entente was not a federal body, nor a confederation, but, in its essence, it was a military league. Hungary first tried to take up connections with Yugoslavia and then with Italy, and later it allied itself with the Rome-Berlin axis.

Still back in 1922, the then premier of Bulgaria, Alexander Stambolijskij, tried his hand with a Southern Slav Federation, but in vain.

The year 1931 brought the agreement signed by Curtius and Schober which aimed at establishing a customs-union between Austria and Germany. France, naturally, could not remain unmoved. Thus Premier Tardieu found it most convenient to take up a proposition from Budapest which was formulated at a non-official conference.

In 1932, as chairman of the Hungarian Chapter of the Pan-European Union, seeing the success of the policies of Hitler, and having a shrewd guess that the agreement between Curtius and Schober must ultimately lead to an Austrian "Anschluss," and that after the "Anschluss", Hungary will unavoidably slither into a situation of dependence from Germany, I resolved to convene an international conference.

I notified those invited that I do not ask them to attend in the name of the Pan-European Union, because not all of the invited were members of the Union, and that the aim of the conference would be to study whether there is any possibility for the Danubian states to set up amicable cooperation, better said to study what are the premises and methods of such a cooperation. Naturally, I was fully aware that my action was not compatible with the policies of the Hungarian government and so I arranged that no word was breathed about the conference by the newspapers, and I tried by any means to organize the conference in such a way that it remained on a pure study-basis. I was not even certain that those invited would

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attend. I was rather surprised to get in quick succession letters to the effect that nearly all accepted the invitation. Thus the following made known their intention to attend: from Rumania Grigore Gafencu, former Foreign Minister, Viorel Tilea, former Minister of the Interior, Mihail Manoilescu, former Minister of Finances and Pillat, Member of Parliament; from Czechoslovakia Hubert Ripka, future Minister of Foreign Trade and Vaclav Schuster, Minister of Finances; from Yugoslavia S. Franges, former Minister of Agriculture and Givotic, former Consul General; from Austria Dr. George Gunther, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Heinrich Mataja, the well-known Member of Parliament of Bosnian descent and Strakosch-Feldingen, the famed economist; from my own compatriots, Gustav Gratz, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gyorgy Lukacs, former Minister of Education, Elemer Hantos, former state secretary in the Ministry of Commerce, Antal Rainprecht, Member of Parliament and Antal Szekacs, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Budapest. In the forthcoming deliberations the following persons also took part besides those already mentioned: Dr. Basch, Chairman of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia, Lazar-Markovic, former Yugoslavian Minister of Justice, Moncilo Nincic, former Yugoslavian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feest, the "Praesidealchef" of the Austrian Chancellery, and from Hungary, Dr. Tibor Eckhardt, chief delegate to the League of Nations, and Member of Parliament.

The Conference was convened for the 12th of Feb., 1932. On the previous day, I unexpectedly was telephoned by Louis de Vienne, Ambassador of France to Hungary, who complained that in spite of ouramicable relations, I did not notify him of a conference which holds such exceeding interest for his government, and which will take place on the next day. The French Government clearly got word of the conference from either the Rumanian or from the Czech participants. But I was still more surprised that an hour before the conference started, I was telephoned at home by Antal Mocsony, the Chief Equerry of the King of Rumania, a person whom I did not know before and who was not invited to the conference, but who now asked for an urgent interview. We met just before the conference and he told me that he was authorized by his sovereign to take part in the conference if feasible, as an observer, for the king, who entertained the greatest interest in the development of friendly relations between the Danubian nations and who regards the conference as an important event.

From the beginning to the end, the consultations were carried through in a most friendly atmosphere. During the banquet on the first night, Gafencu delivered a beautiful, poetic address about the necessity of a Danubian cooperation, of the mutual interests of the nations living on the shores of the Middle Danube and of the bewitching charm of the Danubian Basin whose influence we all feel. During the conference it became clear that though we all hoped for the

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realization of a Danubian Federation or at least of a Confederation in the future, still for the time being our immediate task should be a deepening of economic ties, because time is not yet fully ripe for a solution on the political level. Thus, the same thing happened much later in Western Europe where the six states forming a cooperative body, in spite of their final aim at a political solution, contended themselves presently with the setting up of an economic cooperative organization.

Gusztav Gratz and Elemer Hantos, both eminent political economists, suggested the formation of a standing committee which would be convened from time to time. Thus we founded the "Comite pour le Rapprochement Economique des Pays Danubiens," and I was elected Chairman. The committee was operative until it was blocked by the policies of Hitler. We had sessions in Basel, Vienna and again in Budapest. A periodical was also founded. At the conference which began on the 12th of Feb., 1932, we finalized a draft in order to be submitted to the Governments of the Danubian Basin, which contained as its essence suggestions amounting to a lowering of customs duties between the Danubian countries, the canceling of import and export restrictions, better to say prohibitions, the introduction of mutual preferences for the industrial goods of Austria and Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and for the agricultural produces of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, on the other hand. We further suggested that non-Danubian countries should participate in the implementation of the plan by abolishing their ìmost favored nation" clauses and by securing unilateral preferences for the agricultural produces of Southeastern Europe. Our aims was first the creation of a unified Danubian economic territory and second, that the Western nations by buying the agricultural products of the Danubian states, should offer a secure market for these commodities against overseas competition through preferential treatment. Naturally, we also hoped that the new situation thus created will eventually lead in the Danubian Basin to peaceful political cooperation, the solution of the question of the minorities, and to a greater independence in relation to Germany.

De Vienne, the French Ambassador, asked on the next day for the submission of our decisions and sent them with special courier to Paris. Tardieu faced by impending elections and in need of a plan for Central Europe, favorable for French policies, but outbalancing the Curtius-Schober agreement, saw at once its utility, and at once adopted it. In the West hardly anybody was privy to the intelligence, and it is even today unknown, that the "Tardieu-Plan," which acquired notoriety in its time, was born at an unofficial conference held in Budapest.

The same Louis de Vienne who notified his premier of the results of our deliberations, wrote a book in 1937, "Le Guepier de l'Europe

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Central." He argued that the only possible solution of the problems of the Central Danubian Region lies in federative ideas, but such a solution has for its premises the abandonment of the rigid negative policies of the Little Entente governments when challenged by the territorial problems of Hungary.

The realization of the Tardieu-Plan was successfully obstructed by the negative attitude of Italy and Germany. The importance of the Plan was anyhow already greatly diminished by the fact that it was only meant to cake effect in the economic sphere. The conference of Stresa in 1935, convened on French initiative, closed its deliberations in the same way without results.

The only statesman of the Little Entente who tried in 1935-36, to bridge the differences between the Little Entente and the stipulations of the "Protocols of Rome,' was Milan Hodza, a former Czechoslovak Premier. But he too had to restrict himself to economic measures and had to be content with modest demands abolition of increases in customs duties and cancellation of currency restrictions in addition to the favored use of Yugoslav ports instead of German ones. Hodza, by the way, was the only statesman of note, of the Little Entente, who mentioned before the author the possibility of a revision of the Hungarian frontiers. Tomas Masaryk was, besides him, the only other person whose statements were such that they allowed the deduction of a similar viewpoint. Hodza, in 1942, turned to the West in a book, where he brought together his views regarding a federative solution. He pointed out the dangers of the Soviet regime and the necessity of support to be given to the democratic governments in Central Europe, and emphasized the important role to be played by the present populations of the Danubian states. According to his solution. federation should be built around a common President and a common Congress, which should be elected by the national parliaments. He recommended a federation of the three states of the Little Entente with Hungary, and Austria and even, perhaps, Poland. The plan, however, ran into difficulties because of the foreign policy of Yugoslavia which, at that time, was hostile toward Italy, and appeared to be influenced by an apprehension against Habsburg restoration in Austria, and a further obstructing factor was present in German pressure upon Rumania.

During the peace negotiations after the Second World War, I was assigned the unpopular role to deliver an address dealing with the question of the Hungarian-Rumanian. border. I was asked by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to show my manuscript. I, naturally, complied with the demand. In my draft I pointed out that contemporaneously with a revision of the frontier lines, the organization of a Danubian Federation would be necessary. But this part of my address was canceled. Immediately after the war, even during the last year of the war, there existed several federative suggestions.

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The so called "Intermarium"-group should here be mentioned which wanted to organize into a federation all nations which lived between Germany, Austria and Italy on the one side, and Russia, on the other.

The author of present article published on the 20th of Feb., 1946, a letter to the New York Times, which contained the following passages: "The peace treaty to be concluded with Hungary and Rumania will more or less decide the fate of all Danubian countries. At last the preliminary conditions for cooperation among Danubian nations must be created and the possibilities of its evolution must be secured. Peace, calm, a balanced situation, the solution of minority problems, the securing of the existence of Austria who proved to be incapable of living by herself, the advantages of great economic units can be secured in Southeastern Europe only if the anarchy lasting since 1918 among the nations living here, comes to an end and if again some form of cooperation is developed."

"The Great Powers, the Council of Foreign Ministers, or the Security Council of the United Nations Organization should... take upon themselves the role of advisers and initiators and should give assistance to creating suitable conditions for economic cooperation and its unhampered functioning."

"They ought to stipulate for the gradual winding up of customs duties for economic rationalization and joint sale for their products; for the establishment of a Danubian "Tennessee Valley" scheme, the accord of these countries' foreign policies; the equitable solution of minority problems; the provision for periodical meetings of foreign, finance and economic ministers and bank presidents as well as of meetings of parliamentary delegations. Only thus will it be possible that the treaties should bring the long awaited peace to the harassed Danubian countries."

Though immediately after the revolution of 1917, the Soviet leaders delighted in the use of federative slogans, nevertheless they were not prepared to accept federation within their satellite empire. The Bulgarian Dimitrov favored a Danubian, especially Balkan Federation, which was enough for Stalin to liquidate him, thus persisting in the old tradition of divide and rule.

On the 26th of June, 1946, E. Bevin, then British foreign secretary received, in Paris, the Hungarian Peace Treaty Delegation. Bevin made some interesting remarks about the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier, line and the position of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, and, then literally stated the following: "I myself as a member of organized labor, am constantly giving priority to economic problems, and I am favoring solutions which are apt to secure to nations an increase in their standard of living. Already during the war I tried to persuade the leaders of the Eastern European Governments then residing in London, as for instance Benes and Sikorski, that they should endeavour to create a customs-union or if not feasible, economic agreements

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which will enable every nation in Eastern Central Europe to realize its own economic interests."

At present, as the dependence on Russia seems to become somewhat less severe and the Danubian nations are again beginning to hope for a better future, the same problem, or at least the discussion of the problem, regains timeliness. Its importance is now greater than it ever was. It is really a commonplace today that small nations might only then secure their survival and independence, if they are able to become members of a larger formation within which hegemonic aggression is eliminated. Today we live in an era of "interdependence." The hope today of the Danubian nations lies in their membership within an European community. It might be possible, however, that the Soviet Union, once reconciled with the restoration of self-determination in the Danubian countries, will nevertheless uphold the condition, as already done in the case of Austria, that these states should not join any European community. It is further possible that the West European countries will not move to accept these nations in their midst, immediately after the Restoration of Human Rights, or, perhaps, the new configuration of the economic and social structure will need some time to adapt itself to the new situation. In all these cases, a federative cooperation shall by all means become necessary. But even in the event that an integration into the European Community should meet no objections in the course of its realization, even then, within the fold of the European economic and let us hope, political community, the Danubian countries would be able to play, in the form of an integrated economic unit, a much more decisive role than in a state of disorganization, entering the community as separate states.

It is unnecessary to emphasize, that the importance of a federative solution does not stem from economic considerations alone or from the necessity to secure a position in which we would no more become victims of the power politics of great nations, thus securing peace in Europe, but also it is of the highest importance to solve through federation the vexed question of national minorities, especially if the treaty between the states could be supplemented by a more intimate administrative federation. Perhaps all the commonly endured deep sufferings, the lessons of the past, and an equalization of social and economic structures, will at last, in spite of renascent neo-nationalistic tendencies, secure a peaceful and close cooperation of the nationalities within the Danubian Basin.

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Toward a New Central Europe