The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

The Ottoman Leadership and Intelligence

The basis for any kind of decision is knowledge of pertinent data.Hence, in the discussion of the rationality of Ottoman decisions, weneed to explore how well informed the leadership was about thestate of the world. Was it knowledgeable about European, or evenworld politics? According to some authors, since Ottoman leaders didnot maintain permanent ambassadors at foreign courts, they couldnot have been well informed in diplomatic matters.[17] While admittedlythe diplomatic network which came about in the sixteenthcentury was an effective means of securing accurate politicalinformation, the practice of spying, the classical means for obtaininginformation, lost none of its importance. There is considerable evidencethat the Ottomans had an efficient intelligence-collectingservice. Murad II (1421-1451) and Mohammed II (1451-1481) werealready able to obtain accurate information from their spies on theBalkan states, Hungary, and Italy. [18] This intelligence service continuedto function very well during the sixteenth century. Karl Brandi,the German historian probably best versed in the diplomatic historyof that century, wrote that "admirable spies and agents kept theTurkish government well informed of everything which went on inEurope."[19] Turkish leaders also received valuable information fromforeign ambassadors at the Sublime Porte, especially the Frenchand Venetians. It was the general opinion in Europe that the Venetianskept the Ottomans informed of European conditions; hencethey were often accused of treason.[20] But they were not alone: accordingto contemporary sources the plans of the Nicopolis campaign hadbeen forwarded to Constantinople by the duke of Milan.[21] whileVenice informed the Porte regarding the military concepts of thecrusade planned in 1490 by Pope Innocent VIII, the Porte found outabout the anti-Turkish alliance of 1500 between the pope, Venice,and Hungary through its own spies.[22] Turkish spies were active onHungarian soil as well.

Obviously their own information was the basis of the precisedescription by the Turkish historian, Sead-Eddin, of conditions inHungary after the death of King Matthias:

When the king of Hungary Janko [that is, Matthias] descended tohell...the emirs from the borderlands reported to the Porte that sincethis good-for-hell had no descendants other than the son that was bornto him out of wedlock, by an unbelieving girl, the Bans who were theguardians of Hungary, ashamed of having to bow their heads in front ofthis man of obscure origins, brought in the son of the king of nearbyPoland and installed him on the throne of Hungary. . .. Thus a great dealof dissatisfaction prevailed among the notables who had sold themselvesto the devil. The affairs of Hungary are very confused, and theplans of their Bans are all for naught, because of the opposition. Hencethe occupation of the country depends only on whether the sultanshould direct his campaign of conquest in that direction.[23]

On May 4, 1526, the papal legate Antonio Burgio wrote fromBuda: "The king wants to discuss matters of state with the representativesof the common nobility in secret.... This is necessary becauseof the many spies who manage to infiltrate everywhere wheneverdiscussions are public."[24] It is very interesting to note that evenGyorgy Szeremi, whose chronicle contains many fables and gossipbut who was surprisingly well informed on everyday matters, alsofelt that one of the causes of the degeneration of Hungary was theTurkish intelligence network covering the whole country.[25]

As is well known, Ottoman leaders were particularly interested ingeography as a basis for military and political decisions. SultanMohammed II encouraged the collection of data of strategic relevance.The "world map" of the famous Turkish geographer, Piri Reis,was studied extensively by Sultan Selim (1512-1520), and we mayguess that the reason its eastern half, depicting the Indian Ocean,cannot be found is that the sultan must have cut it off and kept it.[26]As regards Hungary, the commanders along the borders were continuouslyreceiving instructions from Constantinople to reconnoiterits roads, its waters, its mountains.[27]

Economic Strategy

One of the best proofs for the rationality of political decisions canbe found by inquiring into their relationship to economic concerns.Even a brief sketch of Ottoman expansion viewed from this anglecan demonstrate the central role of economic strategy for the sultansof the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[28]

Once the Ottomans had Asia Minor under their control theyconverted Bursa into the center for their north-south and east-westcommerce. Commerce of the ports of southwest Anatolia--Palatia,Ephesus, Smyrna--was oriented in this direction and the silk tradefrom Persia was rerouted from Trebizond to Bursa. The occupationin 1391 of the two ports in southern Anatolia, Antalya and Alanya,was also prompted by economic concerns; these were the transitports for goods from India and South-East Asia. Similarly, economicconsiderations were involved in the occupation of Karamania in 1468:the Turks were thus able to control the land route of the easterncommerce. Expansion along the Black Sea followed the samelogic. The Ottomans had already taken over part of the Black Seacommerce when they captured Constantinople. Between 1460 and1480 Trebizond, Kaffa, Azov, Kilia, and Akkerman also fell into theirhands and thus the Black Sea became a Turkish lake. Henceforththe Empire could intervene in the Polish, Moldavian, and Russiancommerce directed towards the Black Sea, and at the same timeensure the undisturbed supply of the capital, thanks to the agriculturalproducts from those lands.

A new chapter of Ottoman history opens with the occupation ofSyria and Egypt in 1516-17. By conquering these provinces theEmpire could participate in the greatest business of the age: trade inIndian spices, particularly pepper. Towards the end of the MiddleAges a long chain of commercial exchanges connected the spicemarkets of India, Ceylon, and Indonesia with China at one end, andVenice at the other. Arabian dhows carried the valuable goods fromIndia; Ormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf and Aden at theentrance to the Red Sea were the two main points of transfer. Thecommercial road led from Ormuz to Basra, whence caravans carriedthe merchandise through Mesopotamia to Baghdad, then to Aleppo.The spices unloaded at Aden were carried by small vessels along thehazardous Red Sea to Suez; from here caravans departed for Alexandria.

Venetian vessels carried the goods from Aleppo or, moreexactly, from its port, Tripoli, and from Alexandria to Venice to bedistributed to the markets of Europe (See Map 1).

These classical routes of the commerce in spices were completelyinterrupted when Vasco da Gama discovered a new route leading toIndia by rounding the Cape of Good Hope (1497). The Portugueseacquired control over the most important Indian spice marketsrapidly and brutally and conducted a merciless pirate warfareagainst Arab merchants on the ocean. Thus the quantity of spicethat reached Aleppo and Alexandria notably diminished for a while,and Lisbon replaced Venice as the center of the spice trade. In thefifteenth century the Mameluke sultanate which ruled over Syriaand Egypt and controlled the caravan routes collected about half amillion gold ducats worth of customs fees annually; the drop in thistraffic caused by Portuguese explorations and expansion towardsIndia affected it deeply. This loss, in turn, contributed greatly to theweakening of the state of the Mamelukes, to such an extent thatSultan Selim was able to administer a decisive blow to them andoccupy Syria and Egypt in only two campaigns.

The Portuguese economic historian V. M. Magelhaes-Godinhowrites: "Undoubtedly one of the objects of Selim's expansionist policieswas India, or at least control over the routes leading to thislegendary world.'' [29] Since the Ottomans could not reach the PersianGulf because of Persia, Selim concentrated his efforts on the RedSea. Of course, even control of that route exceeded the capabilities ofthe Empire of that time because, in order to re-establish traffic onthe Indian Ocean it would have needed a fleet. It was not possible,however, to construct such a fleet in the area of the Red Sea becauseof the lack of raw materials, primarily wood. Thus Selim could dolittle else than encourage the Venetians to continue to engage in thespice trade so that he, having replaced the Mameluke sultans, mightprofit from duties. Actually, the spice trade gradually revived alongthe traditional routes because the Portuguese did not have enoughships or bases to maintain control over the Indian Ocean as a wholeand to intercept all shipments by Arab merchants.

The active intervention of the Ottoman Empire was also delayedby the fact that dangerous revolts occurred in Syria in 1520 and inEgypt in 1523; as long as conditions were not under control politicallyand militarily it could not even think of taking a standagainst the Portuguese. Only in 1529 did the conditions become

settled enough to allow the Ottomans to take the first measurestowards ensuring the shipping lanes on the Red Sea and IndianOcean. In fact, they went all out: they began to dig a channel at Suez,and, on the shores of the Red Sea they set up huge shipyards towhich the materials needed for shipbuilding were carried en massefrom other parts of the Empire. The work was progressing, someforty galleys were ready for launching, and a further twenty underconstruction when in 1532 news was received of the attack againstCyprus, and the troops as well as a large quantity of artillery werehurriedly carried away.

Thus the Ottomans had to wait another six years to launch anattack against the Portuguese. In 1538, 76 vessels carrying about20,000 troops and strong artillery sailed from the Red Sea to occupyDiu, the most important Portuguese base in India. However, theIndian Ocean presented difficulties too formidable for the Turkishnavy, used to the much easier shipping conditions on the Mediterranean,and thus this undertaking, and several others, ended in failure.

The occupation of Syria and Egypt seriously affected Persia aswell. New sources of conflict between the two empires were added tothe old ones. Persia had always sought alliance with the Westagainst the Turks and was now finally able to obtain it: the Portuguesesold them firearms, and thereby, it seemed, Persia succeededin balancing the tactical advantage of the Ottomans. The help wasindeed significant: by 1525 the Persian army had 400 canons and10-15,000 muskets. Nevertheless, the Turkish army remained thestronger. In 1534-35 it occupied Iraq and managed to force the rulerof Basra to recognize the overlordship of the Sultan. Thus theOttoman Empire acquired control over the spice route through thePersian Gulf as well, especially after 1546, when its army marchedinto Basra.

The Portuguese, meanwhile, had abandoned the idea of closingthe route leading to the Near East and sought an understandingwith the Ottomans. Consequently, the spice trade flowed freely onceagain along the traditional routes which, in the long run, profitedeveryone. The Indians could sell their merchandise freely, as did theArabs, whose trade was not hindered any more by the Portuguese.The Portuguese themselves gained because, though they continuedto use the route around the Cape of Good Hope, their possession ofOrmuz meant they could collect customs from the Arab ships reachingthe Persian Gulf. The Ottomans secured regular income bycollecting customs from the caravans crossing their territories and

from Venetian ships. The Venetians profited too, since they carriedthe spices to the European markets.

Many commentators have argued that the occupation of Syria andEgypt was more significant than the capture of Constantinople.Halil Inalcik, for example, writes: "An equally important result ofSelim's conquest was that the Ottomans now controlled the world'srichest centers of the transit trade. Ottoman state income doubled,the treasury in the palace was able to support his plans for world-wide conquests."[30] Egypt was not only a route for spices, but also forthe gold from West Africa, and it was, moreover, one of the breadbasketsof the Empire, along with Syria. It should come as no surprisethat the Egyptian budget enjoyed a yearly surplus of half a millionducats, which was delivered to Constantinople in gold.

In his great work on the Mediterranean Fernand Braudel devoteda whole chapter to the "Geography of Islam."[31] The Muslim worldincluded the main caravan routes, the water zones (the Mediterranean,the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea), and theoases of the Sudan--a long road leading from the Atlantic to thePacific, with the Mediterranean at its center. Although this enormousarea was in the possession of Islam from the seventh century,the Arabs, as well as the Ottoman Turks of the sixteenth century,"missed the opportunity', of creating a unified empire from it. Byoccupying the Balkans the Empire became fatefully involved inEuropean politics, and, therefore, writes Braudel, "the real problemsremained hidden from the sultans." They did not finish the constructionof the Suez canal, nor the fight against the Portuguese; theyneglected to occupy the lower regions of the Volga River and thuswere unable to open the silk routes; they became lost in the strugglesaround the Mediterranean. Braudel's analysis sheds light on some-thing Eurocentric historians are inclined to forget, that the OttomanEmpire was a world power, and Europe was but one scene, and noteven the most important one, of its activities. However, it is verydoubtful, whether their world empire could have been maintainedwithout controlling the Balkans and the islands of the Mediterranean.Maybe the "many lost opportunities" were just as logicallydefined as were the ones not missed by the Ottomans.

All in all, the Ottoman sultans managed to build a world empireby consciously taking economic factors into consideration; hencerational economic calculations can be seen as determining to a great extent their political decisions. This example suggests that therationality of Ottoman politics was in no way less developed thanthat of any other power of the times.

Ottoman Diplomacy

Had the Ottoman Turks been nothing but a barbarian power withsights set on easily obtainable booty, as some authors assert, thenall they would have had to do was to wage wars, leaving asidediplomacy. Yet we know that Turkish diplomacy was most active,flexible, and circumspect, and often saved the government fromdifficult situations.

The peace of Szeged, signed in 1444 by King Wladislas I andSultan Murad, is a well-known episode of European history. Themotive for the peace, on the part of the Ottomans, was twofold: theyhad suffered defeats in the preceding years, and a dangerous revoltwas fomenting in Asia Minor. The Porte was inclined to makesignificant concessions: it offered, in exchange for peace, severalSerbian fortresses, including Galamboc, as well as hostages, the twosons of George Brankovic , the ruler of Serbia. This price seemedacceptable to the Hungarian government, since war did not promisebetter results. (The futility of an attack became, of course, soonobvious when Wladislas broke the peace, marched into the Balkans,and his army suffered an annihilating defeat, losing thousands ofmen, including the young king himself in the battle of Varna.)[32]

Half a century later, in 1491, the French ambassador, PhilippeCommines, was negotiating in Venice for continued support for hisking when he received, one night, a secret visitor: the ambassador ofSultan Bajazid II. He came to convince Commines of the advantagesfor France of making friends with the Sultan instead of Venice. Atthis time war with Venice was already in the cards; hence theobjective of the move was obvious: to isolate the opponent diplomatically.Although the maneuver did not succeed, nevertheless it isa good illustration of how carefully thought out Ottoman diplomacywas.[33] We also know how masterfully this diplomacy was able toavoid involving the Empire in a two-front war with Persia andEuropean enemies. According to Dorothy Vaughan: "A threat fromPersia could produce in Constantinople a sudden willingness tomake peace in Europe, and also the converse."[34]

Undoubtedly, the most important development in the history ofsixteenth-century Europe was the 1519 imperial election of Charlesof Habsburg, King of Spain and ruler of the Netherlands, the Austrianprovinces, Naples, Sardinia, Sicily, and the American colonies.Practically all governments objected to the election because it wasclear that the formation of so large an empire would upset theEuropean balance of power.[35] By this time there was no inter-national issue which did not bear on Ottoman foreign policy, and thepromotion of the Spanish king to the imperial throne was particularlyunsettling for the Porte. After all, the emperor also bore thetitles "Ruler of Jerusalem, Prince of Athens and Persia, and Ruler ofAsia and Africa", which the Sultan considered an open challenge; henever referred to Charles by any term other than "King of Isphamia"[Spain]. There were a number of other conflicts of interest betweenthem. The persecution of the Moors in Spain elicited great indignationin the entire Muslim world, and the attacks against the BarbaryStates of North Africa could not be a matter of indifference to theOttoman Empire, whether from a religious or a strategic point ofview. Already Bajezid and Selim had sent aid to them, in a waypreempting the great confrontations of later centuries. Spanish ruleover Naples represented a specific threat to Turkish positions in theBalkans and the Mediterranean. Added to all this was the dangerthat the emperor, with his great power and prestige, might bringabout the oft-mentioned but never realized crusade. At this juncturesuch an eventuality seemed possible, since Charles had promised acrusade in the campaign preceding his election, and the Ottomangovernment must have been aware of this. The significance of theelection of Charles V as Emperor was registered by several contemporaryTurkish historians. Kemal pashazade, for example, saw correctlythat the European balance had been upset by Charles ascendingthe imperial throne: "The King of Aleman-country [Germany]--on account of whose tyranny the rulers of the unbelieving countriescomplain--repressed the rulers of the neighboring countries anddeprived them of their prestige with his power and aggressiveness."He has excellent soldiers who are "always ready to attack thefollowers of Islam and to besmirch Rum, the refuge of salvation, withtheir godless feet, and are merely awaiting an appropriate occasion."[36]

For our particular topic it is important, of course, that King Louis II of Hungary was related to the Emperor by marriage and that theHouse of Habsburg and the Polish-Bohemian-Hungarian dynasty ofthe Jagiellonians were connected by a treaty of inheritance andmarriage.[37] Therefore, one had to expect--as eventually happened--that Hungary would fall under Habsburg influence, which wouldindeed imply great dangers for the Ottoman Empire. It was, finallythe fear of the power of Charles V that produced the Turkish-Frenchalliance. According to Inalcik, both the Ottoman and Bourbon rulersrecognized that they needed one another against the common Habsburgthreat.

All things considered, it seems, therefore, highly probable that theOttoman leadership based its decisions on reliable information andon careful assessments. Hence, I feel justified to proceed on theassumption that the political and military leaders of Constantinopleacted rationally, and that we have good reason to apply to ourinquiry the model based on the logic of war.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541