The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Estimates in the Sources and Studies: the Supply Side

First of all, we must work out a reasonably reliable number oftimar estate owners, that is, those landowners who had to providetroops in proportion to their revenues. Even the most recent pertinent estimates are highly divergent: according to Omar Barkan theynumbered 27,868 at the time of Suleyman I, while Inalcik gives theirnumber as 40,000. Along with Kaldy-Nagy, I accept the figure ofBarkan as a point of departure.[47]

There were three principal groups of timar landowners: 1) thesmall timars, whose income did not exceed 20,000 aspers; 2) thezeamet owners, with 20-100,000 asper income; and 3) the hassowners, whose income exceeded 100,000 aspers. The military obligations of these three categories differed: the first category provideda timariot soldier for every 3,000 aspers of revenue, the second, onefor every 4,000, and the third, one for every 5,000.[48]

To determine the total number of timariot soldiers it would bemost useful to know the distribution of the size of the timar estatesand the proportion of the owners, income. According to Kaldy-Nagy, the small timar owners amounted to 95% of all landowners; thefigures supplied by Rycaut (1670) and Count Marsigli (1732) aresummarized in Table 1, but they differ in the ratios. It seemsreasonable to assume for the entire Empire that 0.5% were hassowners, 9.5% zeamet owners, and 90% small timar owners. Grantedthat the data in this table are not from the period of Süleyman, theseratios could not have changed substantially in the course of approximately 150 years.

Table 1.
The Distribution of Timar OwnersAccording to Rycaut and Marsigli

Owners of
Author	Province
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Rycaut	Anatolia	16	0.21	297	3.83	7440	95.96	7763	100
	Rumelia	23	0.25	1076	11.67	8194	88.18	9292	100
Marsigli	Anatolia	61	0.72	793	9.30	7674	89.99	8628	100
	Rumelia	23	0.19	960	8.04	10842	91.76	11816	100

As to income distribution, Marsigli's figures provide some orientation. At the end of the seventeenth century, the total income of thetimar estates in Anatolia and Rumelia might have been distributedas follows:

hass estates: 7.2%zeamet estates: 40.6%small timar estates: 52.2%

A rounded-out calculation using the figures of Marsigli is presentedin Table 2:

Table 2.
The Probable Distribution of Timar Estate Ownersof Their Income and of the Soldiery Provided

		Hass	Zeamet	Timar
			Estates		Total
Owners	in %	0.5	9.5	90.0	100
	number	140	2,660	25,200	28,000
Income	in %	7.2	40.6	52.2	100
	in mill. aspers	13.3	75.1	96.6	185

Aspers per soldier due	5,000	4,000	3,000
No. of soldiers provided	2,660	18,775	32,200	53,635
No. of soldiers & owners	2,800	21,435	57,400	81,635
Avg. #. of soldiers/landowner	20.0	8.1	2.3	2.9

In 1526, as on other occasions, some provinces of the eastern portionof the Empire did not participate in the Hungarian campaign. According to the chronicler Lufti, although they were mobilized, thetroops of Diakbekr, Caraman, Rum, Syria, and of the Egyptianeyalets remained at their peacetime stations. If we assume theyrepresented about a third of the total forces, we must subtractroughly 25,000, leaving us with about 57,000 sipahis, the figure given by Kochu Bey for the eyalets of Anatolia and Rumelia.[49]

The probability of these estimates is enhanced by the data provided in Table 3, which contains the figures given by Kochu Bey,Ayni Ali, Ali Chaus, and Rycaut.[50] The most important fact, for ourpurposes, is the similarity of the figures in Table 3 for the ratio oftimariot soldiers to those of Table 2.

Table 3.
Number and Proportion of Timar Owners and SoldiersAccording to Various Authors

			Number of
Author	Period	Area	Owners	Sipahis	Ratio
Kochu Bey	Suleyman	Rumelia& Anatolia	19,000	57,000	3.0
Ayn Ali	1610	Empire as a whole	37,386	109,500	2.9
Ali Chaus	1653	Empire as a whole	54,775	164,400	3.0
Rycaut	mid-17th	Rumelia& Anatolia	17,745	49,000	2.8

Such are the data that can be puzzled out from the sources and the literature. As we can see, the number of timar soldiers must havebeen around 57,000. This figure, however, is only theoretical, because in practice a number of circumstances come into play. It islikely that as long as the Empire kept expanding--that is, roughlyspeaking, down to the end of Suleyman's reign--the timar ownersprovided more soldiers than the kanun prescribed, because thetimar estates established in recently conquered areas were given tosoldiers who distinguished themselves in the campaign. It alsofrequently happened that the income of the timars was raised evenif the size of their estates did not increase as a reward for meritsearned in the campaign. Thus it was largely in the interest of thebejlerbeyilik and sanjak beyi owning hass estates, as well as of thesub-begs and subasis owning zeamets, to participate in the war withas many soldiers as possible, for victory and rewards were far morelikely with large numbers. Hence Kochu Bey's words, that in thetime of Suleyman, the timar owners participated in the campaignswith considerably more soldiers than prescribed, do not sound at allexaggerated.

On the other hand, the number of fighters may have been negatively affected by the owner's illness or financial problems. Moreover, disobedience may also have played a part: some timars mayhave simply disregarded the draft. Finally, there were cases ofcheating: for instance, the landowners might show up for the musterwith a complete contingent, but then decide to send some home toavoid having to provide for them. However, such instances wereunlikely under Suleyman. On the contrary, the chroniclers write ofperfect discipline and enthusiasm, and report how well the prescriptions of the kanuns were observed at the muster. For instance,Kemal Pashazade writes regarding the muster held at Belgrade in1526:

The beys competed with one another each of them striving to outdo theothers, and each of them striving to present troops as well equipped aspossible.... The number of cavalry and infantry were like the blades ofgrass in the field and their armament was found to conform perfectlywith the official roster determined by the kanun.[51]

It is relatively simple to determine the number of professionalsoldiers. The janissaries must have numbered around 10-12,000,

the Porte's sipahis around 54,000, and the number of artillerymenis known to have been 695.[52]

It is far more difficult to estimate the size of the irregular troops.Among them were the akindjis, the gonuluk, the assab, the musellem,the voinuks, etc. Their total may have been 5040,000. While theywere of limited value in open battle-comparable to the Hungariannoble levy and local militia--the akindjis in particular were veryhelpful from the strategic point of view, because they carried outlong-range raids with unusual cruelty, terrorizing and paralyzingthe enemy's hinterland. The Tartars performed similar roles; theynumbered 10,000 in the campaign of 1532; hence we may assumethere were about as many of them in 1526.

All told, the data provided by Ferdi and Kochu Bey, presented inTable 4, must be close to reality. Although the numbers given byFerdi pertain to the troops who participated in the campaign of 1529,while Kochu Bey gives information regarding Süleyman's reign ingeneral, the situation in 1526 could not have been radically different.

Table 4.
Effectives according to Ferdi and Kochu Bey [53]

	Ferdi	Kochu Bey
Professional soldiers	32,000	36,000
Timariotsover	60,000	47-110,000
Irregular troops	60,000	48-60,000
Tartars over	10,000	10,000
Total	182,000	140-200,000

Modern historians have arrived at divergent numbers of theOttoman army's effectives fighting at Mohacs. The estimate of Gyalokay deserves special discussion. He agreed with those who feelthat the number 150-200,000 is an exaggeration, believing thatwhile at the outset, at Constantinople, the strength of the armymight have been 130,000, those actually participating in the battlenumbered only 90,000, assuming that the army had suffered 25%losses during the march to Belgrade and another 10% in the combatspreceding Mohacs. [54] This calculation is not convincing. The 25%subtracted for losses during the march is excessive; such a loss couldonly have occurred during forced marches over an extended period oftime, or if logistics had failed. Neither of these was the case. The pace of advance did not exceed 13 km/day.[55] Nor do we have anyevidence about failures of logistical service, which is not surprisingknowing the excellence of Ottoman logistical command and the factthat the army was advancing in secure territories of the Empire.Gyalokay refers to Napoleon's advance during the Russian campaign of 1812. Indeed, the Grande Armee suffered catastrophiclosses in the course of their advance, but the explanation of theselosses is common knowledge: the inadequacy of the French logisticalsystem and the scorched earth tactics of the retreating Russians. [56]Hence, we better dismiss these assumed losses and estimate the sizeof the Ottoman army reaching Mohacs at 150,000 troops, not counting the effectives of the train, the servants, and other support personnel.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541