The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

CHAPTER III
HUNGARYS MILITARY POTENTIAL IN THE JAGELLONIAN PERIOD

Since very little detailed information is available on the militaryconditions of Hungary in the decades preceding Mohacs, the picturepresented in this chapter cannot but remain sketchy. Yet, I hope,this outline will reveal the blatant disproportion between Turkishand Hungarian forces, as well as point to issues that demand furtherinvestigation.

The Economic Background

while the Hungarian nobility has often been accused of squandering the wealth of the country in the Jagellonian period, thus undermining its defense, [88] there is good reason to believe that Hungary'sfinances had hit rock bottom immediately after the death of KingMatthias. Such a sudden economic depression suggests that theroots of the malady reached much further back in time.

Economic historians have characterized the cause of the economicdownturn by the paradox formulated by Oszkar Paulinyi, the leading historian of Hungary's mining and minting: "rich land--poorcountry." [89] Indeed, medieval Hungary had plenty of almost everything, not only agricultural produce. From the point of view ofnational wealth, abundant agrarian production is, of course, a valuein itself, but it does entail the risk of having to pay for importedindustrial commodities with animals, wine, and grain on the foreignmarkets. Given the same investment in labor the value of industrialproducts is generally higher; hence the balance of payments of acountry relying on agrarian exports alone may easily become unfavorable. Furthermore, foreign-made manufactured goods representdangerous and even harmful competition for the fledgling industryof a country, to the detriment of its industrial and urban development.

This was the case in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Hungary. Yet the real trouble was, surprising as it may sound, thecounty's enormous wealth in precious metals, above all gold. Inmedieval Europe an increasing amount of precious metal was required to supply means of exchange for the expanding internationalcommerce; hence demand for Hungarian gold and silver kept growing. Consequently, the balance of trade and payment, unfavorable tobegin with because of the large share of agricultural products in thecountry's export, became even less favorable, for Hungary was ableto obtain more and more manufactures in exchange for her preciousmetals.

As a result of this unfavorable balance of trade the development ofcities and of the urban population slowed down considerably and,according to some historians, stopped altogether. The details of thisprocess in the western and northern regions of the country are fairlywell known; some growth seems to have taken place in the centralareas, but its nature and extent are not quite clear yet. In any case,in comparison with the prosperity of European cities, the poverty ofHungarian towns is striking. In the mid-sixteenth century thewealth of the 160 richest citizens of Augsburg amounted to almosthalf a million gold florins, those of Nordlingen to 300,000 florins.Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the annual income of citieslike Florence, Milan, or Naples was between 300,000 and 600,000gold ducats; that of Venice reached the million. In contrast, thewealth of Selmecbanya, Kormocbanya, and Besztercebanya, thethree leading mining towns of northern Hungary, amounted to atotal of no more than 80,000 gold florins in the mid-sixteenth century. [90] These examples intend to illustrate the well-known fact thatcapital wealth in the Hungarian urban economy was incomparablysmaller than that of western burghers. The cash reserves of thepeasantry and of the nobility, who derived their income from agriculture, were even more limited. For instance, the annual income of theprimate of Hungary, the archbishop of Esztergom, who, ownedwhole counties of the kingdom, was around 35,000 gold florins in the1520s, that of the archbishop of Kalocsa between 20,000 and 22,000florins, while the wealth of the richest bishops did not exceed 10,000to 25,000 florins. [91] The sums reported to have been left behind at thedeath of some prelates may have seemed fabulous, yet these sumsremained dead treasures because of limited commerce and credit.

The nobility, including the aristocracy, had to struggle constantlywith shortage of money and could cover extraordinary expenses onlyby short-term loans or by mortgaging their estates. It is typical, forexample, that when Werboczy, chief justice of the realm and wellknown for his great landed acquisitions, was to go on a missionabroad, he had to take out a loan to be able to represent the countryin a proper manner. [92] Indeed, the land of Hungary was rich, but thecountry remained poor.

This poverty, deriving from the inner springs of the economy, wasexacerbated by the extreme burden of the Turkish wars--a burdenthe inhabitants of western European countries could not even imagine. Of course, war was not an inexpensive enterprise even amongwestern countries, but they were not subjected to constant warfarealong their borders in times of peace, nor had to fear that theirneighbor would invade without cause or prior declaration of war,cause havoc, enslave hundreds of thousands of human beings, andwithdraw loaded with booty. From the moment the Ottoman Turksappeared at the border, the Hungarian state had to build andmaintain castles at tremendous expense along a 2,000 km longfrontier, garrison them, and keep additional troops to supplementtheir permanent defense by a mobile force. According to very approximate calculations, the annual expenditure for maintaining theborder defense accounted for almost the entire regular income of thekingdom. If the expenses of a year appear as anything below thisamount, this meant that the garrisons were not paid and the upkeepof the castles was neglected. [93]

It seems that as a result of the two processes of impoverishmentdescribed above Hungary's economy collapsed in the Jagellonianperiod. From the point of view of defense, the consequences wherecatastrophic. To begin with, the military reforms initiated by Matthias Corvinus [94] had to be given up, which meant that the Hungarianmilitary could not keep pace with the European development. Thesereforms would have required considerable funds, and the state couldhave obtained these funds only from a flourishing urban society.King Matthias financed his standing army not from funds suppliedby the Hungarian cities, but from tributes paid by the conqueredprovinces and from the unprecedented heavy taxes imposed on thepeasantry. After his death it had become impossible to retain astanding army, but, since the Ottoman threat did not go away and defense could not be neglected, a quick solution had to be found: thereintroduction of the old feudal arrangements. This solution, how-ever, only increased the power of the aristocracy at the expense ofthe crown's authority, which, in turn, weakened coordinated defenseefforts and the central command.

The Army

Feudal military arrangements do not in themselves preclude thepossibility of fielding professional troops as well. Indeed, the basicdifference between the armies of Matthias Corvinus and those of hisJagiello successors was not in their composition but in the fact thatthe former were solely under the control of the crown, while thelatter were maintained mostly by the aristocracy. Professionalscould serve in the regular standing troops or as soldiers hired at timeof great wars; they could be Magyars, non-Magyars from Hungary,or foreigners. In terms of social background they were also quite amix: nobles and peasants, townsmen and marginalized vagrantscould all be found in their ranks.

The two major sections of the army were the standing troops andthe forces mobilized for campaigns:

I. Troops permanently under the banners; mostly stationed at thefrontier castles or in border areas.

a. The royal banderium. Of its 1000 men, 600 served along theborders.

b. Banderia of the barons. The troops provided by the voivode ofTransylvania, the ban of Croatia, the comes of the Szekely, andof Temes; 1600 all told.

c. Garrisons of the frontier castles. Some 6-10,000 troops.

d. Mercenaries hired by the towns in the vicinity of the borders andserving in the castles; their numbers are unknown.

e. Sailors of the river flotilla. Their strength is unknown. At thetime of King Matthias they numbered 10,000 but a record from1523 has merely 1,000.

f. The light cavalry of the Rac, that is, the Serbian hussars--soldiers who had fled from the Ottomans and served in Hungary.

II. Troops mobilized in times of war. Most could be deployed withinthe country only.

a. The banderia of the queen, the prelates, and the barons. Theireffectives were 14-15,000.

b. Soldiers provided by the towns, from 10 to 100 per town; theirtotal strength is unknown.

c. Regulars from the counties. Their total number is also unknown.

d. Troops provided by the nations enjoying special status. TheJaszok, the Cumans, the Szekely, and the Vlach, numbering4-5,000.

e. The noble levy. An army composed of those noblemen who did notserve as regulars at the court or under some lord. They numbered 20-25,000.

f. Local levy (militia portalis). Soldiers supplied and equipped bylandowners. The rate of expected service varied from district todistrict; the southern counties, closer to the Turkish threat,usually provided a larger number of such soldiers. The militiawas levied according to servile holdings (porta), and since at thistime there were some 250,000 plots, with a rate between 3% and10%, the number of this militia must have been around 10-18,000.

In case of general mobilization the army could be complementedby mass levy and foreign mercenaries. The mass levy was raisedonly in extreme danger and could include all men of arms-bearingage. The high ratio of Hungarian cavalry in the armed forces,particularly the light cavalry, had to be balanced by foreign mercenaries with heavy equipment; since their numbers depended onfunds available, there could not have been very many of them.

Thus, according to very rough estimates, the effectives of the armyin case of war might have been as follows:

I.Standing troops:
Banderia:	2,660
Garrisons of frontier castles:	6-8,000 (?)
Regulars from the towns:	500 (?)
Sailors of the river flotilla:	1,000
Rac hussars:	2-5,000
Total:	12-17,000
II. Mobilized troops:
Banderia:	14-15,000
Professionals from the towns:	1,000
Professionals from the counties:	5,000
Special troops furnished by Cumans, etc.:	4-5,000
Noble levy:	20-25,000
Local levy:	10-18,000
Total:	60-80,000 [96]
III.Foreign Mercenaries:	10,000 (?)
IV. Mass levy:	60-70,000
Total:	70-90,000
Grand Total:	142-177,000

These numbers were, however, valid only under optimal circumstances, for the deteriorating economic conditions and the steadyshortage of funds never allowed for this many troops. The size of theforces for a decisive battle was limited by further circumstances.First, one must deduct the garrisons of the castles far removed fromthe actual theater of operations, since they had to remain at theirpost even at time of general mobilization. Far more constricting wasthe fact that the Ottomans could invade the country from anywherebetween Transylvania and the Adriatic Sea; hence the forces fromthe outlying flanks could not be united with those from centralHungary until the line of Turkish attack became clear. Since theOttomans could not do without the Danube as their main line ofsupply and reinforcement, the probability of an attack from thedirection of Belgrade was high, but no one could be sure of it until themain forces actually arrived there. Even then the danger remainedthat smaller contingents might be diverted to attack Croatia orTransylvania to tie up at least parts of the forces in these provinces.On the other hand, if the Hungarian government reached a decisionon where to concentrate its forces only after the Ottoman army hadassembled at Belgrade and its intention of attacking Buda becameobvious, it was already too late to assemble all forces somewhere near Tolna because the distance between Belgrade and Tolna wasmuch less than that between Tolna and Transylvania or Croatia (ascan be seen on Map 2).

There were other problems with regard to mobilization and recruitment. The fairly limited military worth of the noble levy isevident from a plethora of sources, and the leaders of the countrywere well aware of it. Hence on several occasions the idea came upthat the nobles should pay a tax, in lieu of serving personally, andregulars be hired. Although such a measure was never actuallyintroduced, the question does arise: what would taxing the nobilityhave entailed, and to what extent would it have enhanced themilitary might of the country? The question is all the more legitimate since Hungarian historians are inclined to find the panacea forall the country's problems in the taxation of the nobility. What wasthe financial potential of the nobility? Since this issue has neverbeen explored by Hungarian historians the best I can do is to makesome very vague estimates.

That agricultural production is less profitable than manufactureand commerce is true even in our days and more so in times whentrade in grain and cattle was limited by poor transportation. Eventhough the percentage of the nobility exceeded that of the burghersin the population of early sixteenth-centuly Hungary, the bulk of itsrevenues came from agriculture; hence its income could scarcelyhave exceeded that of the cities. Still, let us assume that the incomeof the two classes was equivalent--although it is likely that theincome of the urban sector was higher--and make an estimate onthis basis. According to the annual budget of the kingdom under thetreasurers Elek Thurzo and Pal Varadi, in 1523 the taxes of thetowns, the Saxons, and the Jews amounted to approximately 30,000florins. [97] Following our earlier hypothesis, taxes that might havebeen collected from the nobility would have been at most of a similarorder of magnitude. Thus, with an additional 30,000 florins, 1250regulars could have been hired for a whole year, or 2500 for a half ayear. While there can be no doubt that these mercenaries wouldhave been, militarily speaking, more valuable than the 12-14,000men of the noble levy, it is also certain that they--and by implication, therefore, a hypothetical taxing of the nobility--would not havesolved the problem of the country's defense.

The other issue is that of the local levies, the militia portalis. Fora long time historians believed that these levies, first decreed underKing Sigismund, had never been used, primarily because the rulingclass feared an armed peasantry. Most recent research, however,has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that such levies didfunction and often included peasants. [98] It is worth noting that whilein 1514, after the great rural uprising of that year, the completedisarming of the peasantry had been decreed, a series of subsequentnational diets did in fact call the peasants to arms.

It is difficult to determine the combat value of this local or peasantmilitia. More likely it was higher than that of the noble levy; we cangather that much from the fact that diets considered using thembeyond the borders of the country, which was not even mentionedregarding the noble levy. Yet we may argue, as a matter of logic, thatit was futile to expect resounding military feats from these peasantsoldiers, for they were summoned on the spur of the moment from their ploughs and could not have been up to the task of seriousfighting for lack of equipment and training. And would the doubtfulmilitary contribution of the peasantry make up for the loss of theirabsence from production? The contemporaries disagree on this scorewhich, essentially, is the debate between proponents of national usmercenary armies. The enthusiastic dilettantes, with Machiavelliin the lead, observing the unruly, rootless mercenaries, alwaysready to commit atrocities against civilians, advocated a nationalarmy in which all classes would serve. [99] On the other hand, thespecialists, the technicians experienced in matters of war, emphasized the expertise of the mercenaries and proposed a simple remedy: regular pay. The prescription was simple medicine, yet therewere not many states which had the money to follow it. Hence therewere incessant complaints about the paid soldiery, even if theirmilitary worth was obvious enough and even if they were everywhere preferred to soldier-peasants or to a national army in general.Technically speaking, of course, mercenaries were the true carriersof military progress, responsible for every innovation in the art ofwarfare. In late medieval Hungary the diet was in charge of proclaimingmobilization but we know little about its procedure. It can be assumed that the banderia were mobilized by those who provided andequipped them and were led by them to the point of assembly. As faras the noble levy, the soldiers from the towns, and the local orpeasant militia were concerned, their organization was in the handsof the county and municipal authorities. Mobilization took place onthe basis of rolls which included information regarding the financialcondition of the nobles and of the towns and the numbers of servileplots. Most likely, the ordinances of the diet which prohibited serfsfrom moving or from being moved by force from their village afterthe census was taken were meant to ensure smooth recruitment incase of war. The troops from the counties and the local militiamarched to battle under appointed captains.

The field army was headed by a commander-in-chief appointed bythe king. A military council was attached to assist the commander.thus some sort of general staff came into being. Concurrently withmobilization the diet ordered the placing of the castles on warfooting and the acquisition of war materials; regulated the circulation of money with an eye to paying the soldiers in good currency; *prohibited the export of agricultural products in order to facilitatethe provisioning of troops; and took measures to stock food andfodder for the campaign. [100] We have already mentioned that theconstant lack of funds hampered the country's defense. In the Jagellonian period Hungary was unable to wage war from her ownresources. The country had to rely on foreign aid, which was provided mainly by the papacy and the Venetians. This dependence hadserious consequences. Preparations for war require time; therefore,the Hungarian government would have preferred to obtain the fundslong before hostilities broke out. But since it was not possible toknow in advance the exact intentions of the Ottomans, the popes anddoges usually paid only when the war seemed a matter of certainty,for they suspected that the Hungarians would spend the moneywhether war broke out or not. In his final report for 1523, LorenzoOrio, the Venetian ambassador, wrote that the papal nuncio hadbrought:

50,000 ducats with him, to use for fielding an army against the Turksand in defense of Hungary.... When he reached Buda, the primate, theking, and all the Hungarians did everything in their power to lay theirhands on this sum, but he refused to hand it over saying that...he hadreceived instructions from the cardinals not to disburse the moneyunless there is a need for it. Since there was no need for it at themoment, it was superfluous to spend it, particularly since the newscame in that the Hungarians had defeated the Turks at that verytime. [101]

The secretary of the embassy, Massero, commented that theHungarian lords wanted to use the money to defray the king's debtto the treasury. Funds, of course, were needed not only for a majorconfrontation; the garrisons of the castles had to be paid even in timeof off"icial peace. The hesitations regarding financial aid could delaymobilization even in case of all-out war and caused the country to beless well-prepared for the onslaught than it should and could havebeen. Last, but not least, because of its dependence on foreign aid,Hungarian politics became an appendage of the policies of others,and foreign interests weighed heavily in political and military decisions.

The Hungarian government made several attempts to procure thenecessary funds for war from within the country. A sales tax wasintroduced and once again taxing the nobility was contemplated. As more effective measures, the debasement of the coinage and the useof church treasures for minting money were planned. Debasement ofthe coinage was decreed in 1521 when, after the fall of Belgrade, amajor attack by the sultan seemed imminent. By that time thepractice of debasing the coinage had become accepted all acrossEurope; although a double-edged sword, there were no other meansto secure funds at the moment. The leaders of the country cannot bereally blamed for it, because, as Zsuzsanna Hermann demonstrated,it was "an emergency solution and the country's situation wassufficient justification to resort to an emergency measure."

By debasing the coinage the treasury made a profit of about60,000 florins--a sum sufficient to hire 2-2500 mercenaries for ayear, or double that number for half a year. Assuming the strengthof Hungary's army to be around 5040,000, this difference was notinsignificant. The trouble was that this device, intended as a onetime remedy, had to be used again and again because the Ottomansdid not attack in 1522, nor in 1523, but only in 1526. To quoteHermann, "this decision had catastrophic consequences; by 1526 ithad rendered the long latent but growing economic and politicalcrisis so deep and encompassing that the state seemed to disintegrate even without the intervention of the Turks." [102] Moreover, inflation had reached such proportions that the troops were reluctant toaccept the bad money. [103] The treasures of the Church were appropriated in 1526. Apparently, melting the gold and silver vessels andminting them into money would have helped, but papal permissionarrived at the last minute, the treasures were collected too late, andfinally nothing was minted at all. [104]

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541