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CHAPTER IV
SULEYMAN'S PROPOSAL:AN OUTLINE OF OTTOMAN AND HUNGARIAN POLICIES BETWEEN 1520 AND 1541



By "Suleyman's proposal", I mean that general policy of the sultanand, by implication, of the Ottoman leadership, that Hungary'sterritorial and political integrity be preserved. Hungary would notbe absorbed into the empire as long as no ruler from the house ofHabsburg was elected and foreign policy remained pro-Ottoman(that is, anti-Habsburg). [134]

As I will show, some historians have acknowledged this policy ofSuleyman's, but have ignored its military aspects or discussed themonly tangentially. In my studies precisely the military aspect is to beemphasized. In fact, this aspect constitutes the gist of my explanation for the Porte's initial cautiousness vis-a-vis Hungary. In themodel I have constructed of the Ottoman-Hungarian wars, the oft-mentioned range of action played a central role. As discussed above,it did not extend far enough to include all of the territory of Hungary.And because Ottoman leaders could not but include this model alongwith the notion of range of action in their image, their politicaldecision was logical enough: Hungary must not be annexed! In myearlier study I had stated:

I had reached my interpretation on the basis of the study of theperiod 1526 to 1541; but, in the course, of examining the eventspreceding 1526, I discovered that "Suleyman's offer" applied to thoseyears as well. [136]

Historiography



Several authors had reached the same conclusion. Mihaly Horvath wrote: "at that time (that is, in 1526) Suleyman had no desireto conquer Hungary. He set the Danube and Sava rivers as theboundaries of his tremendous empire, and did not intend to advancebeyond them." [137] In Jozsef Thury's study on Ottoman chronicles weread:


In our own days, on the basis of research conducted in Turkisharchives, Gyula Kaldy-Nagy was able to be more specific:

The revenues [collected by the Turkish state] from Hungary. . .could cover barely one-third of the expenditures. The deficit, an annual 17-18 million aspers. . .had to be brought to Buda from Istanbul in gold coins. Together with the cost of outfitting and maintaining the fortresses the Hungarian base cost Suleyman 300,000 gold pieces annually. Suleyman foresaw this burden in 1529, when he marched into Buda, and for the second time he refrained from keeping it. The accounts cited bear witness to the fact that Suleyman occupied Buda and the regions on both sides of the Danube not for the sake of increasing the size of his Empire. It was the unforeseen political situation that prompted him to occupy Buda in order to secure a solid base against the Habsburgs, rather than the other way around. [140]

This was also the view of Nicolae Jorga. [141] Similarly, Halil Inalcikdiscussing Mehemmed, writes:

The Ottomans established the Danube as the Empire's natural northern boundary. It became the Conqueror's policy to prevent any foreign static from establishing itself in the Balkan peninsula south of the Danube from Belgrade to the Black Sea as the northern limit of the Empire.

Elsewhere, in connection with 1526, he writes: "The Ottomanswithdrew from Hungary, occupying only Srem.... At first the Ottomans tried to make Hungary a vassal state, like Moldavia, since itwas considered too difficult and too expensive to establish directOttoman rule in a completely foreign country on the far side of theDanube." [142]

Suleymans Peace Offer of 1520 and His Attack in 1521

[143]

Hence, according to Inalcik, the Ottoman leadership observed theprinciple not to extend the boundaries of the Empire beyond theDanube and the Sava already at the time of Mehmed II. Theevents of the Jagellonian period seem to bear out this assertion.From 1490 to 1521, apart from the constant skirmishes along theborders, and from the occasional siege of castles, there was but onegreat war, and in that Hungary was the aggressor. Strange as it maysound, Hungarian policy was the more aggressive, and the repeatedly renewed truce usually came about on the initiative of the Porte.

It is not particularly difficult to explain the paradoxical behaviorof the two parties. The reason for the peaceful intent, or moreprecisely, the intention of avoiding a "great" war on the part of thelurks, was clear: not to engage in a war on two or more fronts. From1490 on the Ottoman Empire waged wars against the Mamelukesultans (148~91); Montenegro (1496); Poland (1497--99); Venice,France, and Hungary (148~91); the Persians and the internalenemy instigated by them (150~1514); Dulkadir (1515); and againthe Mameluke sultans in the campaigns against Syria and Egypt(1516--17). The stakes were indeed high in these wars: the conquestof areas of fabulous wealth, such as Syria and Egypt, the strengthening of positions along the Mediterranean Sea, or the repression ofrebellions threatening the very existence of the Empire. In comparison, the conflict with Hungary pales in significance; nor could therebe any question of deriving economic benefits from its conquest.

The aggressiveness shown by the Hungarians seems almost beyond comprehension. What is more, considering the conditions prevailing within the country, and the European situation which precluded effective foreign help, it may even be qualified as foolhardy.But our stern judgment is bound to turn more lenient if we take acloser look at the predicament of the country and the mentalityarising out of that predicament among the ruling class and amongthe people as well. Even if the Ottomans refrained from launchingan all-out assault, the continuous fighting along the borders, thedestruction caused by the raids, and the terrific burdens imposed bythe defense of the borders were becoming less and less bearable. Theconclusion was obvious: by the time the Turks launched the greatattack aimed at annihilating the country--and no one doubted that they eventually would--the strength of the country would have beensapped to such an extent that it would simply drop like an overripeapple into the lap of the conqueror. To alter this situation became,therefore, a necessity imposed by Realpolitik. As for psychologicalconditions, the intense hatred and contempt felt for Islam, as well asthe consciousness of belonging to European Christian civilization,had such deep roots in the makeup of the mind of the people, that thenotion of compromise, of peaceful coexistence, could not even arise.

Let us observe the evolution of Turkish-Hungarian relations from1490 on. In the decade following the death of King Matthias, official,formal peace prevailed between the two countries. Hungary was theone to denounce the peace when a Turkish emissary came to Buda in1499 to offer to extend it. The Hungarian government rejected theoffer because it saw a golden opportunity for a showdown such as ithad not seen for quite some time. Among France, Poland, andVenice, an anti-Ottoman alliance, which Hungary was invited tojoin, emerged. Substantial financial help was in the offing--a prerequisite, we know, for any serious undertaking. At the beginning ofthe war (in 1501 and in 1002), the Hungarian forces carried outbrilliant actions, penetrating deep into Ottoman territory; yet thesewere far from sufficient to break the power of the foe. With thealliance itself about to dissolve, the Hungarian government decidedto sign an armistice with the Turks for seven years.

Yet another opportunity for waging an all-out war came up in1510. In 1508 the king of France, the emperor, and the pope formedthe League of Cambray, aimed against Venice. The League appealedto Hungary to join, offering Dalmatia as a reward. The Hungariangovernment, however, knew full well that the Ottoman government,intent on maintaining the balance of power in Europe, would nottolerate the destruction of Venice with which it had close economicties; hence Hungary was liable to confront the Turks as well. Eventhough the allies offered to help if this were to happen, the court,assessing the worth of such promises soberly, preferred not to enterthe alliance. The common nobility, completely unfamiliar with thepolicies of the great European powers, vehemently attacked thecourt for passing up the opportunity to regain Dalmatia. But theking, Count Palatine Imre Perenyi, and Archbishop Bakocz remained adamant. The words Bakocz used to ally the fears of theVenetian ambassador were indicative of their thinking: Hungarywould not be able to retain Dalmatia in any event, while drawing theire of the Turks, and, by the time help could arrive--if it arrived atall--Hungary would be long lost. Thus the government, with commendable common sense, kept the country out of adventurousundertakings; in fact, in 1511 it renewed the armistice with theOttoman Empire for another five years.

In the following years, however, the Hungarian government tookthe above-mentioned plans of Pope Leo's crusade quite seriously,and this led, as we know, to the great peasant war of 1514. At theend of that very year, in a letter to King Wladislas the pope painteda rosy picture of the preparations for the large-scale campaign inorder to dissuade the Hungarian government from extending thearmistice. He was so concerned about a possible extension of theHungarian-Turkish armistice that he wrote a letter appealing to therulers of Europe to dissuade the King of Hungary from reaching anagreement, even warning the king, in the form of a veiled threat, ofthe grave consequences such a move might entail. To Francis I ofFrance he wrote: "Write to the King of Hungary not to concludepeace or armistice with the Turks under any circumstance...becausehis country would not be able to withstand their attack anywaywithout support from us and from the Christian rulers." He evenissued a direct warning to Wladislas: "I warn you against signing apeace or armistice with the Turks." Nevertheless, the Hungariangovernment did extend the armistice in 1516, and again in 1519.[144]

Thus the Hungarian leaders had to walk a tightrope: they had tomanifest extreme caution every time the West came forth with theidea of crusade; but they also had to mind the image of the country,that it remain, in the eyes of the West, "the bastion of Christianity",for this was the only way it could obtain the indispensable, if notparticularly generous, financial help without which it would havebeen altogether unable to protect its borders.

The armistice agreement concluded with the Porte in 1519 lost itsvalidity long before it would have expired. In September 1520 SultanSelim died, and, according to Ottoman legal tradition, an agreementconcluded by the deceased sultan did not oblige his successor. Hence,in December 1520, a Turkish emissary arrived in Buda, offering toextend the armistice. While the gesture appeared to be routine, fromcertain data, as well as from the circumstances, one might concludethat this time the conditions were different, for the stakes weremuch higher than the ones involved in the agreement concludedwith Selim.

In his final report for the year 1523 the secretary to the Venetianambassador to Hungary, Massaro, wrote:

According to another source, (and asserted by the sixteenthcentury Italian historian Sagundino), [146] the treaty proposed did notconcern the right of transit, but merely the payment of a tribute.

The following passage, found in a vernacular document from thecollection of the historian Verancsics, is particularly relevant:

The Ottoman chronicler, Djeladzade, though he makes no mention of the conditions stipulated, refers not to an armistice, but to"peace", and even "friendship":

Only one author, Ludovico Tubero, claims that the conditions ofpeace were the same as in the time of Selim. [149]

The first four sources, though they provide differing versions,agree on one thing: namely, that the conditions stipulated by Süleyman differed fundamentally from those of Selim. In trying to makesense of the details provided by the four sources, it would appearthey point to some kind of offer of alliance. While Massaro is the onlyone to mention the right of transit, the "eternal armistice" referredto in the Hungarian source, as well as the "peace and friendship"mentioned by Djeladzade, may easily be reconciled with that interpretation. Nor does the tribute mentioned by Sagundino contradictthis interpretation, since the issue of tribute frequently came up inagreements concluded with the Porte. [150]

All this, of course, does not have the strength of incontrovertibleevidence. Absolute certainty could only be obtained if the contemporary diplomatic records testified that Suleyman had stipulated suchconditions. Since such records do not exist, we must have recourse tothe methodology outlined in the first chapter; that is, basing ourconclusions on the model of war and on the perception the participants may have had of it, let us make sense of the data available andreconstruct the decisions taken by the Ottoman and Hungarianstatesmen.

The evidence according to which the leaders of the powers mostdirectly concerned--Austria, the Holy Roman Empire, Venice, andRome--got excited by any report intimating that the Hungarianswere about to reach an agreement with the Ottomans and wouldallow Ottoman armies to cross Hungarian territory, now acquiresspecial significance. Their concern becomes all the more understandable since, under the reign of Matthias Corvinus, the plunderingOttoman armies crossing Hungary caused havoc in Stir and Corinthian. It is hardly imaginable that the Ottomans crossed the country without obtaining permission from the Hungarian government.[151]

As we have seen, Massaro had already referred to the possibilityof the Ottomans being granted right of transit, a possibility even theHoly Roman Empire expected might come true. In 1521, at theimperial diet in Worms, it was agreed that the Hungarians should beallowed to sign an armistice with the Ottomans, but it was alsostipulated that no harm should befall the Empire--which could only mean that the agreement should not include granting the Ottomansright of transit through Hungary. [152] At the Imperial diet in Nurnbergin 1522 a proposal was made to the effect that, even if the HolyRoman Empire could not provide Hungary with substantial aid,something should, nevertheless, be provided; otherwise the Hungarians would be forced to reach an agreement with the Ottomans. [153]

The Hungarian government, however, did not accept the offer ofpeace; instead, it urgently sent out emissaries to all the powersconcerned with requests for help. Considering that the Hungariangovernments had extended the armistice with the Porte over thepreceding twenty years precisely because they could not count onany substantial assistance from the West, this decision seems incomprehensible, especially since under the existing conjuncture inEurope the cause of a general war against the Ottomans appearedless likely than ever. Charles had concluded a peace with the sultan,while carrying on war in Africa. Venice continued to cultivate goodrelations with the Porte. Last, but not least, the emperor and theking of France were on the verge of a major conflict. Certainly theleaders in Buda were aware of this state of affairs and the rebellionof Djambedri Ghazali, and the difficulties encountered by the Ottoman state in Syria, produced no improvement from the Hungarianpoint of view. [154] We must assume, therefore, that the Hungariangovernment refused to sign a peace treaty because the cost wasconsidered too high. Indeed, the price could only have been authorization for the transit of troops and the payment of tribute.

Although we regard it almost certain that the Hungarian government rejected the offer of peace because of the high price tag,nevertheless we must also consider another possibility. DomokosKosary asserts that Suleyman's conditions were the same as those ofSelim earlier; hence the government simply made a mistake when itopted "for delay and lengthy missions" and "failed to reflect that itwas unnecessary to provoke the Sultan on a relatively minor issue";in other words they should have accepted the proposal. [155] The root ofthe problem, continues Kosary, lay in a faulty assessment of thesituation, in particular, that the government overlooked two basicfactors: first, that the Ottoman Empire, which had concluded itsconquests in the east and had grown even stronger as a result, was now turning westwards; and second, the drastic reduction of thechances of securing assistance from the European powers. Kosarydeclares that we cannot achieve much by indulging in the usualmoralizing tone, because the mistaken measures adopted by thegovernment "derived rather from assimilated reflexes, the routinemeasures which the managers of Hungarian policy had been applying over a long period apparently without running into majordifficulties, and which went unpunished. Now it was suddenly discovered, however, that these measures entailed a mortal danger, onaccount of the international conjuncture." [156]

Referring to the methodological concepts outlined in Chapter I,lets us consider the Hungarian state an "organization', and, consequently, propose that the decision-making process went throughthree hierarchical levels--that is, the political, the administrative,and the operative. If we also assume that at its highest, the political,level, only creative, innovative decisions are possible, then the use ofthe term "routine" is misplaced. Routine or "programmed" decisionscan only occur at the administrative and especially at the operativelevels. [157]

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