The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

The Apparent Realization of Suleymans Concept in 1529

According to the Turkish chroniclers, Suleyman launched the waragainst Hungary in 1526 as a "warning, to King Louis. The warningsucceeded only too well since, as a consequence of the kings death,the inheritance treaty between the Habsburgs and the Jagiellosautomatically went into effect. Suleyman had actually promoted thevery thing he was guarding against: Habsburg influence in Hungary.

Suleyman was quick to recognize the unpleasant, even disastrous,consequence of his overwhelming victory. From Buda he sent amessage to Queen Mary in which he virtually expressed regretsregarding the affair and informed her that he came to Hungary notto deprive Louis II of his throne but rather--and here he resorted totraditional Turkish phraseology--in order to take "revenge for theoffense he had suffered." If the king had lived then Suleyman wouldhave allowed him to retain his throne in exchange for a certaintribute and would have given him back his country. [217]

Vezir Mustafa expressed himself in similar terms to the Venetianambassador in 1528: the sultan had not intended to conquer Hungary, but merely to take control of its "keys"; in former times Selimhad conquered Tabriz, yet he had retained only Diarbekr out of all ofPersia. [218] Here we must understand the term "keys" symbolically,because once the principal key, Belgrade, had been captured, thecastles acquired in 1526 were not nearly as significant. Actually, theterm refers to the objective attained by war with a limited objective,namely, that Hungary's prospects for an ultimate victory had beenreduced to near zero.

It was also in the interest of Ferdinand of Habsburg to obtaincontrol of Hungary. In one of his letters dating from 1532 he evaluated Hungary's significance as follows: the country was the size oftwo ordinary kingdoms, and it would be a disgrace to allow the Turksto take it over. Hungary supplied the hereditary provinces withmeat and other food items and, moreover, formed a "protective wall"against the Turks. Should the Turk lay hands on Hungary, he wouldnot cease his destructive incursions into Austria, even if he did conclude peace. The castles of Hungary--that is, Gyor, Komarom,and others in the Western region--could not be replaced. Furthermore, there was none better than the Hungarian light cavalry; itwas the only worthy opponent of the Turks. [219]

Consequently, Hungary became a bone of contention between timeOttomans and the West and this position resulted in its demise. TheHungarians, alone in all of Europe, may pride themselves that theirswas the only country described as a "defensive bastion" both byChristians and by Moslems.

To return to the Turkish point of view, we may recall that Fernand Braudel criticized the Ottoman leadership for becoming involved in European great power politics while losing sight of its trueinterests in the Near and Far East. [220] I have noted that this involvement was not entirely left up to the Turks. More precisely, it was notas if they had failed to recognize where their true interest lay; fromthe moment Constantinople became its capital, the Empire seemedto move along a set of tracks: it was not possible to protect the capitalwithout controlling the Balkans, and this fact naturally led to confrontation with Hungary, and then with the Habsburgs. At the sametime, the Ottomans also could not forego the is]ands of theMediterranean, for without them their position in the Near Eastwould be in jeopardy.

From this perspective it was entirely logical on the part of Suleyman to send another emissary to Buda, as soon as the "nationalparty" had elected Janos (John) Szapolyai as king and the Habsburgparty had elected Ferdinand. Although the emissary stayed thereincognito, and precious little of the negotiations leaked out, thosefamiliar with the ways of diplomacy assumed it was a matter ofconcluding some type of treaty. In any case, the ambassadors assigned to Buda reported to their respective governments that ifFerdinand did not give up his rights and demands regarding Hungary and decided to attack instead, Szapolyai would turn to theTurks for help. [221]

Hungarian historians are divided three ways with regard to John.According to one interpretation, John, driven by unbridled ambition,"discarded his scruples" and allied himself with the Turks. [222] In asecond interpretation, he decided to take such a step only afterFerdinand attacked him in 1527 and chased him out of Buda. Thefinal interpretation is that John allied himself with the Ottomans onthe advice of, and even under pressure from, France and, especially,Venice.

In my opinion none of these interpretations is correct, but, each ofthem contains an element of truth. We have seen that the peace to beconcluded with the Turks--which, of course, entailed some form ofdependence--was certainly not a novel idea on the part of Hungarian governments. It is hardly conceivable, therefore, that John hadnot pondered the possibility of an alliance with the Ottomans fromthe very beginning, given that the situation was steadily deteriorating. John did send emissaries to consult with practically every courtin Europe in the interest of the great crusade to be launched againstthe Ottomans. Nevertheless, the futility of the undertaking wasclear to him from the beginning. Hence his diplomatic moves mustbe viewed as nothing more than some type of self justification orwindow-dressing.

Yet we must also assume that, much as Louis II and his advisershad been strongly hampered from entering into alliance with the"pagan" Turks by ideological considerations, neither did John opt forthat course light-heartedly. In any case, we have primary sourcesbearing upon the matter. According to these, John turned to thescriptures for help in reaching a decision. He summoned two monksfor council and asked them whether a Christian ruler might enterinto alliance with the Turkish unbeliever? Verancsics states "Reading the New Testament, King John realized that he might call uponthe Turks for help. The friars found the following in the NewTestament: `whoever does him well, is his kin.'" [223]

We are bound to reach the same conclusion from the fact that

while the Turkish emissary had reached Buda in December 1526, itwas only in October, 1527, from Kolozsvar, where John had takenrefuge from Ferdinand's attack, that he sent the Polish noblemanJerome Lasky to offer homage to the sultan. Bardossy is correct inpointing out that "if John had finally decided to ask the Porte forassistance, it would have been wiser if he had done it sooner." [224] But,as we have seen, the considerations coming into play were not allrational ones, but emotional, moral, and ethical as well.

Of course, we must also realize that had John made up his mindalready at the time of the arrival of the Turkish emissary it wouldnot have been possible to prepare the ground for a diplomatic moveof such great import, given the communication and transportationconditions of the age. It was especially important to obtain themediation of some third power; clearly this power had to be Venice,which was on rather tense terms with the Habsburgs, but maintained friendly relations with the Turks. [225] Indeed, Venice fully livedup to expectations and prepared the ground in Constantinople sowell that Lasky, who reached the capital in December, was receivedat the Porte after a surprisingly short delay. In fact, he held in hishands the treaty, countersigned by the sultan, by the end of January. We may logically assume from this unusual promptness thatagreement with John was also important for the Porte.

According to the treaty of alliance, the sultan "returned" Hungaryto John and, without even demanding tribute, promised supportagainst the Habsburgs. There was no possibility of providing suchsupport that year, however, although that was precisely what Johnneeded given that Ferdinand was continuing the hostilities and hadeven forced John out of Hungary.

With the treaty in his hands John coped relatively well with thebitter taste of emigre life in Poland; in fact, he was actively organizing against Ferdinand. He sent agents into Hungary, first of all,Friar George (who made his first historical appearance), and theyprepared the ground for Szapolyai's return. John's task was madeconsiderably lighter by the fact that, as a consequence of the unbridled plundering by foreign mercenaries, hatred toward the Germans, only smoldering until then, leaped up in flames. Furthermore, the campaign announced by the Turks for the following year madeeven the convinced pro-Habsburg elements think again. Thus Ferdinand's position in the country was thoroughly shaken.

The Hungarian campaign of the following year was already decided in the fall of 1528 by the Porte. In discussing the events of 1529Eurocentric and Hungarocentric historians usually limit themselvesto a discussion of the Hungarian aspects and to the siege of Vienna.Yet, from the Ottoman perspective, there were two other importantevents. while one of these was not directly related to the policies ofthe Porte, almost certainly it did not elude the attention of Turkishstatesmen. This event was the venture of the pirate chief Hayreddinon the island of Penon, into the harbor of the port of Algiers. Bytaking possession of this island Hayreddin became the uncontestedmaster of the coast of North Africa. While this was a most dangerousdevelopment for Charles V, it was a very favorable one for theOttomans. Thus, it became imperative to win over the pirate chief--something which the Ottomans managed to accomplish in 1532.[226]

The other event, while significant militarily and politically, wasnevertheless primarily of economic importance: work had begun onthe canal connecting the Nile and the Red Sea. [227] The project'sobjective was obvious: to ensure an uninterrupted waterway for thespice trade, all the way from India to the Mediterranean Sea.

These two events were relevant for two reasons. First, they confirm the point which I have made repeatedly: Ottoman policies werebeing developed on a world-scale. From this assertion I also concludethat the 1529 campaign was important mainly because of the security which it signified for the Ottomans. In contrast, the events ofNorth Africa and of the Near and Far East affected the very being ofthe Ottoman Empire economically, politically, and militarily. Hencethere is even less reason to believe that, as some scholars haveasserted recently, the Ottoman Turks also intended to bring Austriaunder their rule as part of, or in addition to their world-wide agenda.

The army of the sultan reached Belgrade on July 17, and, exactlyone month later, arrived at the field of Mohacs where the famousmeeting between Suleyman and King John took place. The survivingreports of the meeting contain conflicting information. However, it iscertain that Suleyman received John with great pomp and ceremony, as behooves a sovereign ruler. The discussions took place inSuleyman's tent. It is not known exactly what topics they touched upon, but the report of Bishop Ferenc Frangepan, a member ofJohn's retinue, seems reliable: "It was decided that we be allowed tolive by our own laws, and that we may retain the country in peace,without having to pay tribute or accept [Turkish] sovereignty." [228] Ofcourse, not surrendering sovereignty to the sultan did not, for allthat, imply that Hungary could follow a foreign policy conflictingwith Turkish objectives. Essentially, therefore, the agreementmeant a relationship similar to the one that later evolved betweenthe sultan and Transylvania with one important difference: unlikethe ruler of Transylvania, John was not required to pay tribute.

Principally, the Ottoman sources reveal that John kissed Suleyman's hand when they met. It is not easy to accept the notion thatthe once so powerful king of Hungary was humbled to such a point;yet, we must think of John with nothing but appreciation for thisultimate sacrifice for the sake of his country. Frangepan's reply tothe reproachful letter of the Bishop of Ravello is indicative: "You say,he kissed the hand of the Turkish emperor. Well, what is wrong withkissing the hand of a ruler? If we may kiss the foot of Christ'slieutenant for but small consideration in return, why should we notkiss the hand of the lieutenant of Mehemmed, if by so doing we cansave so many souls?" [229]

Advancing from Mohacs the Ottoman army reached the approaches of Buda on September 3 and was able to capture the castle,defended by Ferdinand's troops, in a matter of days. The commanderof the castle, Tamas Nadasdy, was taken prisoner. The sultan remained in Buda for only a few days, the army continuing on its wayfor the siege of Vienna. First, however, he replaced John on histhrone, handing over the Hungarian crown which had fallen intoOttoman hands.

The siege of Vienna was initiated on September 22. Ferdinand'sposition was not particularly rosy: Charles V, busy in Italy, hadrequested troops from him. He received negligible help from hisprovinces or from the Holy Roman Empire, and even that help wasslow in arriving. Thus, around September 20, when the Akindjiswere already raiding the edges of the country, he still had no morethan 12,000 soldiers. Nevertheless, the charges of the enemy brokeup against the walls of the castle thanks to the excellent organization of the defense, the heroic resistance of the garrison, and, last butnot least, because of the Ottoman's lack of siege artillery. Finally, the Ottoman army, having far exceeded its range of action andstruggling against confusion in timing, abandoned the siege andstarted for home. The day of Kassim, the end of the campaignseason, was nearing, and, unfortunately for the Turkish army, thetrials occasioned by the bleak weather, which set in unexpectedly,only added to its distress. After a difficult march the army arrivedback in Buda by the end of October, almost like a defeated host.

As we have seen, the objective of the campaign was to restoreJohn to the throne and force Ferdinand to give up his claim toHungary. The latter objective was not achieved, providing furtherevidence of the uncertainties involved in wars with limited aims.But John's reign was indeed consolidated, at least temporarily. ThusSuleyman's concept came near to realization: the king of Hungaryhad become his ally, and the country itself was a buffer zone vis-a-visthe Habsburgs.

It required no particular genius on Suleyman and his advisers,part to realize that Szapolyai could fulfill his obligations as an allyonly if his rule were consolidated and if the economic, political, andmilitary conditions of the country improved. This is the only explanation for the following conditions enforced by Suleyman. He did notrequire tribute, something almost unprecedented in the annals ofTurkish history. Furthermore, he advised his troops to spare thecountry when crossing Hungary. His clerk noted in his diary forAugust 7: "It was announced in the camp that all the belongings ofthe infidels could be taken from them, but their villages were not tobe set on fire, and no one was to be taken captive." [230] For "all theirbelongings" we should probably understand food, forage, beasts ofburden, and other items necessary to supply the army--somethingnatural even in present-day warfare. But the fact that Suleymanprohibited arson and the capture of slaves is most noteworthy be-cause it was entirely unusual in the course of Ottoman campaigns.As we have seen, the most important task of the irregulars wasprecisely to sow terror, which they achieved primarily by burningsettlements to the ground. To forbid, in time of war, abduction of theenemy's population was equally unheard of; after all, since theirregulars collected no pay, they obtained their reward mainly byselling captives. Even the professional soldiers often obtained extraincome in this manner. Incidentally, it is interesting that Szereminoted the prohibition of taking captives, yet added that the Ottoman troops, demoralized by the unsuccessful siege of Vienna and thedifficult retreat, did not heed orders. He wrote:

King John received from the emperor of the Turks the captives they had taken. . .. And we, hearing that the emperor intended to return the captives, felt elated. The king sent Gasser Raskay to the emperor, and he left with a detachment. When he arrived, he immediately told the emperor that the king had sent for the captives. The emperor gave instructions to Ajaz pasha to release the captives. But when the Turkish cavalrymen and janissary infantryman heard this, they immediately began to shake their shaven heads and mutinously repeated: "That we give up our captives? Impossible! Not a single one of the Hungarians will be returned. Let the emperor beware! . . .." Ajaz pasha informed Gasser, to that effect through an interpreter, and Raskay got frightened. We expected him to return as the savior of souls; but we saw him arrive without any of the captives. [231]

By returning the crown the sultan meant to legitimize John's rulein the eyes of his people. Djeladzade comments:

The king of Hungary had a crown called a korona, which was inlaid with precious stones and had considerable value, and which had been removed from the treasury at Buda and placed in the possession of the Sultan. As long as the kings are not in possession of the crown they cannot be the real rulers of the country and none of their subjects obey their orders. Since, according to their laws, they respect that crown, and the validity of the king's orders depends upon it, King John humbly requested the exalted court to return the crown. The graciousness of the padishah manifested itself: he sent John the aforementioned artfully crafted crown inlaid with precious stones so that now, in the completeness of his royal majesty, he may become glorious and outstanding among rulers by following their tradition.[232]

Incidentally, what Djeladzade provides here is a wonderful summary of the essence of the "doctrine of the Holy Crown -so wellinformed were the Turks regarding Hungarian matters.

The sultan intervened personally to enhance John's prestige. Hecalled a meeting at Obuda, and there he enjoined the Hungarianlords to be loyal to John. Given his excellent feel for politics, the highpoint of the meeting, dramatically set, came when Suleyman ledforth Archbishop Pal Varday and Peter Perenyi, Guardian of theCrown, under a guard of honor (that is, in captivity), and releasedthem to the mercy of John, asking forgiveness on their behalf In order to appreciate fully the significance of the episode we must become familiar with the events leading up to it. While Pal Vardayhad intervened effectively on the side of John, he abandoned thelatter during the 1527 attack and went over to Ferdinand. In 1529,however, when Süleyman marched against Vienna, Varday voluntarily joined the sultan with 600 cavalrymen. On October 5 Suleyman's clerk recorded the event in the following terms: "An infidel begcalled Archbishop who, according to their religion, is the head of allthe ulemas [priests and scholars] in the county, and above whomthere can be no other beg, paid homage to the padishah, and joinedthe camp of the Sultan." [233] The event was also recorded as follows:The whole army greeted him [Varday] with great shouts of joy. Asthey said, it was great joy for them to see the greatest priest of theChristian religion come over to their side. Süleyman himself addressed him kindly, bidding him not to worry about anything." [234]Varday related the event in basically the same terms. Suleyman, hewrote in a letter, gave him a better welcome than one might expecteven from a Christian ruler and promised mercy to all those whoshifted their allegiance to John. [235]

Peter Perenyi had fallen into Ottoman captivity, along with thecrown in his custody, near Siklos. Much like Varday he had abandoned John; thus he too was technically a traitor. Nevertheless,Suleyman did not encourage Szapolyai to punish him but, on thecontrary, to take him back into his good graces. According to Istvanffy, John who, in any case, was neither "merciless" nor "bloodthirsty," shook their hands, and restored their estates and their highoffices on the spot. To be sure, John was prompted to forgive not onlyby Suleyman's intercession, nor even by his "kindness of heart," butalso by his political acumen: after all, winning over the two influential lords could only help him consolidate his power.

Szeremi is in basic agreement with other sources in his description of the meeting called by Suleyman:

In the meantime Archbishop Pal and Peter Perenyi returned from theemperor of the Turks bearing his admonitions, that all the greatHungarian lords should heed King John. As for me [Suleyman], Ipromise, upon my faith, the Prophet Mehemmed, and all my goodfortune that, if God be willing, I will return to you the entire provinceof Srem, the castles and the estates, with the exception of only two, Belgrade and Sabac. Moreover, I will return all the castles I havecaptured in Bosnia at the time of Laszlo [Wladislas II]. And I want youto take an oath of loyalty to King John. And both of them personallyswore that they will serve King John as they had previously [beforethey shifted their allegiance], and will be far from doing as the pharaohs [sic! for Pharisees] had done. [236]

As already mentioned, Szeremi had a tendency to invent fables,yet some of his communications constitute valuable sources. Thispart of his work, titled "About Hungary's Demise", is of decisiverelevance, for two reasons. First, it jibes with Suleyman's oath,described above, with what is contained in the profession offaith he made to Lasky:

I, Sultan Suleyman...hereby swear that I will never forsake you, mybrother in faith, even if all my empires and states and all my powershould crumble; and, even if I were left alone, or with merely one, two,or three, or what would a]ready be a lot, four circumcised Moslems, Iwould still owe it to you to find you and to tell you, after I have foundyou: 'Indeed, here I am, ready to do your bidding.' [237]

Suleyman at least partially fulfilled his promise. In 1533 hereturned the province of Srem, along with Petervarad, Szalankemen, Titel, and Eszek. We do not know about the return of thecastles of Bosnia; either Szeremi was not well informed or--and thisseems more likely--the sultan considered it dangerous to entrustthe defense of these castles to Hungarian forces, now that Ferdinandhad renewed his attacks.

Süleyman placed Tamas Nadasdy, another key personality ofHungarian domestic and foreign policy, on John's side. Nadasdy, asmentioned, fell into Ottoman captivity at the siege of Buda. He hadsided with Ferdinand from the start, playing a decisive role in theformation of the Habsburg party in Hungary and in the election ofFerdinand as king. Now Suleyman gave him the choice: serve Johnor be executed. Of course, Nadasdy chose the first alternative.

Süleyman delegated Ludovico Gritti, the illegitimate son of theDoge of Venice, living in Constantinople, to stay by John's side,along with some Ottoman troops. The mission of the extremelytalented Gritti was manifold: he represented the interests of theEmpire in Hungary; he kept an eye on John and on the Hungarianlords; he functioned as advisor, especially in economic matters; andfinally, he carried out quartermaster duties by setting up depots tosupply the Ottoman army when crossing the country. Moreover, thesultan, in a most tactful manner, retained the rights of militarysupervision. He left a garrison conspicuously at Eszek rather thansomewhere in the center of the country, evidently with the purposeof securing this most important bridgehead if the army should haveto return to Hungary to repel the attacks of the Habsburgs. Thismeasure was indeed justified since the military significance of Eszekwas known to Vienna as well. In 1537 Vienna sent an army underthe command of Katzianer specifically to take Eszek.

Such were the measures instituted by Suleyman for regularizingconditions in Hungary and for consolidating John's rule. Obviously,they evince a high degree of political acumen.

How should the events of 1529 be interpreted today, given theresults of recent research and a diametrically different historicalperspective? Certainly not the way Szekfu had done: "In this campaign Hungary no longer constituted an obstacle for the Turk butrather an area of deployment which neither could, nor was willing toresist. The sword with which Hungary had defended Christianityagainst the pagans for one hundred and fifty years had fallen fromher hands; it had been knocked out by the civil war and by King Johnwhose three-year rule was long enough to bring about this major change" [238] The pathos of these sentences is indeed moving andbeautiful! Their sentiment is a worthy sequel to the picture LaszloSzalay had painted of the "stalwart Hungarian nation" which withstood the flood of invasion and refused to be conquered. The onlyproblem is: the picture is readily proven to be false. Given Szekfü'sgreat expertise and tremendous knowledge of the subject-matter, itcannot be assumed that he may have been unaware of the facts,which were as follows. It was not King John who struck the swordout of Hungary's hand, and it was not his three-year rule that put anend to the anti-Turkish struggles of the previous century and a half.His role was to empty the bitter cup which the Jagellonian periodhad bequeathed him. Nor can it be assumed that Szekfü had notread carefully this portion of Francis Frangepan's letter to theBishop of Ravello: "the truth is that those of us who swear by KingJohn--and because of which the followers of Ferdinand refer to us asTurks--had we not preserved the country until now, it would havebeen lost long ago by the good Christians of the party of Ferdinand?" [239]

Let me quote King John himself. In December 1529 the popeexcommunicated him for his alliance with the sultan. (Incidentally,alliance with the Turks was by no means unheard of in the annals ofpapal diplomacy, and the excommunication of John was dictated notby religious conviction, but by political necessity: it was Charles V,plundering Rome and holding the pope hostage, who forced thehands of the pontiff.) John wrote:

Your holiness, instead of collecting souls as Peter had done when hetook in Cornelius and a hundred of his followers, has thrust thousandsof souls out of the Church. I declare, in front of God, Your Holiness, andthe whole Christian world, that I am content with my fate, that I do notcovet the provinces or countries of others, that I do not wish harm ordanger to befall upon anyone but let me live in this much abusedcountry of mine and serve God and Christianity. If I am not given thischance then I assure Your Holiness that I will defend myself and mycountry by every means at my disposal...although I have no intentionof stepping out from the embrace of the Church of whom I have alwaysbeen an obedient son. [240]

It is a pity that Szekfü paid no attention to these lines which areimbued with John's sense of devotion to his country.

All things considered, 1529 was a most important landmark in thehistory of Turkish-Hungarian relations. In Hungary, the issue ofOttoman orientation, long in question, was finally decided. Hungarybecame a buffer state and, what is more, the "defensive bastion ofIslam" in the face of Christianity. The solution must have satisfiedboth parties completely. Hungary was granted the peace she neededso badly. She no longer had to fight the hopeless struggle against theOttomans and, at the same time, received protection against theHabsburgs; it follows automatically that Ferdinand too would haveto give up his hopeless struggle for the country; hence the danger offoreign wars, as well as of civil wars, receded into the distance. Whatdid the future bring, and how long did the country have to suffer theconsequences of loss of independence? Under the given circumstances--the tremendous misery pervading the country--this question could not become the subject of deliberations, especially sincethe prerequisite for overcoming Ottoman dependence was peace andcollaboration amongst the European powers. It was far beyond thepotential of the Hungarian government to bring about such peaceand cooperation; whereas the Ottoman Empire, having eliminatedthe Habsburg danger, could now focus its attention and energies onthe affairs of the Near and Far East.

This interpretation has but one weak link: name]y, that whileSuleyman did succeed in chasing Ferdinand out of the country in1529, he was nevertheless unable to bid him to do his will because ofthe failure of the campaign against Vienna. Hence Ferdinand neverdid give up his claim to Hungary. This in turn meant that Ferdinandwould not halt his attacks against Hungary; hence neither foreignnor domestic wars would cease; hence John's rule could not beconsolidated. It was only a relatively strong Hungary that couldhave performed the function Suleyman had assigned to it. As forFerdinand's renewed attacks, the Porte could not defend Hungaryagainst them because, as we have seen, Buda was closer to Viennathan to Istanbul or even to Belgrade. The limits of operations of theOttoman army--deriving from its "range of action"--were also thelimits of Turkish policy. Ottoman leaders were perfectly aware thatthey could not annex Vienna, but they had not reckoned with thepossibility of besieging it in vain. The lesson learned in 1529 deter-mined Ottoman strategy for the next century and a half, inasmuchas the siege of Vienna was not attempted again until 1683. Thefailure of the siege could lead to but one conclusion: greater spacehad to be conceded to diplomatic negotiations, and John had to be given a greater role in them. In fact, he even attempted to concludepeace with Ferdinand by direct negotiation.

On the other hand, Ferdinand and the Hungarian ruling class--tobe more precise, only part of that class, for the time being--came tothe conclusion, following 1529 and the unsuccessful Ottoman campaign of 1532 which ended near Koszeg, that Suleyman's hand couldnot reach Vienna and reached even Buda only with difficulty; hencethe protection he had promised Szapolyai was of dubious value.Indeed, such was the case, and this explains the events of the comingyears, and the abandonment of a Suleyman's proposal" in 1541.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541