The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Events From Late 1529 to 1538

As soon as the Ottoman army had left Hungary, Ferdinand renewed his attack. Although relatively small forces took part, theresults achieved were nevertheless significant: the western parts ofTransdanubia, Nagyszombat, Trencsen, Eger, and Kassa all fell intoFerdinand's possession. Moreover, the Saxons of Transylvania sidedwith him. The civil war continued.

John got into a most difficult situation. The troops of Ferdinand,continuing their campaign in 1530, once again placed Buda undersiege. That would have been trouble enough in itself, but then camea completely unexpected blow: the Ottoman relief forces, whose taskwould have been to compel the Austrian army to retreat by breakinginto and destroying Austria and Moravia, destroyed and plunderedCsallokoz Island in the Danube instead--an area spared until then.They took Hungarian men, women, and children captive. Accordingto some sources this was the result of a misunderstanding, theOttoman forces being under the impression that they had alreadyreached Austrian territory. Of course, this interpretation is hard toaccept, especially since the Ottoman commander refused to returnthe captives even after he was informed they were Hungarians.While this expedition did not meet Suleyman's expectations in theleast, John's position also was not made any easier: the fact wasundeniable, the Ottoman ally was devastating and plundering Hungary.

In October 1530, at a time when Ferdinand was still engaged inthe siege of Buda, his emissaries reached Constantinople to offerpeace and tribute to the sultan, in exchange for acceptance of Habsburg claims to Hungary. Naturally the sultan refused to negotiateon such a basis. He sent Ferdinand the following message:

Hungary is mine because I conquered it with my saber; if something ismine, I may give it to whom I please. King John came, he bowed to meand requested the country, and I placed what he requested into hishands. Your emissaries come to seek my friendship, yet you state inyour letter that you are the King of Hungary, the country I hadconquered with my saber. This will not lead to friendship. [242]

In the meantime, John conducted negotiations with Ferdinand torestore peace, with the full knowledge of the Porte. Primate Vardaywas one of those who initiated the negotiations. In January 1530 hewrote Szalahazi, Ferdinand's chancellor: "Let your Lordship remember his country, and let him consider its interests, so that Christianblood may be shed no longer and that this land, already devastated,not fall under the disgraceful yoke of the unbelievers--somethingthat would surely come about soon unless we turn our attention toits peace and recovery immediately." The lords who were on John'sside, Varday continued, were willing to negotiate, and, he assumed,those on Ferdinand's side were inclined to do likewise. Thus theymust meet and let Szalahazi warn Ferdinand "to agree to such ameeting and, setting his stubbornness aside, not to reject a respectable compromise.... In other words, I beg your Lordship to set asidehatred, the desire for revenge, and animosity for the sake of ourcountry, our common tongue. Enough Christian blood has been spiltalready; there is enough rubble and charred ruins and cursingagainst God to wipe out even the name of Christian." [243] Werboczisaw matters in a similar light: "I wish with all my heart, for the goodof Christianity and the peace of all of us that, after so many vicissitudes, we finally serve God and work on restoring our hard-pressedcountry." [244]

The lords on Ferdinand's side agreed. Ferdinand called a diet tomeet in Pozsony on May 8, 1530, where despair over the miserablestate of the country was openly voiced. The participants blamed thetroubles on the divided rule, and, since they were on Ferdinand'sside, they naturally argued that Ferdinand should remain and Johnshould resign. The picture we get from the document in which thecomplaints were recorded is indeed heart-rending: destruction and misery were everywhere; the mercenaries of Ferdinand were exploiting the people and committing atrocities; his councillors, unfamiliar with conditions in the country, merely enhanced the troublesby their unwarranted and unfriendly interference. They insistedthat they wanted Ferdinand for king, that only he was able to defendthe country: "If Your Majesty is not capable of this, have the goodgrace of speaking out honestly rather than letting us all perish, andthen we may seek a way to help ourselves and thwart the impendingdanger." [245] The estates forwarded the document not only to Ferdinand, but to Charles V as well, and even to the estates of the HolyRoman Empire who were meeting at Augsburg at the time. Theenvoy of Hungary traveled to Augsburg and described the patheticsituation of the country in emphatic rhetoric, underlining the factthat if Hungary did not receive effective succor from the Holy RomanEmpire it would be forced to purchase the mercy of the sultan bypaying tribute and that the Hungarian estates would even resort to"further" means.

The negotiations did get under way, but Ferdinand stipulatedimpossible conditions, for example, that John should abdicate immediately; this condition could not be met, even if John's party happened to agree because the Ottomans simply would not have allowed it.

In view of the impossibility of mediating between the two kingsand the misery resulting from the division of the country and theparty strife, some of the lords began to organize. Their plan was tocall together the nobility of both parties and to discuss ways ofsaving the country. They decided to meet at Veszprem. The letter ofinvitation stated:

We all know well how much our country, formerly respected by allnations of the world, is suffering in the present times of danger, andthat it has practically reached a point of agony, torn apart, downtrodden, and divided. Therefore, unless we quickly undertake everythingpossible to preserve it, even its remaining parts will soon go under. Justas at one time it was unity and solidarity that won and kept this land,from now on it is also solidarity, consensus, and mutual love that canhelp it survive through its present and future ills. We, who love ourChristian faith, our land, and our salvation have met...so that theHungarian nation, almost ruined by party-strife and civil war, mayreturn to its unity and be saved. . .. Therefore we appeal to you. . .to sendyour fellow-citizens, so that, setting aside all hatred, animosity, partystrife, the coveting of the estates of others, and with God and the future peace of our country as our sole concern. . .let us discuss only that whichmay contribute to mutual agreement, to the union of the Hungariannation, to the defense of our land and the preservation of our faith. [246]

The meeting of Veszprem never took place since both kings barredtheir lords from attending; the lesser nobility that arrived there, notfinding any of the grandees, dispersed without accomplishing anything. The nobility continued its efforts until January 1532 when, atan assembly in Kenese, the following resolution was passed:

Those of us present will recognize as our king, among the rulerscompeting for the crown, the one most apt a, defend the country; andwith that goal in mind, we shall send ambassadors to both Ferdinandand John. Let those sent to Ferdinand find out whether he is willingand whether he has the power to defend us against the Turks and tosave us from so much misery, not in words, not in writing, but in deeds,in action. If Ferdinand, moreover, promises to maintain our libertiesmore earnestly, we will all take his side. Our ambassadors to John shallask him how he intends to defend the country? Will he recover theborder castles, with the exception of Belgrade and Sabac, from Suleyman, not in words but in reality? Does he have assurances that fromnow on the Turks will leave the country in peace? For only under thoseconditions do we all want to recognize him as our ruler. [247]

The endeavors of the nobility bore no results in the long run, butthat is hardly surprising; in relation to the stakes for which theHabsburg and the Ottoman empires were fighting, the interests ofHungary were indeed negligible.

The situation in Hungary was becoming increasingly depressingfor Süleyman. Through his emissaries Ferdinand had openly laidclaim to the country, and his successful attacks clearly demonstrated that he meant his claim seriously. Hence, by the end of 1530Suleyman had already decided to lead another host into Hungary in1532. Possibly, his decision was influenced by the fact that he wasdetermined to settle the affairs of the Near and Far East; consequently his rear in Europe had to be assured. The Near Easterntrade was beginning to recover from the blow administered by thePortuguese and was bringing increasing revenues into the coffers ofthe Empire. [248] Naturally, the Ottomans were intent on securingthese trade routes to the fullest extent by challenging the Portuguese.

Such an attack, however, as we have seen, required exceptional efforts on the part of the Empire. Incidentally, we may get apicture of the revival of the Near Eastern trade from the dataprovided by Magelha-Godinho in Table 7 below.

Table 7.
Variations in the Quantity of Eastern GoodsOff-loaded in Venice between 1514 and 1531

	Goods
Year	Quantity in tons	Ratio (1514=100)
1514	2140	100.0
1515	2084	97.4
1516	1600	74.8
1517	...	...
1518	1420	66.4
1519	150	7.0
1520	3000 (?)	140.2
1521	300	14.0
1522	623	29.1
1523	154	7.2
1524	100	4.7
1525	200	9.3
1526	720	33.6
1527	1300	60.7
1528	1100	51.4
1529	...	...
1530	2500	116.8
1531	3026	141.4

Table 7 provides indications of the political and military vicissitudes of the Near and Far East with almost mathematical precision.In 1514, the initial year, the caravan routes of Syria and Egypt werestill under the control of the Mameluke sultans. The total quantityof Levantine goods loaded at Tripoli or Alexandria and unloaded inVenice was 2,140 tons. In order to get an idea of the damagessuffered by the Near Eastern trade as a result of the Portugueseintervention, let us note that in the last years of peace, in 1495-98and 1501, an annual average of 6,600 tons was handled in Venice--that is, about three times as much as in 1514. In the period from1502 to 1513, however, the total quantity of Eastern goods unloadedamounted to 6,334 tons. After 1514 the quantity was decreasing; infact, in 1517 no merchandise reached Venice at all. The Ottomanshad occupied Syria in 1516 and Egypt in 1517; obviously, the decrease in trade was caused by these campaigns. The exceptionallylarge figure for 1520--3,000 tons--is most likely due to some misinterpretation of the data, the figure being altogether at variance withthe general trend; such a mass of goods could not have been shipped,if only because that was the year of the rebellion in Syria. Apart fromthis, however, the decrease was precipitous, reaching a low point in1524~.7% of the quantity shipped in 1514. It is not difficult to findan explanation: these were the years of renewed rebellion in Syriaand Egypt. The abuses of the thoroughly corrupt officials in theseprovinces fanned the flames of rebellion. Finally the Grand VezirIbrahim restored order, and this no doubt explains why, from 1526on, the trade kept growing, exceeding the trade in 1514 by almost17% by 1530. We do not know the reason for the sudden drop in 1529.By 1531, however, the trade in Levantine goods was 41.4% greaterthan it had been in 1514. Undoubtedly, the rise in traffic was due in part to the greater number of vessels involved in the fight against the Portuguese in the 1530s, as a result of the Red Sea shipbuildingprogram. Last but not least, we must mention the extremely wisepolicies of the Porte vis-a-vis Venice: encouragement and support forthe Republic in its efforts to revive the Near Eastern trade in everypossible way.

Of course, the increasingly lively Near Eastern trade handled bythe Ottomans and Venetians was not well viewed by the Portuguese;they sought an alliance with the Persians and Charles V against theTurks. [249] The alliance was concluded only in the spring of 1532, butmost probably the Porte had an inkling of it beforehand. The strikeagainst the Persians was carried out in 1534, but Suleyman first hadto disentangle himself in Europe, more precisely in Hungary.

The sole objective of the campaign of 1532 was to gain recognitionfor the rule of John and to force the Habsburgs to give up their claimsto Hungary. As early as February 1531 the French king wrote toRome that the Ottomans were busily preparing for war and that thesultan's objective was "to attack all of Christendom if the Emperorand his brother are not willing to reach some kind of an agreementwith King John." [250] A letter from Lyons giving an account of thehappenings at the imperial diet in Regensburg was equally interesting. It related the following news:

If the Emperor and his brother forswear their claim to Hungary andleave the country in the hands of King John, they can be granted thekind of peace they want from the Turks, and for as long as they like; but under no circumstance would the Turk tolerate the brother of theEmperor [in Hungary], or accept him as neighbor. [251]

Thus Suleyman would have preferred a peaceful solution, all themore so, since French diplomacy, while it did not expect him to giveup the idea of war altogether, nevertheless advised him to turnagainst Italy rather than the Holy Roman Empire. [252] This desire onthe part of France was quite natural since she was also interested inItaly, but most likely it did not make much of an impression on theOttoman leaders. Yet the argument the French Ambassador, Rincon, presented in Constantinople to dissuade the Turks from attacking the Holy Roman Empire must have made them reflect: thesultan would be merely playing into the hands of Charles V by suchan attack, since the Imperial estates would surely not remain indifferent if the German lands were in jeopardy, in which case they werebound to back the Emperor. Thus an Ottoman attack would bringabout precisely the kind of German unity that would be detrimentalto both France and the Turks.

Nor did Süleyman fail to heed the warning, or rather request, ofKing John. The indications are that while John was not convincedthat the sultan could defeat the Habsburgs, he knew perfectly wellthat it would be once again Hungary that bore the brunt of the war,inasmuch as it would become the area of deployment for the Ottoman army. For this reason he asked the sultan, back in the fall of1531, to give up the idea of war, explaining that his negotiationswith Ferdinand were progressing well and that they were close to anagreement. The sultan responded that, as far as he was concerned,there was nothing he would like better than peace in Hungary, buthe would also like some kind of guarantee to the effect that CharlesV and Ferdinand would not intervene. If John could achieve what hepromised, then Suleyman would refrain from launching a war, buthe had to have a final answer by March, presumably because ifJohn's attempt bore no fruit, he would still have time to mobilize.John received the message in January 1532. His task, therefore, wasto persuade Ferdinand and the emperor to accept peace promptly.He sent his ambassador, Verancsics, to Rome posthaste to convincethe pope to intercede with the emperor. It would have been unpleasant for the pope to comply with such a request since he had reachedan agreement with the emperor shortly beforehand; instead, he advised John to send an ambassador to the German diet inRegensburg to try to convince them not to vote in favor of theanti-Turkish aid. Heeding the advice, John sent Lasky to Regensburg. Lasky cleverly used the fact that it would not be to theadvantage of the German states if Ferdinand were to rule overHungary in any case, partly because they did not favor the extensionof Habsburg power in general, and partly because a connectionbetween Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire in the person ofFerdinand would elicit the danger of Ottoman intervention andwould require greater and greater efforts on their part. Lasky,taking advantage of this mood, argued that the sultan would desistfrom his campaign if Ferdinand gave up his claim to Hungary. Since,however, reliable news reached Regensburg regarding the sultan'sextensive war preparations, and finally about the launching of thecampaign--for by then the deadline prescribed by Süleyman hadlong expired--all Lasky and the French diplomats could achieve wasthat the estates voted for aid only as far as the borders of Austria. [253]

Such were the circumstances that explain the peculiarities of thecampaign of 1532. Even the choice of its line of advance was curious:rather than advancing along the Danube, which would have madelogistics so much easier, the army advanced towards Vienna bycutting across Transdanubia. According to one theory, the sultanchose this direction because, in response to the French request, hewanted to retain the option of turning against Italy. This theory,however, is not convincing. It is possible, however that Süleymanchose this line of advance on the request and advice of John. TheHungarian king, as we have seen, was intent on saving the countryfrom the devastation which inevitably ensued from the transit of theTurkish army. Naturally, he would urge the Turks to march throughthe areas in Ferdinand's possession, that is, the western part of thecountry. Djeladzade's observation is relevant: "When the land ofHungary had the honor of being kissed by the hoofs of the war-horseof the victorious padishah, the conquering banners were turned inthe direction of that part of Hungary that owed allegiance not toKing John but to the senseless enemy." [254]

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541