The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541
Continued...
It is possible, however, that the Porte also listened to John'sadvice
regarding strategy. It so happened that in the fall of 1531, theBavarian
princes, whose relations with the Habsburgs were tense,sent an emissary to Buda
and worked out a joint plan of action should the Habsburgs launch an attack
against the princes. According to this plan John would provide light cavalry
for the Bavariansand would penetrate into Austria with his own forces and
persuadethe Ottomans to attack Carniola and Styria as well. Indeed, weknow that
after the Ottoman forces retreated from under the wallsof Koszeg, they wound
their way towards Styria and caused havoc inthe region. [255]
It would be most difficult to establish the actual plan of theOttoman Supreme
Command in 1532. One thing is certain, however:the capture of Vienna was not
its objective. The commander ofKoszeg, Jurisich, was convinced of this, as we
know from his letters. [256] But Djeladzade
writes to the same effect in his chronicle:"The padishah of the seas and land
did not bring along heavy.artillery on this victorious campaign because his
intention was notto liberate castles, but rather to repress the rebellion of
the evil ruler[that is, Ferdinand] who was attacking the people of Mohammed
andwas allied against the believers of the true faith." [257] We may safelyassert, on the grounds of logic, that it
was not Koszeg that deterredSuleyman from his original intentions, whatever
those may havebeen. Without in the least diminishing the merits of its
heroicdefenders, the castle of Koszeg and its handful of guards could nothave
accomplished the task that castles in general are expected toaccomplish,
namely, to interrupt the enemy's contact with its supplybase after it by-passed
the fortress. Had Suleyman intended tomarch on to Vienna, he could have
surrounded the castle with a fewthousand soldiers, and the castle garrison, a
handful of soldiers,would have been unable to interfere with the communications
of theOttoman forces by mounting forays against them.
According to some researchers Suleyman remained under thewalls of Koszeg so
long because he was waiting for Charles V to moveaway from Vienna so as to then
engage the emperor in open battle. [258]
This interpretation, however, is not convincing. On the onehand, the French and
Hungarian delegates attending the Imperialdiet in Regensburg reported to their
governments that the Germanestates had voted in favor of the "Turkish aid" only
as far as theHungarian border. [259]
Suleyman must have obtained this information from Francis I and John. In other
words, he could rest assuredthat the emperor would not come to Hungary.
Moreover, the Ottoman military leadership was perfectly aware that it was
facing thebest military force of the period, among whose ranks were
theunsurpassed masters of contemporary tactics, the Spanish infantryand the
German Landsknechts. The Ottoman army, relying onobsolete tactics, was no match
for them in spite of its usuallyoverwhelming numerical superiority. In fact, in
this case even numerical superiority did not apply since the effectives of the
HolyRoman Imperial army were around 80,000 and we know alreadythat the nucleus
of the regular Ottoman army, the soldiers availablefor a pitched battle, was no
larger.[260]
The apparently inexplicable events of the "strange war" of 1532may perhaps be
best explained by the fact that Suleyman undertookthe campaign half-heartedly,
and even with outright anxiety. Evenbefore his departure, while still in
Constantinople, he was notified ofthe signing of the Portuguese-Persian pact;
by then he also knewthat, for the first time, Charles V was taking an active
part in thewar. All this meant that he could no more impose his will on
theHabsburgs now than he had in 1529; hence the Hungarian issueremained
unresolved. Perhaps it occurred to Suleyman even thenthat his concept could not
work out because he could not guaranteethe integrity of Hungary and hence he
could not use the country asa buffer state vis-a-vis the Habsburgs. Thus a long
war, with unforeseeable results, was in the offing in Europe, even though the
trueinterests of the Ottoman Empire lay in the Near and Far East!
Just at this time a chain of events requiring all the attention of thePorte
took place in the Mediterranean and the Near East, forcing itto confront and to
disarm the aggressive intentions of the Habsburgswith apparent concessions.
Suleyman received the alarming news while still under the wallsof Koszeg,
around August 28-30: Andrea Doria, the admiral ofCharles V, occupied Choron,
the important naval base in southernGreece, on August 8. Although the Turkish
chronicler Ferdi writesthat the messenger bearing the news caught up with the
sultan onlyaround October 5, in the neighborhood of Eszek, this must be
amistake. [261] We know for certain that
after departing from Koszegthe Ottoman army broke into Syria and then marched
homeward, by way of Varasd and Pozsega; in other words, Eszek was not evenon
its way. Apart from this mistake, Ferdi's communication soundsreliable, for he
describes we]l the great importance Suleyman attached to Choron. He writes:
having spent a day at the castle of Eszek, he wended his way andcontinued
across the island of Srem. Here, having received the newsthat the damned Franks
[that is, the forces of Charles V] came to Moreaby ship and, and having ravaged
and destroyed several places, occupiedthe cast]e of Choron, he forthwith gave
the unalterable command thatthe Segban Basi [the commander of one of the
subordinate units of thejanissaries] should reach the castle of Choron in
forced march with2,000 janissaries and some of the sipahis of the sanjak begs
of Moreaand liberate it. [262]
Moreover, we may recall that the army stationed by the Red Seaand the
artillery were also directed in this direction. Even so, it wasonly a year
later, in September 1533, that the Ottomans were able torecapture Choron.
From then on events moved very quickly. [263] The greater or lesserclashes along the Turkish-Persian
border became more frequent andescalated into a regular war. At first only
smaller Turkish units tookup the fight with the Persian armies, which had been
supplied withfirearms by the Portuguese, but then, in October 1533, the
GrandVezir Ibrahim himself traveled there to take charge of the
campaign.Suleyman followed his grand vezir in the summer of the followingyear.
They initiated mobile maneuvers in the course of which Tabrizfell into Ottoman
hands, the campaign ended in complete Ottomanvictory, and another rich province
was added to the Empire: Mesopotamia.
Once the Persian campaign was brought to a victorious conclusion, Suleyman
headed back and reached Constantinople in January1536. Already in late 1535, he
had received a message from Indiaasking for assistance. The Sultan of Gujarat,
hard pressed by theGreat Mogul Empire, was asking for help. Since, however,
Suleymanwas not in a position to provide such help for the moment, the Sultanof
Gujarat turned to the Portuguese. The Portuguese did providehelp, but the
Indian ruler had to allow them to build a fort and anaval base at Diu. The
acquisition of this important base considerably strengthened the Portuguese
presence in the Indian Ocean and would eventually cause no end of worry to the
leaders of the Ottoman state.
In the meantime Hayreddin, now in the service of the Porte,occupied Tunis in
1534. This success of the pirate chief, however,proved to be short-lived since
Charles V was able to recapture thecity in the following year.
Ottoman involvement in the Near East and in the Mediterraneannaturally had its
impact on Turkish-Hungarian-Habsburg relations.Just as at the time of his
European war, Suleyman once againsecured his rear by resorting to diplomatic
manipulation. Hence theemissaries of Ferdinand were given an unusually
hospitable welcome in January 1533, even though the proposal they delivered
wasno different from previous ones: that the sultan should break withJohn and
hand Hungary over to Ferdinand. [264]
Zaray, one of the emissaries Ferdinand had dispatched to Constantinople, sent
a message full of cheer in February 1533: thesultan recognized the rights of
Ferdinand to those parts of thecountry he actually controlled--that is, the
western parts ofTransdanubia and Northern Hungary as far east as Kassa. No
oneknows whether such a promise had actually been made; and, if ithad, whether
the grand vezir had made it on his own initiative, orreceived a cue from the
sultan. Whatever the case, the news exploded like a bombshell both in Buda and
in Vienna--more exactlyin Pozsony where Ferdinand was staying at the time.
Ferdinandhimself, although he had paid little attention to the opinion of
hisHungarian councilors until then, felt the matter to be of such greatimport
that he had to summon them to give their opinion. In theirmemorandum to
Ferdinand, while they did not voice their indignation, they did express deep
anxieties, foreseeing all the problemswhich were indeed to result from
partitioning the country. Theywarned Ferdinand that while peace would
contribute to the prosperity of his provinces, it would be at the expense of
Hungary since thetask of halting the Turkish attacks would henceforth fall upon
thewestern part of the country belonging to him. In any case it is anunusual
thing, they wrote, that a state in existence for so manycenturies should be
divided up, under two rulers. Furthermore, thecouncilors admitted that the
partition would make the followers ofFerdinand face an insoluble dilemma, for
there was not a single oneamong them who did not have estates in the zone under
John's jurisdiction. Therefore, they had but two options: either they gave
upthese estates, opting for misery but remaining faithful to Ferdinand,or they
hung on to their property, but abandoned Ferdinand. As aconsequence of such a
partition, the provision of justice and publicsecurity would all fall by the
wayside, for whoever committed somecrime would simply escape to the other side
in order to extracthimself from judicial proceedings and would obtain pardon
there, tothe immeasurable detriment of law, order, and public virtue. [265]
A few days later the councilors came up with yet another proposal. Resigned to
the notion of partition, they merely asked that, forreasons of defense,
mountain chains and rivers be designated as theboundary line; moreover, that
after the death of John, the entirecountry fall under the rule of Ferdinand.
Thus the lords consented topartition. No one knows what caused them to change
their stance.Most probably they received some assurances from Ferdinand thathe
would compensate them for the loss of their estates in the zonesbelonging to
John. Of course, it is possible that they simply agreed tothe unavoidable;
while Ferdinand could not obtain the whole country, the fact that Suleyman had
changed his position, that he wasnow willing to concede territories to
Ferdinand, and that this couldwell be the starting point for future
reunification was already a bigstep forward. Indeed, it would be foolish not to
take advantage ofsuch an opportunity.
Shortly thereafter Ferdinand sent another delegation to the Porteto clear up
technical matters pertaining to the partition of thecountry and to draft the
boundary lines that were to separate thetwo parts.
If the Porte's decision had elicited deep astonishment among thelords on
Ferdinand's side, it caused outright panic among those whohad sided with John.
Hearing about the partition, the lords realizedthat John's rule was shaken to
its very foundations; the sole justification for it had been Suleyman's promise
to preserve the territorialand administrative integrity of the country. John
quickly sent Grittito Constantinople and a few weeks later Werboczi as well, to
askfor clarification. [266] Ferdinand's new
emissary saw the sultan in thefirst half of June. At this audience, while
Suleyman recognizedFerdinand's rule and made some hints at partition, no
reference wasmade to any exact definition of boundaries; rather, the
eventualsettlement of the matter was left up to Gritti. On the other hand, the
proposal for signing a peace treaty was graciously accepted by thesultan, and
Ibrahim had the pleasure of informing the emissary ofFerdinand that the exalted
Porte had signed "eternal peace" with hislord.
The above took place on June 22; not quite two weeks later thePorte sent
Ferdinand a letter written in an altogether different tone.It stated, among
other things: "I gave all of Hungary, which I hadgained by the sword, to John
out of my good grace.'' [267] Thus Suleyman
had returned once again to his original position.
As noted, the history of these negotiations, which took about ayear and a
half, is not entirely clear; but merely on the basis of thefacts presented
here, we may venture an assumption: namely, thatthe Ottoman government,
mobilizing against the Persians and thePortuguese, was intent on securing its
rear at any price. This wasthe reason they were prepared to make concessions at
the beginning.Thus they obtained peace and gave nothing tangible in return. If
thiswas indeed their motivation then it is proof of the skills of
Ottomandiplomacy.
In the following months news of success kept pouring in at thePorte: Hayreddin
had occupied Tunis, Choron had been recaptured.These events may explain why the
emissaries of Ferdinand werespoken to in ever harsher terms. Gritti was
enjoined to write a letterFerdinand informing him that the January message,
which hadcaused such joy, was based on a mistake. It contained "articles
andclauses which had never been discussed at the Porte and which,therefore,
must be falsifications by the emissaries." [268]
In November Grand Vezir Ajas, who had replaced Ibrahim duringthe latter's trip
to Persia, declared without beating around the bushthat Hungary belonged to
John in its entirety. Ferdinand ownedonly what he had already in his possession
at the time of the deathof King Louis II, and that was not much--Koszeg and
vicinity.
These were the events which preceded Gritti's return to Hungary.His task was
to act as referee in the outstanding disputes betweenJohn and Ferdinand. Gritti
had participated in the negotiationswith the emissaries of Ferdinand; in fact,
he even chaired some ofthe meetings. Thus he had had the occasion to speak to
the emissaries confidentially and to mention his grand design hinting at
therevival of the concept of an anti-Ottoman crusade, the alliance of
allEuropean powers, smashing the power of the Turks, and the capture of
Constantinople. Fantastic as this project may seem, it was typicalof this
bigger-than-life adventurer. We should note, by the way, thatthe project,
impossible though it was, or precisely because of this,fits organically into
the infinite series of projects which severgenerations of politicians and
ecclesiastics, uninhibited adventurers,and fanatic devotees had been
elaborating since the fourteencentury. A no less important personage than Pope
Paul III wasentertaining similar ideas, almost at the same time as Gritti. [269] Theonly outcome of Gritti's obscure plot
was that it aroused the suspicion on of the leaders at the Porte. By the time
he was finally able todepart for Hungary, in July 1534, to carry out the border
arrangements he had more or less fallen from grace. "The son of a bitch" said
Jonus Beg, the interpreter at the Porte, "there is no more lowly and vicious
man than him on earth; he is neither Turk, nor Christian. I feel infinitely
sorry that not a Hungarian has been found yet to kill this good-for-nothing."
[270]
Gritti had already earned hatred in Hungary for his previousactivities. Now
the Hungarian lords were seized by terror becausethe news that preceded his
return was that, by command of thesultan, he would use a heavy hand to restore
order and had come"separate the superb Hungarian heads from their
shoulders."Reaching Brasso, Gritti had Imre Czibak, whom he detested fromlong
before because Czibak[271] had objected to
John about Gritti'sappointment as governor, killed. With the tacit consent of
John; infact with his mild encouragement, the Hungarian lords besiegedGritti at
the castle of Meggyes and captured and executed himOctober 29, 1534. The
worldly adventurer remained true to his styleto the end. On the execution block
he presented the executioner witha diamond ring worth a fortune.
The killing of Gritti evoked a great deal of astonishment, everyonereacting
according to position and interests. Although he had givenhis tacit consent to
the event, John became frightened and quicklydispatched emissaries to assuage
the sultan; this was indeed a wisemove, since the sultan, still uninformed
about Gritti's machinations,was very irritated by the killing of his
representative.
Ferdinand, on the other hand, received the news of Gritti's deathwith an
outbreak of joy because, being an incurable optimistthought the death of the
favorite would lead to John s demise. He also quickly sent an emissary to the
Porte and, raising seriouscharges against John, expressed his hope that
Suleyman "realizingthe devious machinations of his favorite [that is,
John]...would nowhand over the crown of Hungary to him." [272] In his accusations,however, he missed his target
because in the meantime the sultanhad become convinced of Gritti's guilt and
decided that Gritti hadmerely earned in Hungary what was coming to him had he
returnedto Constantinople. What is more, the cloud even extended over thehead
of Gritti's mentor, the Grand Vezir Ibrahim.
It may be assumed that the machinations of his favorite, Gritti,had a lot to
do with the fall and execution of Ibrahim although it ispossible that even more
serious matters were involved; the extremely able Ibrahim may have already
recognized that Suleyman'sstrategy was untenable and perhaps even expressed
this viewpoint.
The real losers in this diplomatic affair were John and Hungaryitself. The
hesitation, or perhaps deliberate tactics, of the Ottomanleaders had two
serious consequences. First of all, the civil warresumed in Hungary. Since the
early news had it that the sultanwould partition the country according to de
facto possession, bothparties strove, until the arrival of Gritti, to lay
their hands on aslarge a portion as possible. Of course, this process involved
armedconflict. Thus, peace and quiet, so earnestly desired, once againreceded
into an unreachable distance. Once again, John's situationbecame shaky since
his rule had been accepted, in good measure,because of the expectations that
peace would be restored to thecountry.
The other serious consequence was that John lost his confidence.Indeed, the
doubt arose in his mind that if even the Porte's protection could not guarantee
peace for the country, then his position wasindefensible. Consequently, the
only remaining solution was to handthe country to the Habsburgs. Verancsics,
who was well versed inthe politics of his time and who fulfilled diplomatic
functions as well,wrote in his history:
Thus King John foresaw the decline and destruction that would befall
Hungary shortly. The ills of his country affected him far more deeply
than they affected King Ferdinand who operated from abroad, in far
greater security. Therefore King John saw no solution to the unavoidable
decline other than to conclude peace, even at the expense of
surrendering his rights.[273]
In October 1534 he sent Brodarics to Vienna for the purpose offeeling out the
situation. Ferdinand rigid]y cut himself off from an)notion of compromise; what
is more, confident that the killing ofGritti had definitely shaken John's
position at the Porte, he denounced John to the sultan, accusing him of
responsibility in Gritti'sexecution, and requested permission to "punish" John.
He sworethat, should the sultan hand over Hungary to him, he could restassured
"regarding his [Ferdinand's] unlimited good will, his sincerefilial disposition
and friendship, and that he would maintain goodneighbor policies and peace as
well." Ferdinand was so self-confidentthat he even concluded an alliance with
the voivode of Moldaviaabout the same time, with the specific objective of
attacking Johnsimultaneously--Ferdinand from the west, the voivode from
theeast. [274]
The lack of success of Brodarics's first mission did not deter Johnfrom his
goal; Brodarics was sent back to Vienna in March of 1535.It is possible that
the news of the Tunisian victory of Charles V,which caused great sensation
throughout Europe in May 1535, aswell as the threats of the chavush sent
out to investigate the Grittiaffair in September 1535, made him even more
determined to securepeace; now he presented the matter to Ferdinand in concrete
form, tothe effect that he would recognize the latter's right of
inheritanceand, moreover, he would agree to Ferdinand retaining the areas nowin
his possession.
John went even further, exposing his person and even the countryto
considerable danger. In September 1535 he sent Brodarics andFrangepan to
Charles V himself, to inquire whether the emperorwould be willing to occupy
Buda and Temesvar with his own troops.If the emperor should agree, he would
abdicate, in the knowledgethat his country was in safe hands. Indeed, such a
move could onlyhave been the result of utter despair, because there could be
littledoubt that if the Ottoman leaders had learned of the proposal theywould
have launched war immediately.
Thus John, disregarding his personal interests, was prepared togive up his
crown in order to save the country. We have no reason orright to doubt that his
proposal was dictated by sincere patriotism, but we should not exclude the
possibility that political and tacticalconsiderations played a part. Well aware
of the mood of the rulingclass, he knew that whether it be his own followers or
those ofFerdinand, they were agreed on one thing: the integrity of thecountry
had to be preserved at all cost. The resolution of the partialdiet of
Ferdinand's side, held in 1536, rigidly insisted on the administrative and
territorial integrity of the country: "Since the estatesand orders of Hungary
fear nothing, at this time, so much as thepossible partition of the country
between His Majesty and his adversaries, be it resolved, in order to avoid
this, that His Majesty notconclude peace under any circumstance without the
prior knowledgeof his Hungarian councillors." [275] At the meeting of the diet of thosestanding on John's
side a similar decision was made. It is possiblethat John's proposal was
intended to win over the nobility, saying ineffect: "See, I have the fate of
the country so much at heart that I ameven willing to give up my rights!"
Fortunately for the country and for John, Charles V could nothonor the request
because of a sudden change in the political andmilitary situation in Europe. In
1536 the king of France sent histroops against Italy while concluding an
alliance with the sultan.The emperor, in order to force the French to retreat,
invaded Provence. The attack, however, did not bring about the expected
result,for the French, applying the policy of "scorched earth" in their
owncountry, burnt and destroyed everything in the path of the Imperialhost;
thus the Imperial forces soon encountered insurmountableproblems of supply.
Their soldiers were starving, their ranks decimated by epidemics, and they had
no alternative but to withdraw. [276]
It would have been suicide on the part of John to continue negotiations with
Ferdinand under the same conditions, since he couldexpect no help from Charles
V, as indeed, the emperor had let himknow in a message. Thus, when Wese, the
archbishop of Lund, cameto Nagyvarad to pursue the negotiations in the summer
of 1536,Friar George and Frangepan frankly told him that the negotiationswere
to continue on entirely different premises. The archbishop ofLund gave the
following account:
The delegates stated that the willingness of their lord to conclude peace
was not because of the Turks or even the French, but because he was
guided by a single objective, namely the preservation of the country.
They declared that it would not be advisable, from the point of view of
the country, to hand over Buda to His Majesty the Emperor, since the
emperor of the Turks was his enemy. If the Turk should find out that
their king [John] had given away Buda received from him and owned
by his good grace, to the enemy, then he would place the cast]e under
siege in a surprise move, take it, and devastate the entire country. At
the moment His Majesty is engaged with the French and cannot come
to the aid of the country, and the King of the Romans even less. Hence
the very device proposed to save the country would now lead to its total
ruin . [277]
Verancsics relates the affair in basically the same way, addingthat should John
hand over Buda to the Habsburgs, "he would playaway the friendship and good
will of the Turkish Sultan, and that, inJohn's estimation, would be neither
useful nor safe." [278]
Since Ferdinand insisted on receiving Buda, the negotiationsbroke down, and
both sides resorted to arms once again. It wasknown in Buda and Constantinople
already in the summer of 1536that Ferdinand was making intensive preparations
for war. It ispossible that this was what prompted John to undertake
preventivewarfare: in December 1536, with a carefully prepared expedition,
hetook Kassa by surprise. The significance of this successful undertaking was
considerable from both a military and a political perspectivesince a
strategically important place fell into John's hands whilecausing division in
the ranks of the counties of northern Hungarywhich until then had backed
Ferdinand.
The unfavorable international conjuncture and the loss of Kassadid not prompt
Ferdinand to reconsider. He persisted in his conviction that he could persuade
John to resign, by force of arms ifnecessary. He began by preparing the ground
diplomatically; thetotal failure of his endeavors alone should have sufficed to
make himreassess his situation. A letter to Brodarics, written from
Rome,reveals the Vatican's position: "Poor Hungary will perish if she is
notcured by peace; under no circumstance would the Turk tolerate thatthe
country be placed under the rule of the King of the Romans." [279]
The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541