The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Timing and Planning

The time frame for the operations of major Ottoman forces againstHungary was defined by two dates: the army reached Belgrade onthe end of June or early July and had to head back in order to reachits garrisons before winter by October 26th, Kassim gunu, at thelatest. Hence, it had three and a half (maximum four) months toengage the Hungarian army in battle, take Buda, and starts back.

Apparently, the Hungarian command was well aware of theseconstraints, for it ordered the troops to assemble at Tolna on July 2,and mercenaries were hired for three months. [348] Yet, the governmentwas unable to take advantage of these few months for a number ofreasons. As with any feudal army, the "feudal" system of mobilization was cumbersome, uncertain, and slow; the serious shortage offunds in 1526 delayed hiring mercenaries. Furthermore, the Hungarian government found out the main thrust of the attack onlyquite late. Until then it was uncertain whether parts of the Ottomanmight not move against Transylvania or Croatia.

The Hungarian military leaders were also at a disadvantagewhen it came to a decisive battle against the sultan's army. TheHungarian commanders had to await the Transylvanian and Croatian force, and the arrival of the foreign mercenaries in order toconcentrate the largest possible force for the battle (see Map No. 2,above). Because of this inevitable time lag the Hungarians had toavoid battle and gain time. But battles, in general, can only beavoided by retreat, and in this case retreat entailed giving up thesouthern regions of the country. If the Hungarian command wasunwilling to make this sacrifice it had to wage battle, even if itsforces were inferior. Hence the time factor did not favor the Hungarians either.

In summary then, no matter which factor we consider, the Hungarians, chances of victory were extremely slim.

From the actual events, it is relatively easy to reconstruct theplans of the Ottoman high command: advance with their main forcesalong the right bank of the Danube while taking the fortressesendangering the lines of supply (Titel, Petervarad, and Ujlak); thencross the Drava at Eszek, seek out the Hungarian forces, defeatthem in a decisive battle, and capture Buda.

It is not so easy to conjecture the plans of the Hungarian leadersfrom the contradictory data in the unprofessional descriptions of Burgio and Brodarics. The reconstruction is further hindered by theobvious disagreements between the royal court, Tomori, Szapolyai,and other commanders, particularly in regard to the time and placeof open battle. It seems that the king and his entourage would havepreferred a delay in time and space, whereas the magnates and thenobles of the southern regions would not hear of it. Finally, theyopted for fighting the decisive battle as far south as possible, evenwithout the troops from Transylvania and Croatia. It seems theplain of Mohacs was the site selected from the start. [349]

The sources are very explicit on this issue: Tolna was intendedmerely as a point of assembly. [350] On June 24 Louis II wrote that thearmy was going to assemble at Tolna, and "from there we willadvance with all our forces and with foreign auxiliaries to whereverwe are needed." In a July 24th letter the king's aim was "Tolna andthe southern region", and in one of July 31^st "Tolna and beyond." [351]

We have no idea how military decisions were reached at court. Weknow that the session of the diet which opened on April 24 instructedthe king to form a war council "composed of men with militaryexperience", but we have no information about its membership orhow this council actually functioned. [352] It could not direct the eventsvery actively, partly because the mobilization process and themarching of troops into assembly areas were in the hands of thebanderial commanders and the captains of the counties, and partlybecause until it could be determined where the Ottomans wouldattack, it did not have the Croatian and Transylvanian forces at itsdisposal, nor could it give them instructions on account of thedistances involved. Coordination between Tomori and the militarycouncil was fairly close, although it would appear that it was notalways smooth, since several times Tomori offered to resign.

Plans for an Advance into the Balkans

A plan according to which Szapolyai was to attack Ottomanterritories, along with the voivode of Wallachia, was typical of thetimes. (Tomori knew nothing about this plan, and it is possible thatsome of the military councilors did not know about it either.)

Brodarics gives the following account of it:

Someone familiar with the plans of the enemy and the state of hisaffairs informed the king, via a secret emissary, that it would be mostadvisable if the voivode of Transylvania and the voivode of Wallachiafor it seemed that in this instance the king could count also on hisloyalty would either attack the unsuspecting enemy in the back or,while the enemy was heading straight towards the king, the two wouldunite their forces and break into Thrace, which had been deprived of allits garrisons. Thus they could defeat the enemy by placing him undercrossfire or by compelling him to turn back and hurry to defend his ownempire. Because of reasons too elaborate to list, this advice provedsuspect from the start but later the king told the archbishop of Esztergom about it. When the latter expressed his approval the king sent amessage by Orban Batthyany, who was on his way to Moldavia, ordering the voivode of Transylvania to give the matter most serious consideration and act as he deemed best for the country; and, should heapprove of the plan, to lead his own and all of Transylvania s troops,along with the voivode of Wallachia, to the said area. [353]

When Szapolyai became king, Ferdinand and his party did theirbest to destroy his credit and prestige with the slander that he haddeliberately stayed away from the battle of Mohacs. A letter of KingJohn, sent to Pope Innocent VIII, was found not long ago. In thisSzapolyai defends himself against the false charges and describesmatters pretty much in agreement with Brodarics, adding only thatthe certain "somebody" who suggested the plan was none other thanthe voivode of Wallachia. According to him the king, the queen,Thurzo, Szalkai and Brodarics all knew about the plan. [354] FromIstvanffy's presentation, however, it would appear that the membersof the military council were also informed. He writes:

This plan, which came too late, and was not very promising anyhow,was completely condemned by several who were familiar with theTurkish way of waging war; for they did not believe that once the enemycrossed the Danube and the Sava to reach the interior of Hungary itcould be forced to retreat, no matter how great the danger threateningits own people.

Istvanffy also adds that even before the mission of Orban Battyany, the king had ordered the venture via Gaspar Vingarti, and ina rather curious fashion:

He seriously ordered Szapolyai to come to him with his army in a hurry but--at someone s persuasion--he also ordered Szapolyai, in a letterdelivered secretly to cross the Danube and ravage Serbia and Bulgariawith fire and iron with his own troops and those of voivode Radul ofWallachia . . ." [355]

Brodarics was also aware of the Vingarti mission, but says nothing about the orders delivered in secret. He probably knew nothingabout that, nor did those who opposed the plan so strenuously.

We do not know just when Vingarti was dispatched by the king.We do know that Orban Batthyany was sent from Buda to thearchbishop of Esztergom on July 18, "with a certain secret mission." [356] It is likely that he was to discuss this enterprise withArchbishop Szalkai. On June 25 it was Szapolyai's emissary, JanosSzalanczy, who arrived in Buda on some "secret", mission. [357] If thismission was indeed the proposal or the reply to the proposal the kinghad sent via Vingarti, then he must have left at least three weeksearlier, given the distance of 500-600 km between Buda and Kolozsvar or Gyulafehervar.

On the other hand, Burgio writes on June 18 that the emissariesof the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia arrived in Buda, and hebelieves he knows just why. The voivode of Moldavia sent a messagethat he had received orders from the sultan to attack Poland, together with Tartars, who were already assembling, but he refused toparticipate in such a venture, preferring to cooperate with the Poles.The voivode of Wallachia supposedly sent a message to the effectthat part of the Ottoman army was assembling at Nicopolis to attackTransylvania through Wallachia, and thus he could not providehelp. [358]

There are many obscure points here. It is unlikely that Suleymanintended to launch a war against the king of Poland, with whom hehad just recently signed peace, precisely to prevent him from comingto the assistance of Louis II. The report of the voivode of Wallachiamust also be taken with a grain of salt. For, as we shall see, all theimportant components of the Ottoman army were advancing towards Belgrade, while none of the Turkish sources mentions troopsdispatched to Nicopolis. The voivode probably sent his emissary inthe last week of May by which time the whole of the Ottoman armywas negotiating the difficult passes across the Balkan mountains; it is almost inconceivable that the reconnaissance of the voivode ofWallachia would have reported that significant units were assembling at Nicopolis. So either Burgio was mistaken or--as is morelikely--the two Romanian voivodes were bent on misleading theking of Hungary. This is all the more likely as we know fromOttoman sources that the emissary of the voivode of Moldavia hadsought out the sultan in Adrianople at the beginning of May, bringing tribute, whereas the emissary of the voivode of Wallachia metthe sultan in Sofia on May 30. It is possible, and even probable, thatthis was the time Radul of Wallachia had to leave his son as hostagewith the Ottomans.

A few days ("a little while"--in the words of Brodarics) before theking's departure from Buda, he sent Istvan Bathory to Szapolyaiwith the message "that he should set aside all other designs, as theapproach of the enemy warrants that he hasten to the king with allTransylvanian forces." This must have taken place around July 20.[359]Szapolyai, disoriented by the contradictory orders, dispatchedGyorgy Bacsy to the king. Bacsy was able to reach the king in thelast days of July at Pentele. Brodarics gives the following account:

Here [at Pentele] was where Gyorgy Bacsy reached us with the message from the voivode of Transylvania. The content of the message was the voivode was at a loss about what action to take, since he had received so many different orders in the past few days; first he received some letters from the king, then came several emissaries--including GasparVingarti Horvath, the royal steward--with the order that he should report to the king. Then came Orban Batthyany, who communicated acertain plan about attacking the enemy in the back with the help of thevoivode of Wallachia; finally came Istvan Bathori of Somlyo, who repeated the first order, without explicitly retracting the one the kinghad sent via Orban Batthyany. Thus he was at a loss to understand what to do amidst all these changes of plans, and which of these manyorders to carry out; he was prepared to do anything his royal majesty should command, yet he felt the plan according to which he ought tojoin the king was the best. It was too late to attack the Turks in theback, and very dangerous at that, and by now would be most difficult to carry out even if it were useful, because the voivode of Wallachia, with whom he was supposed to collaborate, had been forced to send his only son into the Turkish camp as a pledge of security.

Thereupon the king reportedly ordered Bacsy that he should hurry to the voivode, riding day and night as fast as he could, and let him know that the king approves of the voivodes plan, which now, as the enemy has already crossed the borders of the country, is best. Setting aside all other concerns and plans the voivode shouldhurry to the king with all the Transylvanian troops and other troops hemay encounter on the way towards the camp of the king. Let him bringanyone he can find into the camp of the king, not only nobles andknights, but peasants as well. [360]

According to Szapolyai's report, he had previously, on severaloccasions, proposed to the king that he be allowed to join the army ofthe king, since Transylvania was not in danger. The aforementionedJanos Szalanczy must have brought just such a message. "Severalweeks had passed", wrote Szapolyai (King John by then), with thesedebates, and this was the reason he missed the battle of Mohacs.Brodarics confirms this interpretation: "It was mainly this affairthat stopped the voivode from joining the fight on time." [361] We shallsee that this was not necessarily the case: Szapolyai could haveparticipated in the decisive battle, but only if it took place muchfurther north than Mohacs.

All this, let us admit, causes shivers: the court had such a hopelessview of the country's predicament--and it was not alone in thisrespect--that an impossible plan, which should have been dismissedas fantastic, seemed an acceptable way out. What was even moreserious, the indecisive, hesitant young king, discarding the opinionof the experts, decided in favor of a plan without informing thecompetent authorities about it, on the advice of a very narrow cliquewho were all dilettantes in military matters: it is not surprising that,the lesser nobility, used to war, was most distrustful of the court.Whoever has served in time of war knows that there is nothing morediscouraging and more upsetting for the soldier on the line than thefeeling of being sent to the slaughterhouse by incompetent leaders.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541