The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

CHAPTER VIII
THE HUNGARIAN BATTLE PLAN AND THEDEPLOYMENT OF THE OTTOMAN FORCES

It is no longer possible to insist on what had become practically anaxiom of Hungarian interpretations, namely that the Hungarianswent into battle without any plan or foresight. In my opinion Tomoriand his companions had a brilliant idea; indeed, they played uponthe only chance of obtaining a victory or a tie. Of course, the chancesfor such an outcome still remained small, but it was to their credit asmilitary experts that they recognized the opportunity.

To reconstruct the Hungarian battle plan one must start from thepremise that whatever side is compelled to remain on the defensivebecause of its relative weakness may improve its chances by choosingthe right terrain; in other words, the weaker side must meet the foeat the spot where the latter's attack would run into the greatestdifficulties. This principle points to the first task: to become acquainted with the battlefield of Mohacs and the area where theOttomans had to deploy for battle.

The Battlefield at Mohacs

According to the geologists the battlefield of Mohacs "belongs tothe end of the neo-pleistocene era...it came into being as part of theflood era of the Danube--a formation covered with deposits of sand,loess, and silt." [440] On its eastern edge the field is bordered by the floodregion of the Danube which, at the level of Satorhely (Foldvar?)stretched all the way to the postal road; on its western and southernside it is bordered by a plateau 25 to 30 meters high. The Borzastream, which has its sources at the Nagynyarad and Majs, emptiesinto the lake of Dalyok; it has steep banks even though its course hasbeen regulated. Since it is likely that this was the case in 1526 aswell, the stream represented a significant obstacle to the movementof troops (see Map 7).

Brodarics describes the area to the south of the Borza stretching all the way to the plateau as a "large, wide plain." [441] This descriptioncan be accepted only with reservations. He himself adds that theresere valleys on the battlefield and that the field was uneven, asindeed it remains to this day. As geologists have emphasized: "Itslargely smooth, even surface is criss-crossed by relatively deep depressions and high ridges which must have resulted from the haphazard deposits carried by the flooding of the river [i.e., the Danube]." [442] In any case, Brodarics's description implies the unevennature of the terrain when he states: "We hurried forward over thestretches that were at times flat, at times uneven." [443] The differencein level between the densely alternating dips and ridges oftenamounts to 4 or 5 meters--that is, such dips might conceal entireunits. When Brodardics described the area as a "plain" he assessedthe terrain from the perspective of a civilian, neglecting factors suchas declivity, rise and dip, so decisive to a military expert.

Brodarics states that the battlefield was "interrupted neither byforests nor by streams." [444] This statement led Gyalokay to doubt thecorrectness of the description, arguing that he "forgot" about theBorza stream and made no mention of the forest at the foot of theterrace noted by another eyewitness and participant of the battle. [445]In this instance, however, we should take Brodarics's word. Heneglected to mention the Borza because, as we shall see, the Hungarian army lined up to the south of it; that is, the stream was notincluded in the area described. Gyalokay, referring to one of Burgio'sreports, asserts there was a forest on the battlefield. Burgio wrote,probably on the basis of eyewitness communication, that after theirsuccessful first attack the Hungarians chased the Turks all the wayto a forest. The Italian term for forest is selva, but Burgio used theLatin word silva, which means not only a forest but also a clump oftrees or bushes. Thus it is possible that what the eyewitness sawwere the orchards of the village of Foldvar within the area of thebattlefield, which indeed play an important role in our account.Moreover, Gyalokay argues that the census of 1669 also mentions aforest which was planted after Mohacs: "It is most unlikely", hewrites, "that the Turks would undertake forestation anywhere inHungary during their rule." Apart from the fact that it is alwaysproblematic to identify precisely areas mentioned in censuses, planting or forestation is certainly not a requisite for the evolution offorests. Where cultivation ceases--and this must have happenedafter the destruction of Foldvar--the forest soon grows over the areaof the settlement and cultivation. During our visits to the locationwe also noted that the forest or bush had invaded areas which werecovered with vinyards only 40-50 years ago.

What Brodarics notes about the moment of the initiation of thebattle has decisive importance for its reconstruction: there was a large wide plain interrupted by neither forests nor bush nor rivers or hills; only to the left, between here and the Danube, was a swampy area densely covered with reed and grass in which many were to meet their death. Facing us a long hill extended in a semi-circle [collis erat longum protensus, in theatri quodammoda formam], and the camp of the Turkish emperor was on the other side of it. A small village with a church lay at the bottom of the slope of the hill. The name of the village was Foldvar; here is where the enemy placed its artillery. Only later, towards the end of the battle, did we notice that this place was swarming with the troops known as janissaries, who completely filled the area even beyond the houses of the village.... The king...gave the signal for the attack. The sound of the trumpets and horns mixed with the battle cries of the soldiers.... At the same moment we saw a multitude of enemy soldiers descend slowly from the hill across. [446]

There can be no doubt about the authenticity of this descriptionsince Brodarics was recording the mood of a historical momentdeeply carved in his memory, However, the same cannot be said ofother parts of the same description, not recorded under the impact ofevents. For example the only toponymic information in his report,the place-name Foldvar, is by no means as reliable as the elementsof the preceding passage. Yet, regardless, whether the village wasindeed called Foldvar, four pieces of information are not to bedismissed: that there was a village across from the Hungarian army,at the bottom of the terrace; that the Ottoman artillery was placedthere; that at the moment of the attack a large number of enemysoldiers was descending the slope of the terrace ("slowly", whichleads one to assume that the slope was steep); and finally, that thesultan was staying with these troops.

The terrace demands special attention. It may be surmised that itwas steeper than in our own days, in which case it may have causedserious difficulties for the Ottoman troops. A description fromaround 1620 speaks of an ascent on "a path of difficult access." [447] Lufti writes that the Hungarians "had dug a ditch, one end of whichreached as far as a mountain [by which probably the Nyarad side ofthe terrace was meant, and the other the Danube." On two furtheroccasions he makes mention of some kind of trench which caused theOttoman high command a great deal of worry. [448] It is absolutelyimpossible that the Hungarians could have dug a ditch or trench ofa size to constitute a serious obstacle; it is more likely that the ditchLufti refers to was nothing but the bottom of the terrace. It ispossible that the Ottomans lowered themselves slowly, in spite ofurgency, because the terrace was steep and slippery as a result of theprotracted rains in the preceding days.

The preceding comments regarding the incline of the slope arebased on the description of Ottoman chronicles and on an examination of the map. Whelm we visited the location for the first time wewere disappointed to note that the slope was not as steep as we hadassumed. But could not 400 years of rain and wind have decreasedthe incline of the slope? Hence we found it necessary to include ageologist in the team, and he indeed affirmed that erosion could haveaffected the incline since the days of the battle, especially if the areahad been under cultivation. The geologist's conclusion was that thequestion could be definitely answered only on the basis of soilanalysis and of a knowledge of the cultivation history of the area.The first military survey of the area suggests that the terrace wascovered by fields or vineyards, as confirmed by the testimony of thelocals. Regarding the cultivation history, to quote geologist AndrasGalacz, "the erosion of the terrace is a process that can be observedeven today; if the terrace was also cultivated during the eighteenthcentury, the erosion might have been hastened." Therefore, he continues, the leveling of the slope of the terrace at Majs could havebeen intensive for only 2-250 years since 1526. But even during thisrelatively short period a morphological change may have occurred,especially if there was human intervention. [449] As for the soil, theresults of an analysis were not conclusive.

On the whole, our assumption regarding the terrace as an obstaclewas borne out; local experts told us that the slope is almost unmanageable in times of rain. There was, indeed, heavy rainfall in theweeks preceding the battle of Mohacs and on the eve of the battleitself. Hence the slope must have constituted a rather serious obstacle for the Ottoman troops.

Difficulties of the Ottoman Deployment

Once the Ottoman army had crossed the Drava and the swampyterrain on the northern side of the river at the cost of considerabledifficulties, they reached the swampy valley of the Karasso. Crossing it along the line Baranyavar-Baranyaban-Baranyakisfalud onAugust 28, it camped along a stretch of about 9 km. [450] According toZrinyi and other contemporary experts, the camp had to be this widesince the width of a camp composed of 25,000 soldiers was 1.5 kmand its depth 600 meters. The spread of the Ottoman camp, with astrength of 150,000 men must have been at least 9 km (see Mapsketch 8).

To fight the Hungarians the Ottoman army had to reach the fieldof Mohacs, within a day's march, on the day of the battle. Thedeployment of 150,000 soldiers for battle was no simple matter, andthe Hungarian commanders were well aware of the difficulties.Naturally they would select a battleground that would render thedeployment of the Ottoman army even more difficult. This spot wasprecisely the area in front of the terrace, on the "plain" of Mohacs.

Regarding the possibilities of the deployment of the Ottomanforces the Hungarian command could count on the following developments: The day before the battle the Ottoman forces would campon the northern bank of the Karasso and initiate their deploymentfrom there. The site could not be south of the Karasso because thenthe Ottoman army would have to negotiate the swamps along thestream on the day of the battle in order to begin its deployment. TheOttoman army could not proceed in marching formation to the fieldat Mohacs because the end of the column of march, which was120-130 km long, would then reach the scene of the battle only 4-5days later. Moreover, it was a basic military principle, as Tomori andcompanions well knew, that the attacker has to form his order ofbattle long before reaching the battlefield because it would be extremely dangerous to execute complex maneuvers in full view of theenemy, exposed to attacks. [451]

Furthermore, the right wing of the Ottoman army had to bendtowards the Eszek-Mohacs road, or else it might have found itselffacing the marshes of Dalyok. Therefore, the army had to movediagonally leftward and bend towards the right upon attaining theterrace, so that its front line would be aligned with the terrace itself.Also fields occupied a significant portion of the area of deployment ofthe Ottoman army, and it is not easy to advance on arable land. Thearea of deployment, which totalled about 57 km squared, included about adozen villages. According to our computations, the yearly requirement in grain of the inhabitants of these villages could be obtainedfrom about 5,000 cadastral hold, roughly half the area above. Thisimplies that only about half the area was devoted to cultivation. [452] Asa consequence of heavy rainfalls the soil was completely soaked.Thus Tomori and his companions must also have expected that theadvance would be rendered difficult by the mud. It is even possiblethat the water table was high as a consequence of the extensiverains, and the low-lying areas may have been covered with water.Djeladzade writes that when the Ottomans glanced down from theterrace "the waters of the Danube spread like a sea." It seems,therefore, that the area between Buziglica and Baranyakisfalud,87-89 meters above sea level, was under water. The Anatolian armyon the right wing was expected to deploy precisely in this area.

Finally, there were no maps in this period to make it possible toevaluate the terrain; thus familiarity with the terrain was a mostimportant consideration in the selection of a battlefield. Tomori andcompanions could count on the fact that the Ottoman leadership wasnot familiar with the details of the terrain. Since during the threedays preceding the battle the Hungarian light cavalry was continually fighting against the Ottoman reconnaissance we may conclude that they intended to prevent the Ottoman leaders from obtainingsuch information.

All these factors taken together, it could be expected that twosurprises would await the Ottoman command during deployment.One of these was that the army could deploy for battle only along the6-7 km segment between Majs and Buziglica. If we consider merelythe 120,000 cavalry, then, allowing 1.5 meters per horseman anddeployment of ten ranks deep, the front would still have to be 15 km,far longer than the distance available. All this would become clearonly after the army reached the terrace; hence the order of battlewould have to be altered at the last moment: the Ottoman commanders would have to increase the depth of the units in order to squeezethis enormous mass into this narrow segment. Such rearrangementof the order of battle would require considerable time. The othersurprise provided by the terrain, as Tomori and companions werewont to know, would be the terrace itself. It was impossible toprepare for an onslaught on its wet, slippery slopes, and even ameasured descent would prove difficult.

Such were the difficulties affecting the deployment of the Ottoman forces which could be foreseen by the Hungarian command. Wemust point out that the recognition of these factors required nogenius, merely common sense and expertise. Consequently, Tomoriand companions could assume that the Ottomans would not reachthe field at Mohacs all at the same time or in the best of physicalconditions; they may have counted on defeating the components ofthe army one by one, thus neutralizing the advantage of superiorforce. I will argue that they based their battle plan on this insight.

The Deployment of the Hungarian Army

The description by Brodarics quoted above provides the groundwork for our reconstruction of the deployment. But first a briefhistoriographical sketch seems in order here. At the turn of thecentury it was generally believed that "Foldvar" was located at ornear the present-day hamlet of Satorhely. [453] Thus it was quite natural to place the Ottoman army in this spot and the Hungarians to thenorth, roughly at the level of Kolked. The only thing the historiansneglected to consider was that the "line of hills akin to an amphitheater", which undoubtedly refers to the terrace of Majs and Buziglica, cannot be seen from this location, since the distance is around10 km (see Map 9/a).

In 1926, on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of. the battle.Jeno Gyalokay and Barna Halmay arrived at the conviction thatFoldvar, or the village so-named by Brodarics, was not at Satorhely,but at the foot of the terrace. [454] Accordingly, they argued that theOttoman army was in front of the terrace and the Hungarian armynorth of the Borza, about 1-1.5 km from Satorhely, roughly at thelevel of Torokdomb. However, this conclusion is unacceptable because the Hungarian army would have been about 5 km fromthe terrace and from Foldvar: no human eye could have seen theOttomans from such a distance, on hills which appear as a faint bluestreak on the horizon; nor could the Ottomans have seen the Hungarians although we know, from the Ottoman sources, that they hada clear view of the Hungarian army once they reached the terrace. [455]Moreover, the fact that the Hungarian infantry, though it did notapproach the Ottomans at the same time as the cavalry, nevertheless arrived there not much later, also disproves Gyalokay's assumption: infantry, particularly when advancing in battle order, cannotcover 5 km in less than 1-1.5 hours. Nor can we disregard the factthat, as mentioned, Brodarics does not refer to the Borza; hence thestream must have been in the rear of the army. More recently, LajosBende, departing radically from the interpretation of Gyalokay andHalmay, has located the Hungarian host south of the Borza, at thelevel of the village of Udvar, at 2-2.5 km from the terrace. In myopinion, he is right. [456]

There has been similar disagreement among scholars regardingthe Hungarian order of battle. According to older interpretations,the Hungarians lined up in two echelons, with the first echelondivided into three segments: a right wing, a center, and a left wing.Gyalokay came to the conclusion that the first echelon was dividedinto only two parts on the basis of the fact that Brodarics does notmention a center and names only the commanders of the two wings:Batthyany and Perenyi. [457] It seems, however, that Gyalokay wasmisled by his literal interpretation of Brodarics and overlooked thatthe author was a neophyte in military matters and perhaps unawareof the implications of this or that order of battle. In any case, it is striking that Brodarics's interpretation hinges on personalities rather than facts. He was interested primarily in the grandees, mentions only their names in describing the order of battle, and completely omits the names of mercenary commanders. His presentation refers to the infantry only three times and says nothing aboutits role in the battle, whereas we know that they bore the brunt of itin the second half. His presentation is inconsistent: he asserts thatthere "was some infantry" in the second echelon, but neglects tomention what happened to all the rest, 10-12,000 of them. [458]

Gyalokay's reconstruction, relying on information from Brodarics,does not stand up against scrutiny; it becomes even more questionable given certain theoretical considerations and certain specificdata. To begin with, the tripartite division of the order of battle is theclassical solution; it is not safe for the wings to execute encirclementwithout a center, nor is it safe to break through with the centerwithout cover on the flanks. Furthermore, according to Gyalokay theinfantry was distributed among the cavalry; undoubtedly it wascustomary, particularly in the seventeenth century, to assignsmaller infantry units to the cavalry and vice versa; yet bodies madeup exclusively of infantry or cavalry were always retained, for bydiluting cavalry or infantry the commanders would have sacrificedthe advantages of the shock power of both branches and the firepower of the infantry. The force of the shock attack of the Hungarianarmored cavalry of the time was quite considerable. Tomori andcompanions based their battle plan precisely on this asset. It wouldhave been inconsistent to slow down the swoop of the cavalry bystationing infantry in their midst. All in al], the sources confirm thefollowing assumptions. First: the Hungarian army was divided intothree parts. This is confirmed by Lufti and Ferdi. [459] The right wingattacked the Rumelian army, the center attacked the army of thesultan, and the left wing tackled the Anatolian army. Moreover,Lufti writes: "ten thousand musketeers were positioned in front ofthe king and the bans", [460] (which is not quite true because there werearchers among the infantry), confirming the presence of largemasses of infantry in the first echelon. Second: at the end of thebattle only the infantry stood and fought in closed ranks against theOttoman janissaries and artillery in the center.

Having thus determined the probable area of deployment of the Hungarian army and the threefold division of the first echelon, theorientation and extent of the Hungarian frontline remains to beascertained. Since it could be assumed that the Ottoman forceswould adjust themselves to the terrace, the Hungarian army had toline up parallel to it on the field of Mohacs, facing southwest.

In determining the breadth of the frontline we may start from thefollowing assumptions. Just like the right wing of the Ottomans, theleft wing of the Hungarians could not spread much beyond theMohacs-Eszek road to the east because then it would find theswamps in its rear. Since there is no doubt that the Hungarian rightwing was the one that clashed with the Rumelian army on theOttoman left, both must have stood in the area between Majs andFoldvar. Thus the spread of the Hungarian army must have beenabout 4 km. This was rather a long stretch, considering the numberof effectives; but we know from Brodarics that the Hungarian commanders-in-chief strove to "spread as wide as it was at all possible"to lessen the danger of encirclement [461] (see Map 9/a).

We also know from Brodarics that the second echelon stood in five"ranks', and that the king took his position in the fourth. Its deployment was perforce narrower than that of the first echelon and can beestimated from the number of troops that could be mustered by thepersonalities involved, listed by Brodarics. They could not haveconstituted more than one-seventh or one-eighth of the personnel ofthe first echelon; hence it may be more correct to use the term"reserves" rather than "echelon." These reserves were formed by thebulk of the knights in heavy armor, the wings defended by the lightcavalry and infantry units.

While it is difficult to accept Brodarics, communication regardingthe strength of the Hungarian army, w-e must rely on him to avoidthe danger of pure guesswork. If we assume that there were 25,000effectives and, furthermore, that the infantry numbering 10,000stood as a solid mass at the center, then the order of battle was asfollows; if the infantry stood ten ranks deep, the center must havespread about 1 km; half of the 3 km of front line remained for theright wing under Batthyany, and half for the left (the cavalry) underPerenyi. Six thousand cavalrymen, arranged in six ranks, wereplaced along a 1.5 km long front. Even if the effectives exceeded25,000, which is most likely, the spread of the army could not havebeen over 4 km; rather, the commanders may have increased thedepth by arranging the cavalry in ten rather than six ranks.

Even if only this part of this reconstruction is correct that thespread of the second echelon was much less than that of the first itis clear that the Hungarian high command was not counting on anextended battle and did not intend to await idly the onslaught of theOttomans. In the assumed order of battle the army had no chance ofresisting, and a defeat on either wing would have immediatelyentailed a complete collapse because of the narrowness of the secondechelon. On the other hand, the order of battle was most appropriatefor a desperate tout-va rush--to rush the enemy's opposite wing byboth wings, then bend towards the center of the enemy formationand attack it simultaneously with the Hungarian center and thesecond echelon.

As regards the artillery, we cannot accept Brodarics's communication that it stood behind the first echelon. [462] On the one hand, itwould have been unheard of to place the artillery, which can fire onlya flat trajectory, behind your own troops. That could have had butone of two consequences: either the artillery refrained from firingwhen the attack was launched, or, if it did not, it would fire straightinto those in front of it. But we know from Brodarics, as confirmed byOttoman sources, that the moment the attack was launched theartillery began to fire. Thus the artillery could only have been placedwithin the first echelon, presumably distributed along the entirefront. Istvanffy may have doubted Brodarics's description, for hewrites: "The medium range horse artillery, numbering about eightypieces, was placed appropriately between the first and second lines,although some believed that they should be placed immediately infront of the lines, so that they may be fired before it should come tohand-to-hand combat." [463] However, we do not know where Istvanffygot the idea that there was a debate regarding the place of theartillery. As for the commanders-in-chief, we know from Brodarics thatTomori and Gyorgy Szapolyai were with the front echelon, "but theirpositions were not defined, so that they could move to where mostneeded." [464] Finally, Brodarics's statement that the council of warseriously considered surrounding the army with carts and fightingagainst the Turks under their protection needs to be refuted. [465] In alllikelihood Brodarics misunderstood something, for nobody could have seriously considered such a maneuver. The extensive artillerycontingent of the Ottomans would have blasted the camp of cartsapart in no time. Furthermore, enclosing oneself into such an encampment would have deprived the Hungarian army of its mainasset: the armed cavalry assault. We know from Istvanffy that theproposal concerned merely protecting the two wings with a row ofcarts. [466]

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541